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PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON SPACE SHUTTLE CHALLENGER
ACCIDENT--THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 6, 1986
National Academy of Sciences
Auditoriuw
2100 Constitution Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
The President;al Commission met, pursuant to Presidential Executive Order, at 9:50 o'clock
a.m.
PRESENT:
WILLIAM P. ROGERS, Chairman
NEIL A. ARMSTRONG
DR: SALLY RIDE
DR. ALBERT WHEELON
ROBERT RUMMEL
DR. ARTHUR WALKER
RICHARD FEYNMAN
ROBERT HOTZ
DAVID C. ACHESON
MAJOR GENERAL DONALD KUTYNA
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PROCEEI)INGS
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Ladies and gentlemen, I now would like to call this first meeting of
the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident to order.
I want to make just a couple of preliminary remarks. As you know, this Commission was
appointed by the President on Monday, and because of the time frame within which we are
working, we wanted to start as expeditiously as possible, and the members of the Commission
have been very accommodating and agreed to come to Washington yesterday.
We had a preliminary get-together to discuss our plans and where we were to go based upon
the Executive Order, and we have, with the cooperation of NASA and the White House and
other: officials, been able to at up this meeting for this morning. The purpose of the meeting
th_ morning is to be brought up to date on the events that have occurred since the accident,
principally by officials from NASA. They have been very cooperative and have been working
close_ with us, and we are obviously going to rely in large part on the investigations that they
have conducted and will conduct in the future.
On the other hand, .as we said when the
Presidep, t announced the appointment of the Commission. we have our own responsibilities. We
can _k other evidence, get any other information we may desire, and the NASA officials have
been, as I say, very cooperative in that res._t.
I would like to, by way of a beginning, refer to the Executive Order that created the Com-
mission because we want to stick very closely to the instructions that we received from the
President, and I will just read briefly the important part of that Executive Ord Jr.
It :says "The Commission shall investigate the accident of the Space Shuttle Challenger
which occurred on Ja.uuary 28, 1986, and the Commission shall:
"(1) Review the circumstances surrounding the accident to establish the probable cause or
causes of the accident; and
"(2) Develop recommendations for corrective or other action based upon the Commission's
findings and determinations.
"The Commission shall submit its final report to the President and to the Administrator of
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration within 120 days of the date of this Order."
So our fi_t task, it seems to me, and I think
other members of the Commission, is to deal with, one, review the circumstances surrounding
the accident to establish the probable cause or causes of the accident.
Now, with that opening statement, keeping in rnincl that is our purpose this morning, to be
brought up to date on the events that have occurr_ since the accident, we will call on NASA
officials, and I guess the first witness is Dr. Graham, if the doctor will proceed to the podium.
Doctor, I will ask the Clerk to swear you in.
THE CLERK: Do you swear the testimony yeu are about to give before this Commission will
be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
DR. GRAHAM: ! do.
TESTIMONY OF DR. WILLIAM R. GRAHAM, ACTING ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL
AERONAUTICAL AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
DR. GRAHAM: Mr. Chairman, members of the President's Commission oH the Space Shut-
tle Challenger Accident, NASA welcomes your role in considering _,nd ro:dewing the facts and
circumstances surrounding the accident of the Space Shuttle Challel_ger.
NASA continues to analyze the system design and data and, as we do, you can be certain
that NASA will provide you with itscomplete and totalcooperation.Along with the President, I
look forward to receiving your report and to the resumption of space fligl_twith our national
Space Shuttle System.
I would like to int_-oducenow Mr. Jesse Moore, who isNASA's Associate Administrator for
Space Fhght and also the Chairman of NASA's 51-L Data Design and Analysis Test Task Force.
He will condtlctthe briefing.
Thank you.
THE CLERK: Do you swear the testimony you will give before this Commission will be the
truth,the whole truth,and nothing but the truth,so help you God?
MR. MOORE: I do.
TESTIMONY OF JESSE W. MOORE, ASSOCIATE AD._.UNISTRAIOR FOR SPACF_ FLIGHT,
NATIONAL AERONAUTICAL AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION_ AND CHAIRMAN, 51-L
DATA DESIGN ANALYSIS TEST TASK FORCE
MR. MOORE: Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission, we are here today be_,e you to
discuss the Space Shuttle Challenger accident and to talk to you about where we stand today in
terms of our analysis that we have done so far as a result of that accident, and supporting me
here today are various members of the NASA centers involved, as well as members of the Astro-
naut Office down at the Johnson Space Center.
I would like t_ say that we tried, in preparing this document for you, to put it together to
give you a sequence of how NASA goes about getting ready for a flight, what some of the back-
ground associated with the Space Shuttle System is, and then, finally, tell you where we are
with respect to the overall investigation that we are currently working on right now.
We will have to apologize because we probably have some acronyms in our document here
that may be kind of difficult. Some of the charts that may come on the television screens may be
difficult to read, but we have
tried to put together the best set of information we could in the time available to do it.
I would like to now proceed with the agenda, please. 4J_,.t., _, i I
I plan to cover the overview, and then i would ask various members involved in the Space
Shuttle System to cover respective parts cf the Shuttle, and I will stai_ out by asking Arnold
Aldrich, who is the Manager of the National Space Transportation Program Office at the John-
son Space Center to talk about the orbiter system as well as to give you some background on the
Shuttle and overall performance, and then I will call upon Dr. Judson A. Lovingcnxl of the Mar-
shall Space Flight Cen_er to talk to you about the responsibilities of the systems that the Mar-
shall Shuttle Projects Office have, and then I will ask Robert Sieck of the Kennedy Space Center
to talk to you about the launch and landing 6perations at Kennedy.
I think what is also very important to this group is the design and development process that
NASA follows in acquiring hardware and software before we fly it, and we will tell you about
how we do that and the overall process, preparations with respect to that aspect.
Finally, we will close with our actual flight
preparation process: How do we get ready for a flight; who is involved in getting ready for a
flight, and to try to give you some background information about the overall flight process in-
volved in the Space Shuttle Program.
The next chart shows an organization chart showing how NASA is organized from the Ad-
ministrator level down to what we call the field center level, and I w_n't spend a lvt of time
goingintogreatdetail onthis, but I will tell youthat Dr. Grahamis the ActingAdministrator
o¢NASA.I report directly to Dr. Graham.I am the Associate Administrator for Soace Flight.
And then reporting to me institutionally are _bur NASA centers involved in not only tL=" Space
Shuttle program but a number of other programs in NASA Tile centers are the Lyndon B.
Johnson Center in Houston, Texas. They are aiso the ,John F. Kennedy Space Center in Florida,
the George C. Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama, and the National Space
Technology Labs in Mississippi. Im'r. -' *;_]
(Viewgraph.) IR,,r. 2 _ _f
MR. MOORE: The next chart, please will show a little bit more detail i,_ terms of how I
operate the Office of Space Flight. And in this chart I have four principal positions in my front
office: a Deputy
position; a Deputy Associate Administrator for Technical Matters; and a Deputy Associate Ad-
ministrator for Management. I have two staff functions, principal staff functions. One is looking
at STS program integration, looking and making sure all elements of the program are integrat-
ed from a standpoint of program, policy ard b_ldget. Then : have a number of what I call line
divisions that report to me that have various responsibilities which are listed on the chart, and I
will just quickly try to let you have a feeling for what those a_e.
The box on the far left shows my Customer Services and Business Planning Division. That
division principally interacts with the Shuttle customers to give them schcdule information and
planning infvrmation prior to our launches. Then I have a division called the STS, and here
STS--you will see that quite a bit_stands for the Space Transportation System, Orbiter Division
and Logistics Division. This division is responsible for the overall program aspects a,,,d policy
aspects of the Shuttle Orbiter System, and the logistics to support the Shuttle Orbiter System,
meaning all the hardware and the spares that we need to make sure the Shuttle flies.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: What does STS stand for
10
again?
MR. MOORE: I'm sorry, STS, you will hear that term quite a bit, stands for the Space
Transportation System, and that is another way we use of talkirig about Space Shuttle. It is the
Space Transpo_ation System. If you look at the Space Shuttle, you can see the Space Shuttle
here, and difibrent people look at it in different ways. And some say the Space Shuttle is the
orbiter only, but the Space Transportation System involves more than just the orbiter. It in-
volves the external tank, it involves the solid rocket boosters, and all the people, facilities that
we have to support it. And that is kind of what we call in broad terms the Space Transportation
System.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you.
MR. MOORE: In addition to our Orbiter Division we have a Propulsion Division, and this
principally is, from a program standpoint, a budget and policy standpoint, responsible for the
propulsive elements on the Shuttle, and those elements include the Shuttle main engines, of
which there are three, the external tank which provides the fuel for the main engines on the
Shuttle, and then the solid rocke_ boosters which provides the--a major part of the thrust
during the initial ascent phase of the launch.
11
And then I have an STS Operations Division. This is responsible for, again, program and
policy and budget related to how we operate the Shuttle in our launch operations down at the
KennedySpaceCenteraswellas in our flight operationsactivity that is involvedandbeingper-
formedat theJohnsonSpaceCenter.
Thereare other supportingdivisionson the right--Resources,AdvancedPrograms,and
SpaceFlight DevelopmentSystems.Thesearekind of suppo,'tiveto the overallSpaceTranspor-
tationSystem,andtheneachof_:hecenterslistedbelowhavevariousresponsibilities.
AndI think the nextchartwill kind of giveyoua feelfor theoverallmanagementresponsi-
bilities.
(Viewgraph,)i'_''t_.e (_)t
MR. MOORE: You can see the Office of Space F:ight kind of looked at from an overall man-
agement point of view and not so much from an institutional point of view. My office has respon-
siLility for policy, advocacy of the program, budget and resources, marketing, and. kind of ensur-
ing that the overall corporate structure is maintained, and then exter___.! relations interfacing
with the outside world as far as the overall Shuttle is concerned.
12
There is a Program Office at the Johnson Space Center called Level 2, and Arnold Aldrich,
whom you will be hearing from in just a minute, is the manager of this overall office. His job is
overall program management integration, which means making sure that the system all plays
together, that everything is ready from a systems standpoint from an overall performance, that
the hardware all matches and so forth. And then there is a customer service function down at
the Level 2 office as well to make sure the cargo integration and work in that area is also done
appropriately.
Then, reporting to the Level 2 program offices are various project elements at the four
NASA centers that I talke(_ to you about, and I will just quickly go through from left to right
the various projects and the responsibilities for these projects are the responsibilities of, on the
left, the Johnson Space Center has the responsibility for the Shuttle orbiter, for the orbiter cre',v
eoui, .nent, h. aning all the components and so forth necessary for the flight crew, and also the
Astronaut Offices at the Johnson Space Center, for Flight Operations, meaning at liftoff, the
flight of the Shutt!e, and its orbital operations and its landing operations are basically the re-
sponsibility of the Johnson Space Center, and to
13
actually do the payload integration, making sure that the hardware we fly in the Shuttle is
properly integrated into the cargo bay prior to our launch.
The Kennedy Space Center on the next box has the responsibility for ground support equio-
ment such as all the launch pads and all the launch facilities that are required to support the
launch of a Shuttle. They have responsibility for actually launching the Shuttle, the launch op-
erations complex at the Kennedy Center does the actual countdown and so forth prior to a
launch. And then they also do the hardware payload processing prior to installing, and they ac-
tually install the payload elements into the bay of a Shuttle.
At Marshall Space Flight Center they have the responsibility for the Shuttle main engines,
for the external tank, for the solid rocket booster, and for Spacelab, which is a cargo element
that flies inside of the Shuttle.
As far as the NSTL--again, NSTL is National Space Technology Laboratories--they basical-
ly provide us test facilities for testing the Shuttle main engines.
Next chart.
(Viewgraph.) I_''t. -' "-'1
MR. MOORE: The next chart I'm just going to quickly let you look at. I don't intend to brief
this
6
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in detail. What I have tried to do in this chart, you will see it discussed later by Mr. Aldrich.
What I have tried to do in this chart is to give you a more detailed vertical cut from the previ-
ous chart, and on the right of the chart some of the specific functions that are done by this
particular structure.
(Viewg'raph.) Im,f. 2 _i,]
MR. MOORE: Now, the next several charts will talk about the planned eveiution of the
Shuttle program, and this is a plan which encompasses the 1981 timeframe through the 1986
timeframe, and I wili try to show to you and to your Commission what flights have been done
and the kinds of things that have been done during that period of time on the various missions.
There was a phase in the program that initiated in the April 1981 tirneframe and ended in
late 1982 called the Orbital Flight Test Phase.
(Viewgraph.) [m,t. 2 _i71
MR. MOORE: During this phase we flew four Shuttle missions, STS missions, and as a part
of those flights, we flew instrumented pallets--a pallet is a cargo element that sits inside of the
cargo bay--to try to get some feel for how we could accommodate payloads in the Shuttle. We
flew the RMS, another acronym--and that stands for the Remote Manipulator System,
15
--and that is the Shuttle's arm which we now fly routinely on most flights. We did fly our DOD,
or Deoartment of Defense, payload on one of the early flights, and we began doing some experi-
mental flying on pharmaceuticals, doing some early experiments to see how those experiments
would react to zero gravity.
Beginning in STS 5, which occurred in late 1982----
(Viewgraph.) Im.l. e ,_s I
MR. MOORE: --we began what we called the early payload capability demonstration phase,
and we looked at and we did fly a large number of different kinds of payloads to give us a feel
for the capabilities of the Shuttle with respect to accommodating a number of different kinds of
payloads. COMSAT is short for communications satellites, and in addition to the communica-
tions satellites, we flew several upper stages during that period of time. One is the PAM, or
Payload Assist Module.
Let me pause. I think we put an acronym listing in the back of your book here, and we are
going tc try to make that as complete as we can because we in this business do an awful lot of
talking m acronyms, and I apologize for that, but there are a couple of sheets in the back of the
book with acronyms. We will
16
try to make that more complete as time goes on.
We al_o flew the IUS, the Inertial Upper Stage, and you should note that we had an Inertial
Upper Stage on this particular mission, 51-L, and I will come back to that point later. We also
flew Spacelabs, I talked about. We did an EVA, which is an extravehicular activity where a
crewperson would go outside of the Shuttle, and we also did an MMU flight, or a Manned Ma-
neuvering Unit flight, where we actually flew a powered system away from the Shuttle and re-
turned back to the Shuttle.
We did rendezvous on orbit, we did satellite repair, we did--on the Solar Array, and we also
did a refuelling demonstration on the program. Beyond that period of time we have entered into
what we call the Pay!oad Operational Phase where we have done satellite retrievals, where we
7
have flown some DOD, additional DOD, Department of Defense payloads, and we have also done
some salvage rescue operations in space with the rescue of the SYNCOM sateflite last year.
(Viewgraph._ [m.t. 2 _ _ _, mj
Ct{AIRMAN ROGERS: Up to that point, had the military, DOD, been involved in these pro-
grams?
17
MR. MOORE: The DOD has been involved in the Space Transportation System from the
outset. In fact, they are working the launch pad facilities and have the ,esponsibility now for the
launch pad system development and facility development out at the Vandenberg Air Force Base.
And the DOD plays a very strong role in the Shuttle program as far as working with NASA.
There is a lot of interaction back and forth between the Department of Defense and NASA. A
large contingent of the Department of Defense people are at the Johnson Space Center working
hand in hand with our people, and we have also flown several dedicated missions on the Shuttle
with the Department of Defense payloads on it.
So yes, the answer to your question is they are involved.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: ttas the role of the DOD changed at any point during this program?
MR. MOORE: Not in the recent past, sir. The role, in fact, it has gotten stronger. As time
has gone on, I would say the role of the DOD is getting stronger in terms of their planned utili-
zation of the Shuttle. We have plans in the latter part of this decade, the early part of the 1990s,
where the DOD would plan to use a full one-third of the Shuttle capabilitms.
So I would say the role is getting stronger,
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and their commitment to the Vandenberg Air Force Base launch system out there which will
give us polar orbit launch capability--we now can only launch from the Kennedy Space Center,
and basically achieve inclinations around 28-1/2 degrees to about 57 degrees latitude. The
launch facilities out on the west coast will now give us polar orbiting capability which the DOD
is working on that facility development
Now, in the system deployment phase, we are in the process of implementing our major ele-
ments of the system, and at the Kennedy Space Center we have been building Pad B, the
Launch Pad B. Up until this last launch we had been launching off of Pad A, and this 5I-L
mission was our first launch off of Pad B. We had also been putting in place our secood TDKS,
which is our Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System. That was a major cargo element on this
flight, and the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System is intended to allow us to communicate
almost continuously with satellites from the Shuttle to the ground as opposed to using a lot of
ground stations and so forth that we have been using up until this time.
We have also been planning to fly, and we have not flown it yet, a filament-wound case,
which is a graphite/epoxy case t_ replace the steel cases on the
19
solid rocket boosters. And if I could take a second, I will show you what these are.
These are the solid rocket boosters. These are steel cases here, and we have had a program
underway in development to replace the steel cases with a graphite/epoxy case called filament
wound case. The objective of doing that is to achieve more payload performance. We can get
about 5,000 pounds more payload into orbit by going to a composite structure versus steel, and
you will hear more about that later on.
The Vandenberg launch site I mentioned to you earlier, the improved engine life, or CEN-
TAUR, the improved engine life is on the Shuttle main engine. We have a concern in the pro-
8
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gram about lifetime associated with the Shuttle main engines, and we have been putting a lot of
effort into trying to get ourselves into a position f,_r improved lifetime. We are developing CEN-
TAUR G prime which is an upper ' stage that fits into the Shuttle bay, and it was planned or is
planned to be launched in--the first launch attempt was planned in the May timeframe of this
year, to launch two planetary missions.
(Viewgraph.i )_,t. 2 ,i-,, _ ,o I
MR. MOORE: We :_re also planning this year to launch the third Tracking and Data Relay
Satellite,
2O
again to give us the global coverage I talked about. Space Telescope is planned to be launched
this year, a scientific payload. We are building the mobile launch platform, MLP-3, and the
mobile platform is basically what our Shuttle System here rolls out to the launch pad on. You
have seen the large crawler with the big system t _at the Shuttle is anchored on at the launch
pad. That is called a mobile launch platform. We now have two of those in operation at the
Kennedy Space Center, and we have been in the process of developing a third one at the Kenne-
dy Space Center for operation sometime later this year.
CENTAUR G prime is another upper stage which is a derivative of the G prime system, and
it has a little lower performance capability, and it is being principally developed not only for
NASA missions but also for the Department of Defense missions. I should point out that CEN-
TAUR development program is a joint responsibility of NASA and the Department of Defense,
the Air Force in particular.
CSOC, the last one, is a Consolidated Space Operations Center which we are in the process
of planning with the Department of Defense. It is the responsibility of the Department of De-
fense to develop this capability, and it would take over and develop and
21
do some of the operations of the Shuttle from this particular capability in CSOC, and it is in the
Colorado area, and it is planned to be operational in tne early 1990s. So DOD would help us in
the operations.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Would you mind giving us a little more information about Pad B
and Pad A? You said Pad B was the first time you had used that?
MR. MOORE: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And were the differences between--I assume there are differences
between Pad A and Pad B?
Can the Commission--will the Commission be given some information about the differences?
MR. MOORE: Yes, sir. Pad A has been our primary launch platform in the Shuttle program
up until this flight, this flight being the 25th flight of the Space Shuttle. Pad B is adjacent to
Pad A by _me few miles, and it is in design approximately identical to Pad A, and this launch,
as I said, was the first launch attempt from Pad B.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: All before were from. d A?
MR. MOORE: Yes, sir.
Mr. Sieck, who will speak on the launch and landing operations at the Kenneay Space
Center, can give you some additional information about Pad B this
22
afternoon when he talks, and we will be happy to provide the Commission any additional data
that you so desire regarding the similarities and differences between Pad A and Pad B.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you very much.
MR.MOORE: The next several charts I won't spend a lot of time. I think they are mostly
for your background, Mr. Chairman and Commissior members.
(Viewgraph.) il_,., :, it!
MR. MOORE: These kind of plot as a f_mction of time--and I apologize again for the line at
the top. The chart did not come out v:,ry we_!. so you will have a hard time looking at the dates
on this. but this chart basically was from the first launch of the Space Shuttle in April 1981
through the 1982 timeframe where we flew the STS-4.
The next chart--
(Viewgraph.) i'_,'_ :" '_'l
MR. MOORE:-carries us into the latter part of 1983, and it shows the launches of STS-5
through STS-9, which is Spacelab. And there are a number of different kinds of payloads on
here. Most of these payload names are satellites, communications satellites or other attached
experiments like, for example, on STY: 7, Palap;l L-1 is an Indonesian satellite; SPAS-01 is
23
a German payload structure and so forth, so to give you a little feel for those particular cargo
elements.
DR. FEYNMAN: On the chart it says f_rst flight of OV-99. Is that the Challenger?
MR. MOORE: Yes, OV-99 is Challenger. Let me just give you the numbers. OV-102 is Orbit-
er Columbia. That was the first orbiter built and flown. OV-99 is the Shuttle Orbiter Challenger.
It is the second one delivered. OV-I03 is Discovery, and it was the third one built and delivered.
And OV-104 is Atlantis, and we just recently received that last year, as a matter of fact, and it
has had its inaugural flight last year.
There is an orbiter called Enterprise which was a structural test orb;t_er, and it has now
been turned over to the Air and Space Museum, and so we now have four fli_,ht-configured--had
four flight-configured orbiters until the tragic mishap with Challeuger.
Continuing on with the payload capabilities demonstr. *.i_n please.
(Viewgraph.) tmf 2, l:_I
MR. MOORE: Through 1984 and early '85 we flew STS-41-B, 41-C, 41-D, 41-G and 51-A, and
maybe I can spend a few seconds trying to give you a little bit of the sense of the nomenclature
of the 41's: A's, B's and
24
C's. And it is 41, the number four stands for the fiscal year of th_ flight. From October to Sep-
tember is the fiscal year so it is scheduled in that period of time. One stands for the launch area
we are using. One is the Kennedy Center Launch Area, and if we were launching out of Vanden-
berg that would be a two, and the As, Bs, Cs and Ds are kind of the sequences that we have
planned the missions, although as things have occurred we have had to move a mission over
another mission, and so you don't get exactly an alphabetized listing of the flights.
Mi_ MOORE: Our next chart here through the 1985 timeframe, and the early part of--well,
I guess the next chart we will show you through the 1985, we flew STS-51-C, which was a dedi-
cated Department of Defense mission, and we flew 51-D, 51-B, 51-G, F, and 51-I through the
latter part of the 1985 timeframe. And as a matter of fact, 51-I, for a point of reference, I believe_
was launched on November 27, in that timeframe, of 1985.
(Viewgraph.) [_,,t 2 _ J_j
MR, MOORE: In the next chart, the 61-A, 51-J was another DOD dedicated flight. 61-A was
a Spacelab flight. 61-B was, the payloads were the zommu-_cations
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satellites, and then the lost flight befbre 51-L that we flew w'_s ST_61-C, and we flew 'hat in
early January, and it also had communications satellites on it. ,_mong other cargo elements.
And then the flight that we are here to discuss, the 51-L mission, the Challenger incident,
was planned, was launched on the 28th of January. That kind of gives you, Mr. Chairman, an
early overview of some of the flight history and some of the very _op-level structure of how
NASA is organized, and what we have done in the Shuttle program to now.
If it pleases you, I would like to proceed with the 51-L mission summary and talk to you a
little bit about the events of the day during the launch, where we are in the investigati(,n work
that we have done to date, what teams we have formed, and where we plan to go fr)m here.
CHAIRMAN ROGEtKS: Mr. Moore, let's see if any Commission members have any questions.
DR. WALKER: I had one question. Why is 51-L after some of the sixties?
MR. MOORE: It was originally scheduled to be in an alphabetized sequence, but because of
some of the cargo changes and so forth, we moved that nomenclature into the next fiscal year,
and we just held the
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nomenclature. Once you develop your documentation for a flight, it is awfully difficult several
months before that time to go back and change all of your nomenclature. And so our principle is
to hold the nomenclature, even though it may appear out of sequence in terms of the chronology
of numbers and the alphabet.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: All 24 of these flights were without accident, or were there minor
accidents, and if so, how many?
MR. MOORE: The 24 flights to date have been without any major accident at all. We have a
category called anomalies during a flight, like we may lose a power element or we may have
something look anomalous on a flight, but no major accident. We have had a launch that has
shut down nn the launch pad, which is called a launch abort. The system is designed so that if
things are not right before the solid rocket boosters light of/', it will automatically go into a shut-
down sequence. We had an occurrence of that. We also had an occurrence of a main engine
which was shut down during ascent prior to reaching orbit, but we did reach orbit successfully,
and the system operated as it was supposed to operate.
There have been a number of electronic problems, like we have had some problems with
computers on board not functioning properly, and we have had some
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problems with fuel cells, but there have been no major accidents in the Space Shuttle program
to date up until this last flight.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Did you find that the performance improved with each launch or
remained about the same?
MR. MOORE: I think our performance in terms of the liftoff performance and in terms of
the orbital performance, we knew more about the envelope we were operating under, and we
have been pretty accurately staying in that. And so I would say the performance has not by
design drastically improved. I think we have been able to characterize the performance more as
a function of our launch experience as opposed to it improving as a function of time.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: i assume that you have rather complete records of each one of these
flights.
MR. MOORE: Yes, sir, we have. As you will hear during the day, Mr. Chairman, we do a
complete, thorough documentation of each flight, getting ready to each flight, and as the Com-
ll
missionsodesires,wewill bemorethanhappyto provideyouwit's,all of the informationyou
needin thoseareas
CHAIRMANROGERS:Anddo thosereportsshowwhetheroneflight seemedto be more
successfulthan
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another?
And I am directingmy comment--didyou find that the performancewasimprovedwith
eachflight or not?Wereyoumoreworriedin later flightsor ab,_uthe same,basedonexperi-
ence?
MR.MOORE:I don'tthink that wehaverelaxedat all in the program,andI don't think we
havebeenmoreworriedaboutthe performance.I think wehavegottenprobablymoreconfi-
denceasa functionof our overall_erformanceon thesethings,but someof theeventsthat we
talkedabout,like theengineshutdownon the launchpad,that certainly worried us about the
main engines because you need them to get to orbit, and we put together extensive review teams
to find out what we could do about the engines program, and we have done a lot of work on that,
and you will hear some more about the engine activities.
But as a function of time, I think our performance has been better characterized in terms of
understanding the Shuttle system from a total sy_:tem point of view is the way I would describe
it.
DR. WALKER: I have one other questi,_n.
When were the graphite/epo,',y casings to be phased into the program?
MR. MOORE: They are scheduled to be flown on
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the initial Vandenberg launch site flight, which is now targeted for the middle of the summer. It
is mid July at this point in time is the current plan. So we have not flown any elements of the
filament wound case, the graphite/epoxy cases up until this point in time.
DR. WALKER: Once you use them, was the plan to abandon the steel casings?
MR. MOORE: No, it is not. We have a major question that the program is looking at right
now. and we probably won't get any good data on that until later downstream, and our question,
among others that is on the table about the graphite/epoxy cases today, is can we reuse them?
You know, we currently reuse the steel cases. The Shuttle returns, it has its engines on the
back, the SRBs are returned. They have parachutes on them. We go back and retrieve the SRBs
and go through a refurbishment cycle on them to reuse them. For the graphite/epoxy cases, we
are doing some of our final testing at this point in time, and we are not sure whether or not we
can reuse those filament-wound cases after we fly them and they come back and impact the
ocean. We have not made a determination like that, so we are not planning to get out of the
steel case SRB business at this point in time. We have a lot cf
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additional work to go on the filament-wound cases.
MR. HOTZ: Mr. Moore, have you made any design changes in the steel casings of the SRBs
since the beginning of the program?
MR. MOORE: I think there have been some very minor design changes in the SRB, and I
think Mr. Judson Lovingood from the Marshall Space Flight Center will talk about that as he
comes up here this afternoon or later on this morning. He will give you a detailed rundown of
the chronolotw of the SRBs, the external tank and the main engines.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: How many times can you reuse the booster?
12
MR.MOORE:Wehavenot seta real highuselimit. Weprobably,I think--and Bill Luca_,
maybeyoucanhelpmeon this--20times,Mr. Commissioner, is the current plan for the reuse
of the steel cases on the SRBs.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: What is the largest number of uses?
MR. MOORE: I think the- largest--and again, I am recalling from memory--is about three
to four times. This particular flight, 51-L, as I recall, had maximum of two uses of any of the
components, possibly three, if my memory serves me correctly.
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MR. SUTTER: I have one short question. The flights are characterized, the first flights were
test flights to check the Shuttle system, and then the second phase was capabilities demo phase.
In the first flights which were labeled flight tests, was there a documentation of what was
trying to be accomplished, what instrumentation was required, and then after those flights, was
there a documentation of what the flights proved?
MR. MOORE: Yes, sir. We have very, very extensive documentation on all those flights,
what we learned from those flights and what were changed as we left from the orbital flight test
phase into the other phases of the program. We maintain very, very extensive records of all the
flights.
MR. SUYTER: And at the conclusion of those flights were the objectives pretty well
achieved?
MR. MOORE: In general, I would say the objectives of those flights were met. Each flight
data was analyzed in great detail and fed back in to the program designers tz_ look at what they
actually achieved versus what they expected. And again, we will be able--we will be happy to
make available to the Commission any data that the Commission so desires relative to any of
the flights up until now.
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Now, if I might, Mr. Chairman, I would like to move into the 51--L mission which is the
mission we are talking about, Challenger's tragic mission, and I would like to start out by giving
you a very brief look at what the cargo elements were on board.
(Viewgraph) I_,.t z . J,iI
33
MR. MOORE: I have talked about these,but let me talk to you again quickly. The largest
payload component on board, and I should point out that the shuttle cargo bay, you are going to
hear more about the dimensional characteristicsand performance characteristicsof the shuttle,
but I should point out that the shuttle cargo bay is15 feet in diameter and 60 feet long, to give
you some feel of the dimensionality of the cargo bay, and we have flown a maximum of eight
people in the shuttle up untilthis point in time.
On this flight,we had the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite.This was to be the second
Tracking and Dam Relay Satellitedeployed. There }_one on orbitnow, and itwas supported by
an InertialUpper Stage developed by the Air Fnrce and used by NASA for the deployment of
the satellitefrom low earth orbit where the shuttle takes you, up to the geosynchronous orbit
where the Tracking and Data Relay Satellitehas a requirement.
We also had on board a payload called Spartan-Halley. This was a structural element that
actually sat across the shuttle bay attached to the cargo bay and supported several science in-
struments to do some observations of Comet Halley. And then we had in the crew compartment
or the middeck area, we
13
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had the experiments associated with the l'eacher-in-Space Program.
We had an experiment called CHAMP. Comet Halley Active Monitoring Program, a fluid
dynamics experiment, some student experiments looking at different kinds of things from high
schooi students, The Radiation Monitoring Experiment, and a Phase Partitioning Experiment.
Most of those sat in the middeck area of the orbiter, and you will hear some more about
that particular area, and where the lockers are and so forth for putting those kinds of experi-
ments. They are fairly small experiments.
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MR. MOORE: The next chart shows the layout of the major elements of the cargo, and it
showed the TDRS-B/IUS sitting in the cargo bay, the Spartan-Halley on the impasse, the sup-
port structure. It also shows on there an acronym which I talked about before called the RMS,
which is the Remote Manipulator System. That is the arm on boal'd.
The arm was planned to be used on this flight to pick the Spartan system up, deploy it over-
board, leave it in orbit for a couple of days, rendezvous back with it, pick it up, and store it back
into the cargo
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bay and return back to the earth.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Jess, may I ask, how many remote manipulator arms do you have? Is
that the only one?
MR. MOORE: No, we have another arm, and also we have a program with the Canadians
for possibly refurbishing another one.
DR. W/a.I KER: Could you say a word about tbe IUS?
MR. MOORE: Yes. Tae IUS is a two-stage solid inertial upper stage. It is solid rockets, and
the TDRS in this case, I believe, is 5,000 or 6,000 pounds, and its purpose was basically to boost
it from low earth orbit, which was about 140 or 50 nautical miles up to its position in geostation-
ary orbit, which is about 22,000 miles. So it provides the propulsion to basically boost the Track-
ing and Data __elay Satellite up to its final orbital destination in geosynchronous orbit.
It is a two-stooge rocket system. The first stage burns, and then after it burns it separates,
and then it burns a s_ond stage, and at the end of the second stage burn the IUS second stage
separates from the TDRS and then the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite provides its own navi-
gation and its own orbital adjustments with its own propulsion system on board.
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MR. MOORE: The next chart gives you a quick summary of the STS 51-L mission profile.
This shows the liftoff. In the case of 51-L the liftoff occurred at 1_:38 a.m. on the 28th. We go
through what we call a High Q phase or a high dynamic pressure phase for the flight, and then
we go through planned SRB staging, and that SRB staging is about two minutes, and this 51-L
mission was planned ibr 128 seconds, and at that point in time we had planned to stage off the
SRBs, continue with the tank on the orbiter.
Remember, the tank provides the fuel to the shuttle main engines until we achieve our or-
bital destination some 150 or so miles into space. The tank stays with the orbiter or is planned
to stay with the orbiter on this flight for about 523 seconds, after which time it has essentially
depleted itself of its fuel. We shut the engines down, and some ten to eighteen seconds later we
then separate the external tank from the orbiter, and then we plan to go about our orbital pro-
file.
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That plansto giveyous6mekind of feelfor theprofile.Wehada six-plusdaymissionplan,
andwehadplannedto landat the KennedySpaceCenteronsix plusa fewhours,six daysplus
a fewhours,sothe
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day-by-daymissi_>nprofileisgivento you in your upper righthand portion of this vu-graph.
DR. RIDE: You might say something about the Max Q phase of the flight.
MR. MOORE: The Max Q is the maximum dynamic phase. We see that we planned in the
launch profile. We go through a thrott!ing down of the main engines during that period of time,
and ,re are concerned about loads on the orbiter, and so we throttle our main engines down, and
this particular flight had a nominal engine profile of flying at like 104 percent of rated power,
where we have flown a large, large part of our flights to this date.
We throttle down during that period of time to some lower percentage, and then after we
have gone through that phase of the flight, we will begin to throttle back up again and hold that
throttle setting until we get to geosynchronous orbit.
We are trying to minir_iz_e the loads on the total shuttle system during the time it is seeing
its maximum dynamic pressure.
DR. FEYNMAN: Was there any special extra heavy load on this particular flight higher
than other flights?
MR. MOORE: We do not think so, sir. In terms
38
of the prelaunch calculations, we get wind data prior to launch. We look at day of launch winds
even an hour or so right before launch and try to get wind profiles and any kind of loads like
that, and we have load indicators on the orbiter that are sensitive to different kinds of winds,
whether you are getting a tailwind or a sidewind, and all of our calculations during that day had
indicated that our loads condition was okay.
MR. HOTZ: Is there any change in the thrust of the solid rocket boosters when you are
throttling back the main engines?
MR. MOORE: No, sir. The way the liftoff works is the shuttle main engines come on at ap-
proximately six seconds prior to what we call liftoff. We bring those engines up to their near
nominal thrust level. We check those engines to make sure we have full redundancy on all the
engines.
We have redundant systems on the engines, and once that check is made, a signal is sent to
the solids to ignite the solids, and that happens about, as I said, about six to seven seconds after
you have ignited the main engines.
Once the solids are ignited, then it lifts off the launchpad, and the solids are designed to
provide stable thrusting during that period of time until they
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are separated, in this case 128 seconds after liftoff.
MR. HOTZ: They don't change during the entire burn?
MR. MOORE: They are not planned to be changed during the entire burn. Now, we do have
a thrust cone on the back of each of the solids, and there is a little gimbaling motion in case we
do get a little bit of loading effect.
We can change the gimbal on there to change the orientation of the thrust, but the planned
thrust of the solids is to b._'.,_ a matched pair of solids, a balanced thrust during the entire flight.
MR. HOTZ: Thank _ou. 15
MR.ACHESON:Mr. Moore,at ._omepoint in the presentationtodaywill webebriefedon
the test procedures, the preflight test procedures of all of the elements?
MR MOORE: Yes, s_..
MR. ACHESON: And the contractor test procedurcs?
MR. MOORE: Sir, our briefing under the shuttle systems, when we begin to talk about the
orbiter, we begin to talk about all of the propulsive elements of the shuttle system.
We will talk about the test procedures, the
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NASA people involved, the NASA structure involved, the contractors involved, and then we will
talk about our design approach, our certification approach, our testing approach.
We will also talk about the entire process that we use to get ready for a shuttle launch, and
how that is tiered up from flight hardware and flight software point of view until it comes up to
my level at NASA Headqua.vters. We will give you very, very much detail on that during the
course of the day.
(Viewgraph.) tR,', 2 ,I, 1
MR. MOORE: The next chart shows some specific mission data on STS 51-L, launch data on
51-L, January 28th, 1986. The orbiter is OV-9;t Challenger. And we had a planned liffoff time of
9:38. Now, we had a three-hour launch window, and for a lot of our flights we don't have the
luxury of a very long time to launch in terms of meeting payload requirements.
Some launch windows are like 50 minutes, and others are like an hour and a half or two
hours. This launch we had three hours to launch. The throttle setting on the main engines were
104 percent of rated power level, and we have flown many times at 104 percent, and the abort
thrust setting in case we had a problem going uphill was 104 percent as well. We keep
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the same engine thrust. The inclination of the orbit we had planned was 28.45 degrees, and we
had planned to achieve an orbital altitude of 153 and a ha!,f nautical miles circular.
DR. FEYNMAN: What is the inclination? What angle is that,?
MR. MOORE: It is basically the inclination of the orbit relative to the latitude of where we
are launching out of Kennedy, and it is the inclination relative to the--say, polar inclination.
You are at 90 degrees. You are basically going around the earth, over the poles of the earth, and
you cap allow the earth to spin.
You have got an inclined orbit here like the 28 and a half degrees, and so you are not get-
ting full coverage of the earth, so if you are plus or minus 28 and a half degrees latitude cover-
age in effect and your orbit is like a sine wave which walks across a still map if you were to plot
continuous maps of the orbit.
One of the considerations among others that we have to do in this program is to look at our
landing sites, not _,,aly for end-of-mission landing sites, which is a concern, but also abort once
around, which is a condition where something could happen during the powered flight phase of
the profile and not allow us to achieve
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a full stable orbit.
In that case, we could go once around the earth and come back. Edwards was a planned
landing if we had an abort of that nature. We look at weather alternates as well.
The Kennedy Space Center has inclement weather on a fairly high frequency--witness the
last launch prior to 51-L--in terms of clouds or in terms of rain, and we have very stringent
rules about what landing requirements are on the system, and so we have a weather alternate.
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Wealsohavea trans-Atlanticabortcapabilityin the eventwe losean engineduringa certain
phaseofthe flight.
Wehaverunwaysandpeopleandsystemsonstandbyin placesin Africa andalsoplacesin
Spainwherethe shuttlecouldland if sucha problemlike that occurred,and in this casefor
Mission5I-L we had runway availability in Dakar, Senegal, and also in Casablanca, Morocco.
Both of tbose runways were considered viable trans-Atlantic landing sites in the event we
had a problem, and we look at that on a real time basis during the preparations for launch and
during the actual launch count.
We also have what we call an RTLS. Let me say
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before I mention this there is a whole number of abort kinds of capabilities in the system. We
are not planning to go into great detail today on that, but we will be happy to provide you with
additional data on kind of the abort modes in the shuttle program.
We also have one other capability called RTLS. That stands for Return to Launch Site, and
that is in the event again during a certain phase of the projeetory if we have a problem, we can
return back to the Kennedy Space Center. After that particular problem has been noticed, and
after we have separated the solids, you can come back to the Kennedy Space Center and land
there.
So, a constraint for launch is that we have good weather at the shuttle landing strip at the
Kennedy Space Center for some 30 to 40 minutes after a launch to make sure that we have a
capability if that event occurred to land at the Kennedy Space Center.
DR. RIDE: It might be helpful to go into a little bit more of the things that you might do an
RTLS for or the constraints on an RTLS.
MR. MOORE: Arnie is planning to cover that, Sally, during his discussions today about
what an RTLS and what other abort modes might be, but that is a good point. We will do that.
44
Flight duration, as I mentioned, was six days.
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MR. MOORE: Now, I would like to tell you a little bit about launch date chronology leading
up to our launch on the 28th, and this will give you a feel, a very preliminary feel, about the
meetings that we have in terms of getting ready for a launch and who participates in "that, and I
am sure we will want to spend some more time on that as time goes on.
The first day we met at the Kennedy Space Center was oll January 25th. Prior to that time
there had been a number of meetings that a lot of the project people and even myself had par-
ticipated in, talking about are we ready to launch Challenger on the 25th, at that point in time,
or the 26th, I guess, was when that was scheduled, and we all agreed, so we all met at the Ken-
nedy Space Center on the 25th of January, anticipating a launch on Sunday, and that wa_ the
26th.
We have what we call an L-1 Day Review. Participants include myself, my senior managers,
and my NASA Center people, directors, the contractor senior people, where we sit around the
table and review the status of the system prior to launching. That meeting occc, rred at 11:00
a.m,, and the major outcome of that
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meeting was that we had a weather problem, potential weather problem, on Sunday.
We decided at that point in time to hold a meeting Saturday afternoon or !ate Saturday
evening, I should say, 9:30.
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Wemetagainwith essentiallythesametype of people there, although not as large, and at
that time we got our weather reports, and we decided the weather tbr the next day was no go.
We had no optimism for the weatherman that said the rain was going to stop, or we would have
an attempt to get off, and it takes an effort to get the team up, and so we decided to bet on the
weatherman's forecast, and decided not to launch that day.
Well, it turns out the early part of Sunday morning for about an hour was a reasonable
time. The frontal system had not reached Florida yet, and so we didn't win that call in terms of
the weather, but it was a no go on Saturday night.
DR. FEYNMAN: Would you explain why we are so sensitive to the weather?
MR. MOORE: Yes, there are several reasons. I mentioned the return to the landing site. We
need to have visibility if we get into a situation where we need to return to the landing site after
launch, and the
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pilots and the commanders need to be able to see the runway and so forth. So you need a ceiling
limitation on it.
We also need to maintain specifications on wind velocity so we don't exceed crosswinds.
Landing on a runway and getting too high of a crosswind may cause us to deviate off of the
runway and so forth, so we have a crosswind limit. During assent, assuaging a nominal flight, a
chief cencern is damage to tiles due to rain. We have had experience_ in ser_qng what the effects
of a brief shower can do in terms of the tiles. The tiles are thermal insulation blocks, vcry thick.
A lot of them are very thick on the bottom of the orbiter. But if you have a raindrop and you
are going at a very high velocity, it tends to erode the tiles, pock the tiles, and that causes us a
grave concern regarding the thermal protection.
In addition to that, you are worried about the turnaround time of the orbiters as well, be-
cause with the kind of tile damage that one could get in rain, you have an awful lot of work to
do to go back and replace tiles back on the system. So there are a number of concerns that
weather enters into, and it is a major factor in our assessment of whether or not we are ready
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to launch.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Moore, in that connection, I notice a press report that one of the
contractors said that they gave a warning of some sort about the cold weather. Could you deal
with that, please?
MR. MOORE: Yes. I am going to continue on with this chart, which will deal with that cold
weather question in a fair amount of detail, Mr. Chairman.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Fine.
MR. MOORE: Since we decided not to attempt the launch on the 26th, we called a meeting
on the 26th itself at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, again an MMT meeting or Mission Manage-
ment Team meeting, to sit down and see what the weather situation was projected to be, plus
the status of our launch systems, including the launch pad and the shuttle system.
We decided afar reviewing everything that launch was a confirmed go for Monday, the
27th, and that we confirmed that we were ready to attempt to launch on 9:37 a.m. on Monday,
January 27th. Well, on Monday, January 27th, we did in fact get ready for the launch, and that
involves making sure all of the systems have been checked out, the launch system is up, and
making sure you have fueled up the external tank, which we do
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about seven or eight hours before the launch, and making sure you then bring the crew on board
:end make sure all the systems are ready for launch.
And so we started that late in the evening, started the final countdown and began a launch
attempt for Monday morning at 9:30. We had a couple of initial delays during that attempt.
There are a couple of microswitches on the orbiter that we need to receive closed indications of
before we close out our requirement, and we were only getting one indication of a microswitch
on there was closed, and so we went back and did a pressure cheek in the cabin to make sure
that the seal was proper on the cabin door and you didn't have any leaks, and we convinced
ourselves that that was okay.
Ther" we have a piece of GSE or Ground Support Equipment which attaches to the orbiter
door to allow the technicians to close the door, and it is fastened on by some bolts and a nut
plate that is attached to the orbiter Challenger's door, and it is fastened on in three places. One
of the nut plates that is fastened onto the orbiter came loose, and we could not get the bolt off in
a very timely manner, and so we sent some technicians out to actually take a hacksaw and pull
this piece of Ground Support
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Equipment off.
That was successfully done to our satisfaction, but by the time we finished that, we had high
crosswinds, and I mentioned crosswinds _.arlier on January 28th or 27th, and the high cross-
winds, we had wind gusts up to 30 knots, and our limit is like 15 knots.
We have a limitation, a flight rule in the program that we did not launch because of the
Return to Landing Site condition if crosswinds are too high. So the winds kept getting stronger
that day, and after watching the wind patterns for some hour to an hour and a half, we decided
to scrub that particular launch attempt for that day.
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Then we called a Mission Management Team Meeting again, which is made up of the senior
NASA managers, shuttle managers, Center directors in sonic cases, and contractor support
people in other cases, at 2:00 in the afternoon on the 27th, and discussed should we attempt to
launch on the 28th.
We had a fairly lengthy meeting, with the only concern being expressed that the weather-
man had predicted the temperatures were going to be fairly cold that evening, down into the
mid-20s. It was kind of the pL_tiction.
And we talked about temperature concerns, and the main concern that came out of our
meeting as far as temperature was, are the water systems or the support systems on the launch
pad, the water pipes, eyewashes where technicians have water running to wash their eyes in the
event they get contaminated on the launchpad and so forth, were these pipes going to freeze,
and that was the major concern that the system had at that point in time.
Now the laur, ch team guys were given the instructions to proceed with the launch for 9:38
in the morning, assuming there were no problems with tanking and getting the system working
and ready, and Lmcause we had one waterpipe that broke on the launchpad, and I
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think Bob Sieck can talk a little bit more about this than I can from Kennedy, we were an hour
down in our launch attempt. So instead of 9:38 the earliest we couid have launched was like
10:38, because our count was delayed about an hour. We had one pipe that burst.
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Theotherproblemthat wehadandwereconcerned about all during this discussion was ice.
We were concerned about ice buildup, and I think this is where you read the article, Mr. Chair-
man, about the ice concern. We were concerned about ice on the launch tower and that particu-
lar ice doing some damage to the orbiter surfaces and the orbiter tiles because of how fragile
those tiles are from impacts and so forth.
There were technical meetings held to assess the ice situation. A major technical meeting
was held involving a number of people that was chaired by Arnie Aldrich here of JSC. Their
assessment came back that the system is okay, we should hold the launch for probably one more
hour to allow a last-minute ice team to go out at about 20 minutes before launch and to validate
the ice concerns, to go back and do another doublecheck of the ice, and that was done.
They came back and reported that everything was okay, and that we ought to go Ibr launch,
and a launch window then opel|ed up at 11:38, I believe was the
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time, on Tuesday morning.
DR. FEYNMAN: On the 27th you made a launch attempt?
MR. MOOEE: Yes, sir.
DR. FEYNMAN: That means you put fuel into the tanks?
MR. MOORE: Yes, sir.
DR. FEYNMAN: Does it stay in the tanks all thi._ _i_m__e,or de you take it out?
MR. MI_L)ftE: No, sir. Immediately aider we, so-called in our jargon, scrub, we start sating
the vehicle. The crew stays on board and does a number of functims to get the vehicle in a safe
condition to make sure all propellants and all electrical systems are properly safed. Other people
go to the launchpad to start safing the launchpad, and then we allow the hazard and safety
teams to go out and make sure it is all acceptable for people _o come out and do the deservicing
on the tank, and the fuel is drained out ._f the tank, and it will not be replenished again until we
get ready to launch again, which is again some seven or' so hours before the actual liftoff time.
DR. FEYNMAN: And atl this time even when the tank is empty, the tank is standing there,
and the rest of' the equipment, ;n the weather?
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MR. MOORE: Yes, sir.
DR. FEYNMAN: How early was it put out in the weather?
MR. MOORE: Sir, I am going to have to ask Bob Sieck. This tank and the entire stack on
Challenger was moved out, I believe ....
MR. SIECK: December 21st.
MR. MOORE: It was moved out to the launch pad on December 21st, sir.
DR. WHEELON: At your meeting where you were concerned about the weather and the
temperature, did you discuss and consider the impact that that weather might have, and the
temperatures in particular, on the vehicle?
MR. MOORE: Yes, sir, that was discussed at the meeting, and I think the technical team
meeting that Arnie chaired--Arnie can probably comment on the specifics of that, because he
came back to me after the meeting was held on the temperature discussion and reported that
everybody was okay from a temperature standpoint.
And I will ask Arnold Aldrich when he comes up to talk about that in a fair amount of
detail, since Arn.ie chaired the meeting from all the parties involved in that particular session.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I thought that the report I
20
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read about temperature referred qot to the outside of' the space ship but to the booster rocket.
The claim was, according to the newspaper, that there was concern that the cold temperature
might have affected the booster rocket inside not outside.
MR. MOORE: That may be. The one paper or article I remember seeing, Mr. Chairman, was
the article on the effects on the orbiter and so forth, and I will ask the people here who are in
charge of the solid rocket booster to talk about any discussions that went on relative to that, and
_eel free to ask those questions to the members who have the resp,_nsibility for the various pro-
gram elements as they discuss their systems.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: What I refer to is not a rumor or just gossip. It was a statement by
one of the contractors that was a quote that was issued.
MR. MOORE: Yes, sir.
DR. WHEELON: But, Jess, just to come back and be clear, at your meeting was the poten-
tial impact of iow temperat_ res on the SRBs discussed with you? Was it dismissed or not dis-
cussed?
MR. MOORE: At the meeting that I had with Mr. Aldrich, who had come back after the
review from his technical tear1 meeting, it was not discussed at my
meeting. It was discussed at the meeting we had, the Mission Management Team meeting at
2:00 on the 27th of January. Is that right, Arnie? It was discussed by all of the people represent-
ing all of the systems. It was discussed on the 27th of January. Again, I will ask Arnie to give a
little bit more details of that, since he was involved in that particular meeting on the orbiter.
DR. WHEELON: But it was not presented to you as a matter of potential concern?
MR. MOORE: It was not presented to me as a matter of concern. That is correct.
DR. WALKER: Mr. Moore, will you at some point tell us how many temperature sensors
you had in the vehicle and where they were?
MR. MOORE: I will have to have the system design people do it, and let me ask the project
element management down here if they would please talk about that to the extent they can.
Jud, can you do that from the Marshall side, and Arnie from the orbiter side?
_Viewgraph.} le,.l. _' ,_ 21 /
MR. MOORE: Okay, the next chart shows the initial assessment after the launch, after the
Challenger lifted off at 11:38 on January 28th. I
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mentioned the fact that the launch had been delayed for a couple of hours. The launch process-
ing equipment problems I talked about, the ice inspection of launch complex and ice removal. I
did not have any concerns about the temperature expressed other than the concern on the com-
plex, launch complex.
The actual flight, the ascent appeared normal based upon our initial quick looks for the first
73 seconds, at_d it went through its main program roll maneuvel where the shuttle rolls from its
initial launch configuration through its maximum dynamic pressure I talked about, and then
the throttle down and throttle back up of the shuttle main engines.
The vehicle again appeareo to be performing nominally at our 104 percent thrust at ap-
proximally 1,200 miles an hour at approximately 47,600 feet, when all our telemetry stopped.
and at that point in time we observed the breakup from the ground. All of our controllers that
we heard over the loop and all of the net had indicated that the flight was nominal were all of
the calls that i had heard during the morning of the launch.
21
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MR. MOORE: What we initially out in place, the immediate actions that we took, we im-
pounded
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immediately all data and information from this flight at all sites. We have a contingency plan in
NASA, and each center has a contingency plan on STS contingency events of this :,d_,:'_, and
immediately I then was requested by Dr. Graham to form a Mishap Investigation Board.
I immediately put that into effect, and 1 had members, the director of the Kennedy Space
Center, the director of the Marshall Space Flight Center, Arnold Aldrich, the National STS Pro-
gram manager at Johnson, and Walt Williams, a former NASA employee, a special assistant to
the NASA administrator, as immediate members, and additionally I added in the next couple of
days Bob Crippen of the Astronaut Office at Johnson Space Center, and I also added Joe Curran,
who is director of the Space and Light Sciences from the Johnson Sp_ce Center. As ex officio
members on my group,
I added John O'Brien, chief counsel at NASA, and Milt Silviera, who is the chief engineer at
NASA. Jim Harrington was my director of STS integration. He was the executive secretary. And
shortly after this formation, we immediately put into effect a number of teams to start action.
I haw listed those teams on this cbart, and I will quickly just run through them. I think
you can read them, and they are probab!y self-explanatory, but
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some of them, I think, probably are worthy of some mention.
(Viewgraph.) Ir,'l. 2 ,_-_':_]
MR. MOORE: The Flight Data Trajectory and Corn Team was immediately formed, a team
to do the analysis of the launchpad facility at beach area, and I should point out, Mr. Chairman
and Commission members, that we have held all the data, impounded all the data, kept the con-
figurations the same as it was the day of the incident, and we will be working with your Com-
mission as well as our own activities before releasing any of those types of information.
DR. WHEELON: Just before you get too far away from it, could we go back to the trajectory
circumstances surrounding the accident? You have indicated in the handoat that you were at
47,600 feet, goiug approximately 1,200 miles per hour You have just gone through maximum
dynamic pressure. To what level did you throttle down during that period?
MR. MOORE: I will have to recall my memory, but we do have a throttle profile. Let me
look at my information. We throttle down initially from 104 percent, and I will be happy to give
you a copy of this throttle profile. We throttled down from 104 percent at
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20 seconds to 94 percent, and that is held until 36 seconds, and then at 39 seconds, between 36
ann 39 seconds we throttle d(,wn to 65 percent and hold that from 39 seconds until 52 seconds,
and then from 52 seconds to 57 seconds we throttle up to 104 percent.
DR. WHEELON: Was that the usual throttle-v.p, throttle-down profile?
MR. MOORE: It varies depending upon the loads and so forth that we have got in the
_ystem, you know, the cargo elements and the kind of profile that we have to fly to achieve it,
but we always generally go through a throttle bucket of that general type, and we will be happy
to get. you the specific.
DR. WHEELON: But to your knowledge there was nothing that distinguished this profile
from those flown previously except for the payload compensation?
22
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MR. MOORE: No, sir, to my knowledge there was nothing unique or that distinguished this,
and let me say that we are doing--right now a lot of work is going on in looking at the det _i-d
t_'aje_.tory calculati,vns. It _akes--?.he Marsh_:li Space Flight Center gets data. The Cap_ g_* :
data. Johnson is the lead in this thing, _md they have got all of that flight data, and we ha., e a
major team going and looking at synching up all of the trajectory data during the
6O
various missior, phases and mission events that went on.
DR. WHEELON: What was the Mach number at this time?
MR. MOORE: About 1.8, I be!ieve, if my memory serves me correct.
MR. SUTTER: Depending upon the load and everything, isn't there a variation in the loads
as you go through this, rather dynamic?
MR. MOORE: There is a variation in the load, and we use a parameter called Q alpha,
which i.._dynamic pressure versus an angle of attack to look at the load calculations, and also
have instrumentation that we look at, and look at various load points on the wings and the vari-
ous surfaces of the orbiter, and do that calculation based upon a given kind of wind profile.
We put balloons tip starting ac like 36 hours before launch to 24, down to about an hour or
so bei'ore launch to get wind profile data. That is ted back into our computer programs to give us
load indications, to see if we have got any exceedences on any parts of the orbiter.
MR. SUTTER: _ dtlring this flight then th. _oad versus time and corapared to other flights
is something that will be known?
MR. MOORE: That is correct. Yes, sir. We wdl know that very,
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very precise!y, and as to our knowledge on the day of launch, we did not have any loading se-
quences on any of the indications and trajectory analyses we had.
DR. WALKER: Is the throttle controlled by the crew?
MR. MOORE: TLe throttle is automatic.
DR. WALKER: Thank you.
DR. RIDE: The throttle can be controlled by the crew, but on a nominal ascent it is not.
MR. MOORE: Sally knows very well. Excuse me. A nominal throttle is automatic by the
general purpose computer system on board which basically flic:s the flight profile.
There are a number of other teams we put in place, photography teams, data analysis, pedi-
gree teams looking at the hardware, looking at the processing of this hardware. The quality
records, the mamffacturing records, and so forth on that are all being put in place.
Looking at securi*,y, in terms of anything that would be anomalous as far as security, range
safety, public affairs. We have got a team on the flight crew v ith Bob Obermeyer chairing that
from JSC. Marshall has a team on the main propulsion system, and the flight vehicle impound-
ment has also been formed.
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We formed some additional teams Oh salvage and recovery, and our philosophy in the recov-
ery of all the debris or wreckage from this tragic event has been to identify as best _ve could the
areas and to delicately move when recovering, the parts that we possibly can without doing any
additional damage.
We have, as you will see on the next chart, the next slides, a lot of support from a lot of
different people in this whole area.
The other thing I want to mention to you is that we are forming a devil's advocate team,
and that devil's advocate team is a TBD over there, which means To Be Determined. I have not
m ,
named the memb:-,rs of that team, and that will be a team which will set off and support my
activities and think up scenarios that may have occurred on this mission chat will not be inti-
mately involved into the detailed scenarto analysis that we are doir..g with our own tearer in
place here. There will be ,:; team set off to the side and hopefully do :some in¢_ependent thinking
to make sure we are not letting anything fall through the (:racks.
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MR. MOORE: The status as of today, we have reviev, ed some data, and our analysis does
continue. As _ said earlier, we are putting a very, very detailed time line of all events together.
The initial time lines that we saw right after the occurrence were kind of first order time lines,
and we are going back and developing and constructing the high-speed data to look at it.
We are enhancing all of our photography _hat we can, and we are concentrating a lot of
that photography on the righthand solid rocket booster. As you probably have seen, we have
released some photos which--I have three of them in here--which would indicate a plume in the
righthand solid rocket booster.
The salvage and recovery operations is proceeding. I would like to just say, Mr. Chairman,
that we have had extensive cooperation h'om atl branches of the military, and we very much
appreciate that, and also extensive cooperation from the National Transportation Safety Board,
who have j'ast been invaluable to us in helping us and assistir, g us in this grave incident that we
are going through.
"the wreckage analysis and reassembly is proceeding well, and we have essentially from a
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pr_ctural standpoint turned that over to the National Transportation Safety Board. They are
working with us in laying out areas where we are trying to preserve as much of a wreckage as
we can, arid laying it out in some manner that we hope wi!l give us some clues in terms of what
kind of anomalies we did experience on this flight.
The next three charts show the three photos that we released, and again I apologize. We are
working on getting each member of the Commission quality photos tc replace the photos that
did not turn out. In the interest of time I was not able to put any better photos.
You can see them on the monitor here. This photo was taken at about--and you are looking
at the righthand solid rocket booster her(,, and it may be difficult to see on your screen, but the
external tank outline is here. The so!,id rocket booster is shown here.
These are some reflections, we believe. We also think this is a reflection, but again these are
very, very preliminary, and we are not prepared to conclude exactly what all of these are. These
appear to be the engine plumes, and you can see the tail of the orbiter here at this point in time,
and that photograph was observed at 58.3 seconds. Im'r. 2 _ 25 I
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MR. MOORE: The next chart will show what appears to be a plume in this area, in the area
of the righthand solid coming out at a time of 59.8 seconds.
(Viewgraph.) iv_,'r. _ _ 27I
MR. MOORE: And the final char_ shows the plume has basically grown and merged into the
tail from the engines and the other solid, and it basically looks like it has moved quite a bit
here, and that occurred at 73 seconds, just milliseconds ;'rot ' :e tragic event.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Would you mind showing us on the model where that plume is?
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MR.MOORE:_et memakeonecomment.[ can't show you exactly where it is, because we
don't know exactly. I can show you the vicinity of where it is, is what [ will attempt to do.
This is the righthand solid rocket booster, and it appears that the plume is in this area in
here. Somewhere in this area is where it would appear, and until we complete our detailed pho-
tographic enhancements with the best laboratories thot we can get to support us through the
overlays and make sure the t,:ajec_ory siting and the angles of the cameras are all pinned d_wn,
it is going to be very difficult to pin it down. any closer than to just say that it appears in this
area right in here.
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MR. HOTZ: Which segment of the solid rocket would that be?
MR. MOORE: We do not know. This is an aft segment here, and there is an aft center seg-
ment right in here that is joined together in this area. This is the structural attach point here to
the external tank, an¢_ we don't know whether it is the aft center segment. We don't know
whether it is the aft segment. We don't know for sure it is the SRB.
! will caution you, it appears in that area, but we are not ruling out anything at this point. I
just can't say that other than there appears to be a plume in that area. That is basically all the
data that we have at this point in time until we do our high-speed photography enhancement,
and begin to try to pin that down some more.
DR. WALKER: Could you show 'as where the seams are in the solid rocket booster, approxi-
mately?
MR. MOORE: I can attempt to do that. ¥ou are going to see that laid out in quite a bit of
detail when the Marshall people talk at)out the solid rocket booster and so forth.
DR. WALKER: I can wait until then.
MR. MOORE: Would you, please? Thank you.
(Viewgraph.) ll¢,.r -' _ -'_l
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MR. MOORE: Now, my final chart, M:. Chairman and members of the Commission, is to tell
you that the activities we initiated on that tragic Tuesday at NASA are continuing. We are
doing everything we po_ibly can to analyze the data from this occurrence and put in place a
mechanism to fully assess and evaluate and determine the problems associat_ed u_ith this particu-
lar mission.
Yesterday I was designated by Dr. Graham to be the chairman of the 51-L Design Data and
Design Analysis Task Force. We are continuing t) analyze the facts and circumstances and to
identify any design issues that we can surrounding this incident, and we are authoriz_-d to use
any technical and scientific resources within NASA and any available external resources that
we possibly can that we feel the need to call upon to solve this problem, and we would be happy
to suppo_ you and the members of this Commission in any way you deem fit, and we are plan-
ning to proceed forthright in our analy_i._ and detailed evaluation of this tragic event. And that
is all the chmts that I have prepared this morning, Mr. Chairman.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you very much, Mr. Moore, for a very good briefing. We ap-
preciate it.
MR. MOORE: With your permission, I will
6_
introduce Arnold Aldrich from the Johnson Space Center, and he will go through a prc_ess of
covering the other elements that I cited earlier.
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I would like to suggest that we take a five-minute recess, if you
don't mirid,_ before we get started.
(Whereupon, a brief recess was taken.)
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Ladies and gentlemen, we will come to order, ple :._.
Would you please swear Mr. Aldrich in?
Mr. Aldrich, proceed.
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STS 51-L CARGO ELEMENTS
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STATUS
DATAREVIEWA_:_;:,NALYSISC3NTINUES
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SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS, TESTIMONY OF ARNOLD D. ALDRICH. MANAGER,
NATIONAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS PROGRAM, JOHNSON SPACE CENTER
MR. ALDRICH: Chairman Rogers, members of the Commission, my name is Arnold Aldrich,
and I am manager of the National Space Transportation Systems Program Office at the Johnson
Space Center.
(Viewgraph). t_,.I -' ,_ 2!_j
MR. ALDRICH: I am going to describe for you a little bit about the program management
again to show you where I fit in the structure that Jesse described, and then I will describe the
STS system elements, some of the system element performance, and then some of the orbiter
subsystems.
Following me, Dr. Lovingood will describe the propulsion elements responsible by the Mar-
shall Space Flight Center, and Bob Sleek will describe the launch and landing facilities that
make up other portions of the STS system.
(Viewgraph). Im.I -' _i :lol
MR. ALDRICH: The next chart deals with the program manz_.gement relationships. We just
passed over this chart. Level l control of the program is done here in Washington under Jesse,
Associate Administrator for
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Space Flight. They determine top level program requirements, budgets, schedules, policy for the
agency on the Space Shuttle Program, and they deal with large budget items that would affect
primary requirements in the overall program and the overall program sche$::_es.
My office, as program manager at the Johnson Space Center, is management and integra-
tion of all program elements in support of the Level 1 organization. We do integrated flight
system and ground system requirements, schedules and budgets, control of all project interfaces,
control of chariges exceeding program budgets of the different projects across the center, and
those that impact overall STS program requirements, interfaces, and schedules.
Below that are the Level 3 projects at each center, and I will say more about those on the
subsequent pages. Level 4 is defined on this chart by the specific contracts with industry that
will be described for the fabrication, design, and provision of the flight hardware and the ground
hardware that supports the STS program.
(Viewgraph). Im.i.2 _ :_i}
MR. ALDRICH: The next chart says a little more about the concept of the program cefice at
JSC for the STS program. This is what NASA calls the lead
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center concept. That is a relatively small staff at NASA Headquarters for policy, overall budget,
and overall program direction. There is a '.arge program office under myself at the Johnson
5
Space Center that is responsible for cotrol and integration of all elements of the Space Shuttle
System.
This work across the system is identified in the detailed work breakdown structure. It is
supplied to all elements across the program, both government and contractor, for all activiti_'s
and program management, the office manager's projects at the various centers, and at those cen-
ters those projects that manage the contractors that provide the actual hardware that we are
talking about here today.
Integration of this total system is identified as a government role. However, we also have
contractor support in those areas, and I will identify them, some of the major contractor activi-
ties on a subsequent chart.
Project managers at the centers are also in a line responsibility and report through their
directors to Jesse in an institutional fashion as well as through this program chain which I am
describing to you within the Level 2 program office, we have a system, a very careful and de-
tailed
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documentation and control of all technical and management requirements for the program at all
levels, and that will be discussed a little bit later in the day witb some of the later briefings.
We also have very fr_,quent communications nationwide within this program, and we use an
extensive teteconferencing system, because travel is really impossible for the kird of day-to-day
and continuous communications we use, and as was mentioned by Jesse, particularly in the last
several years, we have very extensive involvement with the Department of Defense and the Air
Force, both with their payloads and with the coming on line of the Vandenberg Launch Facility
on the west coast.
(\'i_,wgral)}l) IR,'! 2 _i 32!
MR. ALDRICH: The next chart describes the structure of the government-industry team.
That falls under the National Space Transportation System. Again, the overall policy and direc-.
tion is the government at NASA Headqua,'ters. My role as the JSC Lead Center is for program
planning and control, system and cargo integration of the total system, operations and mission
integration for the preparation and the flight of the Shuttle system. In executing those responsi-
bilities--I am sorry for these acronyms; we tried a
73
_lll('nl ('h;irl .--Ih)('l_\t(ql Illlt'lnalnuhil ,_l)',t('( , I)i\ isi_)ll in in (h;llg(, _)1 n_nl('nl an(l ,arg(_ nil(,grali(ul
fill(WIIIilil)IIHI, Ihi' I_,,,I,_1,11S_ilq_ul ,q)l'l'aIhqls ('l_iilI'll('|Im_X ida's N_IIIIII('l'Ilgill('l'l'iIlg_II|(I()I)(*l'ii-
°,hilly,IIlq_iI,
The Level 3 NASA projects of the National Space Transportation System, the orbiter, at
JSC. Rockwell Space Division, Downey, California, is Prime. Space Shuttle Main Engines are the
responsibility of the Marshall Space Flight Center, Rockwell International Rocketdyne Division
is Prime. External tank, Marshall Space Flight Center, Martin Mariet*a Corporation, Michoud,
Louisiana, near New Orleans, i_ a Ihi_. (,u_I _",_(I,_r.
Solid rocket boosters, United Space Booster Production Company is prime. Solid rocket
motors are fabricated and refurbished by Morton-Thiokol in Brigham City, Utah, in support of
the Marshall Center.
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Thelaunchandlandingfacilitiesweredevelopedin supportof theKennedySpaceCenterby
a numberof contractors, and in the last two years the Lockheed services operations contract is a
consolidated contract that has those responsibilities in support of KSC.
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The mission support at the Johnson Space Center for missmn flight support, flight prepara-
tion, and crew training, Rockwell space operations ".ontract is also a consolidated contract and
that has recently come into being at _he Johnson Spe'ce Center for consolidated contractor oper-
ations there.
DR. FEYNMAN: Could you tell me the difference between the solid rocket booster and a
solid rocket motor?
MR. ALDRICH: Yes, sir. The solid rocket motor is the elements--well, I probably should mt
Dr. Lovingood give you that in detail, but basically the solid rocket _..otor are the elements with
the propulsive grain in them, and the rest of the systems, the recovery systems, the gimballing
systems, the electronics together make up the solid rocket booster as a total system.
MR. ALDRICH: This chart, in fact, deals with the elements of the STS program, the orbiter
which I will be discussing ill a few minutes, flight software, which goes in the orbiter but which
controls all of the elements of the Space Shuttle System during the various phases of flight and
even during ground checkout.
Main engine external tank and solid rocket
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boosters. Flight crew equipment; have a significant activity in the program tbr spacesuits, for
man maneuvering units which Jesse discussed, also for other crew equipments within the cock-
pit in support of the flight crew.
A number of cargo elements, and I will discuss some of those later, also for cargo integra-
tion of the various payloads that come from various places nationally and even internationally,
integrating them into flyable cargoes to make them part of the National Transportation System.
Launch and landing facilities and upper stages, and I believe Jesse described and gave you the
names for each of these.
(\'it,w_ral_h.) [l_,,t. _',,i:_|l
MR. ALDRICH: The next ch_rt shows these pictorially. Again, it shows the solid boosters we
just mentioned, the tank. The Space Shuttle main engines are shown behind the orbiter. The
orbiter itself, there is cargo here. An element of the Space Transportation System is the Space
Lab, which is provided by the European Space Agency and has been integrated by the Marshall
Space Flight Center into the Space Shuttle.
The upper stages, the IUS, the Centaur we have talked about. The TOS is a proposed exten-
sion to that developed by private industry, and does not exist today
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in the program. The three versions of the payload assist module each with additional capability
depending upon the size and performance required for the given satellite or payload which is
going to use it.
In addition, the launch and landing facilities at Kennedy are part of the Transportation
System. The Control Center at Houston and later the Control Center _o be built by the Air Force
in Colorado Springs will be part of the National Transportation System. Mission planning and
training activities at the Johnson Space Flight Center and other places around the nation, and a
wide range of ground support facilities which I will discuss on the n_ chart.
_7
i _1_"_41_l_l_! I¸_'L-'_'_:;I
MR.ALDRICH:Thenextchartdiscussesgroundsupport,l havementionedon the launch-
pad the Kennedy support facilities, so the Shuttle is in direct communication with the Mission
Control Center in Houston.
t\l_",',..: _l>ti } {l_,z 2. :t, i
MR. ALDRICH: Also in support of the Control Cen'er in Houston in the training and mis-
sion preparation phase are the simulation facilities and astronaut training facilities at Johnson
Space Flight Center, and the payload operation control centers exist both within tke
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Mission Control Center in Houston and they exi:st at remote locations such as the Goddard Space
Flight Center, at the JPL at the Marshall Space Flight Center, and in the future likely many
other places.
In our past we have used a wide range of ground _upport facilities around the world for
communications and tracking with the orbiter. We are current!y evolving a Tracking and Data
Relay System that Jesse talked about which is used to relay large amounts of voice telemetry
and television information from the orbiter to the ground and communications and ground con-
trol to the orbiter.
Today there is _ne TI')RS satellite in orbit that covers about half of each orbit of the earth,
and we were in the t:rtx:ss oi" deploying the second and third satellites in that system. The large
antenna is the ground TDRS station which is located in New Mexico, v_hich is the focal point for
all of the TRDS < llit,,s and relays the data to the various stations around the National Com-
plex.
t",l,'_\_41_il*t, , }t_-,. 21_:17 I
MR. ALDRICH: The next chart shows the physical national location of these different facili-
ties. We are here at NASA Headquarters, at the Marshall Center. We have already discussed
the ET, SRB,
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and the SSME. They also provide the interface with the Department of Defense for providing
the IUS upper stage and with _he European Space Agency for the Space Lab.
Kennedy Space Center provides launch and landing operations and facilities. National Space
Transportation Laboratory at Mississippi provides the main engine test firing facility. Dr. Lovin-
good will mention that in some detail. The Michoud assembly plant for the external tank is just
east of New Orleans.
At the Johnson Space Center we have my program office that I am speaking to you today in
support of. We also have the orbiter project focused at the Johnson Space Center and the mis-
sion control, mission design development and crew training activities are at the Jol.nson Space
Center.
At White Sands we have an alternate landing site. We also have the TDRS ground station
which works with the TDRS satellites. We also have an extension of the Johnson Space Cen_r
for hazardous orbital engine testing in California. The Downey Industrial Plant is responsible
for orbiter design, development, manufacturing. In Canoga Park, the Rocketdyne Division of
Rockwell International is responsible for developing the Space Shuttle main engines, design, d_
velop, and manufacturing
4_
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and tests. At Vandenberg Air Force Base we have launch and landing _'acilities on ,'.he verge of
being operational. They have been developed and put in place and they are undergoing final
testing at this time.
in the desert in California at PalmdMe we do the detailed final assernbly of the orbiter vehi-
cles, and we aiso have the west coast primary landing site at Edwards Air Force Base. Brigham
City, Utah, solid rocket motor, M_rton-Thiokol does the construction, the pouring of the solid
rocket motors, and the refurbishment of the used equipment, and reservicing for downstream
flights.
In the future we will have at Colorado Springs the North American Aerospace Defense Com-
mand Control Facility. They are in support of the Air Force control of Shuttle missions.
I tried m go back and provide for you a basis of how the Shuttle program came to be. The
Apollo program was flown in the 1960s, late 1960s and 1970s, and in the period 1967 to 1972
there was significant discussion nationally within and without NASA regarding the follow-on to
the Apollo hardware.
The Apollo was scheduled to fly the sequence of missious that we have come to know the
Apollo program did, also the Skylab missions and the Apoilo-Soyuz test
$0
project, and during this period between 1967 and 1972 there were a series of national and NASA
task force_ to look at the future generation vehicles that would be flown.
At that time there were extensive discussions and phase-in A and B studies for both the
space station and for a reusable service vehicle to go back and forth from a space station, and at
the end of that period in the 1972 time frame the basic characteristic_ of the Shuttle had been
determined and defined coming out of those deliberations.
This chart then picks up with the National STS program development starting with the
characteristics that were defined coming out of those series of activities which I am sure you will
want to know more about, and which are very invo!ved, and will require soi;-e research to put in
the perspec_lve you might like to see it from.
Anyway, in the 1972 time frame and slightly before that the first project _o be begun was
the Space Shutt!_ main engine project. It was started with a set of design characteristics, and
not long after that the orbiter project, external tank project, and solid rocket booster projects
were started in suppor, ,)f the total design concept for the National Space Transportation
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System.
The engineering, design, development testing, mockup, and all activities of hardwaro devel-
opment proceeded through the early seventies, and the first orbito.r .w:'_ Lolled out in 1976. That
was Orbiter 101, the Enterprise. it was a flightwn_hy orbiter for aero flight, but it was not built
for orbital flight, and in fact it was used at Edwards Air Force Base for a series of flight tests on
the back of the carrier aircraft initially and then for a series o,_ free flights in mid-to-late 1977 to
deraonstrate the approach and landing characteristics of the Shuttle and orbiter system.
( \'i('_,_,'gi'alih. } {lt_,i'. 2 ti :1_ I
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In 1979 Orbite.: 102, Columbia, was delivered to the Kennedy Space Center. It was brought
into the Kennedy facilities which had been developed and brought along during this timeframe,
and processing there continued to the first manned orbital flight in 1981.
49
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Since that time we have had a series of test flights. STS-1 through 4 were called test flights,
and in fact, the Columbia vehicle was extensively instrumented, and it was configured uniquely
in a way I will describe shortly as a test flight vehicle. It has since been refurbished, and since
that time other orbiters have flown a series of operational flights that Jesse Moore described to
you.
The next chart--
(ViewgraphA I,e,,l. 2 q_:_._i_
MR. ALDRICH: -describes the characteristics of the Space Shuttle System at a broad level.
I have deleted the solid rocket booster and external tank because they are covered more precise-
ly and in more detail on the presentations of Dr. Lovingood.
The overall length of the Space Shuttle System is 184 feet. It is 76 feet wide if you look at it
as it is shown in this chart. It has a capability for payload weight of 65,000 pounds due east out
of the Kennedy Launch Center, 32,000 pounds in a polar trajectory out of
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the east coast. The 104 is a southerly launch azimuth out of the west coast launch facility, and it
represents the mission which would correspond to the maximum performance out of that loca-
tion.
The system weights represent the weights of the total vehicle on those inclinations on those
max payload flights, 4.49 million pounds at liftoff and 4.49 million pounds at liftoff from the
west coast.
In a minute I will come back to this chart. I would like to talk to you for a minute, first,
about the Space Shuttle stack before I talk in detail about the orbiter vehicle.
I am going to use this mike over here and talk a minute to the model. In fact, I could come
and talk to your model if that would be preferable.
We have defined several times in this briefing the charactemstics of the Space Shuttle flight
system and u_ the names of each of these. I would like to point out how they join together.
The solid rockets are each joined forward and aft to the external tank. They are not connected
to the orbiter. When the vehicle is stacked on the launch pad, the only part of the system that is
load-carrying on the launch pad is the base of the solid rocket motors.
They are first mounted, the external tank is
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put between them and connected here. Then the orbiter is mounted to the external tank, two
places in the back and one place forward, and those carry all the structural logds for the entire
system at liftoff and through the ascent phase of flight. Also connected to the orbiter, under the
orbiter wing, are two large propellant lines, 17 inches in diameter. The one on the port side
carries liquid hydrogen from the hydrogen tank in the back part of the external tank. The one
on the right side carries liquid oxygen from the oxygen tank at the forward end, inside the ex-
ternal tank.
You asked several questions regarding abort profiles and abort profiles for this vehicle are
complex and complicated. I would like to try to outline for you a little bit about the way the
vehicle can fly and the way it can separate.
At liftoff, as Jesse stated, we first light the Space Sh,,ttle main engines, three engines in the
back of the orbiter, using fuel from the tank, oxygen and hydrogen from the tank. They are
allowed to run until they come up to full thrust, a little greater than five seconds, and a large
amount of ground complex and the onboard orbiter computing complex checks a large number of
details and parameters about the main engines to be sure that everything is proper--that the
main engines
5O
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areperformingright, thetank isperformingright.
If all of thosechecksautomaticallypass,the solidrocketboostersareignitedaz_2therelease
mechanisms, the pyrotechnics that release the solids at the base are released, and the SEuttle
System rises.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And that takes six seconds?
MR. ALDRICH: That takes roughly six seconds.
There is an exact time line, and we will be presenting that to you in detail.
Once the Shuttle System starts off the launch pad, there is no capability in the system to
separate these rockets until they reach burnout. They will burn for two minutes and eight or
nine seconds, and the system must stay together. There ts not a capability built into the vehicle
that would allow these to separate. There is a capability available to the flight crew to separate
at this interface the orbiter from the tank, but that is thought to be unacceptable during the
first stage when the booster rockets are on and thrusting. So essentially the first two minutes
and a little more of flight, the stack is intended and designed to stay together, and it must stay
toge_.her to fly successfully.
MR. HOTZ: Mr. Aldrich, why is it unacceptable to separa_ the orbiter at that stage?
MR. ALDRICH: It is unacceptable because of
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the separation dynamics and the rupture of the propellant lines. You cannot perform the kind of
a clean separation required for safety ,_n the p_ oximity of these vehicles at the velocities and the
thrust levels they are undergoing, the atmosphere they are flying through. In that regime, it is
the design characteristic of the total system.
MR. HOTZ: Do you mean you would have raw fuel spilling out?
MR. ALDRICH: Yes, and you would have contact between the various elements, particularly
the orbiter wings and the back part of the orbiter, and it is thought to be uns_,_,_,ivable.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: It is physically possible to d,_ _k,_, but it has "_en proven
that it, can't be safe?
MR. ALDRICH: All analysis indicates there is no }ikelihood _f it beicg successful.
MR. RUMMEL: Mr. Aldrich, in what manner do the boosters separate? Are there explosive
bolts or what?
MR. ALDRICH: Yes, at two minutes and eight seconds the thrust tailoff is s_ nsed in the
orbiter in its computer, and at that time a time sequence to release the booster is _,t up, and
signals are sent from the
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orbiter to the solid rockets to fire pyrotechnics fore and aft to cause the rockets to separate.
There are separation motors in the forward end of the rockets to pull them away in a correct
dynamic sense.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: During the two-minute period,isitpossibleto abort,through the or-
biter?
MR. ALDRICH: I am now going to,ifyou will let me, and I don't have a seriesof charts on
tiffsbecause of how complicated they are.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I didn't mean to interrupt.Go ahead.
MR. ALDRICH: You can abo_. as Sally asked previously, for certain conditions.You can
start,an abort,but the vehicle won't do anything yet,and the intended aborts are ouiltaround
failuresin the main engine system, the liquid)ropeliant systems and their controls.Ifyou have
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a l'ailure of a main engine, it is well detected by the crew and by the _round suppo_'r, and you
can call ibr a ret._rn-to-launch-site abort. That _',_u!d be logged ir_ the _omputer. the compute:'
w_-uld be set up to execute it, but everything waits until the solids take you to altitud-:, At that
time the solids will separate in the ,eqL_ence I described, and then the vehi::le i_.ies downrange
some 4!)it miles, maybe Ii_ to 15 additional minutes, while all or' the tank propeliant is
_8
expelled through these engines.
As a precursor co setting up the conditions ,%r this return-to-launch-site abort to be success-
ful, towards the end of that burn downrange, using the propellants and the thrust of the main
engines, the vehicle turns and actually points heads up back towards Florida. When the tank is
essentially depleted, automatic signals are sent to close off the propeilant lines and to separate
the orbiter, and the orbiter then does a similar approach to the one we are familiar with with
orbit back to the Kennedy Space Center for approach and landing.
DR. WALKER: So the propellant is expelled but not burned?
ME. ALDRICH: No, it is burned. You burn the system on two engines all the way down-
range until it is gone, and then you turn around and come back because you don't have enough
to burn to orbit. That is the return-to-launch-site abort, and it applies during the first 240 sec-
onds of--no, 240 is not right. It is longer than that--the first four minutes, either before or after
separation you can set that abort up, but it will occur after the solids separate, and if you have a
main engine anomaly after the solids separate, at that time you can start the RTLS, and it will
go through
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that same sequence and come back.
DR. RIDE: And you can also only do an RTLS if you have lost just one main engine. So if
you iose all three main engines, RTLS isn't a viable abort mode.
MR. ALDRICtt: Once you get through the four minutes, there's a period where you now
don't have the energy conditions right to come back, and you have a forward abort, and Jesse
mentioned the sites in Spain and on the coast of Africa. We have what is called a trans-Atlantic
abort, and where you can use a very similar sequence to the one I just described. You still sepa-
rate the solids, you still burn all the propellant out of the tanks, but you fly across and land
across the ocean.
MR, HOTZ: Mr. Aldrich, could you just recapitulate just a bit here? Is what you are telling
as that tbr the first two minutes of tlight, until the solids separate, there is no practical abort
mode?
MR. ALDRICH: Yes, sir.
MR. HOTZ: Thank you.
MR. ALDRICH: A trans-Atlantic abort, can cover a range of just a few seconds up to about a
minute in the middle where the across-the-ocean sites are effective, and then you reach this
abort once-around capability where you go all the way around and land in
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California or back to Kennedy by going around the earth. And finally, you have abort-to-orbit
where you have enough propulsion to make orbit but not enough to achieve the exact orbital
parameters that you desire. That is the way that the abort profiles are executed.
There are many, many nuances of crew procedure and different conditions and combina-
tions of sequences of failures that make it much more complicated than I have described it.
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I assume that any abort procedure requires a human decision; it is
not done by machines"
MR ALDRICH: That is, in fact, exactly correct, and that was discussed at length m the
design phase of the program, and no _cenario for automatic abort cou!d be found to be as reh-
able as having the human Interact.
I would also mention Columbia and the ff.rst tbur flights, m fact, the tYt'st five /lights be-
cause Columbia tlew one flight beyond the test phase. Both Columbia and Enterprise on the drop
tests in the desert in Cahfornia had only two crew members, and they had ejection seats in the
pilot and commander seats, and those seats would be fired again by the crew and n_t automati-
cally, but they would blow hatches out of the
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top of the crew cabin and eject the crewmen out for parachute recovery.
Those were taken out of Columbia after flight 5. They have not been in an:, of the other
orbiters except for Enterprise.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: So I assume, then, that in the event of any accident that the safety
of the crew depends upon the safety of the orbiter? I mean. there is no mechanism for using
parachutes or any other escape, mechanism,
MR. ALDRICtt: These aborts that we are describing, RTLS, trans-Atlantic abort or trans-
Pacific which are being developed, and the abort-once-around are all called intact aborts. They
imply the survival of the orbiter, and an acceptable approach to one of our planned landing
fields.
I believe l have described the characteristics of the Shuttle flight system in that discussion
of aborts and how they go together and how they separate. Now let me describe---and if [ could
have the picture go one more chart, and we will look at the picture of the orbiter fleet.
IViewgraph._ Ira.:. " *, mt
MR. ALDRICH: This was the orbiter fleet up until last week, and there are some differences
between
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these four vehicles. Again, ,Jesse named them tor you. Columbia was the first vehicle. I have
described for you that it was a test vehicle, that it had ejection seats. It also had a very exten-
sive amount of instrumentation on board. It had over 1,000 pounds of instrumentation racks in
the cargo bay to take data on the environment and the performance of the orbiter during those
first four flights, and that data has been widely used in rounding out the understanding of the
Space Shuttle System. Columbia is also the heaviest orbiter. Columbia and Challenger were
made, were manufactured earlier in the program than Atlantis and Discovery. There has been a
weight reduction prcr:ram that has allowed u- to take approximately 5,000 pounds out of the
Atlantis and Discover. ,, vehicles that reside in Columbia, and 3,000 to 4,000 that did reside in
Challenger.
During the last two years since STS-5, Columbia has been back at the manufacturing site in
Palmdale, and it has been retrofitted to be of the same configuration as the other flight orbiters
functionally. However, there is one additional difference between these four orbiters that you
see here. Columbia and Challenger have an external thermai protection system that allowed
them only to fly
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trajectories out of the east coast. The trajectories out of the west coast have a higher heating
entry protile, require additional TPS externally, and Colmnbia and Challenger are not designed
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for that Theycouldberetrofittedfor it, but it hasnotbeendeterminedto bea requirementof
the program
Atlantis and Discovery have TPS _ystems on board where they can _ flown from either
launch site. and of course, the plan has been to dehver Discovery imtially for west coast
launches
Now, ff l cc_uld _o back a !ittie bit to the chart that has the characteristics of the orbiter
MR AI,DRICH: The orbiter was conceived, as l said, in the 1972 timeframe. It is about the
s_ze of a DC-9 aircraft. It has a fairly standard aircraft _itlminllm -3k_n :arid ,_trmger design, and
there is not a lot of unique techno!ogT" in the airframe of it. I will describe a little more abeut
the airframe components in a minute, but _he thing that makes it different for orbital space
flight is primarily the Thermal Protectio,- System, and that is, in _eneral. added externally after
the orbiter ts budt as a flight vehicle.
It is 122 feet long. It has a wing span of 78 feet, On its wheels, it is 57 feet high. Jesse
pointed
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out the payload bay is 13, feet by _,0 feet On an entry profile, it can come down the azimuth it is
flying down. It can also fly cross range 1_00 nautical miles in either direction to achieve a land-
ing at a selected _anding site.
Attached to it from the main engine project are three main engines, 470,000 pounds thrust
each. On board the back of the orbiter also zre OMS--stands tbr Orbital Maneuvering System--
engines, _;,000 pounds each, two of them. I wi!l show you where they are in a minute. And then
for smaller corrections on orbit, for all the attitude control, there is a reaction control system--
and I will describe that for you again in a minute--38 engines mounted at various places on the
orbiter, and each of those engines has _q7() pounds of thrust; 6 vernier engines for precise control,
25,000 pounds of thrust each.
The weight of the orbiter inert is 162,000 pounds, and that varies from orbiter ,n orbiter
because, as I said, they have a range of difference of about 5,000 pounds dry weight.
At landing, without a payload but loaded with all of the consumables, that residual and all
of the crew equipment and all of the cargo support equipment in orbit is about 175,000 pounds.
And with the cargo we bring back,
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we have generally been landing cargoes, 205,000 to 215,900 pounds at touchdown from the mis-
sions that Jesse described.
_Viewgraph.) Im,r. 2.12 I
MR. ALDRICH: If I could go to the next chart, and it is a complicated chart regarding vari-
ous orbiter subsystems, and perhaps l will come back to the model in a minute, or for a minute.
The engine systems that I described on board, of course, you know about the main engines.
We talked about them all day. The OMS engines are these little black engines, and there is one
on each side. They do orbital attitude changes of the orbiter. The reaction control engines, the 38
large and 6 small, are mounted on this device that sticks back from this pod which I will de-
scribe in a minute about its contents, and in a bay that is forward on the orbiter nose, and these
black marks here are intended to be the ports that these engines fire out. In fact, there's 14 big
engines and 2 small engines in front, 12 big engines and 2 small on each side, to compose the
reaction control system.
In terms of the structure, this is what we call the forward fuselage. Inside of that is the
crew cabin. This is the orbiter mid-body, the orbiter wings. Attached to the wings are the elevon
_erosurfacesinboardon bothsidesar_.doutboam_ 3othsidesfor controlduring the approach
andlandingphasesTheyalsoareused{'orloadreltefdurin_ theascentphaseandtheyactually
_imbalin conjunct,ion w|th themainenginesto providebalancedloadingof thestack.
Downunder *he main engines is a device called a body flap. And it is an aerodynamic
system that _s trimmed in conjunction with the elevons for proper angle on approach :rod land-
ing. The vertical stabilizer points upward, and it has a big aerosurface on the back. It is both a
rudder and a speed brake. It swings in one directmn for rudder control and opens in both direc-
tions for speed brake on landing approach and roll-out.
This is called the aft fuselage of t'le vehicle, and there are some major engine systeras in
there, and I will show you them briefly on a subsequent chart. This is the payload bay, of course.
Most of the orbiter, as ! said, is aluminum skin and stringer. The payload bay doors are graph-
ite/epoxy. The pods here that contain these engine systems are graphite/epoxy, but all of the
vehicle is covered with some form of TPS to protect either the aluminum or the graphite.
Payload bay doors have inside them devices
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that move with the doors that are cooling radiators when the orbiter is on orbit. It has a large
thermal load to release, and it is released through these radiators which are pointed, in general,
towards dark 3pace. Although they are not specifically pointed, they see enough dark space to
provide total cooling for the orbiter and for the cargoes we fly.
This is the remote arm from Canada that was discoursed earlier. We only have one, on the
port side. The orbiter design would pick up one on the starboard side, but we have not put that
implementation in place in the program to date.
Viewing windows forward and to the side. Also we have viewing windows on the top for
alignment sightings, and there are viewing windows in the back of the bulkhead, forward bulk-
head, for viewing the cargo. And as you have seen from our flights, we have TV cameras mount-
ed in the four corners of the payload bay, on the join to the RMS, and on the tip of the RMS,
I will describe the thermal protection system in a little more detail on a subsequent chart.
On the underside of the orbiter we have wheel wells. V,'e have two main landing gear on the
outboard aft side of the mid fuselage, and we have a forward nose landing gear in a wheel well
under this forward RCS system, at
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the forward end of the vehicle. Other unique physical characteristics. All of the vehicle has a
soft exterior insulation that we talked about with respect to the ice and the rain, except for the
leading edges. This is a reinforced carbon-carbon nose cap, solid, and the leading edges of the
wing are reinforced carbon-carbon and solid.
And that is the orbiter vehicle. Let me show you where some of the systems are.
The orbiter is a very complicated system, and it would take a long time to describe all of it
in detail, but the way I selected some charts for this was to show you the basic structural ele-
ments and then to show you the systems particularly on board that have energy stored in them
since stored energy is one of the things that could relate to what we have seen in the films and
know about this incident.
(Viewgraph.) IR,q. -' _ s:_l
MR. ALDRICH: The z_ext chart shows the basic orbiter airframe as it is assembled. The
crew compartment is shown on the upper left, and it is a welded structure that has full pressure
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integrity, It has got the hatch and windows in it, and _t: t_,ts _nside the up:.-e_ for_vard fuselage
and the lower forward ;uselage at the top and bottom of the page as they c_.me
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together. Then the i0ra*ard reaction control system module is inserted as an engine system for-
ward of this line, and the nosecap is added at the forward end.
The mid-fu_,elage is a big structure configured as shown here, and the _orward fuselage seg-
ments are added to it, payload bay doors are added to it in assembly, and the wings from the
side and through feed-throughs into the main structural members of the mid-fuselage.
And then the aft fuselage is added on the back end and contains some sig'rificant systems
for propulsion and control of the vehicle. Two OMS pods, Orbital Maneuvering System pods,
with their RCS elements also are added on the top of the aft fuselage, the body flap added in
back, and the vertical stabilizer added to the top.
_Viewgraph.! Ira, t*..' ,_ I I i
MR. ALDRICH: 'l_e next chart describes the thermal protection system, and I will describe
that, and then I will deviate here and talk to you a little bit about the ice question that we had
earlier.
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hardest parts of the TPS It is on the nosecap and the leading edges where I showed you. The
plan view of the orbiter is cut down the middle, so on the bottom part of this picture you have a
representation of the top surface of the orbiter, and on the top portion you have a representation
of the bottom view of the orbiter.
The bottom of the orbiter sees the highest temperatures, up to 2,800 degrees for some mis-
sion profiles during entry, and it has on it what we cal! black tiles. The real name for them is
high temperature reusable surface insulation. They are largely silicon fiber, and they are manu-
factured. They are very lightweight, very easy to handle, very lightweight material.
The tiles on the total underbody of the vehicle are this high temperature reusable surface
insulation. It ranges from half an inch up to two inches in thickness. It is very thick on the body
flap, very thick on the forward end of the orbiter, and varies other places across the vehicle.
Coming around the sidewall and up to the top of the vehicle are the things we have called
in the pase white tiles. You have seen them, and they are white,
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and they are low temperature reusable surface insulation, again silicon, different physical ap-
pearance, the same kind of material, and they are generally thinner than the big tiles on the
bottom. They are also lighter weight.
Further upward and rearward on the vehicle, the areas shown in white are a nomex felt
material with a white surface at the top about a half an inch thick, and those are put on in
blanket form. These are the coolest areas of the vehicle during the entry phase.
Now, let's see. Let me divert to the question you asked about ice on the launch pad. The
question had to do with both the meeting we had on the 27th to discuss the temperatures we
might expect and then the discussion on the morning of the 28th with respect to ice and icicles,
and they are two separate questions.
The day before, we had the mission management team with Jesse Mocre and myself, and we
discussed the temperatures and their effects, what they were predicted to be on the launch
system and on the facilities, and the temperature ranges which were predicted, in the mid-20s,
and warming into the morning the next day were thought to be, by all in attendance from my
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understanding,at least,andwhat I believedto bewell within the specificationdesignof all of
the flight
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elements of the vehicle, and in fact, we had no concern expressed for the temperatures that the
flight vehicle would see.
We were concerned ,',bout the facility because about a year ago, in January of 19_5, we [lad
a launch attempt with temperatures in this range, and we had problems with icing on the
launch pad that caused some of the facility water systems to malfunction in such a way that the
launch could not be continued, and we had to delay a day because of this ice.
So our discussion dealt primarily with the facility and the corrective actions from the previ-
ous event as to whether the facility would be adequate to support the countdown, the servicing
and the launch, and Kennedy had changed procedures and had in place arrangements and
mechanizations that we all felt would perhaps be more difficult than the normal countdown but
they would support the full launch processing.
At that time we made the decision to proceed, assumed we might have some slowness in the
processing activities, which we did experience. We had no concern for performance or safety of
the flight articles at that time, nor do I even at this time, given what we know to be the specifi-
cation, certification and desig_n of the components that represent the flight system.
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DR. WHEELON: A question, please.
Did you or your experts specifically consider the effect of the ambient temperature on the
solid rocket motors, and did you judge that that was okay?
MR. ALDRICH: I would like to have you specifically ask that to the Marshall Project, Dr.
Lovingood, when he is up. My answer would be yes, I am sure they did, but they ought to say
that. They reported that al! of their considerations for launch were acceptable and they were go
for launch, which would include those temperatures, yes, sir.
DR. WHEELON: But that wasn't explicitly discussed with you?
MR. ALDRICH: It was not explicitly discussed as a concern, partly because it is r_ ally
within the design characteristic of the Shuttle System, as I believe all of us understand it.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Do you remember any warning from i guess it was Morton-Thiokol
to the effect that there might be a problem with a temperature in the booster?
MR. ALDRICH: I do not recall such a warning at that time. The following morning we had
had the situation where we had some water lines break, and other water lines, the protective
reaction to the low
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temperatures was to let them flow during the night so that they wouldn't freeze and break, and
we had this fairly large, extensive deliberation of what the ice meant to us. There was quite a
large amount of ice, primarily on the north side of the launch complex ,here many of these
water systems are and where the water was permitted to run as part of the procedure to avoid
the freezing and rupturing of the lines. And on the south side of the launch pad where the
launch system was, the flight system, there was significantly less ice, but it had been character-
ized by an ice team which we sent out on every launch and had been out on this launch.
In addition, the sun was rising, and on the south side of the vehicle, and we were alrea,ly
seeing melting in several of the areas on the vehicle. We made a detailed assessment of the re-
ports of the ice team about where the ice was located, where it might fall, what it might impact
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on the |aunch system, and the total context of that discussion had to do with the orbiter thermal
protection system which has the soft elements that I have described to you.
There wa._ no discussion or concern expressed about the falling of ice on any other system in
either the laun_'h complex or on the solid rocket boosters or external tank. There was a detailed
assessment by the
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team and reported to us of where the ice was located, and as I say, there were large amounts on
the north side, smaller amounts on the south side. We calculated what ice might fall at ignition
and what its trajectory might be in conjunction with the winds, and the total recommendation
from all parties concerned was that we did not see a credible threat to the orbiter except for the
Rockwell International orbiter contractor who in that meeting expressed some concern that
there might be a slightly higher risk for the orbiter TPS because this was a condition we had no
experience with before, that is, lifting off with ice on the launch pad.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Could I ask the source of the ice, what percentage was
due to the ambient conditions and what was condensation on the vehicle that froze?
MR. ALDRICH: I can't give you a totally accurate report on that, but essentially the icing
on the propellant lines and on the external tank was relatively normal, quite low, and well
within the bounds that we had accepted on previous launches. All of the ice I'm talking about
was on the launch facility which is off to the side of the vehicle and does not protrude out over
any of the flight elements, or at least does not protrude out over the orbiter. There is an arm
that
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goes out over the nose of the external tank.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: It was unusual because of the unique weather condi-
tions?
MR. ALDRICH: It was unusual because oi _the weather conditions, and the corrective actions
to dram the facility water on the launch pad causing great amounts of water to be in certain
locations.
DR. WHEELON: Was there either a tape recording or a written record made of these delib-
e,ations prior to launch, and would that be available to this Commission?
MR. ALDRICH: We have asked for a detailed report of the specific configuration of the ice
both during this initial inspection that led to this discussion and then I am about to tell you that
we sent the team out a second time to reassess it, and there will be--the written report will
include the findings that the second assessment and the clearing up of small amounts of ice on
the platform. There was not a recording of the meeting in which we discussed the ice debris
threat to the orbiter.
DR. WHEELON: Quite aside from the ice debris, was there a recording or minutes taken of
the meeting where you made the deliberations as to whether to go ahead or not?
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MR. ALDRICH: That is the same.
DR. WHEELON: You are focusing just on ice. I am not worried about ice. I am worried
about a much broader class of issues. How do you record those deliberations?
MR. ALDRICH: The meeting where we elected to proceed was held the night before, the
mission management team meeting that Jesse described, and all parties felt agreeable to go. The
normal process during the countdown is that the countdown proceeds, assuming we ar¢ in a go
posture, and at various points during the countdown we tag up on the operational loops and face
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to face in the firing room to ascertain the facts that project elements that are monitoring the
data and that are understanding the situation as we proceed are still in the go condition.
And this is done prior to minus 20 minutes in the count, and is done again at minus 9 min-
utes in the count as a matter of procedure.
DR. WHEELON: I think you are answering a different question than the one I asked, and
that is these key meetings where you and Jesse made the decisions to go forward or to delay, as
you had in days prior to the launch, was there a detailed record of those deliberations made or
not?
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MR. ALDRICH: To my knowledge, there is not a written record or a recording of those
meetings.
DR. WHEELON: Thank you.
MR. SUTrER: In releasing one of the vehicie_ for flight, and especially now tha*. some of the
equipment has been gone through refurbishment, and it is done by oeeple that do work for you,
is there a formal documentation of releasing the vehicle ibr flight? Is there a formal method of
doing it, and is it signed off like when they release an airplane for flight?
MR. ALDRICH: Yes, it is, and i_ is signed off in great detail. And orate of the briefings later
in the day will go through that flight readiness process. It is the series of meetings that led up to
the ones that Jesse reported right in close at L-1 day. There is a _o:mal flight readiness review
that is extremely thorough, with formal commitments and sign-o_z of all NASA organizations
and all contractors that support NASA for these elements.
MR. SUTTER: Going back to this temperature question, then, if one of the units was de-
signed to a given temperature range, '_hen whoever was responsible for that unit, if it was out-
side of that range, would have to make that known, and there would have to be some review
board action on that?
MR. ALDRICH: Yes, sir, and that would occur
t09
in our system.
MR. SUTTER: Okay.
DR. WHEELON: And there were no _':ch exceptions?
MR. ALDRICH: There were =o such exceptions.
DR. WHEELON: Thank you.
DR. RIDE: How does the ice team document what it sees? Do they take camera_ out with
them?
MR. ALDRICH: They take cameras, I believe, Sally. I have not seen pictures from the ice
team, but our discussion was that it would be photo documented. They also take IR measure-
ment devices and actually measure the temperature around the tank and the propellant lines
where we have a concern for perhaps the formation of ice on the flight system, and this occurs
on all flights, the concern for ice on the external ta_k. It has liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen
in it. It is serviced with insulated lines, and de_nding on the wind and the amount of humidity
and the ambient temperature, you can see extensive icing for different conditions than only the
low temperatare case.
In fact, one of me reasons the tank, in my understanding, had a small amount of--it did not
have a major sheet of ice on it. It had perhaps a slight amount of frosting. One of the reasons is
that although
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the temperature is very low, the humidity wa_ also very low.
This weather discussion we have been having was the result of a front that came threugh
the Kennedy area with high winds, cold temperatures, and very low humidity.
I would go now to a couple of more discussions on the orbiter. I wanted to show you what
was inside several of these elements.
Wiewgraph,) (_,,t -'. l;[
MR. ALDRICH: The next chart shows what is inside the main propulsion system, inside the
aft fuselage, which is primarily the main propulsion system. You can see here where the two 17-
inch lines ccme into the bottom of the orbiter, the hydrogen, liquid hydrogen on the, port side
and the liquid oxygen on the starboard side, through the 17-inch lines and into a candelabra of
mdividual lines that go to each of the three main engines.
In the lower right hand picture is a schematic of the oxygen from tile forward end of the
ET, hydrogen from the aft end flowing through these lines, and the orbiter interface to the main
engines.
I would also point out, not very clearly visible here, but there is an extensive heavyweight
load
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structure built into the aft fuselage to carry the main thrust and loads from the main engines,
and that structure is seen up in this area and around the propellant lines that are shown
coming from the external tank.
(,Viewgraph.) tm,t 2 _ ,.)
MR. ALDRICH: The next chart shows the forward and the aft Reaction Control System. I
mentioned a number of engines. I wanted to point out to you tile amount of propellants and the
type of propellants that are on board. In the forward Reaction Control System we have 477
pounds of nitrogen tetroxide in the starboard tank, 928 pounds of monomethyl hydrozene in the
port tank. They are pressurized by a helium bottle, and they feed the thruster system I previous-
ly described to you. The two aft pods contain both the RCS system on each side and the OMS
system. This cha_ lists the characteristics of' the RCS. Again, the oxidizer tank, I believe it is
the lower tank, in the forward end of the pod, contains almost 3,000 pounds of nitrogen tetrox-
ide. The upper tank, the fuel tank, contains 1856 pounds of monomethyl hydrozene. This is pres-
s_:rized by RCS helium bottles down at the upper corner of the other end of the pod, and the
propellant flows _o the RCS thruster_, and they can be interconnected so the
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tanks on one side can feed the engines on the side or across on the other side as well.
The next chart shows the Orbiter Maneuvering System.
(Viewgraph.) Im,t ' 2 _i 17 I
MR. ALDRICH: The way the charts are laid out, they deal with the OMS separately, even
though it is the same component of the vehicle., and as you can see, there's 14,866 pounds of
nitrogen tetroxide and 9,010 pounds of hydrozene in the lower Ox tank and the upper fuel tank,
again pressurized by helium bottles, and they feed the big OMS engine either on this side or can
be cross connected and feed the OMS engine on the other side.
(Viewgraph.) im.t. 2, t_ I
MR. ALDRICH: The next chart describes the electrical power system within the orbiter.
This shows the cargo bay, the mid-fuselage I have shown you before. All of the cargo fits within
the U-shaped rings, and there is a liner, but under the liner, in the cargo bay are a number of
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orbitersystems,and I havehighlightedheretheelectricalpowersystems.Thenlectricalpowe_'
in theorbiterisgeneratedbythreefuel cellswhicharetedbycryogenicliquidoxygenandliquid
hydrogenbottles.Theconfigurationshownhere
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shows three oxygen tanks and three hydrogen tanks. We can increase that to either four or five
of each for longer duration missions.
Again, there is a fair amou_t of fluid in these tanks. There is 781 pounds of oxygen per
tank, 92 pounds of liquid hydrogen in the hydrogen tanks. They provide 2370 kilowatt hours of
energy, to the orbiter during the mission, and 168 pounds of oxygen for supplying the atmos-
phere in the orbiter cabin and keeping the cabin pressurized.
(Viewgraph.) Im.I -', r_l
MR. ALDRICH: The next chart sl-_ows a little bit aboat the crew arrangement. This is look-
ing down only on the crew module of the vehicle. The top two pictures show the upper level in
the crew module, the flight deck. The lower two pictures show the mid-deck. For launch and
ent, ry there are four crew members seated approximately as shown here, on the flight deck, the
commander on the left, pilot on the right, and mission or payload specialist seated in the back,
and they can participate in some of the procedures in support cf flying the vehicie from the
forward consoles.
Once you go on orbit on the flight deck, more or less crew members can come up to the
flight deck, and a large number of the consoles on the back end of the
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flight deck deal with the payloads and the cargo, and they are operated by various mission and
payload specialists.
DR. WALKER: Is the atmosphere in the crew quarters pure oxygen?
MR. ALDRICH: No, it's oxygen-nitrogen mix, roughly basic atmosphere, basic earth atmos-
phere. In the mid-deck you can see the configurati.on that was approximately what we had on
the STS 51-L, tw _ mission specialists in front of the airlock facing the module stowage, and one
back by where it says the waste compartment is located. The other three crew sea¢..._ shown in
dotted are contingency configuration that can be used to extend the capacity of the vehicle.
However, on this flight and or_ most flights, that is taken up with either three or four sleep
stations as is shown on t.he right hand side of the page,
Locker storage is in front of these crewmen, and we stow there things for crew--provisions,
food, clothing, communications equipment, camera equipment. We also stow some experiments
and some flight activities i_ those areas.
Wast_ management compartment is back in the lower port corner, and the side hatch for
exit and entry to the vehicle is shown on the port side. Airlock is
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truly that. You enter the airlock from the cabin, do_ a space suit, decompress, open a hatch, and
go out into the payload bay for external operations on orbit. The mid-deck picture on the rig}_t
shows a little more detail of personal hygiene station, galley station, and tables that are set up
once the orbital configuration is arranged on board.
(Viewgraph.) I_,.t', :.' _i :'_'1
MR. ALDRICH: The next c[mrt discusses some major systems in the orbiter that I am not
going to go into in great detail today. There is an extensive avionics system in the orbiter, and it
controls not only the orb)ter but the selid rocket boosters and the external tank. and it works in
conjunction with the launch processing system.
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Thereareaseriesof avionicsbaysshownhere.[n themid-deckportionof thecabin,thereis
a Bay I forward and Bay 2 forward. Bay :_ is in the back end of the crew compartment, and
many of the major electronics components, including the general purpose computers that fly the
Space Shuttle are located in that region.
Above them on a navigation fixed mount are the inertial measuring units for flying the
Space Shuttle System and the star trackers for aligning it once you are on orbit. They are
mounted in proximity with these
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other electron,:cs, and they are part of the total guidance and navigation system.
In the back end of the orbiter are three more electronic bays with, again, additional elec-
tronic devices that participate in guidance control of the vehicle and its systems, and they are
shown roughly in the forward part of the aft fuselage module that I showed you previously
mounted on the back side of the bulkhead. These subsystems provide for guidance and control of
the total 3pace Shuttle for ascent, on-orbit and entry. Communications and tracking provide a
series of different communications modes through S band and UHF, through an on-orbit Ku
band system that has an extensively high data capacity. They provide the displays and controls
to the flight crew who can interface to the vehicle systems through the avionics and through the
computers. They provide for the electrical power distribution and the instrumentation through-
out the vehicle, and they provide a series of data processors that both record data and instru-
mentation measurements on board and provide those to the ground.
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Those are the basic systems of the orbiter that I was going to describe. There is one other
high energy system on board. The system operates its elevons and its landing gear release and
brakes and body flap and rudder speed brake with three hydraulic systems, which run around to
the appropriate places on the vehicle.
Also, the throttling and control of the space shuttle main engine use the orbiter hydraulic
systems. And to provide the orbiter power, t;:ere are three auxiliary power units mounted in the
aft fuselage, and they have each 325 pounds of hydrozene in a tank to provide those APUs.
Those units are powered prelaunch for ascent to control the engines and Lhe aero surfaces,
and then pre the orbit for entry to control the aero flight for the approach and landing.
There are also a series of systems in the cargo bay that support the various cargo modules.
There are electronics, there are beam structures to support the payloads. There are keel fittings,
a wide range of instrumentation and communications systems that are put together in standard
configuration so that they can support the widest range of cargo mixes that we fly in the space
shuttle.
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That is the briefing that I was going to give you on the shuttle configuration and on the
orbiter, and I realize it is not nearly the depth to cover any of those things in detail. But I
thought that would be a good start.
And I would be glad to answer any other question about the way the vehicle works or how it
is integrated.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, thank you very much. It has been very helpful.
I wonder, was there anything about this launch, excluding the discussions about ice and
weather, that caused any concern over and above the normal concern? Anything unusual about
this launch that we should know about?
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MR. ALDRICH: I do not recall that there were any unusual things other than we had the
situation with the hatch, where we did not get it off
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Which Mr. Moore referred to. But excluding that and excluding the
questions of the weather, anything else that was discussed about this !aunch that was different
from the previous launches?
MR. ALDRICH: No, slr, not to my knovdedge.
I would add, that reminded me of one of the questions you aske_ earlier about the anomaly
tracking.
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As we first flew Columbia and had our initial flights with the orbiter, we did have quite a large
number of anomalies in the space shuttle systems, and most of them were not of consequence to
completing the mission or to doing the activities on board the way we intended to do them.
There were major engineering problems with the systems that are highly redundant, and
some of the redundancy areas had anomalies, and the system accounted for it properly. We
track each of those systems problems individually by item. It is researched, analyzed, and closed
out formally to my level in the program to be sure we have treated it correctly and completely.
We have it signed off, and we keep a formal tracking system of all of these things that
cccur. And we have had anomalies on every flight. With the amount of instrumentation and
redundant subsystems we have, we frequently have things that need corrective action. Every one
has been tracked, every one is recorded and logged and available,
And a different response than Jess gave to your question about how our performance has
been: We have seen significantly fewer anomalies on flights in the last year or two than we had
early in the program.
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There has been a significant correction of things we couldn't find until we flight-tested, and cor-
rective actions.
In fact, the Atlantis vehicle, which has flown two times and was delivered in the spring of
this last year_ has been extremely clean and has had no significant anomaly as yet in any of its
systems. So I think there is a great learning curve, particularly with renpect to the orbiter, as
we have flown and become familiar with the vehicles.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I assume that you are comparing the flight pattern of this launch
with previous ones to see if there are any deviations from previous flights?
MR. ALDRICH: Yes, sir. We do do the exact characterizations of the winds and profile that
Jess described. We do build a best trajectory from all the data available, and apply these best
known external conditions to it, and we analyze completely, to the best of our ability, the exact
loadings and the profile that the vehicle flew through.
I might add, we talked about throttling the main engines. There is in fact on board an
adaptive control within the orbiter system. The solid rockets have very _ninor variances, depend-
ing upon a lot of
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parameters. And the on-board system senses that an 4. throttles the main engine to a precise
level to account for that.
So what you predicted it might go to pre-flight may be slightly different, That is understood.
That also will be factored into o_r total analysis of the ascent system performance,
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: At what point in the flight was the loss of power detected_
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MR. ALDRICH: We essentially lost all data with the vehicle at very close to 73 seconds, 73
and some tenths either way seconds. And loss of power and data presumably is the same thing.
All contact with the ground was lost instantly at that time, and there is a great reconstruction
of all events from data and from tracking and from photo.
And I haven't seen that yet. That is a fairly laborious job, but my expectation would be that
it will coincide with the physical event that we saw.
DR. RIDE: Could you say something very briefly about the data lines between the SRBs and
the shuttle, the shuttle computers?
MR. ALDRICH: Let me see if I can say what you want me to say.
The central control and computing for the
122
entire stack during ascent is in the computers in the orbiter. Some of the sensing equipment--
for instance, there is a set of rate gyros at the top of each solid rocket motor. That is fed through
the electronics system to the orbiter and it is factored into the orbiter guidance computations for
the total stack.
There is also telemetry and measurements on various parts of the tank and the solid rocket
booster, and those come back into the orbiter and are relayed or recorded in conjunction with
the orbiter data stream. And for the separation sequences, commends go the other way, from the
orbiter.
The crbiter guidance and navigation system .senses when separation should occur, when
engine throttling or gimballing should occur--not throttling of the solids, as was pointed out, but
throttling of the main engines, but gimballing of both mains and solids--and those commands go
through data lines to the solid rocket boosters and to the space shuttle main engines.
DR. WHEELON: Since I sense that our chairman may soon be calling a luncheon break and
since that provides an opportunity to get some data, would it be possible to get from you or from
your colleagues the nominal trajectory, powered flight trajectory parameters as anticipated for
this
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flight, not as actually measured? And specifically, what was--what did you expect would be the
altitude versus time and the speed, the Mach number, the dynamic pressure, and the throttle
position on the main engines?
Could you provide that?
MR. ALDRICH: Expected pre_flight and compared to what we found in-flight, yes, sir.
DR. WHEELON: I suspect you don't yet have the actuals, and if you do that's fine. But, I
would be grateful for just the pre_flight nominal for this flight.
MR. ALDRICH: I will do that.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Acheson wondered if there was any way to make an estimate of
how much fu_her information you want to give to us today. The question is not designed to
hurry you at all, and we are prepared to continue over until tomorrow. We just want to get
some idea of what estimates you make and the time that would be involved.
Jess, can you address this?
MR. MOORE: Mr. Chairman, what we are prepared to do from here the rest of the after-
noon is to go through the Marshall shuttle projects. As I mentioned earlier, the Marshall Space
Flight Center is responsible
for the propulsive elements of the shuttle.
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We haveprobablygot abouta 45-minutebriefingor so on the propulsiveelements,and
maybea little longer.I ar_.kind of gue,_sing.I didn't havetime lastnight to gothrougha formal
dry run.
F'ollowingthat, I l_avea presentationby the KennedySpaceCenter to tell you how the
launch system is processed and all the steps to get ready for launch, and that probably can be
done in about 35 to 40 minutes, depending upon questions It is mostly photograpl:s, to give you
feel for what we go through in getting ready for launch.
Beyond that, we have got about a 30-minute pitch that will address the design phdosophy--
requirements, ,:ertification, testing, analysis--that we go through in NASA for procuring hard-
ware. And then I've got another presentation which is about another 30 minutes long that taiks
about cur flight certifcation, preparations for flight, and talks about the flight certification proc-
ess and the specifics associated with how we pool the rest urces of the NASA-industry shuttle
team to get ready for a flight.
If I add those up very roughly in my mind, we are probably talking about another three
hours-plus of briefings if the Commission would so desire.
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, that's fine. We can extend over until tomorrow, and we don't
want to hurry you at all.
And I think we will take a recess now for about an hour. i would like to suggest, though, on
.... '_ -^'"*^ p_es_'-*-_'t;on._ a little more directly to the Chal-_he presentations, that if you ....... your ............
lenger and what happened. Otherwise it becomes rather abstract.
And so, I don't want to discourage that ,aspect of it, but if you could relate it a little bit more
to what happened here and what you did in connection with the Challenger, anything that was
unusual, I think the Commission would appreciate that.
MR. MOORE: Yes, sir. What we tried to do for the Commission, Mr. Chairman, is also tc
give you some indication of how the systems are manufactured and how they are put. together.
And that specifically is applicable to Challenger, as wel! as the other elements of the shuttle
program. So we will try to narrow our focus a little bit rnoze on the specifics associated with
Challenger and any differences that we possibly can highlight relative to this flight versus
others.
CHAIRM&N ROGERS: Thank you very much.
Okay, we will adjourn until 1:30.
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(Whereu_,-,on, at 12:40 p.m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene at 1:30 p.m.)
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AFTERNOON SESSION
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: The Commission will come to order, please.
Jesse?
MR. MOORE: Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission, we would like to continue this
proceeding now. I have asked our presenters here for the remainder of the afternoon to try to
make their presentations as brief as possible, particularly the background kinds of presenta-
tions, and focus as much as we can on the relevancy to the incident on 51-L.
And with that, I would like to introduce the Deputy Manager of the Shuttle Projects Office
at Marshall, and that is Dr. Jud Lovingood.
Jud?
THE CLERK: Do you swear the testimony you will give before this Commission will be the
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
DR. LOVINGOOD: I do.
CttAIRMAN ROGERS: You may proceed.
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TESTIMONY OF DR. JUDSON A. LOVINGOOD, DEPUTY MANAGER, SHUTTLE
PROJECTS OFFICE. MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER
DR. LOVINGOOD: Mr. Chairman, Committee members, what I have been asked to do today
is to give you a propulsion systems overview so that it will provide you with the background that
you will need in the course of your investigation, and what I have done is I have given a very
brief summary of the elements that Marshall has responsibility for, which are the external tank,
the main engines, and the solid rocket booster. I hope that as a result of this briefing there may
be some areas that you can identify that you do want to home in on, and then we will be able to
provide you additional information if I can't answer it today.
So, with that I will start out by talking about the--
(Viewgraph.) IR,*t -_,_ -,ll
DR. LOVTNGC_D: This is the agenda, which doesn't show up very well.
Go to the next chart.
(Viewgraph.) [J_,,i 2 _ _21
DR. LOVINGOOD: I think none of these a-e showing up on the screen.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, we have the bc,)ks. We
13u
can follow it that way.
DR. LOVINGOOD: If you would look at those, and on these word charts, I will try to sum-
marize basically what I am trying to say quickly.
We have two responsibilities, one in capability development, which is the early part of the
program primarily, with some continuation into the operational phase which we are currently
in, and then, of course, we have support to operations. We are responsible or were responsible
for the development and certification of the external tank, the solid rocket booster and the Shut-
tle main engine. We are responsible for the propulsion system testing, which I will say more
about, which is the testing of the complete propulsion system, including the external tank, the
three main engines and the orbiter propulsion elements down at NSTL, the National Space
Technology Laboratories. We have been involved in propulsion and ascent flight system integra-
tion activities with JSC. They have the lead, but we have been heavily involved in that activity
with them because of the skills that we have at the Marshall Center.
And then performance improvements and productivity, and then in supporting the
launches, we are responsible for producing the flight hardware and
!31
logistics support at KSC and at Vandenberg, and we are involved heavily now in the activation
of the Vandenberg facility as far as processing the vehicle, and then we are also looking at oper-
83
ationalimprovementslike producibilityimprovements,requirementsreductionsandsimplifying
thelaunchprocessing.
(Viewgraph.)l_,.i',z ._:q
DR. LOVINGOOD: The next chart shows what I just said in pictorial form, and [ won't
dwell on that, and we will just go ahead and continue to the next chart.
(Viewgraph.) IR_,t -' _, 3hi
DR. LOVINGOOD: The next c.ne shows the organization that we have at Marshall for the
Shuttle Projects. There is one Shuttle Projects manager that is responsible to the center direc-
tor, and he has responsibility for all Marshall Shuttle activity. Under him is a project office for
each element, and that is indica'._d down at the bottom, showing an External Tank Project
Office, a Solid Rocket Booster Proj._t Office, and a Flight Engine Project Office. In addition, we
have a Development Engine Project Office which is involved in the engine improvements which
Jesse Moore mentioned earlier.
Each of these project offices, if you will
132
note the remark I've got in the upper right hand corner, has a chief engineer which is assigned
to report directly, functionally, on a day-to-day basis, to the project manager, His institutional
home is our Science and Engineering Directorate which is a major institutional organization
which reports to our center director.
Proceeding to the next chart--
(Viewgraph.) Im, r 2,3_1
DR. LOVINGOOD:--and then this is the engine project lead-ira, and then go to the following
one.
(Viewgraph.) [1¢,.1. 2 _3_ I
DR. LOVINGOOD: The SSME, and of course, there has been some discussion of SSME,
which is the main engine on the Shuttle. It has already been discussed to some extent by Arnie
and Jess. It is a liquid hydrogen/liquid oxygen engine. It is manufactured, or its prime contrac-
tor responsible for development, certification, manufacture and launch acceptance testing is the
Rockeuiyne division of Rockwell. Major subcontractors are Honeywell on the controller and Hy-
draulic Research, on the actuators that we use for the valve controls. Test sites are the National
Space Techno?_ogy Laboratories. We have two single-engine test stands at the Santa Susana labo-
ratory, which in near Canoga
133
Park, where Rocketdyne is located.
(Viewgraph.) [m,r. z_-_7 I
DR. IA)VINCd:K)D: The next chart shows the flow. As I mentioned, the engine is manufac-
tured at Rocketdyne in Canoga Park. We acceptance test it at our designated test area at the
National Space Technology Laboratories in Mississippi. We install them into the orbiter at KSC.
In fact, the Marshall Space Flight Center delivers them to KSC, and then the irmtallation in the
orbiter, and then the launch processing from there on is the KSC responsibility. And between-
flight maintenance is done at KSC.
(Viewgraph.) IR,.r. 2_i-._l
DR. IX)VINGOOD: The next chart, shows some interesting characteristics, and what I want
to point out on there, it is a 470,000 pound thrust engine in vacuum. We call that the rated
power level. Most of our flights up until now have been at 104 percent of rated power, with a
few at 100 percent.
DR. FEYNMAN: Excuse me. I am sorry to interrupt you.
84
I wanted to understand whether you, that is, your organization, checks the engine when it is
manufactured. When it is going to be reused, is there another test made, or is the test made at
the
134
Mississippi site?
DR. LOVINGOOD: If an engine is brought back on an orbiter to be flown again without any
changeout of part,n, then our assessment is made in terms of data that we get from the flight,
and any anomalies that are found from post-flight inspections, which the inspections are done
under the cognizance of KSC, but we get a report on that, and we have to disposition those
anomalies before we fly it. In the case of a component changeout, we are responsible for the
production of that new component, the acceptance test of it.
All components are acceptance tested by hot fire on a single engine.
DR. FEYNMAN: Thank you.
DR. LOVINGOOD: FPL is fuii po_-er level, and that is 109 percent of the rated power level,
and we have not flown at that power level yet. In fact, th_ improvements that we are making
are to give us more margin in operating at 109 percent.
I want to point out the mixture ratio, which is the ratio of oxygen mass to hydrogen mass
consumed by *.he engine ;.s six, and down there, on life at the bottom of the chart, it shows that
we have a specification requirement, and I want to emphasize that is the spec requirement of
seven and a half hours or 55 starts, and
135
that has not yet been demonstrated.
And I have a subsequent chart that shows you what we have demonstrated
And then we have a controller which I think has been mentioned today, and we are capable
of throttling with that controller to 65 percent minimum. The controller accepts commands from
the general purpose computers in the orbiter, the GPCs, and then makes the engine valves oper-
ate to provide the proper throttle setting.
Some design features we have--
(Viewgraph.) Ir,_l • z ,_-3!t]
DR. LOVINGOOD:--is that we do have a failsafe philosophy. The controller has redundant
computers which control the mixture ratio and the chamber pressure, and the controller in-
eludes self-check monitoring capability to ensure proper engine operation. The design features
redundancy in the engine control and the monitoring functions, and we have red lines that are
established based on both analytical work and ground test experience.
The engine operation has been demonstrated in our ground test program, both development
and certification. We fly the engine with the maintenance parameters and so forth, just like we
have done it in
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our ground test program. We have included off-nominal engine performance, and that is by vary-
ing the mixture ratio off of the nominal value of 6.0, and we have demonstrated various abort
modes. There was some discussion of that this morning. We fired engines around 600 seconds,
approximately, to demonstrate one of the abort modes, and approximately 800 seconds to demon-
strate another abort mode. And we have also demonstrated off-nominal engine shutdown modes.
Normally the shutdown, for example, is with hydraulic power from the auxiliary power units
which Arnie mentioned, which are on the orbiter. In case of an emergency, we do have a pneu-
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matic shutdown system using a helium supply on the orbiter, and we have demonstrated that in
ground tests.
And then, belbre we put an engine b,.to the orbiter or a component, replace a component
and install a new one in an engine, we do hot fire acceptance tests of those engines, as I have
already mentioned.
(Viewgraph.) {e,,.i _'. '"_I
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Would it be possible to relate these functions to the Challenger?
DR. LOVINGOOD: Well, the way I would relate it to the Challenger is that we did go
through the acceptance testing, our normal acceptance testing
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and data reviews, looking at any material discrepancies that come out of manufacturing to make
sure that we didn't have any problem. This was done before we flew the Challenger fcr the first
time with this set of engines In fact, on things like hardware discrepancies from the plant, we
have what we call a re-review of those discrepancies. That is part of our flight readiness review
process. So we do a very thorough review of the hardware that we are flying.
As far as manufacturing anomalies. We look at process changes that might have been incor-
porated, we look at all the acceptance test data, and if it is a reflight, then we do the review of
the post-flight inspection data from the previous flight as well as the previous flight data, and
we always acceptance test.
DR. FEYNMAN: For example, was this Challenger, the one we are interested in, the flight
we are interested in, a reflight of an engine or a new engine?
DR. LOVINGOOD: I believe that this, all three engines were being reflown. I'm almost 100
percent sure of that. And I don't believe we changed out any major components, but I will get
you that for the record because I am not certain, but I will give you exactly what component
zhangeouts were made for this flight.
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Your records would show any anomalies in previous flights as far as
these engines are concerned?
DR. LOVINGOOD: There could have been. We do have occasional anomalies which are
sometimes dispositioned as being within our experience, something that shows up. We look at
anything that looks unusual. In fact, sometimes people like to call them observations, but we
always classify them as anomalies, and we thoroughly review those. So I am not certain. But I
do know that whatever we saw in the data, that there is a documented rationale as to why that
is no problem for flight.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: In other words, you do have records to show any anomalies as far as
Challenger is concerned?
DR. LOVINGOOD: That is correct.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Yet on this particular flight, we had less instrumentation than on
previous flights, but these engines are very well instrumented, aren't they, to the point where if
you saw an anomaly on climb-out, it would have registered and possibly even shut the engine
down before anything disastrous occurred?
DR. LOVINGOOD: The instrumentation on this
86
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flight wouldbe like it hasbeen.It wouldbeasmuchandin somecasesmorethanwehavehad
onpreviousflights. I don't think--we haven'tsubtractedany recently,andwehaveaddedsome
instrument data.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Did you see anything anomalous on climb-out on these engines?
DR. LOVINCfOOD: N_.
MR. RUMMEL: The engines would not have been shut down until after the accident oc-
curred, ifI understood thiscorrectly thismorning, isthat right?
DR. LOVINGOOD: That iscorrect.The nominal shutdown time isaround 500 seconds.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Let me push that point. Had there been an anomalous condition on
the engine, itwould have shut itselfdown prior to having anything disastroushappen?
DR. LOVINGOOD: There are red lines,and for the record, I will tellyou what those red
linesare.I have got a listof them here.
GENERAL KUTYNA: For example, we had an engine shutdown on the previous flight.It
sensed something going wrong and itshut itselfdown b(,forethere was any problem.
DR. LOVINGOOD: Yes. Iwill tellyou what
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that was. We have red lineson fuel,the high pressure fuel pump turbine discharge temperature.
We have two temperature sensors in the discharge of that turbine,and the red line isset at 1960
degrees, roughly. _t is actually different on the two gauges because of the different coolant flow
we have in there.
We also have red lines on the turbine discharge temperature on the high pressure oxygen
pump. We have a coolant liner pressure red line in the fuel pump turbine. There is a fuel pump
turbine coolant liner that has a red line in it on pressure. We have an intermediate seal pres-
sure that is--the seal that separates the hot gases of the turbine from the 1.()_/ that we are
pumping, this is on the high pressure i.( )X pump, and we have a h.igh pressure t ( ).\ pump drain
pressure as a red line. Those are the five red limes we have.
Now, the problem that led to the engine shutdown in flight was a failure of two of the two
+,emperature sensors that we have, and we have a way that the controller monitors those tem-
perature sensors to determine wbether they are good sensors or not, whether they are qualified.
If the determination of the controller is that they are not qualified--and it is based on the fail-
ure rate, how fast the sensor goes off-scale high--then the controller disqualifies that
141
sensor, and that sensor would not vote to cut.
What happened in the previous case when we had the shutdown was that the failure mode
of that sensor was such that the controller did not recognize it as a bad sensor, and recognized it
as a vote to cut, and so we ended up shutting the engine down.
GENERAL KUTYNA: But the bottom line is you really have a fail-safe system as far as
those engines shutting themselves down.
DR. LOVINGOOD: That is correct. We have got redundancy, and it is fail-ops with the first
one, and then fail-safe.
Okay. I think I was on Figure 11. i_ef. 2,_-_ol
Prior to flight we have a ground certification test program and I have indicated here how
we go about doing that. The current engines that we are flying were initially certified for ten
missions, and that is taking two samples, two builds of that engine, and running through what
_7
wecall two CERT cycles, and a CERT cycle consists of 5,000 seconds of testing in 13 starts, and
those CEI4T cyclc_ rapresent the kind of mission profiles that we would fly in the missions.
If you add all tkat up fo: just one cngine, that would b_ two cycles times 5,000 seconds, that
would be 10,000 seconds, about roughly 500 seconds per
t42
flight. That would be equivalent to 20 missions, and what we do is we divide that by two, we
allow our ground test program to exceed flight by a factor of two. So in running 20 missions on
the ground on two engines, we certify ready to fly ten missions.
When we change, make an engineering change in a component, generally or typically we
require two samples of that, one CERT cycle, and say that qualifies the component for ten mis-
sions operating in that engine system that we have already got certified. But each change re-
ceives a thorough review by both NASA and the contractor to decide what kind of certificati.an
requirements there should be, and that is put into--that is documented in the paperwork, and
that is a requirement that we complete that certification requirement or we must get a waiver
with supporting rationale, if we do not, before we fly.
And then the ground test program develops parameters that we u_e in our mah]tenance, the
post-flight inspections that we use, the inspection intervals, a.nd then any removal and replace-
ment _hedule based upon litb limits on ce_min piece parts in the engine that we know have a
life limit which is less than what we have certified the basic engine for. And all of that, of
course, is documented and it is aocumented in
143
our files as well as at KSC as far as what all of those between-flight inspections, maintenance
and removals are.
And then this last bullet just says that we use a facter of two in our ground test over our
flight.
(Viewgraph.) IJ¢,._. 2 _i _l
DR. LOVINGOOD: And then the next chart shows with our current engines that we are
flying, with our ground test program using a factor of two, we are eertiE, ed to fly 15 flights for
each engine that we put into the field at a mixture of 100 and 104 percent of rated power level.
This program did inciude some testing at 109 percent, some certification testing at 109 per-
cent, and that certifies us to fly seven fligh'_s of that 15 at 109 percent.
And then the last two bullets down there just shows that we did that on Engine 2010 and
Engine 2014 with a ground test of 40 missions on Engine 2010 and 30 missions on 2014, and then
we take the smaller of those two numbers and divide by two to get to 15.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Is there anything about the testing of the Challenger engines that
caused you any concern or which seemed to be diftbrent than previous tests?
DR. LOVINGOOD: No, I don't recall anything.
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In fact, when the question came up this morning concerning this launch, I was trying to think,
the question was asked whether there was anything other than weather considerations that
made you more concerned, and that went through my mind at that time, and I don't know of
anything off hand.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Do I understand correctly that 2010 and 2014 are engines
that are used for testing only?
DR. LOVINGOOD: Engine 2010 and Engine 2.914 were new engines that we had in our plan-
ning to use as ground certification engines, and that is a very controlled program. We don't do
88
developmenttestingon thoseengines.If we'vegota newpart, wedonkput it on there. It is a
very controlled program, and we use the same specifications, so to speak, as far as maintenance
and inspections are concerned, that we use when we fly. I mean, that is the intent of that, to fly
the same way we do _hat certification program.
VICE CIIAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: It is functionality and reliability kind of testing?
DR. LOVINGOOD: Exactly.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Thank you.
DR. LOVINGOOD: Okay.
That is really all I had to say about the
145
engine.
I wanted to talk about this propulsion sys_n-,,testthat we do, and that iswhat Figure 13 is
relating to.This test,which isdone on a teststand down in Mississippi,which includes a flight
type external tank, und it has got the orbiter aft structure simulated, but it has got all the
valves and the plumbing in the aft end of the orbiterfor the propulsion system. And t.henithas
got a clusterof three main engines on it.
Before we flew the firsttime we performed 12 successful tests in the time period I have
indicated there, and then we also performed these, in addition to the staticfiringsand hot
firing,we performed che specialpropellant tanking testwhich had to do with loading procedures
at KS(]. And then our current plan, we have not run a testof that clusterat 109 percent. So the
current plan is to run two staticfiringsat 109 percent of rated power level,and then after we
complete that we intend to convert that to another single engine test stand and convert that
facility to another single engine facility.
That is all I plan to say about the engines and the main propulsion tests, and if there are no
questions, I will go on to the solid rocket booster.
DR. FEYNMAN: I would like to know a little
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bit more about the actual engines used on the Challenger, What new items had to be replaced
after the engines had been used; if the engine is a reused engine, were there some parts that had
to be replaced, or what kind of condition is it in relative to were there some special problems?
DR. LOVINGOOD: Are you talking about this particular flight?
DR. FEYNMAN: Yes.
DE. LOVINGOOD: I don't recall for sure. My recollection is--I have got to get that data. I
recall that we didn't change anything, but I will provide that data to you, and if we changed out
anything, I will tell you why we changed that out.
(Viewgraph.) Ira.l. 2 .r,_2 I
DR. LOVINGOOD: On the solid rocket booster, there were several questions raised this
morning about that. Let me see, I have got some notes here.
We did make a change--well !et me talk about the booster description first.
Go to Figure 15, and then I will try to respom' '_ some of the questions that came up during
Jess and Arnie's discussions.
(Viewgrapb..) I_,'t'. 2 .-.:q
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Figure 15 shows an expanded view of the booster, and starting on the leffhand side of that
chart and working your way across, you will note that we have the nosecap, which contains the
pilot and drogue chute, and then we have the frustum, which contains the three main para-
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chutes.Wehavethe forwardskirt, whichhasthe Yorwardattachfitting to the externaltank,
andwealsohaveavionics.
Thenthe next,moving on across there after the forward skirt, to the right of the forward
skirt is the forward segment, and that is a motor case segment that is cast as shown there. In
that configuration that was 327.5 !on the forward segment) inches long, and it has a forward
bulkhead which is a pressure dome, and then we have what we call the forward mid segment or
forward center segmer_, and then the aft mid segment, and then the aft segment, and the aft
segment is shown there with a nozzle attached to it. And then we have the aft skirt, which con-
tains the separation m dule, the thrust vector control system, and I think Arnie pretty well dis-
cussed that today.
Now, these segments are transported overland, and assembled by KSC. They are transferred
from Morton-Thiokol in Wasatch to Kennedy Space Center, and the assembly is done there. I
think the next chart
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shows who the contracter --
GENERAL KUTYNA: Would you point out the previous problem you had with this booster,
with the SRB and explain how you fixed that? What gave you confidence that that problem
would not reoccur? You had problems with the nozzle and your burnthrough of the nozzle, as I
recall.
DR. LOVINGOOD: We had on--it was STS-8. We had some pocketing in the nozzle, and that
was--I don't recall exactly where it was. I think it was on the throat inlet. It was prior to the
throat, upstream of the throat.
And we had made a process change prior to that time. We went back to our old process, and
there was also some suspect material, a particular manufacturer of material, and we had exten-
sive analysis and test data which supported the fact that that particular supplier of this materi-
al might have had volatiles in there or other parametors which could have led to this pocketing.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I don't understand that. Could you explain it a little to me? It
doesn't have much meaning to me.
DR. LOVINGOOD: Well, I am not sure I can explain it.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Maybe we should try and say
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you had air pockets in the material. Is that right?
DR. LOVINGOOD: Well, there were gases. I think there was just the chemical constitution
of the materials, too, that indicated that this one supplier had components in there or constitu-
ents which were not good as far as this pocketing problem is concerned. The gas pocket, I think,
is one of the things that led to the mechanism, and I am not familiar with the mechanism.
What I suggest we do, we could give you a detailed briefing, because that is all documented,
and if you would like, we can give you a detailed briefing on exactly what we found.
GENERAL KUTYNA: As far as NASA is concerned, that problem is resolved? You found
the pr '!era was not a factor in this particular incidept?
Dh. LOVINGOOD: Thus far we don't see that as being a factor.
MR. HOTZ: Did you change manufacturers?
DR. I,OVINGOOD: No. When I mentioned something about a supplier, we bad two suppliers
of this material, and the analysis showed that this one supplier's product was be.tter, and we are
using strictly that supplier's product. So there is no cha age.
MR. HOTZ: No, but ycu did drop a supplier, then?
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DR.LOVINGOOD:In that particularareaof thenozzle.
_TT A _lr_ ............
•..l_lr_±vu_l_ I_Ot_EI_: Was that based upon negligence of" the supplierS,
DR. LOVINGOOD: No. It was within specification. And I think that it was just on one side
of the spec in the way he had been manufactu:ing it, and we felt like if we could eliminate that,
and we did go back to ou_ TM old process, too_ for curing the nozzle, and doing that, we could elimi-
r=ate a problem, and we hay .n t had a recurrence like we did on that flight.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Is there a report on _hat? Did you make an inquiry and file a report
on that whole incident?
DR. LOVINC_)OD: Yes, we can get you a report.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And that is available to _he Commission, I presume.
DR. LOVINGOOD: Yes.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you.
DR. WALKER: Are you planning to discuss the way in which these sections are joined_
DR. LOVINGOOD: I had not planned to go into ar_y detail on that. This is the aft attach
ring to the external tank, and I think that was mentioned by Arnie. There is a field joint ap-
proximately right here, and the
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field joint is what we call the: joint between two segments that are cast individually, separately,
and that joint is made at KSC.
There are factory joints. These segments, I believe, this particular _gment here is about 27
feet long, so about halfway up, 13 and a half feet or so, there is a factory joint that is made at
Thiokol. These have two O-rings in the joint. When you have a field joint, we have inhibitors
there that inhibit the propellant burning on the face at: that joint.
In the case of a factory joint, we have insulation that comes all the way across that, and we
don't use the inhibitor.
GENERAL WALKER: Are these VITON O-rings?
DR. LOVINGOOD: I am not sure. I believe they are, but I am not certa;n. Yes, that is cor-
rect.
What we can do is, I had not planned to focus--the instructions I had for this was to just
give you an overview. I had not planned to focus on any par'cicular art.a, and that is why I am
not prepared to do that.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, we can corae back to that. We appreciate that we didn't give
you much notice of the meeting, and so, proceed. We will be able to get that information.
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GENERAL KUTYNA: How about the operating limits on this motor? Are you the proper
one to discuss that?
DR. LOVINGOOD: What is the question?
GENERAL KUTYNA: How about the operating limits on this motor? It says in the manual
that it ought to operate between about 40 and 90 degrees Fahrenheit. Of course, it was a lot
colder than that.
DR. LOVINGOOD: The requirement is on propellant mean bulk temperature, and in fact I
had that on a chart that it is one of our requirements, and it was predicted that the mean bulk
temperature would be 55 degrees at launch, and it has been reported to me that that is what it
was, about that value. So we do have a requirement to be between 40 and 90, and we were
within that range.
9t
DR.KUTYNA:Doyouhaveinstrumentationthat wouldgivoyou _,at temperature,or "_"
youpredictit, or howduyt, u know Li,m the mean bulk was what it was?
DR. LOVINGOOD: It is calculated based upon ambient.
\ W_ _ral_ll ) [i_,.,. _'. ul]
DR. LOVINGOOD: Okay, Figure 16 shows the major sappliers on the booster. Of course, the
motor is made by Mcrton-Thiokol. The booster assembly is--United Space Boosters Production
Company, they are
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currently called, does the assembly work of the aft skirt and of the forward skirt and the para-
chute frustum area and the nosecap, and I have got the suppliers down there for structures of
the motors and so forth, and you can read through that list, and then we have done our testing
at Morton-Thioko!'s Wasatch Division as far as the large motor static firings are concerned. All
that testing was done out there, and this is just a highlight, by the way. And then at Marshall
Space Flight Center, we have done the structural testing on the booster, and also TPS, Thermal
Protection System development and testing.
DR. WALKER: Could I just ask a question on terminology? Solid rocket motor refers to the
fuel itself?.
DR. LOVINGOOD: Let me show you on the next chart.
DR LOVINCK)OD: What I have got here, I thought this was going to be in color, but the
solid rocket motor, our terminology for that is the part that is the responsibility of Morton-Thio-
kol, and that would be all of the segments from this forward bulkhead back including the nozzle,
ana this includes the casting of the propellants into those sections, and then there is
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also a systems tunnel that runs along _he motor case, and that is a Morton-Thiokol responsibil-
ity, sc we call all this the solid rocket motor.
Now, when we put the aft skirt on with the thrust vector control system and the avionics,
booster separation motors, whep we add--which is a USBPC responsibility, and then when we
add the forward skirt, the frustu.n and the nosecap with the parachutes, the avionics, the sepa-
ration motors, and so forth, we calI that whole assembly a solid rocket booster. So then there are
two of these per mission. Does that explain our terminology?
DR. WALKER: Yes.
(\ i_,,,',_4r',ll_ll ) ll_,,r, 2 ,_ ,iii]
DR. LOVINGOOD: The next chart I don't plan to dwell on. It shows the characteristics. The
main point there is, we have a mean thrust of 2,.t00,000 pounds per booster.
(\'ie_Rral_h. } II{,,r. 2 ,i ,i7]
DR. LOVINGOOD: Then the next chart, Figure 19, I do have a thrust time trace that I will
show you which is a typical trace, and that will come up next, but I want to leave this chart up
bere until I get ready to talk about that, and I will show you how that is specified as a require-
ment. And then we have a thrust
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vector requirement to be able to gimbal the nozzles for control during the first stage boost of
plus or minus 88 degrees, and these were qualified with five development test static firings out
ut Thiokol and with four qualification test firings.
Then I have just l_sted, and I am just tryi,lg to highlight here sort of our approach on this
motor. The structural integrity_ as far as the design criteria is concerned on the hardware, we
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have a 1.4 time limit load. That is, the limit load is the maximum predicted load from pressures,
ae_'odynamics, engine 'hrus: that you will see in flight, and we take a load 40 percent higher
than that, and then that is what we design to, and then we do an ultimate load test, testing that
structure to that value to make sure that it doesn't break.
And then on the propellant we have got a factor of two times the maximum expected load:
and we verified that with subscale test and analysis. And on the insulation, the case insulation,
we have a 15 factor times the predicted erosion, and on the nozzle insulation it is a factor of two
times the predicted erosion.
DR. FEYNMAN: Excuse me. Predicted erosion is predicted erosion. The qu -,:tion is, in your
experience
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in measuring erosion, how much variation from predicted erosion is the average degree of varia-
tion to be expected? How good i_ the prediction?
DR. LOVINGOOD: The p_ediction is real good, with the exception of one case that we talked
about earlier where we had that pocketing, and we are staying pretty much right in that same
area.
DR. FEYNMAN: What is real good, 5 percent, 10 percent?
DR. LOVINGOOD: Like on the nozzle with a factor of two. That means you know you are
good for another flight. You would have been ___¢y:d.,for another flight. I think we may have come
off just a little bit.
DR. FEYNMAN: How good are the predictions for the amount of erosion, 5 percent accu-
rate, 10 pet-cent accurate?
DR. LOVINGOOD: I would say within 10 percent. It may be more accurate than that. Okay,
and then I have got listed on this chart the fact that we do have a design environment for the
propellant mean bulk temperature, a range of between 40 and 90 degrees.
DR. RIDE: Can I ask you a question just, I guess, relate it to the design environments? Y(_:
must have a set nf launch commit criteria tbr the SRBs and
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the motors. Could we get those available to us, or do you have them?
DR. LOVINGOOD: Yes, I will make a list, and that was o:_ of the questions that came up
this morning. We do have an LCC, Launch Commit Criteria, on ,ome temperatures in batteries,
and I don't know what those values are or what the particular batteries are. We have got them
on batteries. We have got them on the tank. We have got a nose cone temperature limit, but we
can provide you a complete listing c,f that, and of course you know what that means. That means
if you violate the LCC you don't launch or you get a waiver with supporting rationale which is
documented in order to go ahead with the launch. So, we can provide a list of those.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Can you determine the temperature of the booster, inside tempera-
ture of the fuel in the booster?
DR. LOVINGOOD: Just by calct, lation. We don't have any measurement.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: No instrument?
DR. LOVINGOOD: No.
MR. ACHESON: May I ask, in the design environment here, the temperature 40 to 90, does
that mean it is designed to operate at that temperature, or
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does it mean that it is designed not to undergo a physical or chemical change within those tem-
peratures?
- _ 93
DR.LOVINGOOD:! will haveto get youan answertc that. I don't really know. ! don't
knowwhat thegenesisof that reqmrementis andwhat the designcriterion is basedon it. Let
mementionhere,too,som_'thingthat cameup this morning,Wedid doa motorcaseredesign.
Wereducedthewall thicknessapproximatelyt; percent,thewall thickness.
CHAIRMANROGERS:YouarespeakingabouttheChallengernow?
DR.LOVINGOOD:Yes,but I will tell younov,"wemadethat changeonSTS-6,whichmeans
that wehavehad 18flights,successfulf ights,if I did myarithmeticright, andof coursetbat is
twoboosters,so18timestwo is 36,but wedid makea change,andwereducedthe wall thick-
hessabout6 percentto lightenthecaseweight,andweaid motor firings. We also did two motor
firings, one development motor firing and one quality motor firing.
W, • didn't do it in order to certify that redesign. We did it because we made some addition-
al--another change to get more performance out of the motor. We call it our high performance
motor, and that was effective on STS-8, and what we did there was to
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decrease the nozzle diameter by--1 think it was a half an inch or quarter of an inch. No, a half
an inch. I have got to get that [or you. I forgot. And we extended the rozzle ten inche_.
We also changed--we cut back on the inhibitor in the radial direction. We made the inhibi-
tor less in order to get higher thrust at liftoff. So we made those changes, and we can provide
you exactly what we did for the record, what those changes were.
DR. FEYNMAN: What is the inhibitor, a liner of some kind that goes around the propel-
lant?
DR. LOV1NGOOD: The inhibitor is at the field joints, where we cast the propellants in sepa-
rate segments, and then the inhibitor is the:e to keep the surface, let's say the forward facing
surface of the propellant from burning, and it i-' NBR. It is an NBR rubber, the material.
DR. WALKER: Does that inhibitor form a _,al between adjacent sections?
DR. LOVINGOOD: No, it is not a seal. It is an insulation protection for the face of the pro-
pellant.
DR. WALKER: So the four sections of propellant are really separate entities?
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DR. LOVINGOOD: That is right.
DR. WALKER: They don't connect with one another? They burn separately?
DR. LOVINGOOD: Well, it burns from the inside out, is the way the solid rocket motor
burns, so all the segments are burning simultaneously that way.
DR. WALKER: But each is burning separately?
DR, LOVINGOOD: Yes, that is correct.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Jud, _o you have a slide of the joints where these segments are
joined? Do you have the technical detail of that?
DR. LOVINGOOD: No, I had planned to have some detail as backup but we didn't have
backup for this briefing. That is the normal way we do things, and I thought it might come up.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Have you looked at these post-mission after you recovered them from
the ocean to see if there is any damage at those joints from the previous flights?
DR. LOVINGOOD: We have seen some evidence of what we call blow by of those seals, some
erosion of those seals. The primary seal. We have never seen any erosion of a secondary seal, but
we have seen evidence of soot in between the two seals.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Was that any cause for
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concern?
DR.LOVINGOOD"Oh.yes,that is ananomaly,andthat wasthoroughlyworked,andthat
is completelydocumentedonall the investigativework that wedid on that, andwecanget that
for you.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: If a committee or subcommittee of the Commission visits your oper-
ation, would you have the information there that you could answer specific questions about this
"nore conveniently, and particularly about the Challenger as distinguished from the overall oper-
atmn?
DR. LOVINGOOD: Ye_, we would have more data there that we could get, plus we would
have our experts in these areas that could talk much more intelligently than I can on the sub-
ject.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, we do not expect you--I mean, we understand that you didn't
have much notice, and that you were to give an overview so you don't have to be apologetic, but
we are just trying to figure out how to get the information ourselves, and that certainly would
be one way we could do it, isn't it?
DR. LOVINGOOD: Yes, I think that would be a way.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you.
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DR. LOVINGOOD: The next figure sho_s the thrust time trace, and there is a higher
thrust, as you can see, for about the first 20 seconds of flight, and then the thrust drops off. By
the way. the two outside lines represent the band that we have to be within in order to achieve
the proper performance on the motor, and these numbers here, I think the artist took a little
license in the way this was plotted. These aren't exactly right. But anyhow, generally we lie
right in the middle of that band. Sometimes we come up t'airly close to the edge at some points.
But we have never to my knowledge gone outside of that band. So we have that kind of
trace where the pressure drops down. The pressure here starts about 1,000 psi, and in this region
here it drops down to about 600 psi chamber pressure, and then it starts back up nominally, and
then it goes back down and then star*,,s to tail off here, and then we separate when it gets to 50.
That gives a signal to the GPCs to separate.
DR. WALKER: How uniform is the pressure inside of the motor?
DR. LOVINGOOD: I don't know. I know we have done a lot of analysis trying to understand,
and I think early in the program we had some, maybe some acoustical
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measures, measurements up on the forward dome, but that is information that we could give
you, and I really den't have good knowledge of that.
(Viewgr;q_h.) Ir,,r. 2,i.,_l
DR. LOVINGOOD: The next chart, Figure 21, shows some considerations that I thought
would be worthwhile to put out here. The fact that since this is a manned space flight program,
that our designed safety factors relative to other solid rocket motors have been applied different-
ly as indicated on that chart.
Like on the structures, we have 1.4 times the limit load, which is the maximum expected
flight load, and generally on military weapons systems that is 1.25 or 1.15, and then on the insu-
lation 1.5 times the predicted requirement on the case, two times the predicted requirement on
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the nozzle, and that is usually one and a quarter on military systems, and we do proof test all of
the_e segments to 112 percent of their maximum expected flight pressure.
And what that amou.,,,ts to is--that is '_0 percent of the 1.4 safety factor, and that ts the
convention in solid rocket motor techn,flogy.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Excuse me On what do you apply this 112 percent proof
test'?
DR. LOVINGOOD: Segments.
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VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Each production segment?
DR. LOVINGOOD: Each segment.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Thank you.
MR. RUMMEL: Does the term "limit load" apply to the ultimate strength of the material or
the yieid point or what?
DR. LOVINGOOD: That would be ultimate. That would be breaking up. The requirement is
that you don't break up at less than 1.4 times the maximum expected load. You don't have an
ultimate failure,
MR. RUMMEL: Thank you.
DR. LOVINGOOD: Then we have done x-ray and we did 100 percent x-ray of the propellant
in the first 68 segments that were manufactured, and through that verified that the casting
process that we were, using provides proper propellant strength. :_urrently we use the process
control that we verified with those 100 percent x-rays, and we do a random monthly x-ray of a
segment, and then whenever we have a process anomaly or a process change or design change,
then we do an x-ray for the segments, and then we still do a 100 percent x-ray of the nozzle
ablator parts to be sure that there aren't any delams or voids or cracks.
MR. ACHESON: At what times are these x-rays
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taken in comparison--that is, in relation to the dates of deliver}" and flight of mission?
DR. LOVINGOOD: I will have to get you that information. I can get you the information on
these specific segments that we flew, I am not even sure of the manufacturing time. They may
not have been 100 percent x-rayed because it may have been after we instituted this random
sampling, but I will give you a typical example of when the x-ray was taken and when it was
flown.
DR. WALKER: Are the three forward segments interchangeable?
DR. LOVINGOOD: The forwardmost segment, and I am not familiar with exactly how we do
all of these segment changes, but the length of the forwardmost segment is longer, and also you
have got a dome, a forward dome on that segment. So there is not complete interchangeability
between the segments, but when we take these back and refurbish them, we do wash out the
propellants and the liners and start all over again and then remake the factory joint, and I am
just not sure how we can interchange those.
DR. WALKER: Thank you.
DR. LOVINGOOD: But that is kind of data that we can provide to you.
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DR. WALKER: Thank you.
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Now, that is all [ had on the booster. [ want to comrt, ent that there were questions earlier--
I think the gentleman who was asking the question has left. There was a qu,_tion e ,:"ier about.
I think he phrased it, a concern by Thiokol on low temperatures.
We did have a meeting with Thiokol. We had a telecom discussion with people in Hunts-
ville, people at the Wasatch division, and people at KSC. And the discussion centered around the
integrity of the O-rings under lower temperature.
We had the project managers from both Marshall and Thiokoi in the discussion. We had the
chief engineers from both places in the discussion. And Thiokol recommended te proceed on the
launch, and so they did recommend the launch.
We had a meeting where there was some concern about the cold temperatures.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: When was that meeting?
DR. LOVINGOOD: That was the 27th. That started around quarter to 5:00 central time.
(Viewgraph.)l_,.rz. 7. I
DR. LOVINGOOD: Isthereanything elseon the booster?
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Iguessnot.
DR. LOVINGOOD: Going on tothe externaltank
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project--
tViewgraph.) ll_,'l -' _ ;ll
DR. LOVINGOOD: Arnie has talked a great deal already about this, and I think you realize
that the LOX tank is forward, the oxygen tank is forward. And we have the inner tank, which
has a large cross beam, which takes out the thrust from the SRMs. The SRMs are attached on
the sides here to this large cross beam, and that is where all the thrust is reacted into the exter-
nal tank, through the inner tank.
And then the bydrogen tank is the aft tank, which is separated from the oxygen tank by the
inner tank area. And then we have the gaseous exygen pressurization line that runs the length
of the vehicle up to the top of the LOX tank.
We a,3o have a cable tray that runs up to the top of the LOX tank, and that cable tray has
wiring, wires, electrical wires, as well as it has a linear shaped charge in it. This feed line, the
oxygen feed line, comes out of the inner tank. Well, it comes from the LOX tank into the inner
tank and out at this point, and feeds down the side of the hydrogen tank external to the hydro-
gen tank, into the orbiter.
The hydrogen feed line comes directly out of the bulkhead in the orbiter. The hydrogen
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pressurization and the oxygen pressurization lines are just adjacent to that feed line, the oxygen
feed line, and then the cable tray.
And then I think Arnie has already discussed the attach structure that we have back here.
This aft ring is where the orbiter loads are reacted, plus this thrust hmg_,,,,_, and it goes up into
this next forward ring, and then the SRB rear attach points come also into that aft ring.
MR. FEYNMAN: What is the purpose of the linear shaped charge?
DR.
MR.
DR.
runs up
LOVINGOOD: That is range safety destruct in the event there is a problem.
FEYNMAN: Where is it located?
LOVINGOOD: It's in the cable tray. I'm not really sure where the charge starts, but it
the vehicle. And I'm not sure of the total length, but it is actually in that cable tray.
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Okay, that is really all I wanted to say about the external tank. [ think we have covered
that.
MR. FEYNMAN: What loads is that designed to .)
DR. LOVINGOOD: The external tank loads, when we first began the program we had a
safety factor of 1.4 on all loads. We had a weight reduction program in which we took _.000
pounds out of the tank, and we used various methods to get that 8,000 pounds out_
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At the time that we did that exercise and that engineering analysis, we had already done
loads testing on the standard weight Lank that we started out with, and so we knew the load
paths very well. And so what we did was we took loads which we considered to be well-defined
loads--for example, a pressure load--and we said that since we know that load so well and with
our experience at that time, plus the structural testing that we had already done, plus the proof
testing that we do of those tanks, that we would design that structure to 1.25.
The other structure, which is determined by thrust, gimballing loads or aerodynamic loads,
wind loads, are still--that structure is still designed to the 1.4.
MR. SUTrER: When did the lighter tanks get into serv:,.e?
DR. LOVINGOOD: STS-8.
Well, I guess the next chart I had on the tank. Of course, Martin-Marietta is the prime con-
tractor, and we've got major subcontractors as listed there. And then we did a lot of the testing,
most of the testing, at Marshall, including the structural tests and modal sur_,ey tests and vari-
ous thermal protection system activities, as I've got indicated there.
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And I would say, too, that the requirements--and I don't think I have that on that chart Do
I have another chart?
(Viewgraph.) IR,', . 2 ,_ 721
Excuse me just a minute. I think I've got my charts all mixed up here.
Okay, chart 25. Well, this really answers the question, I guess, that was just asked. I've got
down there three sigma loads, and that is a statistical term that doesn't mean anything. That's
the maximum predicted flight loads. That is our requirement.
And there is a loads data book, and I think Dick Kohrs is going to talk about or Tom Moser
I think is going to talk about how we do that as far as the requirements are concerned. But
anyhow, it is designed to the maximum predicted flight leads, and then we do qualification tests
to 1.25 and 1.4, as I just mentioned, depending upon the circumstance.
And then in that testing, we do it at cryogenic temperatures for the hydrogen tank and
room temperature for the oxygen tank and the inner tank: and thep propulsion system, as far as
the interface requirements and delivering the proper propellants to the orbiter and to the main
engine, is qualified by testing that we do.
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But in pa=ticular, the main propulsion tests, which I have already mentioned, we have run
12 of them. And then thermal protection system: that is there to maintain the propellant qual-
ity, to make sure you've got proper temperatures for engine operation and avoid propellant boil-
off and that sort of thing; to thermally protect the structure in certain areas, areas of high heat-
ing, like for example that we have an ablater underneath the LOX feed line over where we do
have external mold line protuberances.
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And then also limit ice formation *.o prohibit damaging the orbi'_er, and we have qualified
that through wind tunnel testing, both combined environments and also putting plasma __rc heat
sources on there to make sure that we've got the proper recession ranges.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: As far as previous flights are concerned, has the external tank been
successful or has it been a source of trouble, generally speaking?
DR. LOVINGOOD: The external tank I personally feel like we have had '_ery gcx_d success
with. We have had some problems with some pressure transducers, and these ar,_: just fairly rare
occu rrences.
I think we have had like two LOX LH transducer bias shifts, just v_:ry small changes.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: What does that mean?
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DR. LOVINGOOD: We!l, we have in the oxygen tank, we have four pressure transducers
that measure the amount of pressure that is in the tank, and then those pressure sensors are
used to control the gaseous oxygen control valves on the orbiter. And on the hydrogen tank, we
also have pressure transducers, and they control gaseous hydrogen control valves, G,r they feed
back information as to the pressure and then those valves open or close based upon what tb_e
pressure is.
The problem we have had is that we have had some--when we sit at one tanking load for a
long period of time, the sensors tend to vibrate. And we're not really sure what the cause of it is,
and we've found that the vibration is causing perhaps shorting between lines or contamination
between the wiper and the coil.
And it has given us like a tenth of a psi or a half a psi offset. The main concern here is that
we will violate a launch commit criteria, because we have--at T minus 31 ._.onds, we have to
have three of these transducers before we go.
And so, we never have really considered that to be a problem as far as safety _n flight was
concerned.
DR. WALKER: Can I ask a question about venting? Are there vent valves when the tank is
sitting
174
on the launch pad?
DR. LOV!NGOOD: Yes. But I would like to defer that question to Bob Sieck. I think he
could answer it much better than I could, about what happens on the pad.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Okay. If there are no further questions, thank you very much.
MR. MOORE: Mr. Chairman, we will, at your request, provide you any of the detailed brief-
ings on the specific elements of this, at the center or -¢¢herever you need, to get more detailed
information on the 51-L situations of hardware.
I asked our people to make sure that they gave the Commission today a good oversight and
an overview of what each of the elements of the shuttle was
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, I'm sure that all Commission members understand that And
as I said, we appreciate the fact that you have been able to assemble all of this information on
such short notice. So please don't be apologetic for not being able to answer all of these ques-
tions, which we'll have plenty of opportunity _o ask later on.
MR. MOORE: Thank you, sir.
Next I would like to continue on with a major element of our program. That is the grounds
operations
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work and getting ready for launchJ The activities that you will see presented herb by Mr. Robert
Sieck, our Director oi' Shuttle Operations at the Kennedy Space Center,, will be applicable to STS
5l-L, as they are in terms of how we process all of the particular flights.
So. Bob.
( _l_ness sworn.)
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SPACE SHUTTLE MAIN ENGINE (SSPE_) PROJECT
[Ref. 26-55]
SPACESIIUTTLERAIN£NG;NE
• MSFC RE_',IhD'NSI£1LITY
AESSARCH. DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION OF TttE ._,,PACE SHUTTLE MAIN ENGINE. A HIGH PERFORMANCE,
REUSABLE, THROTT_rABLE ENGINE FOR THE ORBIIER. THE 470K THRUST _NGINE BURNS LIQUIO HYDROGEN
AND Li(_UID OXYGEN.
• PRIME CONTRACTOR
ROCKETDYNE DIVISION, ROCKWELL iNTERNATIONAL CORPORATION
• MAJOR SUBCONTRACTORS
- HONEYWELL, INC. -- CONTROLLER
HYDRAULIC RESEARCH, INC, -- HYDRAULIC ACTUATORS FOR ENGINE VALVE CONTROL
• TEST SITES
- NATIONAL SPACE TECHNOLOGY LABORATORIES - 2 STANDS
- SANTA SUSANA FIELD LABORATORY - I STAND
[Ref. 2 6-56]
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FLIGHT ENGINE FLOW
O MANUFACTUREO AT ROCKETDYNE. CANOGA PARK. CALIFORNIA
• ACCEPTANCE TESTED AT MSFC TEST AREA AT NATIONAL SPACE TECHNOLOGY
LABOFIATORIES (NSTL)o MISFASSIPPI
• ',NSTALLED INTO ORBIT,_R AT KSC, FLORIDA
• LAUNCHED AT KSC
• BETWEEN FLIGHT MAINTEI_!ANCE AT KSC
[RPI'. 2 6-57]
[NOT REPRODUCIBLE]
[Ref. 2 fi-St41
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• FAIL OPEF_ATEIFAIL SAFE PHILOSOPHY
OCONTROLLER P._.DUNDANT COMF'uTERS CONTRO'.. MIXTURE RATIO AND CHAMBER
PR E_SUR E
eCONTROLLER INCLUDES SELF CHECK MONITORING CAPABILITY TO ENSURE PROPER
ENGINE OPERATION
• DESIGN FEATURES REDUNDANCY IN THE ENGINE CONTROL AND
MO._,IITOR ING FUNCTIONS
• REDLINES ESTABLISHED BASED ON ANALYSIS AND GROUND TEST
EXPERIENCE
• ENGINE OPEF_ATIO_ DEMONSTRATED IN GROUND TEST/CERTIFICATION PROGRAM
- OFF f,IOM_NAL ENGINE PERFORMANCE DEMONSTRATED
DEMONSTRATED ABORT MOD:. _,
- DEMONSTRATED OFF NOMINAL ENGINE SHUTDOWN MODES
• ENGINES ARE ACCEPTANCE TESTED (HOT FIRED) BEFORE VEHICLE INSTALLATION
[Ref. 2 6-591
SSHE CERTIFICATION
VALIDATION _ HAEDWAREFOR FLISHT
• DESIGNS VERIFIED BY GROUND CERTIFICATION PRIOR TO FLIGHT
• BASIC ENGINE CERTIFICATION- 10 MISSIONS
- 2 SAMPLES - 2 CERT CYCLES 5000 SEc. EACH _,, 20 MISSIONS
• COMPONENT CHANGE CERTIFICATION
- 2 SAMPLES - 1 CERT CYCLE 5000 SECS _- 10 MISSIONS
• GROUND TEST (INCLUDE CERTIFICATION) PROGRAM DEVELOPS PARAMETERS FOR
• MAINTEN,-'.NCE
• fNSPECTION
• REMOV_,_ ,NO REPLACEMENT
• ENGINE GROUND LIFE CERTIFICATION PROGRAM (INCLUDING ENGINE MAINTENANCE AND
COMPONENT REMOVAL AND REPLACEMENT DUE TO LIFE LIMITS) LEADS THE FLIGHT
PROGRAM BY A FACTOR OF 2 FOR ENGINE HOT FIRE OPERATING TIME,
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_Ref. 2 6-60]
CERTIFICATION AND LIFE CERTIFICATION EXTENSION PROGRAMS
PHASE I ENGINE RESULTS
CERTIFICAT_ -,N
• CURRENT FLIGHT ENGINES WITH LiNE REPLACEABLE UNIT CERTIFIED FOR:
• 15 FLIGHTS AT 100/104%
• 7 FLIGHTS AT 109% RATED POWER LEVEL
LIFE CERTIFICATION EXTENSION
• ENGINE 2010 COMPLETED EQUIVALENT OF 40 MISSIONS
• ENGINE 2014 COMPLETED EQUIVALEN _-OF 30 MISSIONS
[R,,I'. 2 _-611
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PURPOSE:
RAiN PROPULSION TEST PROGRAM
TO VERIFY THE DESIGN AND PERFORMANCE OF THE INTEGRATED MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM
AND VERIFY SYSTEMS INTERFACE COMPATIBILITY WITH RELATED FLIGHT SUBSYSTEMS AND
SPECIFIC GROUND SERVICING SYSTEMS_
H_RICAL:
tCONDUCTED 12 SUCCESSFUL STATIC FIRINGS
APRIL T978 THROUGH JANUARY 1981
DPERFORMED 6 SPECIAL PROPELLANT TANKING TESTS
-- FEBRUARY 1981 THROUGH MAY 1983
CURRENT PLAN;
OTWO STATIC FIRiNGSAT 109% RATED POWER LEVEL
g CONVERT FACILITY TO SINGLE ENGINE TEST STAND
fl_et'. J 6-621
I08
Og'lGIN,_l. "_GE
POOR QU AI..iTY
SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER (SRB) PROJECT
SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER (SRB)
I MARSHALL RESPONSIBILITY
PRODUCTION OF THESOLtOROCI(ETBI)OSTER THEPRIMARY ELEMENTSOF THE BOOSTER ARE THE2'_)MILLION
POUND M._XIMUM THRUST MOTORS: FORWARD AND AFT STRUCTURES SEPARATION AND RECOVERY
AVIONICS AND THRUST VECTOR CONTROL SUBSYSTEMS,
• _j_r C_._O_NTRACt O_rS
SOLID ROCKET MOTOR
BOOSTER ASSEMBLIES
- STRUCTURES
- SEPARAT_ONmO_ORs
THRUST vECTOR CONTROL
- INTEGRATED ELECTRONICS ASSEMBLY
RECOVERY SUBSYSTEM
MORTON THIOKOL CORPORATION
UNITED SPACE BOOSTERS PRODUCTION COMPANY (USBPC)
- McDONNELL DOUGLAS ASTRONAUTICS CO
- Ui'llfED TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION
- _,;OOG INCORPORATED 8, SUNDSTRAND
- BENDIX CORPORATION
- MARTIN MARIETTA - DENVER
• TESt" FACILITIES
MORTON THIOKOL
MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER
- LARGE MOTOR TESTING
- SRB STRUCTURAL TESTING
- TPS DEVELOPMENT & TESTING
IRef. 2 66t]
SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER
- SRB -
SRM • I
(MORTON THIOKOI..)
(_CC_(_C .C_
AFT
'_--ASS'Y ,,e,.
(USBPC)
!10
[Ref. 26-65]
SOL ID ROCKEt" MOTOR
CHARAL;TERtSTICS
• LENGTH
• DIAMETER
8 PROPELLANT WEIGHT
• TOTAL WEIGHT
• AVERAGE THRUST
• ACTION TIME
126.12 FT
12 17 FT
_ 110(}00 LB
! ,256,000 LB
2.402000 LB
123,4 SEC
IR,,r J t;.*_6]
DESIGN REQUIREMENTS AND QUALIFICAIION
REQUIREMENT
_MANCE
THRUST - TIME
THRUST VECTOR CAPABILITY
FIGURE20
t8 o
STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY
HARDWARE
PROPELLANT
1.4 X LIMIT LOAD
2.0 X LIMIT LOAD
INSULATION INTEGRITY
CASE
NOZZLE
1.5 X PREDICTED
EROSION
2.0 X PREDICTED
EROSION
DESIGN ENVIRONMENTS
PROPELLANT MEAN BULK TEMPERATURE
RANGE OF +40°F TO 90°F
OUALIFICA rlON
DEVELOPMENT (5) AND QUALIFICATION (4)
MOTOR TESTS
ULTIMATE LOAD TEST & ANALYSIS
SUBSCALE TESTS AND ANALYSIS
DEVELOPMENT AND QUALIFiCATiON
MOTOR ; ;STS
ANALYSIS AND TESTS
BB_
[Ref. 2 (L67]
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TYPICAL THRUST OROFILE
J
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10 20 30 40 60 I0 70 I10 !10 100 I I0 120 130
ZIME |SEC_
[Re!'. "26 6_ I
SRM
PROJECT _ERFORMANCE
O OPERATIONAL RELIABILITY CONSIDERATIONS
O THE SRB HAS BEEN VERIFIED BY ANALYSIS AND GROUND TEST
• MANNED SPACE FLIGHT DESIGN SAFETY FACTORS (RELATIVE TO OTHER
SOLID ROCKET MOTORS) ARE APPLIED
o 1.4 X LIMIT LOAD ON STRUCTURE VS, 1.25 OR 1.15 ON MILITARY WEAPONS
SYSTEMS
1.5 X PREDICTED REQUIREMENT (CASE) AND 2.0 X PREDICTED REQUIREMENT
(NOZZLE) ON INSULATION THICKNESS VS. 1.25 ON MILITARY WEAPONS SYSTEM
o PROOF TEST TO 112% MAXIMUM EXPECTED FLIGHT PRESSURE
- POST CASTING X-RAY VERIFIES PROPELLANT QUALITY
o 100% X-RAY OF PROPELLANT IN FIRST 68 SEGMENTS VERIFIED THAT
PROPELLANT CASTING PROCESS PROV!DES PROPER _ROPELLANT STRENGTH
o PROCESS CONTROL WITH RANDOM MONTHLY 100% X-RAY ON ONE SEGMENT
o X-RAY REQUIRED FOR ALL SEGMENTS WITH
o PROCESS ANOMALIES
o PROCESS CHANGES
o DESIGN CHANGES
- 100% X-RAY OF NOZZLE ABLATIVE PARTS VERIFIES NOZZLE LINER INTEGRITY
[Ref. 2 _-6fl}
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EXTERNAL TANK {El) PROJECT
[Ref, 2. 6_7g)]
I
SPACE SHUTTLE
LIGHTWEIGHT EXTERNAL TANK
AFT ETIORB
SUPPORT AI"TACHMEN1
INTERTANK FWD ET/ORB
SKIN/STRINGER /-- ATTACHMENT ST RL)CTU RE i
($ RING FRAMES1 i _ A' rLH2
•N.,-VO.TEX..L,,I / _/--_:T,C,'L
FWtD OGIVE L02 ELLIPT;CAL
GORES iS| DOME 112 GORE$I
LENGTH 15.1.8 FT 146.6 METIERS)
DIAMETER 27.6 F¥ (IL4 METEr, S)
WEIGHT 46.000 L8$ 130,)60 KILOGRAMS)
PROPELLANT 1,6M LB$ (736,000 KILOGRAMS)
[Ref. 2/6-71}
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ilil_l_%_ _ _'_ ,,._:_-_ _.
IA-t_
EXIERNAL 1MtK
MAJOR DESIGN REQUIREMENTS
STRUCTURAl_
3 SIGMA, tOADS AS DEFINED _N LOADS OAlrA IIOOK
PROPULSION
MAINTAIN AND 10ELIVI_R PROPELLANT9 TO MEET
ORSITER/SSME INTERFACE REOUIREMENTS
THERMAL PROTECTION SYSTEM
MAINTAIN PROPELLANT QUALITY
T_tERMALLY PROTECT _;TRUCTURE FROM ASCENT
AND PLUME INDUCED HEATING
LIMIT ICE FORMATION TO AVOID DAMAGING
ORBITER
QUALIFICA I'ION
TEST 1101.2SJ1_4 T_MES MAXIMUM SPECtr tED
LOADS
AT LH 2 TEMPERATURE FOR LH 2 TANK AND
ROOM IIEMPERATUR I;: FOR LO 2 TANK AND
INTERTANK
QUALIFY mY TEST TO REOUIR_MENT$
MAIN PROPULSION TESTS
GUALIFY BY TEST (WIND Tt)NNE [. COMBINED
I:NVIRONMEP_T. PLASMA ARC, EIC.I TO
SPECIFIED ENVIRONMENT
FK_URE 2_
[Ref. 2'6-72]
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TESTIMONY OF ROBERT SIECK, DIRECTOR OF SHUTTLE OPE_ATIONS, KENNEDY
SPACE CENTER
MR. SIECK" Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission:
I'm Bob Sleek, Director of Shuttle Operations at the Kennedy Space Center, responsible for
the conduct of the shuttle processing at Kennedy. Today I'm going to give a very general over-
view of that and talk about the facilities and the operations we perform within them.
(Viewgraph.) fm.J. z _ 7:: I
This is an aerial map of KSC, of course, central east coast of Florida.
The next chart.
(Viewgraph.) 11¢,_. 2 ,_711
The two major areas, industrial area, which is primarily administrative, and some of our off-
line shops and labs.
The next chart.
(Viewgraph.) !m.r 2 _; 7:_I
This is where I am going to focus the briefing today, which is what we refer to as Launch
Complex 39,
The next chart.
(Viewgraph.) it¢,.t 2 ,_7_q
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This is an overview of what we characterize as our flow. For the Challenger mission it was
generic in terms that we used all of our major facilities. Orbiter processing facility is the pri-
mary one. We do the integration of the shuttle elements in a vertical assembly building and
proceed to the launch pad.
And I apologize, this is not in your briefing. We're going to have to get you this, along with
better reproductions of all of the slides and the photographs that I have here, because the qual-
ity is not good in your handout. But we will get you a good photocopy of them.
I should say a few words about the processing team at, Kennedy. It is a civil service-contrac-
tor team. We have approximately 6500 contractor personnel. Lockheed is our principal shuttle
processing contractor. We have subcontracts with Morton Thiokol for the solid rocket booster
processing. We have Grumman, which handles our launch processing system and computers, and
we have Rocketdyne for the main engines.
We also have on-site at Kennedy during all of our processing representatives from the
design agencies and the design elements. That has been briefed before. Principally again, for the
solid rocket b-osters we have United Space Boosters and Morton Thioke!. For the main
115
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engines, we have Rocketdyne. For the orbiter, we have Rockwell International. And for the ex-
ternal tank, Martin Marietta.
And they are part of our process as we go through the flow of the vehicle at Kennedy.
The next chart.
(Viewgraph.) lR,'i . -' _i771
A little bit more detail. On the left, the orbiter processing facility. We have two bays. We
can accommodate two orbiters simultaneously. In the center, the vehicle assembly building,
which is where the shuttle elements come together: the orbiter from the orbiter processing facili-
ty; the solid rocket boosters, after their refurbishment cycle, come through our rotation and
processing and surge facility into the vehicle assembly building; and the external tank arrives
via barge from Louisiana.
They are assembled on a mobile launch platform in one of our two integration cells, and
proceed to one of our two launch pads.
The next chart.
(Viewgraph.) [r,.r. 2,7_ I
This is where it starts. This is our landing facility at Kennedy.
The next chart.
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(Viewgraph.) Im.r. 2 t_ 7r_I
It is basically a three-mile runway with standard aircraft navigation aids, and we have a
microwave scanning beam system for the autoland capability, which the orbiter has not demon-
strated yet as part of its operation.
The next chart.
(Viewgraph.) IR,,r. 2 ,_so}
We have had five landings of orbiters from orbit at Kennedy.
The next chart.
(Viewgraph.) l_et. '-' li-81]
This is the way that Challenger arrived after its last mission, which was in November of
1985. It came in cn our carrier aircraft to our mate-demate device.
(Viewgraph.) [R,.r. 2 _*-u2]
And of course, put it on the runway, extend the landing gear, and we tow it to the orbiter
proceasi_g facility. And that is the next area which I will address.
The next chart.
(Viewgraph.) IRef. 2'_i-s:_ I
This is a view of the orbiter processing facility, basically two hangars with extensive check-
out and access equipment. It gives us the capability to essentially totally refurbish the orbiter,
with the
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exception of very major structural roods. This is where most of our work force is concentrated.
Most of our activity in a turn-around is conducted on the orbiter because of the complexity of
that hardware, in one of these two high bays.
Next chart.
(Viewgraph.) IR"f. 2 _i-sl!
A few words about the capabilities there. Essentially, we can access every compartment on
the vehicle and we can test it remotely using our launch proce_ing system.
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The principal activity here, of course, is with Lockheed, primarily the refurbishment after a
flight,
Next chart.
(Viewgraph.) Imq :" ,_ ";I
]n_ operations there on the standard turn-around, approximately three to four weeks. We
do all of the things that you see here, essentially in parallel to minimize the time really that _¢e
spend in this facility.
Characteristically, after a mission we safe the vehicle, and this was the case with Chal-
lenger. There were no major anomalies there. We did our de-servicing of the hazardous consuma-
bles, went into our
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main engine inspections, which is one of the critical items that we perform, and reconfiguration
of the payload bay for the next mission.
All of that processing was normal. This particular turn-around flow of Challenger was a
little bit longer than normal because we took the opportunity to put in some of the modifications
required on Challenger to fly the Centaur interplanetary missions, which would have been in
the sprang of this year.
The tile operations are something that we contend with each turn-around, and we start
those as soon as we roll in and they proceed through until OPF rollout.
The next chart.
(Viewgraph.) IR,,r. 2, _"1
To give you somewhat of an idea of the access in there, we totally surround the orbiter with
access platforms and support equipment.
The next chart.
(Viewgraph.) (n,q. 2 .-_7 I
We do perform payload integration for horizontally installed payloads in the orbiter pr',cess-
ing facility. In this case we did not do that, but we had to remove the space lab from the previ-
ous mission.
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(Viewgraph.) Im.r. " ,-ss)
There is a picture of the space _,ab,
The next chart.
(Viewgraph.) [m,I. _ ,-s_q
Some of the tile work,
The next chart.
Wiewgraph.) [R,q'.:__m;I
I'm going to talk a littlebit about the processing of the solid rocket motors and the solid
rocket booster segments.
Next chart.
(Viewgraph.) [Rer. 2 _-_l I
These are the facilities that we perform that in, t k:e triangle of buildings in the bottom of
the picture. We have two surge facilities and we have what we call a rotation and processing
facility.
Next chart.
(Viewgraph.) [n,.r. 2 _-!_zl
If?
l
The segmentsare broughtin on rail car. Theyare horizontal.We removethem with a
crane,bringthemintc the processingfacility,performan inspectiononall of the interfaces,and
then wemovethe segmentsin andstackthemin sequencein oneof our two surgefacilities.
Nextchart.
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(Viewgraph.)[R,q_', '):_i
This isa photographof someof theoperationsin theprocessingfacility.Again,nocheckout
in here,storageandinspectiononly,
Nextchart.
(Viewgraph.)It¢,') 2, _),]
Now I'm going to talk a little bit about our mobile launch platform. The particular one used
in the Challenger mission, I would have to get you the exact number, but we have used it for
approximately half of our previous launches.
The next cha_.
(Viewgraph.) :m., z. _w,I
Basically, it provides the launch mount for the shuttle vehicle. As was explained before, the
solid rocket boostel s are bolted to this launch mount and it is moved around.
The next chart.
(Viewgraph.) JR,q. :, ,_ ,._)
That is the mobile launch platform.
The next chart.
(Viewgraph.) Im,_ 2 _i ,)71
This is a crawler transporter, which we use to transport the mobile launch platform to the
"vertical assembly building and back and forth to the launch pad.
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The next chart.
(Viewgraph.) I)¢,,t. :z .-_.;]
Now, I'm going to spend some time talking about the integration of the shuttle elements,
and that occurs--the next chart--
(Viewgraph.) II¢,,r 2 (i _)_)l
--in the vehicle assembly building. This is where the shuttle hardware essentially comes
together. We have two what we call integration cells, high bays, that we can stack the vehicle
in. We have two other bays which we use for storage of the external tank, and in the low bay
areas we have some shops and labs.
The next chart.
(Viewgraph.) [l¢,,r 2 (_ ,oo]
Next chart.
(Viewgraph.) [Ref. 2_6-mo]
Okay, this is the mobile launch platform being brought into one of the integration cells with
the crawler transporter.
The next ch_ ft.
(Viewgraph.) ,l¢,,r. 2 (_ loll
We then begin tz,_ stacking of the solid rocket booster assemblies on the mobile launch plat-
form. They are brought over with the transporter from one of the two surge facilities.
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Next chart.
lib
(Viewgraph.)iu,,t _ ,, Eoz]
To give you an idea of that process, we use one of our large cranes to raise the solid rocket
motor assembly.
The nexc chart.
(Viewgraph.) [l_,., : _, Io:_l
And we lower it, and we put the pins essentially in, which is approximately 150 of them,
around the circumference of the solid rocket booster. A final inspection of tb= :_aling surfaces is
done et this time, again with the factory reps on board, before we do the final pinning of the
segment interfaces.
Next chart.
(Viewgraph.) II_,'t. 2 _ loll
MR. FEYNMAN: Excuse me. How well do they fit together? Of course, you've constructed
them round and everything was okay, but they fell into the sea and so on, and then you bring
them together. Did they still fit perfectly?
MR. SIECK: No, sir, they do not always fit the first time. After they are rep_7,ed with the
solid propellant in Utah and they're transported to KSC, when we get ready to do this process
we do an initial fit check.
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We have the capability with the sling to hold the segment wi*L either two points or four
points. We have found many times that, when we try to mate these, due t_ out-of-round condi-
tions, we have to demate, change the sling positioning, and let the segment sit for some period of
time, maybe even up to three hours, and then come back down and do the mate again.
So they do not always mate the first time. And again, when we give you a detailed presenta-
tion on the actual history of these segments, we shall go through that with you.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Why did you change the launch pad on this occasion?
MR. SIECK: This particular one, we have been working on launch pad B, which is our new
pad, last used in Apollo for over a year_ And it is part of our process to increase the flight ra*_
to get two launch pads on line. This was the first opportunity to use the new launch pad. It was
completed in December of 1985.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Was it identical with the previous one?
MR. SIECK: It is identic_;1 from the standpoint of looks and function. At the time we did the
launcl,, there were still some differences in the buildup of the Centaur modifications to make
the two
1_7
pads identical, and the rain protection systems.
Getting into more detail, functional components on each pad, due to vendor changeout you
would find some differences there, but functionally the same.
Next chart.
(Viewgraph.) [Ref. 2/6-104]
Okay. The er.ternal tank comes in via barge from Louisiana, usually many weeks, some-
times months, before we stack it in the vehicle assembly building.
Next chart.
(Viewgraph.) 1_,'l. 2 ,_ Io:,!
Again, we use the cranes to put it in the storage cell and remove it.
Next chart.
(Viewgraph.) [,_,,I 2 ci Io,iI
And attach it to t_he two solid rocket boosters.
ll9
Nextchart.
(Viewgraph.) It¢,,l 2. io7 I
We bring the orbi_r in from the processing facility.
Next.
(Viewgraph.) I:¢,'J -'_; I_"l
Attach the slings, retract the landing gear.
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Next.
(Viewgraph _ [R,'I'. 2 ,_-1,)91
Lift it. Next.
(Viewgraph.) ira.r. 2, x io I
A_.d lower it and attach it to the external tank att.ach points, the three that were described
before.
Next chart.
(Viewgraph.) (_," 2 _, _ I m)
Once we have completed a verification of all of those new interfaces, which is a fairly small
amount of time--and for the Challenger flow it was the nominal four to five days--we roll to the
launch complex.
Next chart.
(Viewgraph._ [_,.a 2 ,_ l l2 l
And that is what I will describe next.
Next chart.
(Viewgraph.) l_('t, z _ i l:_I
Here is our two launch pads. The one to the right is launch complex B. Again, the last time
we used that was ip the Apollo program. But again, to repeat, the mobile launch platform,
which is the launch mourn for the vehicle, has been used a number of times, and we had had it
to the launch pad previous for some fit and
189
interface verifications before we did the stacking for tb;_ mission.
Next chart.
(Viewgraph.) [t_,,_ 2. i l 11
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A few words about the facilities there. The watec systems, we have three water systems,
sound suppression water, which is a quench to deaden the shock wave at liftoff of the solid
rocket boosters. We have what we call a potable water system, which is primary safety showers
and eye washee and faucets, and we have a firefighting system which we refer to as the FIREX
system.
The night of the launch, our procedure in order to maintain those three capabilities was to
establish a bleed through all of those systems, much as you would a water faucet when freezing
conditions were eminent, and routed most of that water over to our drain system. Cur drain
syste_ is not what we call a closed loop system, though.
It damps out on some of the platforms on the west side of the service structure, and we did
notice a lot of ice out there, and that was one of the reasons for the additional ice inspection we
did late m the launch count on the launch day. Next chart.
(Viewgrapb). [m,f. 2, !15 l
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MR.SIECK:Aswegoupto the launchpadwith ourcrawlertransportermobilelaunchplat-
form,wehavethecapabilityto keepthevehiclelevel.Nextchart.
( \ h'_,_._t'tl_*ll i [l{,'t _'li llii!
iOi
MR. SIECK: And set it down on the pedestals at the launch pad and remove the crawler
transporter, Next chart,
_\'b,_,_V.:.t[_[] } [1_*'1 2 h 117[
DR. RIDE: Is there any concern for the orbiter being out on Pad B without the rain protec-
tion that it would have had on Pad A?
MR. SIECK: We did have that concern. Of course, we waterproofed the orbiter thermal pro-
tection system before the rollout from the orbiter processing facility, and our criteria since all of
the rain protection modifications were not in place, that after each rain we would go out and
reinspect the water protection system, which is sprayed on the tile of the orbiter, and we did
that three or four times, We will have to get you the exact data on that between the time -.re
rolled out to the launchpad on the weekend of December 21st until the launch on the 28th of
January.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Following up on Dr. Ride's question, I gather the rain protection
system on one launchpad is different from the other?
MR. SIECK: Yes, it is. The plan is to get them both the same. Launch Pad B, the one we
launched from, the modifications were not complete. One of the operations we perform at the
launch pad is the
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integration of the payload into the orbiter, and this was done for the Challenger mission the way
it is normally done. You use a payload cannister. The interim tipper stage IUS and the TDRS
satellite were brought to the launchpad in a cannister such as this, and that was done before the
orbiter and Shuttle arrived there. Next.
(Vi('_v_r:it)tl.) Ilt:_.r. 2 ti-II_ I
MR. SIECK: Next they are removed from the cannister and installed in the orbiter using
our ground handling mechanism. That was the normal procedure. Next chart.
{'_,j(,_>,_i:tt)tl ) il¢,.r, 2 +i i I, I
MR. SIECK: I would say a little bit about our launch processing system, which supports all
of the Shuttle flow from the orbiter processing facility to the launchpad. Next chart.
(Vi_,wTi'at)i_.) ltl_,l . 2 ti 12tl i
MR. SIECK: The launch processing system again is primarily maintained by the Grumman
Corporation. The next chart.
(Viex,,grat)h.) ltl,,i. 2 li. i21l
MR. SIECK: The heart of the system are these consoles. Each engineer, when they perform
their systems checkouts per the design center requirements,
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use their procedures and their software. Whether the orbiter is in the processing facility, the
vehicle assembly building, or the launchpad, we have four of these control rooms. Two of them
are configured lbr launch process. The control room we launched from on the Challenger mis-
sion had been used many times before. Next chart.
(',,'i_'w_r:q_h.) li_,'l. -', _i I::;Zl
121
MR SIECK: That is the photograph of the control center Of course, on launch day all of
those positions or consoles are manned. There are approximately I._0 people in the control room
at launch time.
MR. SIECK: A }it.tie bit about the pos:-launch activit.y f:)r _he SRB retrieval. Next chart.
\ ;_".'. <T'I[_} ,:,'! 2,, 121i
MR. SIECK: We have a dis_sembly area located over on the Air Force instaliation at Cape
Kennedy Next chart
MR. SIECK: We retrieve the solid rocket boosters from the ocean. We have three retrieval
ships. Currently here one of them is designated r,> go to Vandenberg, but there are cur, ently
three on site at
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Kennedy. Morton-Thiokol people are principally in charge of this operation of the retrieval.
Next chart.
', \ _,_",', 'all J_il I I{''1 -' l' t'-'t'i
MR. SlECK: We right the booster assembly, and tow it back to Port Canaveral. Next chart.
f\ _",_<r,ll)h tR,.r :2 ti 127 t
MR. SIECK: And take it into this facility. It is lifted _ut of the water. It goes through a
rinsedown process, and then a disassembly, a cleaning and a refurbishment process. The Morton-
Thiokol people essentially finish their part of the disassembly and retrieval process at the time
they turn it over to United Space Boosters and the Marshall contractor who performs the refur-
bishment of the segments which go back to Utah or the aft assemblies and the forward assem-
blies which have the electronics in it.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Originally the retrieval program was based upon economies, I
assume. We felt it, or the country thought it was cheaper and less expensive to do it that way? Is
that still the case? !s it cost effective?
MR. SIECK: I probably ought to defer to Marshall to get you the actual data on that. For us,
for our operation at Kennedy, it is relatively inexpensive. How the money stacks up on the reuse
and
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retest of the hardware versus new. That was the original plan, obviously. I don't know how the
dollars would add up. We will have to get you that.
MR. SMITH: I was talking to the captain of retrieval operations the othe" day. In his calcu-
lation, they i,3ve retrieved slightly in excess of $1 0illion worth of hardware.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: A year?
MR. SMITH: Totel.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS. The whole program? But l mean, I would assume that since that
program started there would be improvements made so that the cost of buying new ones would
have decreased. In other words, ,lo we know whether it is still desirable from a standpoint of
dollars?
MR. SMITH: The figure that I was quoting would be the cost of brend new steel cases and
all, and not the total cost of the motors. It is the money saved by reuse, is what the figure should
have bee_. Vie will have to verify that, but that is the figure he had.
CHAIRMAN ROGEP_: I think the Commission would like to have that if we could get some
accurate figures on that, on whether, if you, instead of continuing the retrieval program, you
went to a program of buying original boosters, how mucL wouid it cost, and would it
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bedifficult to put intoeffect?
MR MOORE:Mr ('hairman.we havegot economicanalysesthat _e havedone and ,,)
forth, and we a'ill be happy to provide this (7ommission what we thi,'_'," the ecoNom._: tradeof[_
are relative to retrieval or not retrieving this hardware.
MR ACHESON: How long an interval in days or hours or whatever is it between the t, nal
assem',,ly of the system and ti_e rollout to the launchpad'?
MR. SIECK: Well. in the ca,_e of Challenger we wtl] have to get you that data specifically
MR. ACHESON: In the case of 51-L.
MR. SIECK: For 5l-[,. we completed th_ ,_tacking of the solid rocket motor segments ir the
vehicle assembly b_lilding approximately the first week in December. and then mated the exter-
nal tank, and again we rolled out to the launchpad the weekend of the 21st of December
Now, going back further in the genealogy of those casings, whenever they were delivered
from Utah, we will have to retrieve that data for you.
MR. SUTrER: After the thing splashes into that salt water, l assume they are still hot. and
they get towed around by a ship. and yt_u wash them down, but do you do any detailed structur-
al analysis to make sure
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that the load, the design loads haven't changed?
MR. SIECK: Well. l ought t(, defer to Marshall on that. But there is a complete inspection
done at this Air Force facility before these segments are shipped out of Florida.
MR. SUq'I'ER: Is that just a visual inspection'?
MR SIECK: it is primarily a visual inspection and a cleanup of the insulation. The process
back at _Iorton Thiokol in Utah. we will have to get you a briefing on that, what they do with
the segraent casings and the repacking of the grain.
DR. RIDE: Is all of the refurbis' ment done in '_lorida and then the refurbished casing sent
back to Utah for packing, or is some of the refurbishment done in Utah?
MR. SIECK: It is split up some, Sally. There is some done here by the Marshall contractors
over at Cape Kennedy, and the remainder is done back in Utah. and the same applies for tho_
assemblies which have the electronics in it. the aft and forward. Those are primarily done here
in Florida. but again by the Marshall Space Flight Center.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Bob. what you have been describing for the last 20 or so minutes is
really a fantastic example of teamwork and hands-on experience in
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processing the shuttle after a flight and getting it ready for launch. In the early days of the
program, that was done by the people who built and designed the Shuttle, those three element
contractors. We then decided to compete to get the price down.
Could you describe how well did we do in retaining that old hand_ on experience, those old
pros that processed this before we changed contractors?
MR. SIECK: Well, the specific percentage of retention of the work force, I think we will
have to get you the exact number there. It was approximately 85 percent. But there were some
disciplines that had a higher percentage than others. When the contract change u, _ made and
the Shuttle processing contractor, Lockheed, took that over, they got predominant_j all of the
hands-on work force; a lot of the management and enNneering percentages were less.
But the point to be made, a number of people, particularly the key ones, remained at Flori-
da as part of the launch support services contract under the desiffn centers, and they are still
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there as part ,,." the processing, even though they are not m line in the management t'unction :m
the minute-to-minute, hour-by-hour work.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I nutice there appeared to
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be a leak that Lockheed had some inquiry that you were conducting When will that inquiry be
finished, and will it be available to the public':
MR. SlECK: t am sorry'? The inquiry on what. sir'?
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: There was pr -ious inquiry atmut Lockheed's performance, and it
was in the paper, l guess, two days ago
MR. SIECK: Well, maybe [ ought to ,_pldin the process. We evalua t, • x;,ckheed.
MR. SMITH: Bob, let me address what Chairman Rogers is speaking of.
MR. MOORE: Mr. Chairman, if [ might, let me introduce Dick Smith, center director of the
Kennedy Space Center.
_Witne_ sworn.
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TESTIMONY OF RICHARD SMITH, DIRECTOR, KENNEDY SPACE CENTER
MR. SMITH: We did have a handling estimate back in November, if I remember correctly. I
don't remember the exact date. We coml_leted our internal investigation of that. [ approved that
in around mid-December, and I don't remember the specific date rtght now. We typically send
that to headquarters for our review up there before we release it. That process is going on at
this time. I have on a preliminary basis already implemented, started implementing all of the
recommendations, and we will make modifications if there will be any additional judgments to
that.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And the question is, will that report be made public?
MR. SMITtt: That report is a public document after the final approval by the headquarte_
people. Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you.
MR. SIECK I believe that completed my presentation. Let's see. Next chart.
i \ _,,.,,_r _l)ii {R,.I. 2_i I'_ I
MR. SIECK: Okay. just a few words abt, ut our off-line support facilities. A large logistics
building which we just completed to maintain our spares. The
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Hypergolic maintenance facility is a special facility we use to handle the orbiter maneuvering
system pods on the orbiting and the forward RCS, because of the nature of the Hypergolic fuels.
We do not do maintenance on those systems in the orbiter processing facility. We remove them
off line, and the parachutes from the solid rocket boosters, we retrieve those, clean them, repack
them, and reuse them.
That completes my presentation.
DR. WALKER: Could you say something about the venting of the gases from the external
tank during launch?
MR. SIECK: During our launch countdown process, when we load the external tank liquid
hydrogen and oxygen, the hydrogen tank venting is contained through an arm with a disconnect
that essentially is cut loose at liftoff, and all that hydrogen venting is contained, and it goes
through a burnoff system which in the case of Launch Complex B we call a flare stack, and it is
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containedin that _ystemthroughoutthe loading,and wehave__ensorsaroundthat _mbilical
and at the interfaces with the orbiter where we load it to detect an_ leakage
The oxygen system. The exygen, liquid oxygen tank is on the top. We have what we call a
beanie cap
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that fits over the top of the external w'_k. and it has an inflatable bellows to contain a!l of that
oxygen, and it also is vented through an lrm to the outside at the same level as the top of the
external tank.
DR. WALKER: Is the hydrogen vent valve closed at launch?
MR. SIECK: Yes, we dose the hydrogen vent _alve when we pressurize the tank at approxi-
mately two minutes before launch.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: If there are no further questions, thank you very much. We appreci-
ate it. I think we will have a ten-minute recess now, please.
'.Whereupon, a brief recess was taken.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: May I have your attention, please?
We plan to complete the hearing today by 4:30, quarter to 5:00, and that will finish the work
that had been planned, the testimony that had been planned that we were hearing from NASA.
Tomorrow we will meet at 9:00 a.m. in the Old Executive Office Building in a closed session.
The Commission will conti_ _,e its work. including making plans and setting up some procedures
tbr future work. and we also may take some testimony from _'itnesses, possibly classified infor-
mation.
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In order to explain to the media our general attitude about the future work of the Commis-
sion, let me say that we all would like to provide as much information as we can to the public,
and obviously all of the information will eventually be provided to the public.
Secondly, we have to have some of our sessions in closed meetings. President Reagan has
aske<t us to consider the evidence that we have and testimony in a calm and deliberate fashion,
and in order to do that and to have a free exchange of ideas, we must meet in private session
from time to time.
We have no plans to announce today as to future meetings, but as soon as we make those
decisions, we will let you know.
Now we will go ahead with the rest of the testimony.
MR. MOORE: Mr. Chairman, continuing on with our planned agenda, we will talk about the
design and development process for both hardware and software as well as the review process
and safety process. We will try to abbreviate this process to try to give the Commission a flavor
of it and to show that it is in general applicable to all the flights, but also applicable to 51-L, the
Challenger mission.
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I would like to introduce Thomas L. Moser, director of engineering at the Johnson Spa e
Center.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Moser, go right ahead.
(Witness sworn.)
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ORBITER PROCESSING FACILITY (OPF)
DESCRIPTION
• TWO IOENTICAL HIGH BAYS CONNECTED BY A LOW BAY WITH AN OFFICE ANNEX
• CONTENTS
-- ACCESS PLATFORMS WHICH SURROUND THE ORBITER
- TWO ROLLING BRIDGES EACH WITH TWO TELESCOPING PLATFORMS FOR
CARGO BAY OPS
-- EMERGENCY EXHAUST AND FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS
-- ZERO "G" COUNTERWEIGHT DEVICE FOR CARGO BAY DOOR OPERATIONS
-- LIDS INTERFACE EQUIPMENT WITH CONTROL RCOMS
- SHOPS. MATERIAL SERVICE CENTER
-- MECH AND ELECT SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
ORIGINAL PAGIE !_
OF POOR qUALITY
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ORBITER PROCESSING FACILITY (OPF)
(Continued)
OPERATIONS
• INITIAL ACCESS AND SAFING
• POST FLIGHT TROUBLESHOOTING
• MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM REVERIFICATION
• CARGO BAY OPERATIONS
- DOWN CARCO REMOVAL
-- MISSION KIT RECONFIGURATION
- HORIZONTAL CARGO INSTALLATION
• ORBITER MODIFICATIONS
• POWER ON SYSTEM REVERIFICATION
• SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES
• TPS (TILE) OPERATIONS
• ORBITER CLpSEOUr
[Rof. 2 16-77 3 of :_}
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STS LANDING FACILITY (SLF)
DESCRIPTION
• THE RUNWAY 15 15.000 FEET LONG, ,,_ND 300 FEET WIDE WITH A 1,000 FOOT PAVED
OVERRUN AT EACH END WITH LANDING SYSTEM AIDS
• LANDING AIDS CONTROL BUILDING IS LOCATED NEAR PARKING APRON WHICH
SUPPORTS THE LANDING CONTROL OPERATIONS
• THE MATE/OEMATE DEVICE LOCATED AT THE RAMP OF THE SLF
OPERATIONS
• ORBITING LANDING AFTER A MISSION AND LANDING OF THE ORBITER PIGGY-BACK
ON A 747 CARRIER AIRCRAFT
• MICROWAVE SCANNING BEAM LANDING SYSTEM (MSBLS) AND TACTICAL AIR
NAVIGATION (TACAN) ARE USED FOR ORBITER LANDINGS. ALSO, VISUAL AIDS
PRECISION APPROACH PATH INDICATORS !PAPI) ARE INCLUDED.
• ORBITER CONVOY OPERATIONS FOR CONTINGENCIES AT TIME OF LAUNCH AND
SAFING THE ORBITER, EGRE_'SlNG THE FLIGHT CREW AND PREP THE ORBITER FOR
TOW TO THE OPF AFTER A MISSION
• THE MATEIOEMATE DEVICE IS USED TO EITHER REMOVE AN ORBITER FROM THE BACK OF
THE 747 AIRCRAFT OR TO PLACE AN ORBITER ON A 747 AIRCRAFT.
[R,,f'. '2 (;-7_]
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SRB ROTATION, PROCESSING AND
SURGE FACILITY (RPSF)
e
OESCRtPTION .... • ._..._1
• CCNSISTS Off'FOUI_BUrt(I[_IIN_ LOCATED NORTH OF VAR
- OFI_LOAO. ROTATION AND PnOCF.SS_,_G rlIIILDINC CON_;ISTI_;G OF AFT
i30OSTEI_I I_IUILD_tPWORK,':;TANDS, 200 TON OVEfIHEAD B,'IIDGE CRANES, AND
A R_ IL.TBACK W)IICH Tf_AV_ m.;F.*.,TtIROUGH T'_E 6UILDING
- I"_O _UR.r;,E rtlHLDING._ FOR 5TORAGE OF PRO(:E._;SED Sr_M COMPONENTS
PRIOR TO STACKI.*IG
- SUPPORT {1UILDI_;G
I OPERATIONS
• OFFLOAD. nOTATION ANDPROCFSSING BUILDING
-- RECEIVING. OFFLOAD. ROTATION AND INSPECTION OF SRM SEGMENTS
ARRIVING FROM MANUFACTURER IN UTAH VIA RAILCAR
- PLACEMENT OF PROCESSED SEGMENTS ON TRANSPORTATION ANO STORAGE
PALLETS
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MORILE LAUNCHER PLATFORMS (MLP)
• DESCRIPTION
• TWO STORY TRANSPORTABLE LAUNCH BASES
• EXTERIOR PROVIDES
-- $RB HOLDDOWNS
- TAIL SERVICE MASTS
- SOUND SUPPRESSION WATER NOZZLES
• INTERIOR PROVIDES (3ROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT FOR SHUTTLE CHECKOUT,
SERVICING AND LAUNCH
• TWO MLP'$ OPERATIONAL. ONE UNDERGOING MODS
• OPERATION
• BUILDUP AND MOVEMENT OF SHUTTLE TO PAD
• LPS HARDWARE INTERFACE TO ORBITER, ET, AND SRB
• PROPELLANT LOADING
• SOUND SUPPRESSION, OVERPRESSURE REDUCTION, AND MLP PROTECTION DELUGE
• REFURBISH AFTER LAUNCH
[Ref. 26-9tl
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VEHICLE ASSEMBLY BUILDING (VAB)
DESCRIPTION
• HIGH BAY
- FOUR SEGMENT BAYS WITH TWO BAYS ON EACH SIDE OF TRANSFER AISLE
- HB I & 3 WITH EXTENDABLE PLATFORMS USED FOR SHUT'TLE ASSEMBLY AND
INTEGRATION ON A MOBILE LAUNCH PLATFORM
- HB 4 CONTAINS SRB AFT BOOSTER BUILCUP STANDS
- HB 2 & 4 EACH CONTAIN AN ET CHECKOUT CELL AND ASTORAGE CELL
- HB 2 CAN ACCOMMODATE ORBITER STORAGE
• LOW BAY USED FOR SRB COMPONENT REFURBISHMENT AND _UBASSEMBLY;
$SME REPAIR AND MAINTENANCE SHOP
• TRANgFER AISLE AND HIGH BAYS CONTAIN OVERHEAD CRANES FOR SHUTTLE
ELEMENT AND CARGO CANNISTER MOVEMENT
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LAUNCH PAD 39A AND 39B
DESCRIPTION
• BOTH PADS ARE OC TAGO_JAL IN SIIAPE ,&ND CONTAIN A£OJT 1/4 33UARE MILE
LAND.
• EACH PAD OONT_NS. / r'EDE!;TALS TO ;_L)PPORT THE MO[III.E LAtIAiCHER PLATFOR,_
[MLP). FUEL AND O,,XI[) "E sIJPPC_RT ,\Ri; aS. FIXED SERVICE STRUCTURE {FSS] AND A
ROTATING SE_V_CE STR ' ',3r_E !R';._I
OPE,q.AT1ONS
e PAYLOAr) Tr'_ANg,=ER FROP,4 P/L ,_:Af't",Jl";'rEr_ TO PAYLOAD CHANGE OUT ROOM [PCR)
• SHUTTLE/PAD SYSTEM VALIDATION
• PAYLOAD TR,_NSFER FROM PCR TO OR[_ITER USI61GPAYLOAO GROUND HANDLING
MECHANISM (PGHM)
6 PAYLOAD/ORBITER INTERFACE TESTING
• SHUTTLE HAZARDOUS SERVICING INCLUDING HYPERGOLIC FUEL AND CRYOGENIC
FUEL ANDOXIOIZER_
• COUNTDOWN PREPS AND COUNTDOWN OPERATIONS FOR LAUNCH
• PAD BEFURBISH AFTER LAUNCH
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HANGAR AF - SRB DISASSEMBLY FACILITY
DESCRIPTION
- LOCATED AT CAPE CANAVERAL AIR FORCE STATION
- BERTHING FOR TWO SRB RETRIEVAL SHIPS
DISAS.._;EM BLY OPERATIONS
- CRANES STRADDLE SLIP LIFT SRB CASING OUT OF WATER AND PLACE ON
HANDLING DOLLY
- HAZARDOUS SYSTEM_ SAFING
- SRB CASING INITIAL WASH OPERATIONS
- CASING DISASSEMBLY TO MAJOR ELEMENT LEVEL
-- AFT SKIRTS AND FORWARD SKIRTS UNDERGO HYDROLASER WASHING/DRYING
BEFORE T,P,ANSPORTATING TO VAB LOW BAY FOR REFURBISH
- DISASSEMBLED SRB CASINGS ARE TRUCKED TO SRB PROCESSING AND SURGE,
FACILITY FOR RAILCAR ONLOADING AND SHIPMENT TO UTAH
[R_,f. '2 6-12:_]
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SUPPORT FACILITIES
LOGISTICS BU_ LDING {LC-39)
a 300,000 SO. FT.
• WAREHOUSE, PROCESSING SUPPORT FOR SHUTTLE SPARES
HYPERGOLIC M,AINTENANCE FACILITY (INDUSfRIAL AREA)
• OFFLINE PROCESSING OF ORBITER FORWARD REACTION CONTROL
SYSTEM MODULE, AFT ORBITER MANEUVERING SYSTEM MODULES.
• CHECKOUT ILPS), DESERVICING, MAINTENANCE
SRB PARACHUTE FACILITY (INDUSTRIAL AREA)
• WASH, DRY, REFURBISH, ASSEMBLE AND STORE RETRIEVED SRB
PARACHUTES.
IRet. '2 li- 12,_ I
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TESTIMONY OF THOMAS L. MOSER, DIRECTOR, ENGINEERING, JOHNSON SPACE
CENTER
MR. MOSER: Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission, my organization at the Johnson
Space Center provides technical support to the Shuttle Program office and to the orbiter systems
in particular.
What I have done today is, I have constructed for you and for the Commission an overview
of the design, development, and certification process, as Jess said, which is applicable across the
board to all flights, and in particular to 51-L.
I hope that this presentation can give you an insight into the process by which the design
and development is conducted, and will also give you a feel for the wealth of information that
exists in the program, which I think you would want to pursue in more depth. Next chart,
please.
MR. MOSER: I would like to talk to you briefly about the requirements and give you a feel
for how they are established, the reviews which are conducted during this requirement and
design process, the verification which demonstrates the capability by test and analysis, proves
the design. The safety process,
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which I think is very important that you understand, is independent of the program. It is inde-
pendent of the technical organization that does an independent assessment and audit. And then
give you an overview of the external committees which have looked over our shoulders.
The next chart, please.
I\h,\_:_,z:ll_ll ) [1¢,,I 2. I:_o]
MR. MOSER: And the next chart, please.
CViewgraph.) I,t,.r. z, ,:_11
MR. MOSER: Now we are on an overview of how the process evolves from the definition
phases which essentially establish the Level 1 requirements that Mr. Moore control_, the tech-
nology which was developed in parallel to that. For example, this is where the work was done on
the thermal protection system, that is, in establishing the advance capability and the enabling
technology for the Shuttle Program. There was not a lot of enabling technology developed for
this program. It was pretty much on the shelf.
The design and development process is the big phase in the program which established the
detailed requirements of the individual elements and the individual systems. I will talk a little
bit more about that later on. The ground test program then establishes through ground testing
and analysis that the design as
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established meets the requirements that have evolved over the prggram.
The flight test program then provides a verification that those ground tests are in fact ade-
quate to meet all the requirements, and then the orbital flight tests during the early phases did
that very thing. The next chart, please.
(View_'aph.) it,., _ _ ':_zl
MR. MOSER: All of these requirements, for the Commission's information, are delineated at
the very top level, and are traceable all the way down through the various levels through the
different elements that we have talked about today, the orbiter, the external tank, the solid
rocket booster, the engines, the launch to landing sitefacilities.Itisthen--it goes down into the
next level of detail,into the subsystems, for instance, the hydraulic system in the orbiter,the
_]ectricalpower system in the orbiter.
Those requirements are very, very well delineated and documented in a seriesof documents
by each one of the projects.Next chart, please.
(¥iewgraph.) Ir,.r. z ,_t:_:_t
MR. MOSER: In addition to those general requirements, there are specifications which go
down through the same level of all of the flight elements and
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includir, g the support equipment for the program. These specifications not only address the
interface specification between the various elements, for instance, the interface hardware be-
tween the orbiter and external tank, as an example.
In addition to that, the specification for the detailed subsystems are also included in the
specifications. Next chart, please.
(Viewgraph.) Im,r. z. 1:_11
MR. MOSER: There is a series of documents which are maintained and controlled at the
three different levels of the program which establish the baseline. This is an active system. Any
time changes are made in the system for any reason, those documents are kept up to date. The
center series of documents which is in your handout are the technical requirements. Comple-
menting that are the NASA management requirements and also the resource requirements
which ensure the program meets its requirements.
The next thing in this overview and generic presentation, and ! am going to go through this,
Mr. Chairman, very. quickly in response to your request to try and keep it applicable to 51-L so
that you can see what is available, and there are a few things that I
209
would recommend that you pu:sue in more detail.
(Viewgraph.) Ir,.r. 2, 1'_.5I
MR. MOSER: The next chart, please.
(Viewgraph.) [r,,r. 2 ,_.l:_. I
MR. MOSER: I think it is important to emphasize that, as the time phasing chart indicated
to you, that the initial requirements are established and the detailed requirements are con-
firmed. It is se: into _ce as the design evolves. The chart that is on the monitor at this time
shows how the enginee, :ng organization, both at NASA and the contractors, are establishing the
details, and then the" are provided to the program manager at various milestones throughout
the program.
These milestones are identified along the lower portion of that chart. Their acronyms--let
me just tell you in a few words what they are. The program requirements review are established
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early in the program.That evolvesall thewaydownto detaileddesignrevmw_whicil arebase-
lined in the programsomewhatime phaselaggingas the technicalcommunityestablishes
those,but that is what isdocumentedandestablishedin thedocumentsthat I mentionedto you
previouslyThenextchart,please.{Viewgraph).!m')-'" 1::7}
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Thenext threechartsdelineateexactlywhat thosereviewsconsistof,whochairsthem,how
theyareapproved,hewtheyaremodified,andwhatprogramelementsate involved.
Letmehavethe nextchart,please.{Viewgraph.)im.r 2,, I:_sl
MR.MOSER:And thenext.
(Viewgraph.)Ira.,.z, ':_:)l
MR. MOSER: These are just definitions of those major review milestones.
The next, please.
(Viewgraph.) Ot,'*. 2, Iv)l
MR. MOSER: Now, once the design is established, the next process is to verify that that
design does in fact meet the requirements, and also, Mr. Chairman, to establish whet the capa-
bility of that system is, and I think on any one of the systems that you have talked about today
there is a wealth of information and long presentations which should be made to, ou establish-
ing how those capabilities have been established based on the things which are de ineated on
this chart, namely, the ground testing, the analysis, the checkout and the flight demonstration.
The next chart, please.
{Viewgraph.) Im'f_ 2 (_ , '_l
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MR. MOSER: Comparable to the requirements in the establishmen, of all of those that they
in fact do meet the various J_vels of requirements from Level I all the way down to Level III,
there is a well-documental path which is traceable for the certmcation of each one of the ele-
ments. Here we have not only taken the elements and the subsystems, but we have cross-corre_
lated, if you will, each one of those systems with the environments to which it must be proven to
work in, and that is shown on the integrated system veriLcation.
The next chart, please.
{Viewgraph.) Ira.) _ 2 (i I )2 I
MR. MOSER: As the verification is established, each one of the elements focuses on those
things which affect its design and affects the design of the total system, for instance, the loads,
the thermal, the acoustics, the vibration, etc. This is done in a total system sense and provided
to each one of the elements. The way in which all of these loads and environments are combined
is unique with each one of the elements, and that is probably a half-a-day presentation to this
Commission on any one so that you can adequately understand it.
Next chart, please.
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{Viewgraph.) la(". _ '_i I:*l
MR. MOSER: And the next?
(Viewgraph.) [m.r z (_)l_l
MR. MOSER: It is important to highlight on any one of the specific components how i_
interfaces with the other systems, how it is traced through a total verification logic from the
initial flight requirements, design requirements to the environments in which it must live its
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particu'_ar mass prope_ies and so forth to establish the design loads, the design ccnditions, and
the tests which verify that capability
Once those things are done _n the ground, the important thing to recognize is that whole
process then is verified with flight data fl'om the test program. This was constituted primarily
with the firs_ four flightts of the orbiter system and correlated back with the analysis. There
were a few surprises during that program.
MR SUTTER: This process was used in the design and development of the basic program'?
MR. MOSER: Yes, sir.
MR. SUTTER: When you got to these _'eight-saving programs and what not, did you use as
complete a process when you made those ct_ a'_ges also?
MR. MOSER: The answer to that is yes, ,."
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Each one of those elements that had significant changes so that it would affect the conditions or
the loads or the environment to which it was designed was re-analyzed and gone through the
same process, that is correct, sir.
MR. sU_rER: Thank you.
MR. MOSER: The next chart, please.
(Viewgraph._ fm.r _, ;1_ r
MR. MOSER: And the next. That just shows the verification process from the flight data
back to the design.
'The next chart, please.
(Viewgraph.) IJ_,.t " _ I J',l
MR. MOSER: Independent of th;_ total engineering task that I have just walked you
through very quickly is another process which goes on independently of that organization, inde-
pendently of the program office, and that is the safety operations. They do an assessment of the
design from the very beginning. They participate in all of the designs, the design reviews, and
the certification reviews. They, in concert, with the technical organizations, sign off on the ade-
quacy of each one of the systems and subsystems in the program, that it in fact does meet its
design requirements.
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In addition to that, this organization does a complementary set of analyses which is high-
lighted in a box called complerr_entary analysis. There are some acronyms there which are im-
portant. They do a failure modes and effect analysis of the system to understand what the
impact of a failure of that system is. If there is something that comes out of that, it is identified
in a critical items list, of which there are various categories of criticality of functions. A Catego-
ry 1 mea,as that loss of a component or a function would mean loss of the vehicle or loss of the
crew. Category 2 means loss of the mission. And Category 3 means something like loss of data.
Those are all documented along with the analysis on the criticality of all of the components in
the program.
If i could have the next chart, please.
(Viewgraph.) [m.t z ,_ liT]
MR. MOSER: The next chart entitled "The External Review Committees" gives you a feel
for, in addition, gives you a feel for the involvement by committees of technical capability and
expertise external to the program which is reviewed in our total process. I have listed for you
here a few of those committees. It is not complete, but we could provide you a complete review
of all external review
164
r _
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committees.
I would like to point out that the Aerospace Safety Advisory Pane[ which reports to the
NASA Admimstrator and to Congress annuailv in a report_ and also to the appropriate NASA
managers, has participated in an extensive number of reviews of this program since its incep-
tion Last year. %r instance, they conducted 32 reviews of the entire process.
In addition to that, prior to our first flight, we had a certification assessment team which
had eleven subteams in it which conducted a review over about an eight-month period in exten-
sive detail which involved a lot of industry and academia personnel, which reviewed the NASA
design and certification process,
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Could I interrupt to ask on these reviews, do you know whether any
of them relate directly or indirectly to the Challenger flight?
MR. MOSER: Yes, sir, some of them I believe have related directly, if you are speaking of
the 5[-L flight or Challenger in the previous flights.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS I am speaking of 5I-L.
MR. MOSER: Mr. Chairman, I do not know specifically that any one of these reviews related
directly to that. I think that there were perhaps, and I would defer that to Mr. Moore.
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Or indirectly. Rather, if we have to, if our staff looks at these, we
want to be able to somehow target the things that become important for our considerations and
exclude the ones that obviously are totally unrelated, and I guess what I'm asking is would you
be ble to find out the ones that could directly or indirectly relate to the Challenger accident?
MR. MOSER: Yes, sir, I will find that out for you and provide that to you.
MR. ACHESON: Are these reviews made of specific anom_ alies that arise in the program, or
are they reviews also of questions that people raise from time to time?
MR. MOSER: They are both of those, sir. Some of them are reviews in response to particular
anomalie_. Others are part of the normal process, flight readiness reviews, design reviews, certi-
fication testing, etc. I would say the majority of them are in response to the normal process, but
any time we have an anomaly, many of these committees have participated in the reviews of
those anomalous conditions with us.
MR. ACHESON: Have there been reviews of solid rocket boosters on any of the Shuttle
flights, or in assembly and testing generally?
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MR. MOSER: Sir, t would like to refer that to that program, to that project office, if I may,
and we will get that answer for you.
Listed .below in not as much detail because I did not have time to prepare that for you, are
other committees which have participated in an oversight or assessment, some of which are on-
going at this time, Mr. Chairman.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Are the records maintained here in Washington, or would they be in
Kennedy or where? Both places?
MR. MOSER: The answer to that is both places. Some records are maintained here, sir, and
some are at the field ce;,_ters.
Thank you.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you very much.
MR. MOORE: Mr. Chairman, for our final presentation this afternoon, I would like to talk
about the flight preparation process with some specifics related to 51-L, and again give you a
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little bit more feel about some of the specific aspects we go through for the flight and preparing
it to get ready for launch, as well as talk in a little bit more detail about anomaly tracking and
so forth.
To do that, I would like to introduce Mr.
218
Richard Kohrs, Deputy Manager of the National STS Program Office at the Johnson Space
Center.
THE CLERK: Do you swear that the testimony you will give before this Commission will be
the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
MR. KOHRS: I do.
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TESTIMONY OF RICHARD H. KOHRS, DEPUTY MANAGER. NATIONAL SPACE
TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS PROGRAM, JOHNSON SPACE CENTER
MR. KOHRS: Mr. Chairman and members of _he Commission, Tom Moser covered the
design, development and verification, and that continues throughout the program. If we have
new changes to the vehicle or new changes to the process, then that process continues.
What I am going to describe today as an overlay to that is the flight preparation process,
and the flight preparation process is really typical of any mission. It varies a little bit depending
on the cargo, but basically it goes over a year and a half time period. And then I am going to
conclude with showing you the FRR process, at least on an overview scale of what we used
during this 51-L mission, and how that was conducted and handled.
If I could have the next chart.
(Viewgraph.) tm't 2 ,l a,N
MR. KOHRS: It basically shows at the top--and I will only deal with the top bullet--it basi-
cally shows that the flight manifest, which is really our mission assignments--is determined by
the Level I Board here in Washington, and it is implemented by the Level II _ystem. The way
we implement that is through a
220
document called the FDRD document, which is a Flight Definition and Requirements Document.
In the next chart we will show you a little bit of detail.
(ViewgraFh.) Im,I _. LJ_I
MR. KOHRS: And I will point out here that that is this document over here, which is
Volume 3. It is part of our overall configuration, control and management system of how we
track requirements.
The next chart--
(Viewgraph.) It¢,,t 2 ,i i-,,) I
MR. KOHRS:--will show you the details of what this Flight Definition Requirements Docu-
ment does. It essentially has three phases. The first phase is to document basically the next
year's flights in terms of the specific flight requirements for that mission, specific characteristics
like throttle setting, the number of crewmen, the payload, the cargo, etc.
The second part of that document looks beyc _ld the first year into the outyears, and it basi-
cally sets our schedules and our flight manifests for the downstream activity. It will go as far as
probably today, we would go to 1989, 1990, and define the missions we have planned, when they
are scheduled, etc. This allows the projects to plan their flight deliveries of
221
their tanks, rockets, etc.
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PIn addition to that, o,: the bottom of the chart, it is also used as a general mission planning
document, a general document for logistics scheduling, etc. This document is controlled through
our PRCB system, and if you show the next chart--
(Viewgraph.! !m., _' ,, 1511
MR. KOHRS: i apologize I think the one in your handout is not too clear. On the top of the
chart, it shows a Level I organizatmn which is here in Washington, and in the middle of the
cha_ it shows in the top box in the middle what we call the Level II PRCB organization, which
is chaired by the NSTS program manager, who is Arnie Aldrich. And the way we operate on
this, mission by mission, is we meet daily every noon in Houston by telecon. At those meetings
we deal with the activities that are going on with the flight vehicles at the Cape and eventually
with the flight vehicles at Vandenberg. We deal with all changes to the vehicle. We approve
both the hardware and software, and to the processing. We approve all waivers, and we approve
all changes to things like critical items lists, failure modes and effects analyses, and any other
waivers.
(Viewgraph.) itl,.l 2 ,_ 1:,2 I
MR. KOHRS: The next chart in this year-and-a-
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half process of a flight to flight, we have developed some other program milestones, and we have
adopted the terminology called f.reeze points. Freeze points are just a term, but we essentially
sa) for the system to flow in a logical order, we have got to set baselines that are the lower tier
t.li wlli:ll, iS in our i Ll__li_ i.st.,A***_,_,, _,_,.ll__,_t_,_l_**_>_ t_#oCl.iiiii:**_.
This chart is a busy chart, but briefly, it lists in the first column what we are freezing by
this timeframe. If you look across the top, we freeze things at 66 wc-,eks, which basically freezes
the cargo. At _3 weeks we have something called a cargo in,+.egration review, the next step of
freezing that mission definition. At L minus 22 weeks, we go into the crew compartment and
freeze things that are added to the crew compartment like student experiments, f311 up the 1,,ck-
ers, etc.
The .second one from the right is a major milestone, and that terminclogy up there stands
for the OPF, which is the Operator Processor Facility roll-in, minus four weeks. And what we
have learned over the years is to get a logical modification to the flight vehicles, we need t(_
define our enCneering and our changes that the Cape needs to accomplish, arid we shoot to do
that at four weeks before roll-in, which normally
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is on the order of two to three mon',hs before launch.
And finally, at the L minus ten week timeframe, we once again have a review of the ascent
design. Primarily it is to reflect any late changes into maybe cargo that we have loaded on that
might change our performance. We always try to launch, optimize launch probability in terms of
our upper winds in our atmosphere. Normally, and I would say in our 24 flights, at that L minus
ten review, we probably have only changed the ascent design maybe four or five times. And a
very minor change is normally a small update to the ascent trajectory.
The last three lines on the bottom list the OPR, which is _he Office of Primary Responsibil-
ity for the Level I! Those offices are all within the Level II organization. That is, the code there
is just different organizations. The record that we document this is listed in the second column
across the bottom, and it shows how we keep track. We update the FDRD. We update the draw-
ings.
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This nomenclature of MECSLSI and MESELSI and CCCD are really drawings that reflet't
the configuration of the cargo below the payload bay_ cargo above the payload bay and the cargo
that is in the crew cabin. In addition to that, we also baseline for each vehicle, for
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D[ RIDE: How closely have you been able to stick to these launch minus weeks in, say, the
flights over the pant year? If you were to look at one particular flight, take 61-C or 51-L?
MR. KOHRS: As we get closer to launch, of course, we stick closer to them, but I think back
in the CIR timeframe, because of some of our remanifesting and some of our launch abort type
things we have had here, we have had to go back and readjust and do what we call delta reviews
because we had to change our manifest.
DR. RIDE: I know we have been doing a lot of remanifest_ng lately, and compressing these
schedules quite a bit, and getting things like cargo integration reviews actually very close to
flight.
MR. KOHRS: That's right, Sally, but in alm._st all of those cases it is due to some program-
matic change that in a lot of cases is beyond the system's control.
For example, on the TDRS flight that we were going to fly L_st January, we had actually
rolled out to the pad and were a week before launch, and the system decided that TDRS needed
to roll back for some
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modifications. That, which was two _,.'eeks before launch, upset our proce_, if you will, and ere-
ated a series of delta reviews that we -.ad to perform in order to get back into our normal how
do we do business.
(Viewgraph._ {_¢,,t 2 _ I-,:_I
MR. KOHRS: The next chart--and I have a seri,_,_ ' of charts--then get into th_ hght readi-
ness, and this first chart is an overview, and I will just touch on a few points, and then in the
subsequent charts I will go into a little bit more detail of what we typically do at. one of our
m_'.jor centers, and an example I will use will be the Marshall Space Flight Center'. But basical-
ly, prior to every flight, and normally it is L minus one v_ek, launch minus one we_:"_, t_e Asso-
ciate Administrator for Space Flight, in this case, Jess Moore, conducts a _letailed fli_ _t readi
hess revie',, with all the Shuttle elements, the flight operations, and the cargo maragers and
their contractors. Each of these project managers or element managers that I have listed here
with the basic content is--I won't read that to you. I will get into a little bit more detail on
subsequent charts, and then at that review there is normally _ series of open action items. Those
open action items are documented by the Board, with the :equirement that all open actions be
closed out before or at the L minus
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one day review which Jess m_d Arnie talked about earlier, which is our launch minus one day
mission management team.
At that review we formally close those actions, they are signed off. Each project and ele-
ment manager again states his readiness for flight. That readiness is matter of record in our
documentation, and then the commit to flight again is reaffirmed at the L minus onc.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And all of this was done, I assume, prior to _he Challenger acc_,ient?
MR. KOHRS: Yes, sir. This process is typical of our 25 _.auncb attempts. We also do the
same type of process, as Tom mentioned, if we have a major test. We call it a test readiness
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review.Wearegoingto doa clusterenginefiring of three main engines which are scheduled in
the next month or so, but that also get into this revie_ process and get the same level of detail
and documentation.
The next couple of charts or five charts show typically how Marshall--and this is typical of
Marshall and Johnson and Kennedy--
Wiew,,,_aph.) It_,.l -', I-,lt
MR. KOHRS:--establish their flight reaJiness review process, aod the first chart, which is
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up there, shows on the bottom that the prime contractors, element contractors, have their own
internal review. The Shuttle element project which is the first project that reports i'o Dr. Lucas,
has their re_Aew--I'm sorry, Each Shuttle element project, ET SRB and SSME, has their review.
That goes to the Shuttle project office, and then goes to the center director for his review.
It comes to the Level II office for a pro-review and then goes to Jess Moore as an FRR
review and culminatec at the L minus one day review.
(Viewgraph.) Im'_. e _ I;5 I
MR. KOHRS: I'he next chart shows for each of those who eL,airs the FRR, end the thing to
note is on the first one which is the contractor, it is chaired by a level of management that is at
least one higher level than the project manauger for that system. The Shuttle element projects
are chaired by the project manager for the three elements, and the projects office chairs the
FRR, which leads up to the center dir_tor review. I have included on the next charl--
_Viewgraph.) [_,t z, _"i
MR. KOHRS: --the typical membership, which is really the main line organization of the
Marshall Space Flight Center.
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(Viewgraph.} i_,'t _ " l-,';l
MR. KOHRS: The next two charts show in a little bit more detail the purpose and the con-
tet_t of the review, basically, the compatibility of the mission requirements with _he hardware
and the experience base we have had, the experience base for the engines, tank, orbiter, etc.
The hardware pedigree is determined, and I have listed there. It deals with the changes that
have occurred, any waivers and deviations, any--MR there is material review actions on materi-
als, and also limited life items. Anomalies--and Jud talked earlier about, sometimes are called
ob_r-¢ations--are also reviewed and dispositioned and documented rationale as to why that
ancmaly close-out is acceptable to allow us to fly on the next flight.
Also, on the next chart--
(Viewgraph.) Im,r. -', ' _'_l
MR. KOHRS.--is a safety and RQA review which Tom Moser mentioned is basically inde-
pendent of the main line program, but it is reported to the center director institutionally, and
then review of all unplanned open work that still remains before launch.
And then it goes over the support operations at the Kennedy Center, and will go over the
operations
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at the Vandenberg Center when it is operational, and then each element completes what we call
a cert._ficate of flightworthiness.
Now, the level of devil of the certificate of flightworthiness goes all the way down to the
subsystem managers, as Tom Moser mentioned. It is that we will have in the backup documenta-
l81
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tion the statement that the OMS subsystem manager or the APU subsystem manager on the
SRB, he and his contractor counterpart have attested that this vehicle is ready for flight.
That culminates up to the project managers, and then on the FRR day, in this next chart--
(Viewgraph.l ll_,., : _, i-,_j
MR. KOHRS:-is the end product of that review, and I won't deal with the signatures on
there. But basically what it says is that each contractor, on the left hand column, and each
NASA project manager signs this endorsement for flight. This particular page is signed on the
bottom, signature of Arnie Aldrich, who is a Level II program manager, and after that review,
,Jess Moore then, who chairs this meeting, and when I show you the next chart--
(Viewgraph.) IJ_,'t -' _, I.ol
MR. KOHRS:--conducts a verbal readiness poll of all of the contractors that are listed on
the
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top of the page that are directly involved with the next launch, and this sheet happens to be the
sheet from 51-L, where he Los polled these contractors listed on the top, he has polled the pay-
loads and their managers listed in the middle, and down below, the Department of Defense, the
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel. In this particular case they did not attend that 51-L They
normally do. Any consultants to the Administrator ur to the Associate Administrator, Chief En-
gineer, data tracking, and finally, the center directors.
Based upon this poll being conducted, the signed certificate of flight readiness, any open ac-
tions are documented which are closed at the L minus one.
And the final chart I had is what Jess Moore signs to attest--
(Viewgraph.) ll_,'l _" _,ll
MR. KOHRS:--that this fligh_ configuration, the procedures are ready for flight,
And this is an example. It is typically done for every mission and for every major test that
we conduct.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you.
Are these reviews that you speak of, do they result in a written report?
MR KOHRS: Yes, sir, written minutes with
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written action items.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And that, of course, would be available?
MR. KOHRS: That is available. For the record, we can go back to any flight that we have
had or any major test. That data is available the action items and the closeouts.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Have you ever fired any contractor or subcontractor for ,)oor per-
formance?
MR. KOHRS: Not to my knowledge.
Someone else may wan_ to help me on that, but not to my knowledge.
MR. MOORE: We can get you that information, Mr. Chairman. I don't recall any recently.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Are you permitted to contractually? Do you have a provision in the
contract that permits you to fire a contractor or subcontractor for poor performance?
MR. KOHRS: I believe we do, and then some of our contracts are incentive contracts, some
of them are award fee contracts, and you have your mechanisms for dealing with any abnormal
performance in that way also.
But to my knowledge, Jess, ; don't recall anybody where I would use the word "fire" ¢or
poor performance.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, terminate maybe?
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MR. KOHRS: I will have to look for help on that.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I am just wondering, I think, whether you are pretty well locked in
to contractors and subcontractors by the mere fact that they are in that position, or whether you
have any option to terminate a contract if you find poor performance?
MR. KOHRS: Well, a you know, as I mentioned earlier, the Kennedy contracts were just
recompeted into a single processing contractor, and just effective January 1 of this year, I think,
Arnie, the eastern contract, major st_pport contract was recompeted and awarded the first of
January and actually put into implementation the first of January this year.
MR. ACHESON: But the law allows you termination for the convenience of the government?
MR. KOHRS: I think that is right.
DR. WHEELON: I notice in the example here of the checkoff sheets that you have Xeroxed,
most of the signatures are dated 15 January, and a few are dated 23 January.
Do you have a mechanism to go back and make sure that these were still valid certifications
on the 28th?
MR. KOHRS: Yes, _ir. And the reason you
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don't see all of these filled out is, like Arnie said earlier, we do a lot of our meetings by telecon.
The people where you see the signatures were at the meeting that day. Where it says endorse-
ment attached, it was sent in through the mail system., and the record has all of those attached
endorsements.
DR. WALKER: ! had a question as to what occurs after a flight. You have a lot of data, and
I presume there is some procedure for analyzing and evaluating that data?
MR. KOHRS: After each flight the anomalies are tracked. The anomalies, if they affect the
next mission, automatically flow into this process for the next mission. Each project writes a
flight status report or summary report for the previous mission, and that normally is document-
ed, I would say in the average, within 30 to 40 days after the flight. Any hardware items that
are removed from the vehicle go into another tracking system which the orbiter calls CAR,
which is customer action request, and tracks the hardware that is removed and tracks its dispo-
sition, especially if it was involved with an anomaly closeout.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Any other questions?
(No response.)
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you very much.
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MR. MOORE: Mr. Chairman, that completes our planned briefings for today, to go through
the process to give you some feeling of what we go through to get ready for a flight, and to Calk
to 9u a little bit about the activities that we are doing at NASA with respect to the Challenger
accident. And as we said earlier, we will be happy to provide you any additional information
that you need and support your Commission in any way you deem fit.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you.
I compliment you and your associates. We appreciate it very much. We know that we gave
you very short notice, and I think it has been a very worthwhile and effective presentation.
MR. MOORE: Thank you.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: That's it for the day.
(Whereupon, at 4:25 o'clock p.m., the Commission recessed, to reconvene at 8:30 o'clock a.m,
Friday, February 7, 1986.)
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M/Associate Administrator for _pace Flight
Space Shuttle Mission 5I-L F_ight Readiness
Review Assessment
The Mission 51-L Flight Readiness Review (FRR) was conducted on
January 15, 1986,
Based on the assessments and supporting documentation presented
at the FRR, the Space Shuttle mission system is declared to be
flight ready contingent upon closeout of action items and open
work which wore identified and satisfactory completion of _ehicle
wn operations.
Enclosure
i. CoYR E::dorsement Status
2. STS 51-L FRR Action Items
Distribution
(See attached)
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PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON SPACE SHUTTLE CHALLENGER
ACCIDENT--FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 7, 1986
National Academy of Sciences
Auditorium
2100 Constitution Avenue.
N.W.
Washington, D.C.
The Presidential Commission met at 9:30 o'clock a.m.
PRESENT:
WILLIAM P. ROGERS, Chairman
NEIL A. ARMSTRONG
DR. SALLY RIDE
DR. ALBERT WHEELON
ROBERT RUMMEL
DR. ARTHUR WALKER
RICHARD FEYNMAN
EUGENE COVERT
ROBERT HOTZ
DAVID C. ACHESON
MAJOR GENERAL DONALD KUTYNA
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\l._l ) I'R E._I.:NT:
JESSE MOORE, NASA
ARNOLD ALDRICH, NASA
JONATHAN THOMPSON, NASA
MARV JONES, NASA
STANLEY KLINE, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Hearings pages 237 through 302 covered a presentation on physical
security at Kennedy Space Center and Vandenbcrg AI:B. In the
interest of security ai Kennedy and Vandenbcrg, these pages haxc
not been reproduced.
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STATEMENT OF .MAR_, ' JONES, NASA
II_,_l_Ii!_, '_, lil'*' :lll_ "--tN'IIY!I)
[-iaving gone through a rather lengthy title, I will focus on the very last oi:e of th_._, specifi-
cally security. What I'm going to do is to focus on the security prior to the mishap and what we
have done after that, and I will not spend a great deal of time, sabject to your questions, as to
the routine kinds of security that we maintain around the clock--
iViewgraph> fmq. 2 7 l I
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--other than to say that basically we have a very large reservation, around 100,000 acres.
We have perimeter gates, then we have gates with guards furtner in at the critical facilities, and
ther_ f_nally e_m÷ nternal guards.
N_;v, you will note on the six or seven viewgraphs that I have a large number of acronyms.
I'm sure I wiil be in trouble with Jesse if I use any of them. There is a list, if all else fails,
attached to the back of your briefing that describes what each of these are.
DR. WALKER: Could I just ask one question? Are you completely separate from Patrick Air
Force
3O4
Base?
MR. JONES: No, we are totally a separate entity, with one exception. The Cape Canaveral
Air Force Station and Kennedy Space Center are contiguous, and by agreement between the two
organiz_ations the Air Force guards the south side and NASA guards the west and the north side,
with the ocean taking care of the east. It's a very cooperative venture, but totally separate.
A few days before the launch we established what is called a Blast Danger Area. This is
essentially a circle of about a 4500 foot radius around the launch pad. We also established what
we call an Impact Limit Line, which is basically three miles from the launch pad. The purpose
of the impact limit line is that, if there is a catastrophic problem, that no major pieces repre-
senting danger to property or to life should fall in that particular area.
All of that then becomes a guarded area.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: How large is that area?
MR. JONES: The Bias1, Danger Zone, sir, is 4500 feet from the center of the pad. It's a circle.
And then the impact Limit Line is basically three miles to the west of that. So that then the
pads and the beach then are the unprotected area from the blast.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: It is all sides three miles
305
around and in the ocean?
MR. JONES: Let me have backup number 12 on the far screen, if I could, please.
What we have done is to effectively determine the maximum yield that the vehicle could
generate if we didn't take any destruct action, so that we know essentially what kind of cata-
strophic situation we would have.
We then go back and draw an Impact Limit Line. In this instance, it is essentially right in
front of the vertical assembly building, and then go due north, as you will see.
(Viewgraph.) [Ref. i I
Here we have the dotted line, and we make sure then at launch time that we know that
there is no one inside or to the east of that dotted line, which, as you see, comes down right by
the landing facility, the vertical assembly building, on out through Cape Canaveral Air Force
Station.
And then the circles, as you see, are the Blast Danger Areas.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: What is the closest spot to the launch site?
MR. JONES: Well, this is actually or, pad A, but it's exactly the _ame for pad B. We have 70
people who are inside
306
that impact limit line at the time of launch.
CHA!RMAN ROGERS: My question is how far is ..'t from the outside line to the launch pad
B?
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MR. JONES:
CHAtRMAN
three mile area'?
MR. JONES:
and are there [br
From here? This is about three miles, from here to the pad.
ROGERS: So you're fairly comfortable that there were no people within that
Yes, sir, l am, with the exception of 60-odd people that I know who are there,
a good reason. So we restrict access, of course, to that area at about the launch
minus three day point and, with the exception of people who have to go to the launch pa6 for
actual work, we also reatrict access to the Launch Control Center and critical support facilities,
such as some of the communications sites and some of the radar antennas.
Now, during this period of time we actually sweep the area twice daily. It is done with a
helicopter with a security team on board. We do it at different times. And of course, we also
have the guards that are still out in that area, and they are doing roving patrols and making
sure no one gets in there.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Is it fenced in?
MR. JONES: The only fence we can speak to immediately is approximately 1200 feet out
from the
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center of the launch pad, and it is a complete enclosed fenced in area, with guarded access to get
in and out. That is the only fence.
There are other fenced areas, but the whole center as such is not fenced in, no, sir.
DR. WALKER: Does the fence go down to the beach?
MR. JONES: No, it does not. There is on the launch pad, 1200 feet out, and then there's a
large open area to the east of both pad A and pad B. Then there is a beach road and then the
actual beach itself, But no, they do not go that far out, although access to that beach road and
that area is controlled through a guard post.
Now, at this point approximately three days prior to launch, anyone who needs to get into
the Blast Danger Area has to go through a rather elaborate series of checks, ultimately being
approved by the NASA test director, who is on duty 24 hours a day. And when he arrives at a
control checkpoint, he ch_cks in with the guard who is there.
And the guard will not accept that individual's word that he needs to go in. He must radio
back to the launch control center and to the console, and then the console will discuss why this
man wishes to go in with
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the NASA test director. And if he does not know why he needs to get in, he will not approve it.
And for example, if there was a problem on the pad with a fire detection system on the
structure, he might send an alarm technician in. If the NASA test director was not aware of
that problem, he would go back to the control console in the firing room to confirm that they
had a requirement. Then he would approve him going in.
So we think we have good controls for any access to the stack or the entire vehicle on the
pad at that particular point in time.
(Viewgraph.) IR_f. 2 7-11
Let me say that, really up front from our thing, we see absolutely no evidence as of this
minute of any sabotage attempt, any willful attempt to damage the hardware, or any terrorist
activity. And I might also add, we have no claims of that, which would not be out of character
for terrorist activity.
Essentially, as we got closer to the launch, we of course were monitoring all of the security
implice, tions, and we simply had no unusual security incidents reported. We also take a pretty
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goodlook--andgenerally,I've beenfocusingon the land areas right now. but as we got closer to
the launch we
309
implemented certain launch area restrictions in the surface out in the water, and we had
normal United States Coast Guard support, and also the Range Contrgl Center, which is operat-
ed by the Air Force.
And we had various helicopters and boats operating out there. And in fact, on launch day
we had three Coast Guard vessels, five helicopters, plus radar, surveiling the launch area.
And all of the logs and all of the tapes that we have been able to come up with so far reveal
that there were never any reported penetrations of any boats in that area. On one of the NASA
helicopters we had a brand new security officer who was being trained for the first time, was
riding backwards in the helicopter and spotted what he thought was a small boat. It was over
water and he was looking over water and had no frame of reference.
And we have interviewed everyone else on that helicopter and we believe that he spotted
one of the Coast Guard boats. He thought it was 1200 feet away and it turned out it was more
like five miles. He thought it was a 14 footer and it was a 41 footer.
But to substantiate their memories, we have also gone back and reviewed all of the films
that would have any evidence of that area. On top of the large
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building, the vertical assembly building, there are a couple of cameras and they are essentially
looking down at the pad. But, this area, this suspect area behind, and we see no evidence of a
ship.
I might add, there were eight to ten foot waves a mile out to sea, and we suggest a 14 footer
would have been probably at some degree of risk to have been out there. And so we don't believe
that this spotting was accurate.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Did this result in an investigation?
MR. JONES: Sir?
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Did this resmt in an investigation by you?
MR. JONES: Well, in the course of events post-accident this came up, about three days
later, which led us then to go through the interviews and re-examine all of the tapes. And so it
was a rea.tion on our part.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Did you file a report or is there a report of that incident?
MR. JONES: No, sir. It was reported verbally to us, and then we have documented that as
part of the files that we are building.
DR. WHEELON: Would it be unusual for such a boat to be in the area at the time of the
shuttle
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launch?
MR. JONES: No, and I guess if the seas had not been rough it would have been just the
opposite. We have experienced--I might add, I've been involved in every single one of the
launches. We have had a large number of vessels attempt to get very, very close. We have had a
large number of aircraft that have intruded into the area. We have actually had to hold
launches for aircraft.
And that is why the Coast Guard is out there, simply because it is very common. It is a
heavy area for boating interest, as you know, as well as fishing interest. And in fact, ene day we
• " 197
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hadthe QEII simply mi!_up and stopwith a full loadof peopleto seeit. And soit is quite
commonto havevessels.
But theyall knowthe areais closed.Noticesaresentout to themto tell themto stay"out,
andthenof coursetheCoastGuardenforcesit, aswell asourhelicopters,usingloudspeakersor
hailers.
DR.WHEELON:Soif tl_isshouldturn out to bea validreport,youwouldn'tbesurprised?
MR.JONES:No, I wouldnot besurprised,that is correct.But at this pointthere is noevi-
denceto suggesthat it wasvalid. Webelievethat hesawsomething,but whathesawis the
question.
MR.RUMMEL:Canyouclarify theparachute
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incidentthat wasreportedin the press?
MR.JONES:Yes.Asyouareaware,the solidrocketboostersareparachutedback.Initially
whentheycomedown,adroguechutedeploys,andoncethat's stabilizedthenat a certainpoint
theotherparachutesaredeployed.
Andwhathadhappened,asbestwecantel!, that duringthe sequenceof eventspost-event,
post-accident,and postrangesafetydestructaction,the parachutesimply deployed.And what
youwereseeingthenwasa partof oneof thesolidrocketboostersasit camedown.
MR.RUMMEL:Wasit recovered?
MR.JONES:Wedohavea largenumberof thoseparachutesthat camedown,but the first
reportof a paramedicgoinginto the sceneby parachutewastotally false.That wassimply an
assumptionon thepartof theauthor.
CHAIRMANROGERS:I do think that thesetwo pointsillustratewhatweweresayingear-
lier.Anythingthat wedonot commenton in thereportwill besubjecto later rumorsandcriti-
cismsthat wedidn'teveninvestigatethosethings.
DR.WALKER:Theseinstanceswill haveto bein our report.
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CHAIRMANROGERS:Absolutely.
DR.WHEELON:HowclosewasthenearestRussianvessel?
MR. JONES:We did not haveonethat wascloseenoughto be a factor,which is fairly
commonfor us.
DR.WHEELON:How closewasthe nearestRussianvessel?Not that it wasa factor,but
howclosewasit?
MR.JONES:I don'thavethat information.
DR.WHEELON:Canyoufind it for us?
MR.JONES:It's noproblemfindingit. I just don'thaveit.
I do knowthat from my own point, that he wasnot within visualsightingof the areas
where we normally--where it would be common to see them. He wasn't three of four miles out,
but I will find the exact location ane provide that to you.
DR. WHEELON: On previous launches, how close do they come in?
MR. JONES: The closest I have seen them on one of these actual launches was I think about
three and a half miles out, outside the legal limit. I have seen them probably within 100 yards of
the three mile limit, very early in the Apollo program.
In fact, I believe for STS-l--and this is
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strictlyfrom memory now--I believe they were more interested in the solid rocket booster
splashdown area, and so we have seen them in various positions,c[ose or a littlefilrtherout.
DR. WHEELON: And then just in a qualitativeway, on this one were they relativelychose
or relativelyfar away?
MR. JONES: To the best of my knowledge, the closestone was up north of Charleston.
South Carolina. But again, that isfrom memory and I'm going to have to check it.
DR. WHEELON: So they were nowhere near the area? They were unusually absent?
MR. JONES: No, they have, been off and on. We have had several launches where they
didn't show up.
DR. WHEELON: On this iaunch were they unusually absent or in their normal position?
MR. JONES: Their normal position, from my perspective.
DR. WHEELON: Could you clarify that and be a little more precise?
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Jess, I think on those points you should have a complete file, and I
don't care what you call it. We will have to have a section dealing with every one of these
things. If we don't exclude
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every possibility with some convincing evidence, we're going to be subject to criticism for a long,
long time. And if you remember the Warren Commission, that is exactly what they were criti-
cized for, failing to do this and that and other things.
They did a good job and they did all the things, probably, chat any commission should do,
but for years they have been subject to that kind of criticism.
So each one of these things,: by asking the question we don't mean you haven't done a good
job. We just want the material, so that you will have it ready when we need it, to exclude these
possibilities.
And we are going to be working on the exclusion theory most of the time, probably. We're
not going to discover something, so we're going to have to exclude a lot of these things and say,
here is what's left.
MR. MOORE: Yes, sir. We will make sure that gets documented in great detail, and go back
and look at the history from the first flight all the way up to this one, and try to give you a
relative comparison of it.
MR. HOTZ: I think the point here is, how many--do they--or how do they behave when
there is a launch of unusual interest, in contrast to how they behaved here.
MR. JONES: We've seen their interest vary from
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high level of interest, close by, to no interest at all, simply by not being in the immediate ":icini-
ty and so you wouldn't be aware of it.
We know through intelligence sources where they are, and routinely prior to the launch the
Air Force range commander is briefed on the location of those ships. So it's not uncommon to
find them in Charleston or down south and sometimes in transit, going home. And so we get
that data routinely.
It is just that I did not get it for this particular flight.
MR. HOTZ: But they didn't appear to be particularly interested in this flight?
MR. JONES: No, not from my perspective.
MR. COV i When you say they're highly interested, is that five ships, two ships, one
ship? _,_.'_
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MR. JONES: In the immediate Launch vicinity, I've never seen more than one close by.
MR. MOORE: You also have to realize they put ships in the splashdown area.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Most of the intelligence they get is from other sources, anyway.
(Viewgraph.) l_,.r, z 7 I!
MR. JONES: One of the other areas that we concern ourselves with prior to launch is what
we call
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mail-package screening. Essentially, what we do is to screen all the mail that is addressed to our
ce-ter director, to the astronauts, and we also take a look at any other mail which seems to be
consistent with the profile that one would anticipate finding if you had a suspicious letter or a
letter bomb, something of that nature.
And we use the data or information from the FBI to establish what the profile is. And we
had no significant mail of any type whatsoever, announcing any threats or any significant
events as far as mail was concerned.
We did nave a couple of packages that we thought were a little suspicious, and on actual
examination again absolutely no significance related to the mishap.
(Viewgraph.) I_,'r. 2 7 Jl
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MR. JONES: Turning now to the period of time immediately aftei- the mishap, as you would
perhaps expect we've had numerous reports of suspicious persons. We'-e had numerous letters
from a wide variety of people around the country.
Primarily, though, they have been of what we would characterize as the kook type, telling
us what went wron- N9 one in any of those letters has claimed responsibility, announced any
threats or anything.
We feel that just because it appears to be a kook letter to us is not in itself good reason to
put it in a round file. As a result of that, we're working very closely with the FBI, the Secret
Service as necessary, local law enforcement officers, and we intend to pursue each of those to a
logical conclusion to satisfy ourself that in fact it was a kook
DR. WALKER: You say numerous. About how many?
MR. JONES: Oh, I saw five or six yesterday. We have had reports from FBI field offices
around the co*'ntry that they've received some. I think one day last week I had five letters ad-
dressed to Jess Moore that we received at Kennedy. I would think probably a hundred would be
a fair representation at this point.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: It's amazing there are so few.
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MR. JONES: Well, Mr. Chairman, there will probably be a lot more than that ultimately.
We also are concerned, of course, with the wa_er areas, and as noted here on the chart that
area is still controlled by the Coast Guard while the search and recovery process is going on.
Late--early in _he evening after the mishap c_ccurred, the Vice President came down, as I'm
sure many of you know, and during his visit thr, re or shortly after he departed we had a small
boat that was _'eported about half a mile off the c_ast adjacent to Pad B which is shown on the
map over there.
He seemed to just pull up and just stop in the water, and he was spotted by our security
forces on the beach rvT.d. We tried to shine lights out and get some identification off the boat. It
w_ not a large one, and we were never able to identify him.
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Wetried to raisehim with a radioanda PA system, public address hailers, arid he did not
respond at all, and so we called the Coast Guard.
As you can imagine, this was about nine hours after the accident. The Coast Guard was
simply too busy to come and investigate him. He did n,Jt declare himself in distress, and after
about thirty minutes he drove away, and unfortunately we were not able to get any
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ide:tification on him.
Our assessment is at this point it was probably a curiosity seeker, but we're trying to make
every attempt to see if we cm, identify him. I am not encouraged that we will be successful at
this point.
DR. WHEELON: From the way you describe this incident, you seemed to identify it with the
presence of the Vice President. Did you mean to?
MR. JONES: Yes.
DR. WHEELON: Why?
MR. JONES: I will in fact come back to that in a couple of minutes.
Well, what we have taken a look at was what was not normal, and was it not normal be-
cause of some malfunction? Was it not normal because it doesn't happen? The Vice President
being there is not normal. He doesn't routinely come down there. We had that boat incident that
I just referred to. We had the Vice President on hand.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Could you give us the facts again on the boat matter? I wasn't clear
on the facts.
MR. JONES: It seemed to be a small boat in the 15-18 foot range.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: What happened to the man in the boa_?
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MR. JONES: The boat stopped about a half a mile out to sea, approximately adjacent to the
launch pad that we have used. We signalled him with flashlights, car lights, tried to speak to
him on loudspeaker systems in the police car. He never responded to us at all. He never identi-
fied himself. We had no radio transmissions from him at all.
We asked the Coast Guard to come investigate, and since the ship had not declared himself
in distress the Coast Guard opted to not show up.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Then what happened?
MR. JONES: Then he- -
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: He didn't land or anything?
MR. JONES: No, sir. There was no evidence. We were standing there with armed guards in
case he tried it. He just cranked up his engine and left.
DR. WALKER: It's not illegal for that person to be there because it's not a launch.
MR. JONES: That's right.
DR. WHEELON: But why do you tie that to the Vice President's presence?
MR. JONES: Because of the presence of the Secret Service there and his presence, we were
being very sensitive to any event that was out of the ordinary, and
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that was out of the ordinary.
We were also concerned because of the mishap with anything that was out of the ordinary.
At approximately the same time, and I don't have the precise times with me. Over on Cape
Canaveral Air Force Station there is a balloon that is called--well, it's tethered aerostat radar
system, or nicknamed Fat Albert. Fat Albert crashed into the ocean at approximamly the same
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time. All three of these mishaps occurred, of course, shortly before noon. The Vice President
arrived at 5:00 and was there until around 7:',_0_ This event occurred about thirty minutes later,
and within an hour of that time the balloon fell into the ocean.
The initial report on the bal}oon falling in was that there was a report of small arms ground
fire, obviously a non-normal event, and that gave us a great deal of concern. It now turns out
that the investigation revealed the bal!oon was being hoisted back up. It is taken down routinely
before Shuttle launches and was going back up to aid in air traffic control over the search area
because we had a large number of airplanes.
The balloon was probably up over 10,000 feet. The tether oroke, and as each of the d:fferent
strands
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began to break under a h_t of stress and high strain, then the Accident Investigatior, Board be-
lieves at this time, and their findings are not final, that what was heard was in fact the strands
breaking
So these were the not-normal events that I would actua!ly include in there, and of course
ground fire being heard within approximately ten miles of the Vice President gave us some con-
cern, but again, no evidence whatsoever that there was ground fire.
MR. HOTZ: Fat Albert doesn't, normally fly that high, does it?
MR. JONES: Normally it's about 12,000 feet.
DR. WHEELON: If the Vice President hadn't been there, would you have been surprised
that there was a boat in the place you described?
MR. JONES: I think because of the mishap, ye_, because we wanted to keep that whole area
sterile at this point. It was obviously just a tbw hours after the accident, and we simply did not
know what had occurred. We knew that we had floating debris out there. We had objects being
washed up on the shore by this time, and I would not have wanted him there.
Now, l do not know ms of right now what time Lhe Coast Guard declared it a closed area.
That is part of our trying to tidy this pa_zicular event up, because tl_e Coast Guard did close that
area to all surface
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shipping.
DR. WHEELON: But you see the point of my question. You were tying it into the Vice
President's being there. Had the Vice President not been there and he had still come, perhaps
he was unwitting of the Vice President's presence and he was in an area where he shouldn't be,
and all that sort of thing.
But it seems pretty normal to me that there wou'_] be a lot of curiosity seekers. Why are
you so concerned with this?
MR. JONES: I'm not concer,ed wi[h it at all, sir. I just simply am reporting the facts to you
as I see them.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Jess, consider if you will, and you don't have to decide now, whether
at some time in a public session this kind of report would be useful.
MR. MOORE: Okay.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: in other words, this is the kind of thing that would show care, and it
would show that you have done a lot of work ahead of time and you have excluded some possi-
bilities in public, so that would give us a basis for the report that we will make.
MR. MOORE: Yes, sir. I think that if we continue to go in and get most of the details put in
to place and kind of get a big picture story, then I think
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we cau talk to you about some version that is going to the public.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I think that you might keep in m;nd what kind of public sessions we
can have without damaging you." investigation and ._t,;ll reassuring the public that a lot of things
are being done.
MR. MOORE: Yes. sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Go ahead.
,%'iewgraph.) Im'f z 7 N'
MR. JONES: The next day after the launch we decided that one of the moat important
things that we could do was to search the area immediately adjacent to the pads, and we were
perhaps somewhat influenced by what Dr. Kutyna suggested in view of the latter part of this in
a sabotage event.
What we did was take thirty of our very well st_ecially trained investigators and forrr,:d up
five-man teams, and we spent the next three days closely examining the entire area within 2,000
meters of the launch pad; some pretty formidable terrain, some wild animals, alligators, virtual-
ly impassable areas out there.
We were simply searching for any evidence thai someone had been there; food, paper, ciga-
rette butts, scuffed areas, broken branches, flattened weeds. We
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simply tbund nothing.
Now, related especially to the sabotage issue, we did find a tew items of debris that could be
orDiter related. We very carefully plotted wh,-:re all of those were. We photographed them in
place. If they could, we felt, stay secure, we wot_id leave them there and get a trained engineer
who would understand the thing better than my security people would, to come take a look at it.
To date we have found--well, I think we found about 25 items, many of which we have dis-
counted as being orbiter related, a couple that were related to the vehicle. It is not uncommon to
find a little bit of foam, for example, and an occasional piece of a tile, those kinds of tifings.
But no one who has examined the debris that we have found to date,, reads any special sig-
nificance into it, We do have, o¢ course, exactly where it was located.
As a separate action while we were doiag the area outside of that perimeter fence which I
referred to a few moments ago, we had a special facilities team, who understood the launch pad
from an engineering point of view, do a complete walkdown of the launch pad, and that data
will of course be available to you in a later forum.
After they finished, then we went back with some of our security people to _,ake another
complete
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look at the entire area, essentially from the very top the fixed service structure all the way to
the ground. Yes, we started yesterday morning and should have finished late last night after I
left for her;;, with a complete security investigation of the entire inside of the area.
Again, as of now, we have not found anything of any concern to us, and we have continued
on using the mail, as I referred to a little bit earlier, and we are working with all of the other
agencies who have perhaps received mail or those who have not. We're using their talents to
help us in our use of it.
_'iewgraph.) Im.f. -' _ II
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MR.JONES:Asweget official mail for the Board. it goes to the investigative t)oard that we
have. Unofficial mail goes to our pub['c affa'_rs office, and any :.mggestions or information relat-
ing to the mishap goes to the security office as well.
Additional!y what we're doing, we are "ontinuing to review all of the fi!ms that we have.
The 60-odd people that I referred to wt_o were inside the Impact Limit Lines are all being inter-
viewed. We are satisfying ourselves that there were always two or more people together, that no
one _erson was in there alone.
We are in direct liaison with the Air Force
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Office of Special investigations and the Naval Investigative Service, the local law enforcement
agencies, the state as well as the FBI. as I was s'<_ ing, and the real bottom line is, sir, as of this
point there have been no claims of r<' .ponsibil,ty, and we have no evidence at this point that
there was any attempt of sabotage or terrorism related to the orbiter. Just because we haven't
found anything doesn't mean that we will stop looking.
DR. WALKER: The 60 people who were there, would they be doing things like operating
cameras'?
MR. JONES: Yes, there were camera _;perators, security personnel at various roadblocks,
and fire, crash and rescue in the event that we had a problem on the pad to help the flight crew
get out of the pad and get into a safe area.
DR. WALKER: So. they were all officially there?
MR. JONES: They were all there. We know exactly who they were and what their job is. It
is a very limited number, and that is why we know precisely who the individuals are.
DR. WHEELON: Let me address a question to you and to Jess, if I may, meaning both the
security and the technical side.
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By the inspections that you, visual and otherwise, that you performed prior to the launch,
can you preclude the possibility that an explosive was attached to the vehicle?
MR. JONES: I w(,uld say from my perspective, no, I cannot exclude that until I have exam-
ined all of the film and satisfied myself' and looked at it [or]
MR. MOORE: I was just going to say" that what we have tried to do is to look at the outside
aspects of this thing to make sure that we could not find any, ae_ we did not find anything
suspicious.
We still plan to continue the investigative process, but we can't exclude that as an absolute
possibility until we look at all of the photos from all aspects, and it's not clear that we're going
to get coverage of all aspects of the areas we might be interested in. We can't exclude that possi-
bility.
DR. WHEELON: Was the vehicle thoroughly photographed prior to launch?
MR. '_IOORE: Yes, we have photographs of the vehicle very, very close up prior to the liftoff.
DR. RIDE: Did you get pictures of the right SRB?
MR. MOORE: We got pictures of the right SRB; not tota:, however. They are in stacks.
There are parts of it that are
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excluded and so forth that we do not have pictures of, S, lly, so there may be some area there
that you're just not going to see anything.
204
GENERALKUTYNA: Jess,on our guidancesystemst__ accelerometersare sensitive
enoughif I hadanexplosionaboardmyvehicleit wouldbepicke1upby theaccelerometer.Does
theShuttlehavethesamekindof sensors'?
MR,MC.ORE:TheShuttlehassomepretty sensitivethingson it to pickupG-loadsandthe
movementof thebird,like that andsoforth,andthat dataisunderwork right now.
GENERALKUTYNA:Soasyouanalyzeit, _)ossiblyif youhadanythingyouwouldseeit'?
MR. MOORE:The loadsanalysisis a very critical questionwe'readdressingright nowin
additionto the eventstime line which,asI saidearlier,needsgreat correlation, from everybody
that was taking flight data in real time, and that _'.eems to me is a systems thread one has to go
through to get the people to agree on what the events are.
Then the loads analysis is another major effort that is going on right now to try to under-
stand the dynamics of the loads that were on that vehicle as a function of its flight.
DR. WHEELON: Did you take--not have yoa analyzed, but do you have in your poss_sion a
good
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photographic coverage of the area of the SRB which is presumed from the in-flight photography
to have been a problem?
MR. MOORE: We have good phetography of that SRB, but we do not have photography com-
petely 360 degrees around the SRB, so there are some limited zones that we do not have photog-
raphy of.
DR. RIDE: But I think there is photography of the area where the plume comes out.
MR. MOORE: There is photography but, Sally, there is not photography of exactly where
the origin is at this point in time. At least the guys have told us that we do not see that area
exactly where it comes out,
DR. WHEELON: But is there prelaunch of that area'?
MR. MOORE: There are pre!aunch photos of the entire stack that our photography team is
going into and putting together right now, including as I might say prelaunch closeout photo-
graphs of all the flight segments aad the various phases. We are trying to pull that whole
stream of photographs together.
DR. RIDE: Do you do closeout photos of the vehicle on the pad just a day or two before, or
are most of those closeout photos in VAB?
MR. MOORE: Most of those closeout photos are
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on the VAB. There are some pictures taken at prelaunch but not in great detail from the time it
goes to the pad until the time of launch.
DR. WHEELON: What kind of closeout photography do you have on the day of the launch?
MR. MOORE: The photography we have on the day of launch is the still cameras that were
sitting there taking pictures during the actual liftoff. How many pictures have we seen of that
still photography, Arnie, ten or so?
MR. ALDRICH: We personally have not looked at but a small percentage of the total
number of films and locations. They are available.
MR MOORE: But we have :_ real time camera that looks at the launch pad that is transmit-
ted back into our console area that looks at video and so forth. There are also cameras that are
sitting out at the pad.
DR. RIDE: I was going to ask you about those. There are a million cameras on the pad. Are
they running the day of launch?
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MR,MOORE:Theyare runningat sometimebetbrelaunch,Sally.l don'tknowexactlythat
time Mary,doyouaappento knowthat time?
MR..JONES:Well, therearea seriesof them out there, sir, ._ctivated one of two ways. One
are
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sound activated, and the 9thers are light activated. So essentiall:. Sally, they would be at igni-
tion.
DR. RIDE: I'm talking about the ones that are basically--gosh, there must be almost a hun-
dred percent coverage of the pad. You can't stand any place there without being in view of a
camera. Ju:_t on, if you go out there a month before launch or something, there are cameras
running all the time everywhere, and I was just wondering when those are turned off.
MR. MOORE: [ don't know the answer to your question, and our photography team down at
the Cape is pulling all of that data together and we have not looked at that data yet. We haven't
had a chance to look at it, and I don't know the answer to your question. I don't know specifical-
ly when they are turned off. There are a lot of c_meras out there.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Would the Commission be able to look at those pictures whenever
we want?
MR. MOORE: Yes, sir, we would be mot? than happy to provide this Commission with any
of the photographic data that we are looking at.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: It probably would be better to do it down there.
MR. MOORE: Y'es. There's a photography lab that we had set up down there, and we have
got a major
334
team of people that are just doing nothing but looking at photography and trying to enhance the
photography and looking at it from different aspects.
So, yes, at the appropriate time it would be quite good.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: We would not want to do it at a time that would interfere with
whatever they're doing, but from the time standpoint I think that would be useful, just so we
don't interfere with the analysis.
MR. MOORE: Yes, sir, and I would say sometime in the next several days or week or week
and a half we would probably begin to have a good photographic story together on the sequences
that we ,_ee.
We may not have all of the fine enhancement done yet on the photography, but I think we
will have a good knowledge base of the data in terms of the complete set of events sometime
within the next several days or week.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Is this classified?
MR. JONES: No, sir.
MR. MOORE: Only sensitive from the standpoint of the public and exciting the public again.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Why don't we give it back to you? We don't need it.
MR. ACHESON: Has there ever been a sniper
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incident at the Center?
MR. JONES: No, sir. One of the things that we thought, that Dr. Graham suggested that we
offer to the Commission, is the subject of the generic terrorism threat at Kennedy Space Center.
We have asked tbe FBT to share that information with us, and I think they ill have a few
minutes on that.
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DR.WALKER:Can [ just askonequestionon that'?Wouldyousaythat your securityLs
sufflcien'_lytight sothat in yourmind nooneunauthorizedcouldhavegottento the vehicleat
any time when it was undergoing any of its operations at the Cape'? I_. seunds like that is the
case.
MR. ,JONES: We believe that we have a very positive control system. [ would be very hesi-
tant to say absolutely no one can get (n. l think [ would be ibolish to make that commitment to
you, but I think we have a pretty positive control system.
DR. WALKER: The intent is good.
MR. JONES: The intent is good. l think we have reasonably good control.
DR. RIDE: As a result of what you've been doing just the last week or so, have yo_ come up
with any suggested improvements for the security system, or
have you got any recommendations?
MR. JONES: Oh, I could come up with a million dollars worth of improvements probably
overnight, Sally; infrared detectors, closed circuit TV cameras, intruder alarm detection systems.
But yes, I could improve on the system.
DR. RIDE: I guess that is kind of the same as Art'_ question, which was do you think it is
possible for somebody to have gotten on there and sabotaged it, not on this particular launch but
just generically? Is that something you're concerned about?
MR. JONES: One, I think, it would have to be an orchestrated effort by more than one
person because I think we try to
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Could you just say you can assume that what is happening in the
world is that there are all kinds of orchestrated efforts and they always have more than one
person, so that's an assumption.
MR. JONES: We try to ke,_p two-man control anytime anyone is out there. There are obvi-
ously times when you can't do hat, when you're getting back into the aft end of the engine
department, and so on.
But we do try to make that effort.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I think this is really a
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vitally important issue because of terrorism in the world. I mean, this is a natural place, par-
ticularly with this accident.
MR. MOORE: Yes, sir. As visible as the Shuttle pt'ogram is worldwide, [ totally agree with
you.
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: It seems to me we should continue to draw on this one as long as
necessary to make sure it is absolutely secure.
DR. RIDE: I think this is a good area of investigation to be sure what the possibilities for
sabotage are.
MR. JONES: We have done some fairly lengthy studies and tried to come up with some sce-
narios, and then we have characterized those in terms of attractiveness to an outsider, and then
in terms of likelihood, and then we have those kind of numbers.
CHARMAN ROGERS: When you talk about attractiveness, do you have any scenario to
handle a small plane with a suicide pilot?
MR. JONES: No, sir. Well, yes, we do, as a matter of fact, and I think that I would have to
say that we are--and I would like to treat this portion of it, sir, if I could, as classified.
It is simplya vulnerability that wecannotaddress.[t is rather ironic that one week ago
today [ was supposed to be in this very building meeting with the Presidental Protective Detail
to discuss their procedures of how they protect the air
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space over the White House, and that was an arranged meeting which, of course, was cancelled,
but to address that very subject.
DR. WALKER: But this is an area of concern for you?
MR. JONES: Well, I think it is, and of particular concern, and I happen to have had a mili-
tary background as General Kutyna does. The rules of engagement are horrifying. An airplane
comes toward the launchpad and you get terribly concerned. At what point do you shoot him
down? Only to find that it was a poor young man from Memphis on his way home from the
Bahamas, and was curious. I mean, he shouldn't have been in that air space.
DR. COVERT: Or lost, even.
MR. JONES: But it could occur. And that is kind of a real problem to come to grips with.
The rules of engagement and how do you protect a 40-story building which is the launchpad
with a vehicle on it?
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: All you have to imagine is the type of terrorist who drove the truck
into our embassy, and I guess I accept the fact that probably there isn't anything you could do
that is completely safe. But I do think the record should reflect that you are giving a lot of con-
sideration and you are trying
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to do something, and that there are some steps that can be taken along that line. I think that
would be very helpful.
MR. MOORE: Yes, sir. We have not given up looking into the internal prospects as well. I
mean, I think Mary Jones and company have done a good job of sweeping some of the areas. He
told me that they walked ovcr some areas on the land around the launchpad down there.
That is probably the first people since the Indians left that area down there, and so they
have covered a lot of acreage around the pad, but I do think that we have to continue to look
internal as well at our own system to see if there are some suspected areas that we would want
to proceed on. So I think this is by far not closed at this point in time, and we need to continue
to work this area.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you very much.
MR. MOORE: Sir, the next thing is that we asked for a very short presentation by the FBI
on the general threat in the area, just as some background information for the Commission.
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Vie_vgraphs introduced by Marv Jones
on February 7, 1986 were not published
for security reasons.
[Ref. :2 7-1]
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STATEMENT OF STANLEY KLEIN. FBI
MR. KLEIN: Thank you. My name is Stanley Klein. And I am an FBI special agent, and as
such, I direct the bureau's counterterrorism efforts in the United States, both domestic and
international. I am assigned to FBI Headquarters.
I would like to begin by saying that Director Webster expresses his greetings and offers the
full resources of the FBI to this Commission an(: to NASA. We are now working with NASA in
Florida and throughout the country in trying to dispel, if that is what we should do, any hint
that a terrorist has committed sabotage and caused the explosion of the Space Shuttle.
What I would like to do is touch on terrorism briefly, what we see in this country and what
we view as the major threats, what we have seen so far, and some of the inquiries we have
looked at based upon information supplied to us by private citizens and the news media, et
cetera, and where we stand and where we hope to go in the future.
We have approximately 18 domestic terrorist organizations currently under investigation
and 40 some odd international terrorist organizations under investigation operating within this
country with many hundreds and hundreds of supporters and infrastructures
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and groups, et cetera, and it is a tangle of motives and ideals and religious fanaticism, et cetera.
I would like to concentrate on Florida more than anything else to show you what we see
there now. Between 1981 and 1983, there were nine bombings and seven attempted bombings
and one kidnapping carried out by terrorist groups or alleged terrorist groups in the Florida
area. All 17 of these incidents were in Miami, Florida.
There has been no indication of t_errorist activity up around the Cape, and there don't seem
to be any groups operating in that area. A group called Omega 7, which was an anti-Castro
Cuban group some of you might have heard of, were the perpetrators of these bombings. The
leader, Eduardo Arencino, was arrested not too long ago, and is currently serving a life plus 55
year sentence, I believe, and w_:th his prosecution and conviction, there have been no terrorist
acts in Florida since that time, in the past year or two.
The major threats in the United States right now, we believe, are posed by Libya, by Iran,
and by domestic terrorist groups operating out of Puerto Rico, which is not that far from Flori-
da. As far as Iran is concerned, we have seen no terrorist acts committed by that country in this
country.
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Most of their activity centers around intelligence-gathering and attempts to purchase weap-
ons and spare parts to ship back to Iran to support their war with Iraq. They have a large orga-
nized infrastructure in the United States based mostly on college campuses, and they collect
their information from meetings and taskings that they get directly from Iran, and we believe
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we are about as on top of their operations as we carl be at the present time. We don't believe
that any Iranian terrorists were involved in the action on the disaster of the Shuttle.
Libya. Although Mr. Qaddafi makes a lot of pronouncements and he makes it seem as
though he can reach into our streets, I believe, and our investigations have shown _'hat he has
not as yet reached into our streets. When he has attempted to, we have been able to stop him.
The attempts of intelligence officers that he sends into this country are almost naive. They seem
to be the gang that couldn't shoot straight. They go through intermediaries to get things done,
and because they do, we are able to insert often undercover agents and thwart their plans before
they occur and arrest their operatives.
DR. WHEELON: Stop right there. You would agree they reach into the streets of Lebanon,
wouldn't
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you?
MR. KLEIN: Absolutely. Could they reach into the streets here? Of course.
DR. WHEELON: And haven't they drilled some of their own people here on our own
streets?
MR. KLEIN: What Qaddafi has done is offered training to individ_lals in the states that he
believes would form a support base for his view, his Green Book view of what the Arab world
should be in the states and support his causes, and because of that people have been flown or
have flown themselves to Libya and participated in training in that country.
Most of that training is what you and I would refer to as basic training, some basic military
skills, political indoctrination, and through the intelligence community and through our sources
we have not seen Americans being trained there for what we would define as terrorist activity.
DR. WHEELON: I appreciate all of that, but isn't it true that they have in fact killed their
own people here in this country?
MR. KLEIN: They have made attempts to assassinate dissidents in this country. And the
last instance was about a year ago, when they did send an intelligence officer into the United
States, and he was
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forming up an organization to plan the assassination of anti-Qaddafi dissidents. We were fortu-
nate enough to thwart that plan, and he left the country, and we have the people that are part
of h_s group currently under very close scrutiny.
DR. WHEELON: But there have been no killings?
I)(( 111t'(4t ill ( _h_r;t_h_ I)_ ;t _HII_)._H[(', _._. IH_%_, II;tllI(' ('_4_111_,'-, iiH' ;H I}|(' IIHHII('I/I. _,_.hq) Ili_l _11_,_1. ;ll
Th_s _,_y was part of the Wilsin-Terpil network, and of course Wilson is in jail now, so he
did make attempts, but he has not really succeeded.
DR. WHEELON: I don't think it is relevant. I was just trying to focus in on that,
MR. KLEIN: I just wanted to touch on Iran and Libya briefly to say that we have no infor-
rnatio_ based upon our best intelligence, which includes human sources and technical sources,
that either Iran or Libya, our two greatest threats in this country, were involved in any actions
against the Shuttle.
That is not to say that information such as
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that might not come up in the future as we continue probing our sources and things such as
that. The only viable domestic group would be an organization that calls itself the Macheteros
out of San Juan, Puerto Rico. They have boon involved in numerous terrorist acts on the island,
one of which is interesting because it does involve explosions that damaged aircraft on the
island. This occurred on January 12th, 1981, where a series of 18 explosions occurred which to-
tally destroyed a Corsair, two A-7B subsonic attack planes, damage to one Starfire F-10_ aircraft,
and also some equipment that was in the National Guard air corridors alongside the planes.
They went in, cut through a chain link fence, went in at night, planted their explosives, one in
the front of the plane and one in the back.
Let's see. There were, I think, ele,,en devices planted, and it caused $45 million in damages.
The Macheteros have also been active in this country. They were responsible for a multimillion
dollar armored car robbery in Hartford, Connecticut, in which we have staged a series of raids
and arrests in Puerto Rico in the latter part of last year and arrested eleven individuals, the
leadership of the Macheteros.
And they are currently incarcerated and about to go on trial, hopefully by the summer or
fall in
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Hartford for that armed car operation. We do not have any indication that this group, which
does have the skills, and could have the desire to make a statement, was involved in any action
that was taken.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Are they supported by any foreign governments?
MR. KLEIN: Cuba. The Puerto Rican independence terrorist groups that operate in Puerto
Rico we have definite very interesting information that is going to probably come out during the
trial process about the Cuban involvement in support of Puerto Rican terrorism going on.
DR. WHEELON: Okay. Now, you fellows rolled up a Puerto Rican gang in Chicago which
was preparing for activity about two years ago.
MR. KLEIN: That group was the FALN, which is the Pue_o Rican liberation movement in
this country. We did conduct a series of arrests. We did arrest a number of people up there.
There also have been a number of people arrested in New York and in other parts of the coun-
try. Most of the leadership of the FALN is in jail right now. And I think with the FALN in jail
and the Macheteros in jail, we are going in the right direction, and that is how we look at terror-
ism, as criminal acts. I mean, we don't look at it as political acts. And we try to
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identify those people who are involved and put them in jail, and all of a sudden the terrorist
statistics go down.
DR. WALKER: What about the neo-Nazi group that was just sentenced?
MR. KLEIN: The Aryan Nation is a rightwing organization. Again, its leadership, eleven of
them, ten or eleven of them were just convicted of racketeering charges in the state of Washing-
ton and are currently awaiting trial. There is no indication, although they certainly have the
wherewithal as far as weapons, homemade weapons and explosive expertise to do something like
that, there is no indication either that this group was active or is active or has been active in
Florida.
DR. WALKER: Going back to Libya, what about Farakhan, who is making some noises
about going to Libya?
MR. KLEIN: Yes, we are very interested in Mr. Farakhan.
2_2
DR.WALKER:Doyouthink it ismostlynoises?
MR.KLEIN: Well,he certainly received a lot of money from Mr. Qaddafi, and we are look-
ing at that very closely to see if that money will be, could be, might be used to support terrorism
in this country. At
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this point in time we can't say one way or another.
DR. WHEELON: What about the parties responsible for the bomb in the Capitol?
MR. KLEIN: We believe there were two cells. I think I will take you back in time a little bit
to the old Weather Underground, going back to the SDS days on the campuses, and as I say
often, I think most of them when they turned 40 became--their motives changed, yet there was
a small, dedicated group of people that were involved in criminal acts and supported revolution
in this country.
One of those groups was, one of those cells which moved up and down the east coast from
Boston to Washington to Baltimore consisted of individuals that were involved in the robbery ot
the armored car in Nyack, New York, in 1981. Marilyn Jean Buck's name comes to mind. I don't
know if you have heard her name mentioned before. And in her house during the searches that
followed her arrest we did find detailed plans in a folder calling for action on various facilities
around the country, wbich included this building, very detailed sketches of where to place a
bomb, and also other targets such as some facilities at Ammpolis, et cetera.
Most of their bombings occurred in the evening hours. They were preceded by a telephone
call. They
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did not want to cause any grave, I don't believe, any grave physical damage. Our terrorists as
opposed to the ones you see in Europe seem to want to make a statement, and they believe, I
think, that the taking of human life detracts from their cause, which is to gather the American
people behind them in a socialist communist revolution at some point in time, and that turns
people off.
So, most of those individuals also currently have been arrested during the past few years
and are currently in jail, and we don't believe that those two cells function or exist any more. I
would be surprised to see another bombing like that occur in D.C., but then again there are
people out there who could take up the flag.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I think the FBI does a fine job. I am sure you do all you can do
prevent it. This is a little bit beyond our jurisdiction. Go ahead. _¢e are having a bit of a time
problem here.
MR. KLEIN: I have been working with NASA since the explosion by offering FBI laboratory
services to NASA, and we were in receipt of some hairs and fibers on February 2nd from NASA
that we have examined in the FBI laboratories, and the exams have been completed, and we do
have humml hair, Negro hair, Oriental heir, and
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hair from two different brown-haired Caucasians, and what is interesting, according to the labo-
ratory, is that there were no signs of heat damage to any of the hair, which was surprising. The
hair came from face seals_ fragments of helmets, and helmet liners, and headrests.
There have been a number of threats and investigations that we have become involved in
since the Shuttle went down. An engineer in a consulting firm for Rockwell Engineering out in
California advised the FBI that he believed the Shuttle was hit by a laser, that his examination
of the frame by frame stills--I don't know how he recorded it--showed that brown smoke was
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emitted as opposed to white smoke, which would mean that--the white smoke would indicate a
fuel problem, and brown smoke would indicate possibly a laser.
And we have intvcviewed the chief engineer' at Hughes Aircraft, and he beAieves the theory
is plausible but not probable. The FBI agent that interviewed this person believes be is sincere,
and not a flake, or not demonstrating any emotional instability, but it is just a theory which we
have passed or, to NASA.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Is that being taken seriously at NASA?
MR. MOORE: 2 il po_ibilities are being looked
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at. Yes, sir. No possibilities are being excluded.
GENERAL KUTYNA: I tell you, if that guy has got a weapon like that, I would like to put
him on my project.
(General laughter.)
MR. KLEIN: There have also been a number of other instances where people have come
forward and said they believed that this happened or that happened, and we are following every
one of those l:ads out. At this point in time we pass it on, because we don't have the scientific
expertise to say whether their theories are correct or not correct. We just pass it on to NASA
and let them be the judge. And so I guess what I wanted to say is, there is no terrorist threat, no
information that there is, or was or is a group that planned, organized, or executed any action at
Cape Canaveral.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And I am sure you are watching very carefully to see that it dnesn't
happen m the future.
MR. KLEIN: We are watching very carefully.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you very mu,'h
Any questions?
DR. WALKER: Should we handle these theories with our own discretion? That is, if an indi-
vidual who
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is someone who we know, and if the person has a theory, we handle that in a way that we think
best, but if there is someone that you don't know, do you have any advice in that regard?
MR. KLEIN: I am sorry?
DR. WALKER: If someone contact_ us personally and has a theory about the explosion, do
you have any advice to offer us as to how we should handle that?
MR. KLEIN: Yes. If you could pass it on to either us or NASA, we are conducting these
kinds of interviews jointly, so we will take it for possible sabotage violation, and aomebody from
NASA.
MR. MOORE: It is kind of my repository right now for all of these kinds of things, and we
are going to run every one of them down. It is our intention right now.
MR. JONES: If you get some information of that type, either refer it to Jess's office or
Stan's, and then while you are down at the Cape area, again, my office, and we will tie this
thing together, because I see the highest degree of cooperation between all of the government
agencies on this particular operation. No one is worried about turf. Everybody is working togeth-
er. The Bureau and NASA are working together. And we will handle any of those kinds of
things that you
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receive.
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Okay. Thank you very much.
MR. MOORE: Let me just add one little more comment to what Mr. Walker said. Don't send
it to me by mail. Hand it to roe person.ally or to Mary personally, I_ecause I don't think we want
to distribute that information in the mail to my office.
MR. THOMPSON: Mr. Chairman, if you want to give it to me, I can take care of getting it
to Jess.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Okay. That's fine.
MR. MOORE: We have completed all of our discussions we had planned this morning with
you, Mr. Chairman.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Why don't you come up here, Jess? Can you tell us now anything
beyond what we have read in the newspapers?
MR. MOORE: I can tell you that about 670 or 80 milliseconds after launch we saw a short
puff of black smoke come out of the righthand soiid. We cannot see the exact origin of it. I have
had reports that it is all the way down to where the attached unit from the external tank at-
taches the solid all the way to so_ e two feet or so above that, which could or could no_ include
the joint, which some people are fo,:using in on right now.
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I can also tell you that we did see some- -
DR. WHEELON: Wak a minute. Excuse me. Within a second of launch?
MR. MOORE: It was less than a second. What was it, Arnie, 680 milliseconds?
MR. ALDRICH: Six-tenths of a second from ignition of the sqlid, and that is the precise time
that the solid comes to full internal pressure.
DR. WALKER: That was before liftoff?.
),l_ _I(_()t_: N_. L(q m_',_lhr_u,_h_t_('_t,_lu__ , _;_ _.'i'lw_t_iu_,l_ ,i_,_t_,nl_m_,_ _'_/;_1_
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DR. WALKER: It doesn't actually lift off then?
MR. MOORE: Well, it takes some pressure to iift it off of the launch support platform.
DR. WALKER: How long does it take the solids to build up?
MR. MOORE: We don't know precisely. That is what we are looking at on
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these films, to try to get the precise time that the system unlatched itself from the pad. There
will be some variation in there. It i,a not exactly precise.
This happened about 680 or so milliseconds. It finished at about two seconds or so. And it
settled down. We don't see it any more. And the orientation of it on the one set of films that we
have looked at is kind of behind the solid. It is kind of obscure. We see the smoke come out, but
we do not see, we cannot see on at least the initial films we have looked at exactly the origin of
it.
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DR. FE3(NMAN: Could you remh, a me whether the oxygen line that comes down along the
ET tank and those trays of electrical cables, is it in that area, or is it somewhere else?
MR. MOORE: They are on the right side of the Shuttle. The whole cable tray that you saw
yesterday on the. bottom and so forth are on the right side of the Shuttle.
DR. FEYNMAN: In a place that could possibly be related?
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MR. MOORE: Possibly. The other question that was asked, I guess, Bud asked me earlier
about the range destruct and so fbrth, the linear shape charge that goes up and down the solid,
all the way up to approximately the area below the thru.stum where the parachutes are stored
up, clown the segment:y, up until some 18 or 24 inches above the attach going onto the ET, the
linear charge that goes up the solids and each side of the solid.
DR. FEYNMAN: How close is that to the electrical tray?
MR. MOORE: That in terms of distance, I would say a few feet would be my guess to "_e
electrical tray t.hat carries that cable.
Arnie, do you have a better idea?
MR. ALDRICH: You are talking about the shaped charge
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on the solid?
MR. MOORE: Yes, where it is relative to the tray on the external tank.
MR. ALDRICH: I don't think we could comment in terms of the clocking radially around the
solid with respect to that. I am not sure that I know.
MR. MOORE: It is feet. I mean, it is not very close. I mean, there's the big solids themselves
aim then there is the distance.
DR. FEYNMAN: I am confused. I thought there was also a destruct tray along the ET.
MR. MOORE: There is.
DR. FEYNMAN: That one, is that close to the electrical line?
MR. MOORE: That is close to the cable tray. There is a cable tray that goes up through the
thing, and there is an destruct package down on the top of the tank and one down on the
bottom.
MR. ALDRICH: There is a destruct tank in the middle under the orbiter. However, you are
asking for information that we know. We have found pieces of both of those cord, and neither
has been fired on the external tank.
DR. FEYNMAN: You have found that?
MR. MOORE: Yes, we found that floating.
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Why don't we let him go ahead and finish, and then we will ask
questions.
MR. MOORE: Then that finished at about two seconds, and we did not observe or we have
not observed in any of the photography we have looked at up until that period of time, and then
there was an unusual event, a forced event that occurred around, what, 40 seconds or so is what
the time line chart indicated. And you have a better analysis of that than I have. Why don't you
come up here and discuss that?
MR. ALDRICH: This would be a correlation.
MR. MOORE: Is that the time line? We haven't seen that?
DR. RIDE: Yes.
MR. ALDRICH: Without trying to read this, the telemetry events do show indications of
happenings as the flame occurs on the solid rocket boosters in flight. And Jess, I can't recall the
discussion we had at Marshall about the possibility of some dynamic change at 40 seconds. There
was such a discussi6n.
MR. MOORE: The gimbal angles on the solids moved at about that period of time, as I
recall. And they moved about two degrees, and maybe Sally has got it li_ted in there.
DR. RIDE: I think it is in there. I think
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there may be something at around 40 aeconds.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Sally, why don't you come up here, teo?
DR. COVERT: Sally, what was the altit'ade, then, 35,000?
DR. RIDE: Probab!y. I am not sure.
MR MOORE: The events that we are looking at could be associated with some winds. It
could be associm;ed with some loadings and so forth. We send up weather balloons at various
times before launch, and the last balloon we did was about two and a half hours.
That balloon data is then sent down to Houston for computing the wing loadings and system
loadings on the orbiter at that point in time, and early on, I guess, about 20 hours or 15 bours
before launch we had seen some wind changes, but they were witk.n the spec of the envelope
and so forth.
DR. WHEELON: At 40 seconds you are at Mach .85 and 16,000 feet going 950 feet per"
second at 65 percent throttle thrust with a Q of 605.
MR. MOORE: Go ahead, Arnie.
MR. ALDRICH: Looking at this closely, the first thing that I recall started about 60 seconds,
and that is when you first begal_ to see the flame on the exterior photos as well, and at that
time the thrust
v
r.
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within the solid recket boosters is building gradually, normally, and they see the leffhand boost-
er, which is the one we suspect performed normally, build along the normal thrust profile,
which is a slight increase.
At that time they do not see the righthand rocket. It attempts to stay down, and is affected
in some way and does not build.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: And what is the sensor, Arnie?
MR. ALDRICH: I believe the thrust level from the solids is a derived _alculation based upor_
the performance of the stack. Coupled with that, we do have tkrust chzmber pressure from the
solids, and the chamber pressure on the righthand solid does not build, and it does on the right.
So both the calculated thrust level and the chamber pressure correlates as not increasing on the
righthand side as this bright spot ape-mars on the left, it does appear.
As I say, we haven't been down to Florida in two days, and I haven't seen what Sally has,
but further up the cycle, close to the event, as you approach the 70-second time frame, you do
see a kick of order of magnitude of two degrees in the gimbals on both sclids, both pitch and
yaw, or what do you call it, rock and tilt on both solids, and you see _ similar minor
362
adjustment on the main engip.es as they account for some dynamics, and that is what Jess was
describing.
My recollection is, that is higher up, closer to the event.
MR. MOORE: You could be right, because I haven't physically sat down and seen that data
in several days, so the timing that you probably have, Sally, is probably the most accurate
timing that we have at this point in time.
MR. ALDRICH: And then I recall at about the time that the visual analysis predicts the
hydrogen tank first beginning to rupture, where you see hydrogen fuel come out of the hydrogen
tank, and on the order of a second later you can see the rupture occur and fuel come out of the
oxygen tank. You can also see the main engines which are being fed by these liquids. The main
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enginechamberpressuredecreaseslightly,becauseof the lack of feecfrom the propeliant
system
[ think thoseare theonly indicationsthat I ran remember
CHAIRMANR(NIERS:Wouldyou ,_'.ind_oingoverwhat youjust saidaboutthe six-'enths
of asecond,andthen thetemainderof it, becauseI amnotquiteclear,
MR.ALDRICH:Yes,sir. At ignition"f zeroon theShuttlelaunchis definedasthe time .e
light the
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solidsasthemainenginesarelightedat minus6seconds,oT zeroisessentiallythesolidrocket
ignition.Thetime of releaseis slightly differentthan that, almostpreciselythe sametime. At
six-tenthsof a secondthe thrust within the solid rocketsbuilds to its maximumpressure,its
normalflighl,pressure,andin thephotosthat wehave
CHAIRMANROGERS: Now, is that when the rocket takes off and leaves the ground at that
point, six-tenths of a second?
DR. RIDE: That is sort of hard to define, because as soon as it ignites, it starts trying to get
off, and the main engines are already running, and so they are trying to get it off, so the whole
process, it is hard to say when it actually is no forger in contact.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But obviously at about that time.
MR. MOORE: Yos, at about that time. I thi.k that is correct.
DR. WALKER: It is not restrained, it is just sitting there'?
MR. ALDRICH: No. it has holt._ that hold it up.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: It rips them out'?
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MR. MOORE: They are blown You want to hold down the launch to make sure that you do
a validation ckeck on the main engiues. In other words, we want to bring the main engines up to
make sure all three are running and you have fuli redundancy in each engine, and that is a
launch commit criteria.
DR. WALKER: Once you start the solids, then you release any constraints?
MR. MOORE: That is correct.
DR. WHEELON: And isn't it true you probably start to lift off before you have the maxi-
mum pressure?
MR. ALDRICH: I believe so.
DR. WHEELON: So probably at about .4 you start to move.
MR. MOORE: I think we will be able to tell that when we go back and look at some of the
high-speed photography.
MR. ALDRICH: That is my point. I didn't want to imply that that fact can in fact be deter-
mined. I just don't know precisely.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But at about that time?
MR. ALDRICH: At about that time, that is what happened, and we can tell you precisely.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But then you see something?
MR. ALDRICH: Let me _y one more thing about
rj
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blowing the bolts, because that is an important factor. We send tl_-. '!_nal to ignite the rockets.
At the time it is called T zero, or launch. We also send the sig_,,_ to fire the bolts, either at
precisely that time or within milliseconds of it. But before :hat, _he rockets are bolted solidly,
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aed they see a loadim:, because the Space Shuttle main engines are cantilevered off the solid
rockets.
We light them at minus t; seconds. The whole vehicle _tack actually swings tbrward and
back, and the timing of when you will commit to light--to release and light the solids is timed
such that you load that stack this way and back from the main engine ignition, and about the
time it is vertical again, that is the _;-second period, and the ignition of the solid, so these boost-
ers give a strong bending load during that 6 seconds up to the time of ignition
Now, your question, what did we see'_ At six-tenths of a second after ignition the solid rocket
pressure is essentially up to flight level. On the righthand solid in the same area that 60 seconds
later you see the flame you see a puff of black smoke, a big puff.
DR. WHEELON: How big'?
MR. MOORE: [ would say it was a couple of
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feet in diameter.
MR. ALDRICH: I would say it was about the size of a main engine bell.
MR. RUMMEL: Would a burning seal produce that black smoke?
MR. ALDRICH: That is under discussion and investigation. The comment I have heard, and
I am not an expert, and we don't know the answer yet, is that more likely the grease that is
used around the seals if it were burned could cause a smoke of that characteristic. It is a very,
dark smoke. Most of the flame and smok(, you see is light-colored, and this is a very black puff.
DR. FEYNMAN: Possibly from graphite in the liners or something?
CttAIRMAN ROGERS: Why don't we go ahead and let him tell the rest of it? Then we can
come back with questions.
DR. WHEELON: Have you ever seen such a puff before?
MR. ALDRICH: We are researching all flight films, as we do on every flight. No one that
h,ts done that viewing the films in the past recalls _eing it before. We are going back to be sure
that we haven t miss_:d anything.
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DR. WHEELON: So it could have been there'?
MR. ALDRICH: It could have been there before. No one recalls seeing it.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Anyway, now you have got the puff of smoke, roughly two feet.
DR. WHEELON: Two to ten.
MR. ALDRICH: I would say two by ten.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Then what happens?
MR. ALDRICH: That seems to persist for 2.9 seconds and stop, because as the stack rises
you can see the _ter rising through the _,fff, and it disappears, and there apparently is no
evidence of further black smoke or any other c 3ndition from that area until the time 60 seconds
later tha_ you see this little finger of flame m_proximately, and by approximately it could be a
number of feet apart, along the solid either rad :ally or upwards or downwards. We haven't corre-
lated the blownup photos well enough to say how close the two things are together or whether
they coincide in their location. They are from that place cn the solid rocket booster in a general
sense, however.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: If you get to that point where those things are pretty accurate]y de-
termined visually, will you then be able to isolat _ the area or "_ould that condition be related to
a lot of other
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thin_s' In otherwords,deesthat helpyouisolatethe,cause'
MR M(X)RE:! think it helpsus isolatethe cause, but contributing factors, it could be a
while to understand whcl_ the contributing factors were The other thing, '._.'t me poip, t OUt, :IS the
cases are put toCether. I don't know it" they were shown yesterday, i don't recall, the: are metal
pros about that big in diamete, and ab'-,ut that lonog that are inserted around the case i'here is a
c')rk lining put around those pins There is a band and a cork lining around it And then there is
grease put along the outside of that entire segment out there, and so I have heard some com-
ments that the smoke goes up. ar.d others have said the smoke goe; out, and so forth, so we
don't have that exact origan, but we have really got an area to go and concentrate on.
MR. ALDRICH: I would also like to recall Don's presentation this morning. We of course do
discuss scenarios :is we go along oar path. and there is ever._ possibility that this black smoke is
from something completely different from the thing that caused the flame or the thing that
caused the accident.
DR. FEYNMAN: This is what we would have called an anomaly? Is that right'?
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MR. ALDRICH: It is an anomaly unless we find a film where we have seen one just like it
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: These incidents all fit very well within Don's anomaly
t ree.
MR. MOORE: There is no question, and we have got the people putting all these anomaly
trees together. The way you eliminate the anomalies is. you validate them. and in most cases
you need to go through testing or to have previous test data to cross off this as an anomaly, and
that is what we are building now, i.s one giant system anomaly tree, to go through and try to
cross eff all the things on that tree that we can validate as we test or through other procedures.
MR. ACHESON: Ho_¢ many seconds apart did you say the black smoke and the first visible
plume of flame were'?
MR. ALDRICH: Sixty. This is fairly close to the ignition and liftoff. Now, when we do the
refinement of the photography, it may be that a much smaller flame is visible a good bit earher
than that, but what we have been able to see to date, the flame starts about 60 seconds.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Arnie, I didn't press Judd yesterday, but he talked about erosion,
l_)st-flight inspection to find out about erosion of these joints.
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How much of a problem has that been? Have you got it solved yet, do you think, or do you still
think it is sort of an open item?
MR. ALDRICH: It has been in discussion in the program at least during the last year. There
are two O-rings around the seal, and on about five, perhaps half a dozen STS flights, on each
flight there are six seal areas, three segments, three breaks in each of two solids. There are six
seam sets that see the flight experience each time we fly, and on five flights one or at least on
one flight two of those seams saw some amount of erosion on the inner O-ring.
That is believed to have occurred at ignition. When you first pressurize, you get some blow-
l)y of the first O-ring, but in every case they have seen it stop by the second O-ring However,
'_hat blow-by has caused what they consider to be within an allowable tolerance the amount of
degradation called erosion of that O-ring, and then sooting from that degradation occurred bc
tween the two O-ring seals;
DR. WALKER: But not beyond the second O-ring?
MR. ALDRICH: Not beyond the second one.
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MR SU'I_FER: Are these O-rings replaced .?
MR. ALDRICH: They are brand new every
:57t
flight There is an interesting factor related here that you should understand. Of all of those
instances that occurred, the worst one that we have seen from torndown rockets is the teardown
after the launch we did a year ago, also in cold weather. There was more erosion and more
blown-by material between the O-rings on that one than _n any of the other four or five.
DR. WALKER: Did that one burn two rings?
MR. MOORE: Yes, that wa_,_ one of the flights--that was the flight where the tem_ratures
were low.
MR. ALDRICH: Everything that I know about the certification of this seal, and this is being
worked in much more depth at the Marshall Center than anything that has been reported to our
board, is that the certification tests run on that joint show that the seal wou!d be somewhat
more stiff but completely adequate for sealing at all temperatures in the ranges. There was
never any intention that the system couldn't be launched in freezing conditions, particularly at
32 degrees. And it is my belief that we ex,-_ct this Viton O-ring to perform essentially at much
lower than that.
MR. SuI_rER: They said when these pieces are brought in they aro somewhat warped, but
they may not be as good as a new piece.
MR. ALDRICH: What they said yesterday was,
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they ship these segments on rail cars after they pour them. They pour them vertically, and they
are tested for roundness, and then they ship them horizontally all the way from Utah to Florida.
They store them there, and sometimes when they _,, mate them, they round that they are not
completely circular any more, and they have a variety of hang points so that if it is not circular
you can hang it up some other way for a little while and it will reform into a full circle, so that
they do this check for roundaess before they do the mate.
MR. SUTTER: Then maybe that builds some stresses, so again when the load changes it
pops back to where it wanted to go.
MR. ALDRICH: Perhaps. We will find as we investigate this that the contractor and the
Marshall Center have been very thorough in analyzing the characteristics like that in their
buildup of this design and the way it is handled and the procedures. I agree with you. It seems
like there is some flaw here we should be looking for, but I think many of the obvious ones will
be shown te be completely researched.
CHAIRMAN ROGEtLS: One of the things that--when we ask questions, when we continue
to ask questions, we are not really trying to point a finger. Really, this is an area of what can be
done to make it
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safer. I mean, I don't think anybody, if there were any errors in judgment, God knows, nobody is
going to expect everything ,_o be perfect. I think that is one of the reasons that you will see that
there is bound to be a lot of discussion on this point, and it may well be that we will decide to
recommend that you not retrieve them.
I mean, I know--some people have told me that I thought knew what they were talking
about that it might be just as cheap now to buy new ones when you consider all of the problems
of recovery and rehabilitation and all of that. Any'_'ay, that is certainly one problem, and there
will be continued interest by the public.
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The other thing [ wantedto mentionto you, i thoughtit wasa little unfortunate i_ the
paper this morning that they said that, and I don't think you really said that, that you had
excluded the possibility that weather had any effect i mean. I think weather is also going to be
considered very actively by a whole lot of people, and if at the end of the road you decide or we
decide to exclude it, fine. but if it appears you have excluded that to begin with, particularly
because apparently R6"ckwell did call and gave you a warning which you considered and decided
that it was okay to go ahead, suppose that judgment 4 _s wrong. Nobody is going
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to blame anybody. I mean. somebody has to make those decisions, and you were all there and
made the decisiov..
MR. MOORE: We made the decision on the basis of the data that ',vas available. Let me say
one other thing about weather which didn't come out. Weather is by no means being excluded.
My opinion is that that might be a very major factor, During the month of January, I believe,
before this launch there was also something like seven inches of rain down at Kev.nedy. Axed so
that is another element that really has to be looked at, that the associated moisture may have
had something to do with it.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And again, the testimony yesterday was that one pad had a rain
cover and the other didn't. I mean, tht_se 'hings are of interest.
M_. MOORE: Absolutely, and the t,.,ferences between Pad A and Pad B, those are being
looked at as well. They were looked at before this particular launch. But whether we have put
everything in place, we have got to go back and scour that from top to bottom to see, although
we did use the same mobile launch plattbrm, I guess, as the previous launches have gone off, but
there could be some kind of different loading effects at that particular pad.
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MR. WALKER: Is it possible to get a detailed drawing of those seams showing where the O-
rings are?
MR. MOORE: Yes, sir.
MR. WALKER: If we could just have a sketch.
MR. MOORE: Yes, sir.
At some point in time, if that continues to be a very high probability area, as it is right now,
we think it would be appropriate to bring our experts from the field to talk about this whole
thing and give you a very detailed presentation on it. I think that is the best thing to do for the
Commission, and we would certainly offer that, to get some more information about the seal
area.
The other thing that we are looking at is the checking of those seals at the segment of the
stack. There is a pressure port in the seal on the side of the case, that a person goes in and does
a pressure check. And that pressure check is done to ensure the integrity of the O-rings, and the
pressure check is up to 200 psi, and then it is backed down from 200 psi and brought back up
and held at 50 psi.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Is that a plug on the nozzle?
MR. MOGRE: It's a plug on the side.
MR. ALDRICH: You blow one O-ring up and you
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check it?
MR. MOORE: You check the integrity of the O-rings prior to launch, and that is done sever-
al days or a week or so before.
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VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: But the pressure would be outside-in in the case of the
inside O-ring, then, right'?
MR. ALDRICH: That's right. And that is presumably what set_ up the position tbr initial
blow-by of the first O-ring. You do the pressure checks and it moves the upstream, tl_e inboard
O-ring. upward. And then when you ignite the engine many days later, the first pressure .s_.lrge
hits the O-ring out of the sealed-down position.
And that is wha_ has been alleged to be _he most probably cause of the blcw-by, in addition
to the dynamics of the joint.
MR. MCY)RE: It should seat the other one.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: It should ._eat the other one, but it could act like a flap-
per valve, where you would be pressurizing.
MR. MOORE: That's right.
MR. RUMMEL: In the main joint, I think near the attached fitting, in addition to an O-ring
you have a seal that was somehow inserted, I think in the seam.
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Is that inserted after assembly?
MR. MOORE: There is a putty that is laid up on the segments there. I think it's a zinc
chromate putty that is laid up on the segments as they fit together l_rior to the assembly, and
then the segment is put down with a male section of the segment down into the female section
of the segment.
And then that fits around, the case segment fits around, and you've got putty around this
area, and then there are holes, about 175 or 180 holes, about an inch in diameter, that--circum-
ferentially around this joint. And each of those holes is then plugged with this piece of steel,
round steel about an inch in diameter and about two inches long. It is plugged in each of these
holes and there is a little clip put over each one of those pins from the outside to hold it, a
retaining clip.
And they are all completed and then there is a band that is put on the outside of that, and
that band is tightened around the segment, and then there is a cork layer put over the outside
of that, and then you finally put some coating on the outside of it, some of the whi_ coating. 1
forget the kind of material.
DR. FEYNMAN: I think it's an epoxy.
MR. MOORE: That's probably what it is. And
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then there's a layer of grease put around the outside segments, each of these segments, to form
a water repellent seal. And that is hand laid up, to keep any moisture from getting in that seal.
So there is--the O-rings are laid in there and this thing is put together. So when it comes
together, those two O-rings kind of are laying around this way.
MR. RUMMEL: How is the putty inspected afterwards for voids?
MR. MOORE: There are closeout photographs made and an inspector goes off and looks at
those things.
MR. RUMMEL: This is purely visually or X-ray?
MR. MOORE: Most of it is visually looking at how the putty is laid up. And we do have
closeout photos that we saw before we left the Cape of some of the se_.._ents
Now, we don't know whether we've got complete closeout _hotos. We're supposed to have
complete closeout photcs of all the segments. But Arnie and I only saw a few of the photographs
before we left Kennedy the other day, of some of the segments.
MR. RUMMEL: Has there been any evidence that
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that particular sealant, from past launches, was a problem?
MR. MOORE" We haven't observed much as far as the putty was concerned. There was a
putty that was used, I think a different Kind of putty that was u_ed for the first seven or eight
launcaes, I think, and the manufacturer of that putty went out of business. And I think the
supplier put another putty in, the same kind, supposedly the same kind of putty, the zinc chro-
mate putty.
But the characteristics, what is supposed to be the same, we don't really have any evidence
of anything from a putty standpoint.
MR. RUMMEL: Excuse me. If I recall correctly, yesterday it was said that this was not the
first launch with the new putty.
MR. MOORE: No, it has been since STS-10. which was in '83, I think. And I'm having a
hard time remembering. It was several years ago and there have been a lot of flights with this
parhcular putty in it, this kind of putty.
DR. FEYNMAN: Would it be fair to say that when you were discussing it, the blowby by the
O-ring, you said we don't expect it on the other O-ring. On the other hand, you didn't expect it
on the first O-ring, that
38O
if the second O-ring gives just a little bit when the first one is giving, that that is a very much
more serious circumstance, because now the flow has begun. That is, if the second O-ring holds,
if there is a little bit of blowby, the pressure builds ap and the flow stops, and then it settles
back and seals. But if the secorid one opens just a little bit, there is a flow of very hot burning
fuel product.
MR. MOORE: That's very true.
DR. FEYNMAN: And that can eat away the O-rings and so forth, and so the second one is
very much more critical if it doesn't hold when the first one isn't holding; is that true?
MR. MOORE: I think that is a true statement. There has been no evidence to my knowledge
of erosion of the secondary. There have been some burnishing, some discoloration, and some soot
that was deposited between the first one and the second one, was what I think our flight experi-
ence had said.
And the testing of these O-rings and so forth, there was a lot of lab tests that were done
down at Marshall in the laboratories on these O-rings, and I think some out at Tbiokol of the O-
rings, and their analysis indicated that as long as you don't, as you say, have a complete gas
path through this whole cycle
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of O-rings, that you are okay.
I think these O-rings are Viton rubber and I think they are probably the same kind of O-
ring that is used in the Titan segment, where you guys have only one O-ring, I think, in Titan,
Don, as I recall.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Let me add to your comment, however. That is how we lost the iner-
tial upper stage, was there was leakage and once it got a path, then it burns like an acetylene
torch, once it gets that continuous path. If it leaks a little bit, you just get soot. As soon as you
get that flow, it just goes right through.
DR. FEYNMAN: I have a picture of that seal in cross-section here, if anybody wants to see
it.
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VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Is it determined yet that the two degree nozzle switch
would be consistent with--would the direction of the two degree nozzle change be consistent
with the moment of correction that would be expected if the kind of thing that Professcr Feyn-
man is talking about actually made a nozzle
MR. ALDRICH: That is being calculated and it is conceivably reasonable, based upon the
first look.
DR. RIDE: Do you have data from the RGA's, the gyros, that would show you this?
MR. MOORE: Yes, what the RGA's were doing and
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so forth.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: In addition to that question, have you ever seen nozzle
excursions of this magnitude as a result of a breach?
MR. MOORE: My understanding, based upon the ques_.ion--Arnie, you probably have more
detail. My understanding is the upper regime--
MR. ALDRICH: An excursion like this we would consider highly unusual. We don't predict,
from what we considered the winds to be that day and the wind speeds, that there was such a
wind event. If the flight had been completely normal and all you had seen was these booster
nozzles kick, it would probably not have raised many considerations or concerns that something
peculiar happened.
MR. MOORE: They have what, a three degree limit of the motion of the nozzles?
DR. WALKER: I thought I saw eight degrees.
MR. MOORE: I didn't realize it was that much, but we have seen up to a couple of degrees.
The question we are addressing is the rate. You've got to look at the rate of how fast this thing
is responding, and so forth, and I tried to get all of that correlated and we've just not looked at
that.
But the RGA's, as Sally mentioned, and any
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other kind of acceleration---one of the people reported to us last week when we were down in
F_erida--I guess it was the we_k before last--that there was some noticing of some kind of fish-
tailing of the system going up. We saw some cargo bay, maybe the cargo bay area, accelerations
that were anomalous, and we are running that down.
But I don't have any more data on that.
DR. RIDE: Do you have any data from any accelerometers? Is there anything like that in
the payload area?
MR. ALDRICH: I think we've got some data from TDRS.
MR. MOORE: We have that data impounded, and we're going to try to look at that accelera-
tion data to correlate the events. That is the hardest job, is to try to get the time line in se-
quence that everybody's data will sign up to, because you could be off a few milliseconds and
miss events, just like you pointed out very clearly. And that is what we're _o concerned abo, Jt.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Was the IUS guidance on at this time?
MR. MOORE: I think IUS guidance was on, I believe, although I'm not sure. We have a lot
of IUS
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parameters we monitor.
GENERAL KUTYNA: We initialize on the ground, but I don't know whether the record
came back or not.
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DR.RIDE:It should.It comesdownoa thedownlink.
CHAIRMANROGERS: I feel awfully sorry for this geutleman who's trying to record what
we re saying.
MR. MOORE: Don, to answer your question, we are looking at all that dar.a. It was impound-
ed out at Sunnyvale. All of that cargo information is very important to us.
MR. ACHESON: (_ould I ask a question? Have there been any interesting discoveries and
material collected from the ocean that we have not seen in the press yet?
MR. MOORE: I would _y there are some observations that have been made on some prelim-
inary pieces. We have recovered the orbiter speed brakes, which are on the rear section, and the
left speed brake I guess is just like it came out of the factory and the right speed brake has got a
lot of particles, it looks like, were embedded in it, and so forth.
But if you look at the flow and everything, it
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looks like the wind would have shielded it. So we're not sure what all that means. But it is just
kind of a--those are some of the black and white differences that we're beginning to see.
And we're got metallurgists and others going back and looking at those samples to tell us
the kinds of materials we see. We have a very--that we did not show to the public yesterday, we
have a very elaborate layout that the National Transportation Safety Board has provided and
has assisted us in doing.
We have got a facility down at Kennedy thaz has been laid out to assemble a lot of the
pieces. And I guess the Navy brought in, with the assistance of the Air Force, a tremendous tent
or a portable building that they are putting up, of some 250 feet long by about 75 or 80 feet
wide. And we're going to use that as kind of a layout area.
And we would invite members of the Commission .....
MR. HOTZ: Is this the jigsaw grid?
MR. MOORE: Yes.
MR. ALDRICH: We're actually building a frame for the orbiter to be constructed on. There's
a very interesting characteristic on the orbiter. Every tile on the orbiter has a serial number, so
when they find a
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piece of the orbiter it is not one of _hese, lefts just see where it goes. We can look in the tile
records and they know exactly where it goes.
MR. WALKER: Each tile is different, basically?
MR. MOORE: Yes, sir.
MR. RUMMEL: I have a somewhat different question. According to what I read in the press
and partly from what I heard today, there was generally a lack of heat evidence. If that's true, I
just don't understand. Can you explain that?
MR. MOORE: We can't explain that at this point in time.
MR. ALDRICH: One of the places that we think the largest amount of the explosion was
focused--I don't say we think, but what Marshall reported in their early analysis showed, the
largest part of the explosion occurred where the oxygen comes out of the oxygen tank in the
inner tank area.
They found pieces of the inner tank, which is the cavity between the two tanks and the
external tank. Some parts of it are melted and burned dramatically and very blackem_, and
other parts are as pristine as new metal.
MR. RUMMEL: From the same canopy?
Lz.0
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MR. ALDRICH: Yes.
DR. WHEELON: I have a request. The _./me lines that Sally has there, I wonder if we could
get copies of that.
DR. RIDE: Actually, [ am not sure that this should be considered an official time line.
MR. MOORE: Wc can take an action to provide it. I mean, Sally has it and she can distrib-
ute it.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: My only question about that is whett_er we should have this until
we're a little more sure of it.
DR. RIDE: I guess I would feel better about having somebody, one of the working groups
down there, not put out an official one, but just because there really is the problem of time cor-
relating all of the data, and this has their first guesses at the time correlation down to millisec-
onds. But those things could change a little bit and a couple of things could get added.
MB. MOORE: I would say that we could pull together a preliminary events sequence by
very early next week and provide it to the Commission, if that would be acceptable.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I guess maybe I'm sort of conscious of possible leaks. Not that I
think anybody
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would leak it, but if it hits the press and we have it, then everybody's going to say, well, some-
body in the Commission must have leaked it.
And I'm not sure that at the moment having any of these documents is particularly valua-
ble to us. We've got them all anyway in due time, and certainly, if you're going to correct it
later on--I mean, there's no reason why we can't all look a_ them now, and Sally could make it
available to look at it.
But I just think that the fewer documents we have in our own possession until we get ready
to do something with it, the better off we are.
Dick?
DR. FEYNMAN: I think we've just learned from the General's report that the proper way
to do it is not to go flying at various possibilities when the data is only preliminary. You think
you're going to gain something by that.
That is what I learned. I thought I was gaining something. That is what I thought I was
going to do. But when I saw what he suggested, I see that the proper way, I think, is to wait
until that. Do it as fast as we can, we might come down and look and suggest something that
you could calculate on the time, or a suggestion of something else or something like that, but
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not to try to make the decisions and analyses as we're going along.
We have the same thing in physics experiments. The theorists sit on top of the experiment
and as the data starts to come out, when it still has errors in it that haven't be_n checked out,
they are already making theories to explain bumps in the curve which turn out to be nothing,
and it's just a complete waste of effort and confusion and everything else.
DR. RIDE: I'm a little bit _cnsitive _o this because I have good sources and o_'er the last
week I've heard a lot of things from e_ce!!en*_ sources that are wrong, like for _xample the bal-
loon, the balloon being shot down, and that's not right.
MR. MOORI_: Let me say also, Sally, that we made a very special effort to involve as many
members of the astronaut corps down at Houston as we can. But your point about data and the
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sources,we'veheardall kindsef things,too,that soundedverypromisinga weekago,andnow
theytotallydon'th_vear,yrelevance.
DR.R[DE:I'm verysensitiveto the r:ght approaches:Collectthedata, tookat all the data,
andthenonceyou'velookedat it all, cometo yourconclusim,s.
MR.MOORE:Andhavethis devil'sadvocate
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teamsetoff andmakesurewehaven'tforgottensomethingoverhere,a bunchof wildandcrazy
ideas.
CHAIRMANROGERS:I think you'reright. I think weareentitledto that. Let, not think
that becausewewould--let'snot takeit becausewewoulddry upSally'ssources.
(Laughter.)
DR. WHEELON: But we will have an official time line?
MR. MOORE: Sure.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Unless there are any other immediate questions. I have a couple of
questions on procedure. Any other questions?
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: I guess, was that that--did they complete their list of
things that we ought to hear about and we haven't heard abt_ut?
MR. ALDRICH: There's at least one other thing that shows on the telemetry. The telemetry
shows, from the gyros that Sally was talking about--there are gyros in each solid, and it shows
that in the last second before the loss of data the right solid rocket deviates from the stack, and
the left one and the orbiter stay together in a conformed trajectory.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: When was that?
MR. ALDRICH: Within the last half second before loss of data.
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MR. RUMMEL: Would you repeat that?
MR. ALDRICH: The data on the telemetry has gyroscopic measurements from the orbiter
and from each solid rocket, and in the last second of data before loss of data and the explosion,
the right-hand rocket is shown to deviate away from the orbiter and the left-hand rocket, which
means that it broke loose.
DR. FEYNMAN: Can I ask a dumb question? Do we know on which side which recket is
afterwards? Did they go like this and cross or do they look like they went that way?
MR. ALDRICH: The photo team will be able to pinpoint that precisely, and you've asked
quite a few questions about what we see in the photography and, believe me, there's a lot of
photography. On a normal mission, there's over g0 rolls of film and television tapes to go
through, and this one even more has been brought in.
And to do it justice, the photo team will be able to spend hours with you showing things
that are of interest.
DR. COVERT: Arnie, can I ask, in this rotation of this right-hand solid booster, does it look
like it is pinned at the bottom or pinned at the top?
MR. ALDRICH: I did it wrong in my talk. It
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locks like the bottom comes free and it toes in at the top.
MR. MOORE: Let me make one more comment in response to Neal's question, and that is
we think we have sonar data that has located the right-hand booster. And we're putting a lot of
priority on getting that booster, and we think it is in about 12 or 1400 feet of water.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: This is sort of interesting, Dick.
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MR. MOORE: I say, I think we have data that pinpoints an area, that has located what we
think is the right-hand solid rocket booster. We are spending a lot of effort trying to look at that
on television to make sure that that is what we're looking at-
However, we believe it is going to take a fair amount of time to get that hardware back,
because we don't want to do anything to that hardware during the retrieval process. That is
absolutely fundamental to our investigation
So Navy salvage is working with us. We've got experts down there kind of directing the
whole salvage thing, and it's absolutely critical that we keep that hardware in as good a shape
as we can in terms of the retrieval process.
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MR. ACHESON: How far offshore is that discovery?
MR. MOORE: It's 40 to 50 miles is the range, and it's about 12 to 1400 feet, is what was
reported to us before we left the Cape.
MR. WALKER: Can you tell how many pieces it's in?
MR. MOORE: No, I have not seen any of that.
MR. ALDRICH: I had a report on that last night. It is in the Gulf Stream and the currents
are high, and the first submersible they wanted to photograph or video observe it with was too
lightweight to be able to operate in that condition, and they're bringing in heavier equipment.
And I was told that perhaps by Sunday or Monday we would have our first views of it.
MR. SUT_£ER: Do you have access to the submersibles that were used up in the Irish area,
in that accident?
MR. MOORE: I don't know if they're the same vehicles. Mark, you probably know.
MR. JONES: We have access to the very same vehicles, and actually we have gone a step
further. We also have the same people who were involved in the recovery of the Air India that
we,at down off the coast
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of Ireland, as well as KAL-007. So we have the same people and equipment i,avolved.
MR. MOORE: We've had offers from all kinds of people. AT&T doing underwater cabling
offered their boats, and everybody has just offered all kinds of services to us.
MR. SUTTER: That job they did in the Irish Sea was tremendous. They got like to 6600 feet
in two days. And with the salt water, the quicker you get it up the better.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Have you made an announcement about this?
MR. MOORE: No, sir, I have not announced it to the public.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I guess it's known.
MR. MOORE: No, I will tell you, I have a very strong feeling that I'm very nervous about
releasing information to the public, because that immediately focuses the public on an area, and
that may turn out to ba the wrong area.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: How do you correlate with NASA here in Washington, because they
are giving out some information.
MR. MOORE: I have a public affairs person that is on my investigating--on my task force
that is
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down at Kennedy. And when we're down there, there's a tremendous amount of pressure to re-
lease something. And what I have been trying to do is only release kind of status information ot
my activities, our group's activities, that we are continuing to meet here and we're continuing to
meet there.
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And I've gotBobCrippenandBobOvermyerdownat theCape looking at all of the photo-
graphic data that comes in, and selectively they're releasing pieces of it. Chuck Hollins, my
person, talks to the NASA public affairs person up here, Shirley Green, and supposedly main-
tains contact that way.
One of the things we need to do is to make sure that we have got a liaison here. That Jona-
than and I have talked about, so that you aren't surprised about things that are zoming out, and
you will have your own announcements.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: The only announcements we will make will be when we decide on
meetings, where the meetings are going to be held. And if we have public meetings, we will an-
nounce the witnesses. But except for that, we won't make any announcements or comments at
all.
I think we have all agreed to that, and if there is any thought of deviation, why, I will talk
to
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all of the Commission members.
MR. MOORE: Sir, if it's okay with you, I thought I would set up someone with my task force
to maintain a c,n_tant liaison with Jonathan down here, so the members of this Commission are
not surprised by anything that our group deems important to release. We are totally trying to
focus on any factual information, and not let the public speculate.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: There was one other thing I noticed in the press about a little acci-
dent you had. Tell us a little about that.
MR. MOORE: That was a handling of one of the segment accidents. It was called an SRM
incident report, and it was down at the Cape. And it was, Lockheed handles the unloading of
segments off of rail cars into the proper facilities to begin the stacking, and they've got either
two or four places that they pick all of these things up.
And there were load cells on the device that picked it up, and I guess there were a couple of
failures of a load cell, and the segment came down and impacted too hard on the ground, and
that segment was discarded from use.
It was scheduled, back when it occurred, for this particular stack. I think it was pulled out
of the
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whole flow.
MR. JONES: This particular segment has a large handling ring on the top of it, and it was
part of the processing procedures and we had to get this handling ring off of the top of it. And I
say "we"; as Jess pointed out, it was Lockheed.
This particular device is held in by the very same pins that we referred to earlier, like the
flight pins, and the handling ring that is on top of it weighs on the order of 11,000 pounds. So it
is not something that you can come up and gently pull the pin out and lift it up.
And so, with the handling s_-_ecial device to pull the pins out, some of them were just simply
wedged in by the brute force of this l 1,000 pound device. The technician in charge invented a
procedure which was a deviation from our published procedure, in that he attached the crane to
the handling ring, asked for 11,000 pounds up, effectively zeroing it out, so he could pull the pins
out.
He didn't clear the area around it. He got this lift up and they continued to pull pi_,s. And
that should have been, people should have backed away from it. At that particular time, the
load cell indicator on the crane failed.
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The crane operator did not look over to take a look and see what kind of current he was
using at that point, and we suspect that he probably put perhaps even [00,000 pounds -p-lift on
it. Then at that point it created same damage.
There was a loud bang, a noise, and it immediately shut down, and of course the investiga-
tion ensued and revealed all of these things I've just shared with you. A decision has not been
made whether that segment was then flightworthy or not. One discussion said, no, when exposed
to that kind of environment it probably ought to be discarded. Another one said, we think we
can X-ray it, examine it, shim it out properly, and fly it.
But whatever the case was, we couldn't do it for this particular flight, 51-L. That segment
was pulled out and set aside and its c_rresponding segment on the other side, because you have
to have matched pairs for burning rates from the same amount of propellant.
MR. MOORE: [_was in November. And the cent_,rdirector at Kennedy signed and approved
the
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report on the 13th of December. That is when it was approved, and it was worked in concert
with the headquarters safety office and the guidelines that come out of the headquarters and the
headquarters office, not just bureaucratically signed off the paperwork on it.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, as you know ........
MR. HOTZ: The incident was reported publicly?
MR. MOORE: Yes.
MR. HOTZ: It was made public at the time?
MR. MOORE: It wa_ made public.
MR. MOORE: But you know, Lockheed is heavily revolved in at! the processing. They are
our shuttle contractor, and we have criticized them for scme of their operations. Their oper-.
ations have improved some overall, but we have criticized th¢:m from time to time.
MR. SUTTER: It makes me a little nervous to
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hear that this was a procedure outside of the operating handbook, and if this incident hadn't
have happened, it might have continued. I'm not criticizing. All I'm 3aying is-- -
MR. MOORE: I understand what you're saying. Let me say as far as that is concerned,
we've got some people from Dryden Research Center, our flight research center out in Califor-
nia, that I asked several months ago to go down and spend some time at Kennedy and look at
the overall process and flow down there and to take a look at it.
And I haven't had a report back from them, but we have had that concern for some time.
DR. WHEELON: I would ask, Mark, you've just described an incident having to do with the
handling or the mishandling of the solid rocket segment. Is tbat unique or does that sort of
thing happen reg_larly or now and again or often? And if so, what are _he other incidents that
have happened?
MR. JONES: We maintain an informal log, if you will, of any kind of incident, for whatever
reason, whether something broke, whether a platform fell down, those kinds of things. Given
that there are 16,000 people employed there, I would suggest that there are some number of
incidents related to flight hardware.
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Theyareveryminimal.
That is whywechoseto doa very thorough investigation in this particular proc:edure, and
that is why we were critical of the management from the imme'iate technician, who was the
lead tech on the floor, through the higher levels of management that perhaps had not reviewed
that procedure.
I cannot compare our incident rate with any other industry, l know that we have a certain
rate of in_ idents, which I would fi_,_are out over a per hours worked, but I can't compare it to say
it is more frequent or less frequent than an assembly plant.
DR. WHEELON: Excuse me. That wasn't the question. The question was, was this event
that you described, was that unique? have things like that happen._'_t betbre? And if so, do they
happen every ten flights or every, one flight, just in your place?
MR. JONES: This incident was unique in itself. This is the first time we have seen that kind
of an incident in handling an SRB segment.
DR. WHEELON: Have you seen other incidents in handling SRB's? And I ask you because.
you're the director for RQ&A.
MR. JONES: I'm not aware of any other incident, and ! can research the record, but I'm not
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aware of any other incident in which we have danaged flight hardware to the point where it
wasn't usable. This was the only incident of that ty:r_e.
DR. WHEELON: Would you review the records and give us an answer to that question?
MR. MOORE: Yes, sir.
MR. JONFS: Yes, sir.
MR. MCW)RE: We track incident rates down at KSC and I _a._)w o, e rail incident rates en
flight hardware, as well as other kind of activities, and we have got that data and we will be
happy to provide it to you.
DR. RIDE: Do you have any idea, just a feeling of whether the incident rates have gone up
since Lockheed took over or whether they stayed about the same?
MR. MOORE: Sally, my general feeling on that is they went up initially and stayed up for
some period of time, and they have been coming down pretty well over the past year. As a
matter of fact, Dick Smith was telling that they have been giving a few special certificates to
some people in certain areas of Lockheed for safety consciousness and improvements and so
forth. And so I believe the incident rate is coming down, is what I have been told. And we have
had that data
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tracked and we can provide that data to you.
Now, one of the other things that we have had a long-term concern about is safety at Thio-
kol, and we have had a couple of safety incidents out at Thiokol, where we've had pit fires and
so forth.
DR. HOTZ: This is in Utah?
MR. MOORE: This is in Utah where the units are poured. And we have had some major
concerns about that. We have had several boards look at that and that is one of the reasons that
NASA initiated about a year ago a look at second sources for the solid rocket launcher--solid
rocket boosters.
MR. WALKER: When they're po, ro& are they then shaped?
DR. WHEELON: Most solid rocket motors are poured and then machined.
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MR MOORE: t "+,_t ts the way these are doner
MR COVERT + I wanted to follow up on something Bud said, and that id, every so often
problems arise where sgme guy gets "t good idea in the middle of :t process and, with al_ the best
intentions, implement.s it without adequate clearance
And how often has th_s c_curred down there'
MR -JONES: I think that, first of all. [ can't give you a specific answer
40.i
MR. COVERT: Is it a recurring problem?
MR. JONES: It's not that much of a problem, because the intent--we have tried over the
years to insalt into what we call the test scheme the discipline to follow that proc:.+dure.
And all of the procedures, especially the hazardous procedures, are routinely reviewed peri-
odically. In fact, the procedure this man invented was probably a pretty good procedure, except
what he did was he didn't document it. It wasn't reviewed and he didn't use things, like giving a
64th of an inch up, which capability we have. Instead he said, give me it,000 pounds and a
met_suring device.
So I think the procedure in and of itself +as probably a good one, but very few instances of
deviations from published procedure.
MR. COVERT: That is a partial answer+ People are going to get good ideas. The kinds of
people you want working .++oryou are going to get good ideas, and they're going to want to see
them implemented.
But there should be+ a discipline around to make sure that the procedures are reviewed by
other people who are knowledgeable, and so they can say to them, don't use a load cell because
we know they drift, that you ought to _ve dimensions, and so forth.
40.5
So I guess, with a bright, inventive group like you have, there must be from time to time
unauthorized improvements put into the processes, and then they either work well or they don't
work well. And my question is, does that happen a half a dozen times m year or three times?
[ have only heard of it twice since I have been down there; that is the kind of response I'm
looking for.
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MR. JONES: I'm not sure how I could an._wer that. ! simply can't give you a definitive
answer.
MR. MOORE: I understand what you're driving at. Let me mention one other thing, Gene,
that about a year and a half ago or a year or so ago the top management at Lockheed down
there was replaced, and it was because of our criticism of the way they were paying a lot of
attention to the overall management of this job, and I think during that period of time there
were some of the kind of things you're talking about. I don't have the specific numbers.
Lockheed then brought in some aircraft experieuced people who were experienced in run-
ning this overall thing, and I personally believe that has been tightened up pretty good. But
again, I can't give you a precise set of numbers. We certainly have the statistics on that. We go
through a very comprehensive award fee process with each of the contractors down at the Cape,
as m,_my of the other things, and we can go in and give you a much better quantitative feel than
I can give you off the top of my head.
DR. COVERT: Well, it may not be relevant to this particular investigation that we are talk-
ing about, but I have seen other cases where, in fact, a good idea turned out to be the source of a
problem.
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MR MOORE:Onepoint that o:tghtto bekept in mindhereis a majorityof the people that
Mary ta!ked about are the same people that have ,been down there for a long time When Rock-
well did not wm ti_e Shuttle processing contract. Eighty-five percent, approxtmately, of those
same people stayed on ,,rod simply worked for the new company. There were critical areas and
certain areas you had a b_g void. [n others you had a peak. and there was a general manage-
ment concern down there i,,r some period of time. and a lot of techs and so torth were there to
d_J the pr¢x:edures.
CHAIRMAN RCR;ERS: .Jess. if I could ask a question about terminatim,, whether you termi-
nated and so forth? It seems to me very difficult if you find Lockheed, for example, has been
deficient and you are disappointed with the performance, to terminate because they are right in
the middle of something. Do you have any alternative? Are there any severe penalties you can
impose?
MR. MOORE: It depends vpon the specific contract, but in the case of Lockheed. they are
under an incentive fee contract, and they are supposed to process so many missions, and process
them and make sure that--if they have a problem with their processes, they are penalized.
There is not only a dollar penalty, but
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there are also written-up penalties that go to the corporation, and each contract that we have
has various segments to it.
I think the Lockheed contract is basically a three year contract w_th three, three-year exten-
sions to it. and so you can terminate at the end of that particular three years.
('HAIRMAN ROGERS: But in 'the meanttme you can fine them or impose a heaw penalty'?
MR. bIOORE: You can impose a heavy penalty, and also you can get the corporate manage-
ment involved in this thing, and that is where the action came about in terms of replacing the
ma.'.lagers that originally took over.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Have you imposed any penalties'?
MR, MOG_RE: Yes. sir. there are award fees, and they've lost a lot of fees over the past few
years.
DR. WHEEl,ON: You can withhold the awarding of grants. All of their costs are covered, so
they are not focfeiting costs. They are just not earning profits. But there are opportunity costs
lost.
MR. MOORE: That is true.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: That is money they don't get. in other words?
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DR. WHEELON: In other words, they might have done a little better under the award fees.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Maybe we ought to think of some more severe penalty You know
probably as well as I do, and probably better, that there is dissatisfaction about performance,
and particularly in Congress. I _aan, they have spoken to me about the fact that they feel that
the performance has been sloppy, the contractors have been taking it easy and so forth, and
even if we don't relate it, relate that poor performance t) this accident we are talking about this
morning, there's no reason why we can't comment on it, there's no reason we can't comment on
the very severe terms, and propose a penalty or some other provision that you can use so that if
there is a deficiency of that kind, even if management couldn't have detected it--
MR. SuI"rER: I would like to make a corament.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Is that too tough?
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,MR.SUTTER:No.I think that as_conasyou takethat up, thenweshould_,k thequestion
why.andtheanswermaynotbesloppywork,perse It maybepressureFor instance,this pad
did nc'thavea rain coveran itemthat witsscheduled,andthesepeople,they work{'oronecom-
papvonce,and_hentheywork for :mothercompany.rodchan_emanagement;i 's thesame
workerswith experiencebutdifferemtmanagers,andheis underpressure.
And I think that isoneof the thingsthat weshouldask.is theschedulerealistic,especially
now.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: What was the reason for the lack of rain cover'?
MR. ALDRICH: Can I give you a bit of a lengthy answer?
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Sure.
MR. MOORE: Why don't you give some background on the whole waterproofing situation?
MR. ALDRICH: The orbiters come from the factory with brand new tiles and they are wa-
terproofed internally That is, they can stay up indefinitely. When you fly the orbiter, it enters
under a high heat environment, and that heat causes the waterproofing to bt driven out of the
tile, so you have to rework it before the next flight.
The arrangement was to internally replace the waterproofing in each tile in Florida be-
tween flights, and it was a system developed with squirt guns where we actually penetrate each
tile and squirt a certain amount it,. And on Challenger, several years ago now, after about its
eighth flight, after about its fifth flight, I believe, of Challenger, we noticed a condition where
the
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rubber that was holding the tiles to the vehicle, the rubber cement, was softening: and in effect,
a tile came off during re-entry, which led to the investigation. We found large amounts of soften-
ing rubber, and the investigation showed a reaction between the constituency of the rubber and
the rewaterproofing material.
Since that time we have not used the rewaterproofing technique again, and we have run the
threat of the orbiter picking up some amount of water. We have been investigating. We have
had an extensive analytical progra :-, to find a new material that will work as well. That is still
under work.
In the interim, we have been spraying the vehicle with Scotchguard, which is a deterrent
but doesn't completely preclude water pickup, particularly in heavy rain, and we have added
additional rain protection to the launch pads. We put up some metallic protection on Pad A, the
old pad, and also some canvas type material that protects it from the driving rain, and it has
been very effective.
During this period of time, however, Pad B has been coming along to be the second launch
pad, and a more elaborate all-metal waterproofing system was conceived and was being imple-
mented on Pad B. Sometime this past fall some of the materials for that were
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delivered, and they were defective, the metal was not up to the standard expected of the metal,
and so it had to be scrapped and returned and wait for additional metal to arrive.
So in that period leading up to the first use of the pad, we 1Tad to make the choice of going
to the pad without the complete mechanization of the waterproofing intended for Pad B, and
Pad A would be retrofitted to the same all-metallic considerati( "_ later.
The original schedule was that in January of this year for :his launch, all the rain protec-
tion on Pad B would be finished, aiong with the other facilities on Pad B, and materials prob-
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lems caused this issue which we believed we could well work around, and I think we aid work
around it successfully as far as the orbiter, which is the concern for the rain protection. We
don't ha_e rain protection tbr the _olid rocket boosters. It has never been considered that that
would be required
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well. yesterday didn't [ hear testimony to the effect that rain also
had an effect, you were concerned about it on the outside of the boosters and the launch pad
itse I_'
MR. ALDRICH: Two questions with separate answers.
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The concern on the outside of the external tank comes from either rain--in fact, rain is
good. What is really bad is humidity in the air because the tank is so cold, ice will form on the
tank, and that is a concern only because when you launch, the ice will fall off and strike the
orbiter. So again, we have different loading conditions and conditions leading to launch that pre-
clude moisture from forming ice on the tank.
DR. RIDE: The tank is only cold after you put the cold propellant in it.
MR. MOORE: That is exactly right, about seven or eight hours before launch, when you fuel
the tank, then you get it extremely co!d, and _.f there is a lot of humidity, you will get ice on the
"ank as Sally was saying. We are concerned about ice then breaking up.
MR. ALDRICH: But it is only of concern again for the orbiter.
MR. HOTZ: You did get some damage in early flights from the ice breaking up?
MR. MOt)RE: We did see on some flights some tiles that were damaged and so forth on the
orbite,.
MR. HOTZ: They were pretty big chunks that were coming off.
MR. MOORE: Yes, and that is why we send an
ice team out to take a took and see how bad. There is a spec in the program about what kind of
ice is acceptable and what is not acceptable.
MR. ALDRICH: There have been modifications to the insulation on the external tank to cor-
rect the areas where we had large pieces of ice. And we have seen a very significant reduction in
damage to the orbiter from the ice during flights.
MR. HOTZ: You only got it on the early flights?
MR. ALDRICH: Yes, sir.
Now, the facility, we were concerned tbr ice there largely, not so much from the rain but
from the facility systems themselves, broken lines, fluid comes out on the facility, freezes, cre-
ates ice that can interfere with the operations of the equipment at the launch facility. There's
not a concern about safety of the flight hardware but for the ability of the facility to continue to
do its job successfully during that time period.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I mentioned yesterday, I think, and maybe before the report I saw in
the paper, about Rockwell, and I found it in Time Magazine, and you made a comment about it.
The report said that a Rockwell official said thac he had called 20 minutes before the launch to
advise against the launch because
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of ice, and I wondered, did Rockwell change their mind? Were they in that conference?
MR. ALDRICH: Let me tell you about the conference. In the conference that I held outside
the firing room--I was in the firing room with Jess, and I went outside to hold this conference.
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Theconcernwasfor the orbiter.Theconcern was for ice that we knew was in the vicinity of the
facility, on the facility, at different locations, {'ailing at ignition and hitting the orbiter.
In the conference I had. the orbiter project manager from Johnson Space Center, the chief
of engineering from Johnson Space Center on the telephone, live. myself, the Shuttle Program
had worked these issues previously in the meeting personally, the head of the orbiter project for
the Rockwell contractor in Downey, on the line to him, the chief engineer for the orbiter project
at Downey, and we had a discussion where all parties participated.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And this call was reported to that group, and you all considered it,
and decided to go ahead?
MR. ALDRICH: I think this call was that discussion.
MR. MOORE: There is no recollection of any
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other manager from Rockwell calling outside of this group. I certainly didn't get any phone
calls. Nobody that I talked to knew about that.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, I press that a little bit because as long as there is not a dis-
pute about the facts, then it doesn't seem to me that anybody can fault anybody. After all, we
are going to have a lot of different points of view on something like this, and somebody has to
make the decision.
DR. RIDE: Well, I guess the question is whether at the end of this meeting Rockwell was
saying we don't want to launch.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: That is exactly it. If Rockwell comes up in a public session and says
we advised them not to do it and they went ahead anyway, and were concerned about the weath-
er, and so forth, then you've got a problem.
On the other hand, if there is no dispute about the facts, that this was conveyed to every-
body, and everybody, after consideration, everybody agreed to it ....
DR. WHEELON: What position did Rockwell take?
MR. ALDRICH: Everyone in that meeting--and I just told you who was there. There were
many others,
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Kennedy facility people at that meeting, everyone in that meeting voted strongly to proceed and
said they had no concern, except for Rockwell. The comment to me from Rockwell, which was
not written specifically to the exact word, and either recorded or logged, was that they had some
concern about the possibility of ice damage to the orbiter. Although it was a minor concern, they
felt that we had no experience base launching in this exact configuration before, and therefore
they thought we had some additional risk of orbiter damage from ice than we had on previous
meetings, or from previous missions.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Did they sign off on it or not?
MR. ALDRICH: We don't have a sign-off 8t that point. It was not--it was not maybe 20
minutes, but it was close to that. It was within the last hour of launch.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But they still objected?
MR. ALDRICH: They issued what I would call a concern, a less than 100 percent concur-
rence in the launch. They did not say we do not want to launch, and the rest of the team over-
ruled them. They issued a more conservative concern. They did not say don't launch.
GENERAL KUTYNA: I can't recall a launch that I have had where there was 100 percent
certainty that
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everythingwasperfect,andeveryonearoundthe tablewouldagreeto that. It is the job of the
launchdirectorto listen to everyone,and it's our job around the table to listen and say there is
this element of risk, and you characterize this as 90 percent, or 95, and then you get a consensus
that that risk is an acceptable risk, and then you launch.
So I think this gentleman is characterizing the degree of risk, and be's honest, and he had
to say something.
DR. RIDE: But one point is that their concern is a specific concern, and they weren't con-
cerned about the overall temperature or damage to the solid rockets or damage to the external
tank. They were worried about pieces of ice coming off and denting the tile.
MR. MOORE: I think that is an important
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point.
MR. HOTZ: This is completely different from Thiokol's alleged concerns.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTUONG: The concerns that were expressed there are not obvious-
ly related to the accident at this ._ nt although they may be.
MR. ALDRICH: I think that is not true, Nell. The concern was for falling ice to damage, and
therefore remove a tile from the orbiter. The tiles play no role in the ascent of the Shuttle
system, and if I had made the wrong decision in proceeding for the launch, we would not have
known any issue from that until the orbiter came to the re-entry phase and we saw it, and we
saw a hole burned in it.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I guess what we want to be sure about, though, if we can, is whether
there was a telephone call, and who got it. In other words, if you have an official of Rockwell
saying we called and told them not to do it; however, they say--and you say, well, we never got
such a phone call, then you've got a discrepancy. If you got the phone caI1 and you considered it,
and you decided to make the decision based upon the reasons you have just described, then I
don't see any problem with that.
MR. ALDRICH: My only question was I think the
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phone call went the other way. I think my Rockwell project manager was in the room and called
the chief engineer at Downey and asked for their position, and he reported that position to me
which was his, and, as I stated, we made the decision to go.
I don't think there was any input from Rockwell.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: The Time story said, and I don't have much confidence in their accu-
racy, but this one sounded accurate, said that a Rockwell official had been watching the launch
preparation and noticed on the television how much ice there was and made a call 20 minutes
before the launch saying he didn't think they should do it, and then they quoted Jess as saying
we fully considered that matter at length and decided to go ahead.
MR. MOORE: I don't know why the 20 minutes, where the 20 minutes comes in. I don't
think any of us were involved in any conversations, because you came down from your meeting.
Your meeting was at 8:00 o'clock in the morning. You came down about 9:00 and sat in the
firing room, and Phil Culbertson was there, and Dick Kohrs, and you guys came down and said
we have considered the launch, considered the ice, and we believe it is an acceptable risk based
upon the ice
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concernfor the orbiter.It is principallya descentproblem,andwedobelieveweoughtto send
out onefinal iceteamoutat about20minutesbeforelaunch,andthat is exactlywhatwasdone.
An ice teamwentout and walkedon the mobilelaunchplatformandreportedbackinto the
loop,to Arnie and soforth,and camebackand saidthey don'tseeanythingout there that is
anomalous.
Andsothat is the wayit happened.I don'tknowwherethe 20minutecall camein.
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CHAIRMANROGERS:I just wantedto clear up the phone call and let's get our facts
straight as we can before there's any further discussion about it. I don't want to press any more
on this. It is just the kind of thing I know that gets a lot of attention in the press when you have
this kind of thing, that they focus on a few little things, and this would be one, if there's a dis-
agreement as to facts.
If I said I made a call and I told them and they said we never got any such call, then you
have to go get the record of the phone call. And so I just wanted to straighten that up.
Unless there's something else, I would like to ask some questions about our plans. I think
the consensus is among the Commission members that we at some point w_)uld like to visit the
facilities, all of them, I guess. And the question comes up, when would we be the least nuisance.
MR. MOORE: Don't call yourself a nuisance.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, I think we are when we go to those places. There's going to be
a lot of concern about what we're going to ask and so forth.
First, I want to tell you, as far as I'm concerned we will try to do it in a way that is not
disruptive. But secondly, if you could tell us when it
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might be best to do it.
I was thinking certainly not next week, but maybe the week after that.
MR. MOORE: That is what--you kind of suggest, we, Arnie and I and a whole group are
going back to Kennedy Monday morning, and we're going to spend Monday afternoon and prob-
ably Monday evening getting not only the reports from the groups of activities, but also putting
in a more permanent organizational structure and trying tolook at these teams and see if we
have got some things that have been left out and if we want to consolidate some teams and so
forth.
Tuesday we will have detailed reports, status reports, back from the people _ve have had
working. So we will spend Tuesday in a data gathering mode.
Wednesday we will probaly come back to the Washington area and Arnie will probably go
back to Houston. And I would say the first part of the following week would look like a good
time that we could set up, I think, out at the Cape, an excellent meeting for you.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: That would be a week from next Tuesday?
MR. MOORE: That would be a good time frame to do that.
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: How does that sound to the membor_ of the Commission? We don't
all have to be there.
MR. HOTZ: What is the date?
MR. MOORE: That would be the 18th, February 18. You could see the wreckage, the layout,
the photography that's being pulled together there, and the analysis that we have done.
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DR. RIDE: Is that something that we could do in a closed meeting, in a closed way?
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: That's going to be tough if they find out we're going.
DR. RIDE: That is not what I was wondering about.
:CIR. HOTZ: Well, they will find out we're going there. There's no way you can keep that
out° But you could certainl_ keep it a closed meeting, and maybe the chairman or somebody
could make a statement after the meeting that, we have inspected this, and so on.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Let's assume we could do it in a closed way. Let's first just decide on
the time.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vl_(i_t- staff members came up to me and said
they wanted a report from Jess and our side on what the alternatives were, and I thought that
was the 18th.
MR. THOMPSON: Mr. Chairman, there is--and I
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just throw this out for your consideration. The Senate Committee on Space will be holding hear-
ings that day on this issue.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: What about the end of next week, like Thursday?
MR. MOORE: As far as I know, that would be okay. I think some time next week, next
Thursday, would be well. We could support yon next Thursday.
DR. WHEELON: Isn't there a certain charm to that? After all, the press would be focused
on the Senate, who seeks press coverage, in contrast to us.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: No. There are some of them that would follow us. They are assigned
to us and they would go with us anywhere.
MR. SUTTER: Well, how about the 19th or 20th? I don't think these guys will have a lot
more to tell us in four or five days.
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MR. MOORE: We will show you the status of our analyses and the status of our photo-
graphs of the investigation.
DR. RIDE: I would say I think there is probably at least a full day of things for us to see,
and just seeing the debris and seeing the photos---
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: How about Thursday?
MR. COVERT. I would prefer the 13th or 14th. That's next week.
MR. ACHESON: Could I ask a question? What should our timing be in relation to the recov-
ery of the booster?
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I think we're going to have to take a trip down there anyway. I
think this is a good time to do it, if it is a convenient time. I mean, we can't wait for the recov-
ery.
MR. MOORE: We will status you where we are in all of the areas and any prognosis that we
might have. But my guess is it's going to be a long time before we have got all the procedures in
place to make sure that we can handle that hardware without doing it additional damage.
DR. WHEELON: The 14th is better for me, and I probably can provide transportation from
the West Coast.
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MR. HOTZ: What kind of a trip are you talking about, down in the morning, back at night?
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: That's what I'm wondering about.
MR. WALKER: I think we're going to need at least a day down there and maybe two.
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Why don't we do it Thursday, and if you can't make it then, Bud,
you come down Friday.
How about the others? Is that okay with you?
MR. HOTZ: What was that again?
CHAIRMAN ROttERS: Thursday.
MR HOTZ: That would be Thursday and Friday of next week?
CHAIRMAN ROGERS. Yes.
MR. MOORE: I would say we've got enough data to keep you very, very busy tbr as long as
you want to stay down there. I mean, every one of our meetings that we've held down there has
gone seven or eight hou_ and we have had to hurry them through.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Gene, is that okay with you?
MR. COVERT: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Dick, in your absence we arranged a meeting for all of next week. Is
that okay?
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[Laughter.]
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: We're planning to go to Kennedy on Thursday and possibly Friday
of next week, okay?
DR. FEYNMAN: Yes.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Bob?
MR. RUMMEL: I think so.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And Arthur?
MR. WALKER: It's as bad as any other time.
[Laughter.]
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: So let's plan on that. We will go down Thursday.
MR. MOORE: We will be ready to talk to you next Thursday, then.
MR. RUMMEL: A housekeeping question. Will someone arrange hotel accommodations?
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Yes, that is our hope. You will make the arrangements, Jonathan?
MR. THOMPSON: I will take care of it.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: What about transportation? Do you want to provide an airplane?
MR. THOMPSON: I will have to look into that.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, we will decide how many people are going from here and then
decide how to get there.
429
MR. THOMPSON: One other thing. I think, to avoid confusion with Jess' people and be-
tween you, if you have got a request for information from anybody that testified yesterday or
that you think of something over the weekend, between now and next week, I think what might
be easiest, if you could give me a call or detail exactly what it is you want.
And I will provide that information to Jess and his people, and in turn i can submit it back
to you.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Jess, at that meeting would you have an overview of where you are in the planning for your
investigation that would be better than we have today, so we can see the major milestones and
possibly plan future actions?
MR. MOORE: Yes, you will see a more definitized charter of the things I'm looking into and
an organizational structure of how we're going to operate, and probably some forecasts of mile-
stones and some consolidation of the teams that we have formed to make sure that we are cross.,
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cuttingall of the areasthat weneedto andthat weareconsolidatingteams,that nowwehave
maybeseveralteamsworkingon various things,
And so I will have, I think, a significant
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amount of progress from where we are now with respect to organization. As far as long term
prognosi.q about what is it going to take to get this fixed, it is totally too early.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: May I suggest that we break up for the moment and reconvene at
ten after 2:00. What about food? Is there any place to eat here?
Why don't we do that. We will try to finish--let's try to meet here at 2:00 o'clock, so we can
get out by 3:00.
(Whereupon, at 1:20 p.m., the Commission was recessed.)
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PROCEEDINGS
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: If I may, I would like to call the meeting to order, please.
The first order of business is to welcome our new member, Chuck Yeager, who was not with
us at our previous meetings because he was breaking another record, and I just wanted to say
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how happy we are tbat he is here, and how pleased we are that he is a member of the Commis-
sion, and we would like to give him a hand.
_,Applause.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: The second thing, Chuck tells me that he has to, because of previous
commitments, he has to leave tonight and is going to be gone until when?
GENERAL YEAGER: When is the Commission ending?
(Laughter. 1
GENERAL YEAGER: The 7th of March.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Anyway, we will look forward to your safe return and the opportuni-
ty to get together with you when you come back, and take part in the most crucial aspects of
this investigation.
By way of preliminary comment, let me say that I have not had a chance to meet with all
the member_ of
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the Commission since the weekend developments. I talked to some of you on the phone, but we
will have the opportunity to talk a little further in executive session about some of those devel-
opments and why we felt it was desirable to have this meeting, and why we felt it was desirable
to have a public meeting.
And in that connection, I want to say that the public meeting was something I think that
most of us felt we had to have, and I talked to Dr. Graham, who strongly supported that posi-
tion. Otherwise I would have polled everybody on the Commission before we made the decision
to hold a public meeting. But in view of the time pressures and in view of the fact that that is
what we wanted, I felt it was quite appropriate to go ahead with this meeting.
So what we have asked for was the production of all the documents and records that relate
to the matters that involve the seals, and we realize that it is not possible on such short notice
to produce all of the documents, but I am sure that NASA has attempted to give us the key
documents now, and Dr. Graham has agreed that he would give the Commission not only the
documents that we have available, which will be supplemented by later documents, but also that
he has here today and he will provide any further witnesses that
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you would like to discuss the matters that we are here to discuss.
I think it goes without saying that the article in the New York Times and other articles
have created an unpleasant, unfortunate situation. There is no point in dwelling on the past.
The important thing is to be sure that the Commission has all the appropriate documents and
all the appropriate information. It may well be that we have all learned a lesson from this, that
as much as possible we would hope that NASA and NASA's officials will volunteer any informa-
tion in a frank and forthright manner. We don't want to be in a position that we have to ask for
everything in advance.
This is not an adversarial procedure. This Commission is not in any way adversarial, and we
hope that in the future, as much as it is humanly possible, when you think information has been
developed that we should know about, that you will volunteer to give us that information.
And with that short statement, I would like to call on Dr. Graham to proceed and present
whatever he would like to present on behalf of NASA.
And I might also say while he is taking the podium that he has cooperated fully with us,
and we have
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no reason to think that we will not get full cooperation from NASA.
DR. GRAHAM: Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Commission members.
As I said in the remarks opening NASA's _resentation to the Commission iast Thursday,
that while NASA continues to analyze the system design and the data, :,,,,_u can be certain that
NASA will provide you with ful_ cooperation. That is NASA's policy and my personal position as
well, and that continues to be NASA's policy, and'. will remain that way throughout the course of
this investigation.
To help that process, I have put out the following internal memorandum today that [ want
you to be aware of. This is to the Associate Administrator for Space Flight, Jesse Moore, who is
also the head of our Internal Design Review and Data Analysis Task Force, who has the overall
responsibility within NASA and to me for the conduct of our work related to the Challenger.
And it says all NASA testimony should be reviewed on a word-by-word basis by a knowledgeable
NASA technical review team, and this refers to testimony which has already been presented to
the Commission. Should any error, partial or incomplete statement or potentially misleading
statement be found, an amendment to the
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testimony should be filed in order to clarify the issue of concern.
And so I want you to know that in addition to trying to glve you as timely and complete a
volume of information as we can during our testimony, we realize that it is possible for NASA to
occasionally misspeak or to delete something inadvertently, and should that occur, we will in
any case be going back ever the testimony and looking at it and checking it. As soon as we find
something that appears _o be--to warrant an amendment to the testimony or a clarification or
an addition to the testimony, we will provide that to you.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: We are going to have a little atmospheric problem here, and so I
don't want to interrupt you.
Let's see if we can get it a little cooler.
DR. GRAHAM: Mr. Chairman, NASA hereby formally submits to you all of the reports,
memoranda, briefing charts and other material that we have been able to locate to date concern-
ing issues associated with the integrity of the SRB segment seals and other things related to
that part of the solid rocket performance, and assembly and operation.
And I would now transfer to you, the Commission, the
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material. We wi),l continue to search for such material. As we/_n3 it, on an incremental basis we
will transmit it to you through our cha_'nels of liai3on and make sure that it is called to your
attention.
From this point forward, ! intend to turn the conduct of the NASA presentation over to Mr.
Moore. But before I do, I thought I would be willing to entertain any questions you have.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: When did you first hear of the possibility of the s_ory by the New
York Times?
DR. GRAHAM: Mr. Chairman, I first heard of that at approximately 1:40 p.m. yesterday_
Saturday.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And what did you do at that time?
DR. GRAHAM: At that time I called you to make you aware of the general subject that was
being addressed and the possibility of a story from the New York Times, and that certain docu-
245
mentsappearedto be in their hands,and l alsoinformedotherswithin theadministrationthat
this materialapparentlyhadcomeinto the possessionof theNewYorkTimesandhadthepossi-
bility of thestorygoingforward.
CHAIRMANROGERS:Haveyou sincedeterminedwhetherany previous work had been
done by NASA in
1:39
connection with the preparation _)f the story or preparing a reply to the story?
DR. GRAHAM: ! believe there was an awareness, at least earlier that same day within
NASA, of the story, because it was brought to me by NASA employees. There was some tl-,ought
_ven as to how to respond to it, but no response was transmitted outside NASA at the.t time
because it seemed apprupriate that the Commission be aware of the subject before a public re-
sponse was put forward.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: So that nay question is not misunderstood, I want to make it clear
that obviously you can't report to the Commission every time that some newspaper is going to
'_rite a story. We wouldn't expect that. On the other hand, there are certain types of investiga-
tions which y,._u may be aware of that seem to have particular significance, and in such event,
we would hooe that you would, and members of NASA would immediately let us know about it
so that it didn't appear that we were taken by surprise.
Do you agree with that?
DR. GRAHAM: Very much so, Mr. Chairman. I am in complete agreement with that policy,
and I have transmitted that policy to the NASA staff both before last Saturday and since last
Saturday.
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Furthermore, I want to make it clear, speaking for myself, that we
don't want to react to every newspaper story because it is inevitable there will be a lot of them,
and a lot of them will be unfair and unfriendly.
I guess what concerns me a little bit about it, and I hope we don't have any further discus-
sion publicly about it, is that this seemed to go right to the heart of the matter, and it seemed to
be rela_ed to the plume that was started and shown to the public, and it occurred to us that
there must have been a good deal of thought in NASA about how serious a story it would be if it
appeared, and theretore I would have thought that there would have been an eagerness to
present it to the Commission on Thursday, and particularly on Fridays in the private session.
But with no further ado, go ahead.
DR. GRAHAM: Yes, sir. I share your view of that. and I think that further discussion ad-
dressing that issue will be given to you today.
DR. WALKER: Is any of this material specifically classified?
DR. GRAHAM: Let me ask the people who compiled it all.
Is any of this package, have you identified
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any material that is classified related to this subject that isn't in the package?
MR. MOORE: No.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: In that connection., it would be Lelpful to be sure that any time _'e
are given classified information, that it is made clear to us that it is classified because oZherwise
we will treat it as if it is not.
MR. ACHESON: Could I ask a question?
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DR GRAHAM: l have also asked that NASA staff pull together all or" the information that
may exist in our files related to any failure modes of the SRBs and make sure that is available
first to me, but very quickly then transmitted to the Commission That subject can be enlarged
even further to the extent of the tank and the orbiter itself and the ground support equipment.
and if you wish, we will tr:; to do that
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I think that we will need to realize that there will be a large volume of engineering informa-
tion, concerns and issues and so on, that it may take a little bit of time to pull that together in
any complete way, and there probably will be a substantial volume of information as there has
to be in any complex program such as this, a constant ebb and flow of engineering design
checks, information, background and so on, such as this, and I strongly agree with the Chairman
that this is a particularly pertinent one and very much to the issue now.
We will continue to pull that information together across the entire system and continue to
provide it to the Commission. And with your concurrence, I would like to do that in the order.
SRB first, expendable tanks second, and the orbiter third, and then ground support equipment
and related matters foucth, subject only to particular issues that seem to arise that might put us
off the track.
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(Xlaterial deleted.)
We will ce_ainly do that, and you will have that within the day.
In fact, this information is information we need to collect internally in the course of our
own ap.alyses and review, and so this operation does not constitute a major interference. In fact.
it is complementary with what we are doing, and we would certainly do it in any case. and we
are pleased to provide it to you.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Very well.
DR. GRAHAM: Thank you very- much.
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Mr. Moore?
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TESTIMONY OF JESSE W. MOORE, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR SPACE FLIGHT.
NATIONAL AERONAUTIC AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
MR MOORE: Mr. Chairman and members of the Commi_ion, the data that you have before
you here is data that we immediately started collecting sometime last week in preparation for
:he briefing of the Commission on this coming Thursday at the Kennedy Space Center. It was
our intentior to review that data with you at that time, as well as status reports on the data on
all other areas.
Let me say up front that we are looking at all areas of the 51-L incident. We are looking at
the tank, the SRB and *.he orbiter and so forth, and any_.hing that we judge sensitive on those
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areasvv_w_lltry to clearlymakeit availableto theCommission prior to any data that we would
want to present, and sc, fl_rth We will honor Dr Graham'_ request to provide that. to the best of
our knowledge
()he of the thtngs we would .-'also like to :_tate for the ('ommi_sion is _hat much discussion as
you have doubtless t_e_rd over the weekend ._b<.,ut O-rings has appeared in the paper. I would
like to say th,lt ()-rin_ _ro,-ion. which we are _oing to address today, i._ only one of s_veral areas
that we are Icx)kin,4 at for possible _enarios. anomalous _cenarios. There have been some
44_:,
concerns (;n the O-rings. We are going to try to relate that to you today. We will provide you
with any additional information that we have in our hands to ._uppert that. plus any other
things.
We are looking at a lot of additional areas in addition to the O-rings. As I say, there is a lot
of additional data on flight readiness reviews. We could probably stack several feet of documents
on you in terms of this Commission. What we have tried to do is to excerpt some of those docu-
ments, the most relevant pieces of information here today, and as the Commission has additional
questions or needs additionaI information, we would be glad to do our best to provide that.
I would like to do two things here, if I might. I would like to first quickly review for you the
agenda that we prepared.
IViewgraph. )
MR. MOORE: I _.rust everybody in the back can see this as well.
[ am following Dr. Graham's introductory remarks. I'm planning to just give you kind of an
overview of setting the sta_e of this whole activity, and [ particularly wanted you and the Com-
mission members to meet the people, some of the people that are involved
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in the Shuttle projects, and in particular, the se!id rocket booster project, not only here in my
office in Washin_on but also at the M_arsha!! Space Flight Center, and also several members of
Morton-Thiokol who are here -as well, that handle the solid rocket booster project, and we would
again welcome any questions that you or the members of the Commission may have on the
booster activities as we go forward.
Mike Weeks is a deputy in my office at NASA headquarters. He is the Deputy Associate
Administrator with emphasis on the word "'technical." Mike has been in the program for some
time, since about 19"79, and is very familiar with the elements o_"the Shuttle program.
Let me introduce Mike Weeks right here.
Then Mike will also provide for the Commiseion documentation that we have at NASA
headquarters and some concerns that we have had over a period of time on the solid rocket
motor, and in particular, on the O-rings.
Then we have also asked Larry Mulloy--and Larry, would you stand up, please? He is right
here--who is the Manager of the solid rocket Looster project at the Marshall Space Flight
Center, to go through some technical areas with you today to give you some historical data on
the solid rocket booster and some of
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the performances that we have seen out of the SRB in the course of the Shuttle program.
And finally, I will have a few closing remarks, and one item that T will want to discuss here
with you this afternoon, Mr. Chairman and other members, is our participation at tomorrow's
session. If you can give us some insight into that, I would appreciate it.
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Let mealsosaybeforeI turn this overto Mik- ..' meintroduce__omeof the other peopl_
that are here.
[ wuuld like to introduce Mr Ball Hamby, Mr Wt[ham t{. Hamby. He is the Deputy Direc-
tor ,_t"STS Program Integration in my office at NASA headquarters
I would like to introduce Mr. David Winterhalter. David i-_ the Director of Shuttle Propel-
_ion in my office in Washinffton.
And I would like to introduce Irving Davids. He i,_ with the Shuttle Propulsion division.
I would like to introduce Paul Wetzel. who is the Chief of the Solid Rocket Booster Pro-
grams at NASA headquarters.
And l would also like to introduce Paul Herr. He is in the Shuttle Propulsion Division at
NASA headquarters.
And finally, with NASA, I would like to
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introduce Russell Bardos, who is the Manager of Productivity Operations Support. also at NASA
_eadquarters.
These are, in effect, a large percentage of my staff that are working in this particular area.
And so [ thought if you or other members of the Commission would like to ask them questions
directly, we would certainly be happy to try to answer any questions the Commission has.
In addition, I have invited Dr. William Lucas, Director of Marshall Space Flight Center here
today, who has responsibility for all propulsion elements on the Shuttle program.
l have introduced Larry Mulloy previously.
I would like to introduce Larry Wear now of the Marshall Space Flight Center. Larry is
involved in the solid rocket motor project at Marshall. And I would like to introduce John
McCarty, who is Deputy Director of Structures in the Propulsion Lab at the Marshall Space
Flight Center,
Now, we have four people here from Morton-Thiokol Corporation in Utah, and I would like
to introduce Allen McDonald, who is the Director of the Solid Rocket Motor Project at Thiokol;
and I would like to introduce Mark Salita, who is a scientist in the Gas
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Dynamics Section of Morton-Thiokol; and I would also like to introduce Donald Ketner. who is
the Supervisor of the Gas Dynamics Section at Morton-Thiokol: and representing the Washing-
ton office here of Morton-Thiokol is Frank Ross.
Now. that completes the number of people that I brought here today, and with your permis-
sion, Mr. Commissioner, we will proceed with the presentation of the information that we have
brought.
And I would now like to introduce Mike Weeks.
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TESTIMI;NY OF MR. I,. MICHAEl, WEEKS, DEPUTY ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR
SPACE FI, IGHT ITECHNICAI.). NATIONAl, AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINIS-
TRATION
MR. WEEKS: I put this briefing together, gentlemen and members, to address first the New
York Times article, and there are six document_ that obviously were provided to that news
media, and first [ want to go through those and bring you up to speed on that. [m,r '- Io-i I
tViewgraph.) lu,-I " _,_ -'1
MR. WEEKS: And then I will go to this chronology of things that have happened on the O-
ring problem since we first ran into it. And the first time we really addressed that was way back
in 19_0, and I will show you that and bring you up to date.
tViewgraph._ [re, t-' in :_t
MR. WEEKS: As was spoken to, and it is in your document there, the first one is the Cook
memorandum, and that is a memorandum that was written on the 23rd of July, and it was pre-
pared by the financial analysts over in the Financial Department, and the person is E financial
type person and not coo knowledgeable of the whole program situation, imq. -' ll_ ll
I am going along now at page 6. I am right here ¢indicating_ at page 6, and I gu,:ss I would
suggest to you that that is a less clinical analysis of
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this whole situation because the young chap came aboard about the first of July and was just
picking up things in a hallway, and wrote this to his immediate superior.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Is he here today?
MR. WEEKS. No, he i,s no,."
MR. MOORE: We could bring him, Mr. Chairman.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: We didn't expect him. I was just asking. He is still employed by
NASA?
MR, WEEKS: Yes, he is.
DR. COVERT: This stuff you call putty, that might be an unfortunate choice of terms. It is
really an inhibitor, isn't it? The heat burning from that at the joint might fit together perfectly.
MR. WEEKS: Dr. Lucas ought to handle that.
DR. COVERT: It is zinc chromate, isn't it?
DR. LUCoA, S: It is a zinc chromate, but it is not in an inhibitor that goes on the end of the
train. It is separate from that. I think Larry Mulloy will demonstrate that for you.
MR. WEEKS: Now, the next one, Mr. Chairman and Committee, is a memo dated the 17th
of July by Irv Davids over here, who I guess we gave him his 35-year pin some time ago, and he
is very senier and very careful, and this is No. 2 up there, tm*l. z l_;
DR. COVERT: Is it true that he changed this stuff, as Cook said, from being a sealant that
has asbestos in it to being a sealant without asbestos?
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MR.WEEKS:No, l believewestill haveasbestosin the system,andweeventuallyhaveto
_et
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_'id of that, and that is one ,)f our longer term plans But we aren't concentrating on that 'oday
We are concentratiag on O-rings.
DR. COVERT: You are ,'oncentrating on-the material that was used in this particular set
of boosters was the old material and made by the old manufacturer?
MR. WEEKS: No. This is the second generation because the original vendor, and [ have for-
gotten his name, went out of business, and we had to go to a Randolph type of one.
DR. COVERT: How many firings have you had with the new material?
MR. MULLOY: It was introduced on STS-8.
DR. COVERT: So it is about 17.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Mike, let me ask you, we used this same type of material on the
Titan.
Did you change manufacturers also on the Titan?
MR. MULLOY: I do not know.
MR. WEAR: The one on the Titan is an Inmont putty, and--
MR. WEEKS: So we do not fly the Inmont putty?
MR. WEAR: No.
DR. WALKER: Is the pw:ty supposed to be the
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primary or backup seal?
MR. MULLOY: The putty is a thermal barrier, not a sealer.
MR. WEEKS: The pressure goes through the putty and gets down through the exterior of
the case, and theretbre that pressure of the 1000 psi in the chamber motor does go down to _he
O-ring.
CHAIRMAN ROCERS: Just so you don't go too fast, _,et's focus up ibr a moment on tte
Cook Memorandum.
As I understand it, you are saying that he was just hired and was in a departmont where i_e
really didn't have much knowledge of what was going on?
MR. WEEKS: I would believe that you should discount this to a fairly great extent because
as you will see in the next memorandum of Mr. Irv Davids, who has been with our program for
at least a decade, and is '30 years with th, • Agency, it is a very careful and thoughtful response to
his memo. His memo was created because we had a failure in April of 1935 in which it is the
first time in all of the program that we had the secondary seal have any difficulty, and the only
time, whereas the other erosions were all in the primary seal, the primary being the one that
first sees the pressure, and the secondary being the one that is backing it up,
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if you v,nill.
DR. RIDE: Which flight was that?
MR. WEEKS: That was 51-B.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Mike, you did not have charring of the secondary seal on 51-C?
MR. WEAR: No.
MR. WEEKS: It was 51-D.
DR. RIDE: Did you see a problem with the primary seal on 51-C?
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MR.WEAR:Wehadsomeerosionop theprimarysealin the K joint on51-C.I will coverall
of this later.
DR.COVERT:Didyouhavethesamegel thicknesson51-B,Candsoon'?
MR. WEEKS:I believeall of theseare the thinner steelcasings. We started and had the
first early flights with the thicker steel casings, but l believe all of the recent flights are thinner
casings, and I guess they do get mixed, General.
GENERAL KUTYNA: They do get mixed. We try to use them whenever we can.
MR. HOTZ: Mr. Weeks, could you tell us whether there are any errors of fact in this memo,
and if so, would you point them out?
MR. WEEKS: Which one?
MR. HOTZ: The first memo, the Cook memo.
MR. WEEKS: Could you help me out on that, Herb?
MR. MOORE: We can get Mr. Cook here if you
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would like, Mr. Chairman.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Yes, we would like that, but let's just go ahead.
MR. MOORE: We will get an answer to that.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Just so we understand. I think Mr. Hotz and I asked the same ques-
tions. All right. This says: You have asked us or me to investigate reported problems, and then
he says, discussions with program engineers show that these are potentially major p_ oblems af-
fecting both flight safety and progress cost.
My question is, is what he set forth there accurate, and didn't he talk to the engineers and
deduce this information _ Isn't this information he got from the engineers?
MR. WEEKS: I think that his statement in here where he says that it might be catastrophic
I think is overstated.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, that may be.
MR. MOORE: I think the best thing for us to do, Mr. Chairman, is to think about getting
Mr. Cook here, and then we can ask Mr. Cook to sit down and try to answer your questions on
this thing.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Yes, but we want to ask questions as we go along--
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MR. HOTZ: We would also like your opinion of whether this is accurate or not. We can get a
witness--
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: This is a ease where you are saying, in effect, that you didn't have
much confidence in this fellow because he was in the wrong department and had been there just
a short time, and so we are asking is the material that he reported on accurate?
MR. WEEKS: If I may, I would like to pore over every word and come back to you.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, is it substantially accurate?
MR. WEEKS: I think it is substantially accurate.
DR. COVERT: I think the other thing, Mike, when you go through it, try to go through it
from the point of view of a rather naive sort of guy who hears the words and doesn't necessarily
understand all of the nuances but gets an overall picture of things. It has been my experience
that sometimes people have amazing insight. Part of the problem is to understand the nuances.
Thank you.
MR. WEEKS: Now, if we could go on to Irv Davids' memo, which is on page No. 9, and he is
discussing there the two cases, the nozzle-to-case, which is at the back end of the booster, and
the ease-to-case, which there are three of those joints
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alongthe lengthof it, andtheoneup from the bottomis the suspiciousonein the moviesof 51-
L.
CHAIRMANROGERS:Now.it looksto me as if this documentprecededthe Cookdocu-
ment,is that :orrect?
MR.WEEKS:It did,yes.
CHAIRMANROGERS:Sothis wasnot in responseto whatMr, Cookwrote.
MR.WEEKS:That'sright. Thismemowaswritten underthe followingcircumstances.We
havethesecondaryerosionon theflight of the 29thof April, andweaskedMr. DavidsandMr.
Hambyto goto Marshallto reviewit becausewewereconcernedaboutthis beingthe first case
of anyerosionon the secondaryseal.And that wasa fairly smallnumberof .032inch in that
particularcaseon thesecondarysealonthe nozzle-to-casejoint.
CHAIRMANROGERS:Let ustakethis aglanceat atime.
MR.MOORE:Mike,youmightpoint out that Mr. Davidsishere.
MR.WEEKS:Yes,heis here.
DR.COVERT:Whenyou say heat affected, was it discolored?
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TESTIMONY OF IRVING DAVIDS. SHUTTLE PROPULSION DIVISION
MR DAVIDS: Yes
I would like to just mention that when we went down there, the secondary seal failure that
we experienced, or erosion, was at the nozzle-to-case interface and not _,ast the case-to-case.
THE CLERK: I'm sorry, Mr. David, you will have to speak up, please.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Excuse me. Would you want to swear the witness in, please?
And this is what we do for all witnesses. This is nothing personal.
THE CLERK: Do you swear the testimony you will give this Commission will be the truth,
the whale truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
MR. DAVIDS: I do.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: This gentleman is a court stenographer, and he has to record what
you are saying. So if you could speak a little louder, please.
MR. DAVIDS: I just wanted you to understand that the secondary seal that Mike was allud-
ing to, with the type of erosion that we had was at the case-to-the-nozzle interface and not the
case-to-case That is significant to what w_ ar_ talking about.
However, when we got that problem due to the
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fact that it was a secondary, seal, we thought we had better go down to Marshall and go through
the entire area of seals to see what we were doing and what kind of problem we were having,
and that is what initiated our visit to the Marshall Space Flight Center. And you w'll note from
the memorandum that we did point out that there was certain--that we did experience some O-
ring erosion of the primary O-ring on the case-to-case seals, and the nozzle-to-case seals. And
what I wanted to do was obtain all the data that was available so we had a pretty good history
of what kind of failure or erosion we were getting on the seals and make sure that all of this
data was brought up to top management so that we all were well aware of what the problem
was that existed, and we vould try to get some pressure to accelerate trying to think about what
we could do about clearing up this potential problem that we had, and that was the real intent
of why we went down to Marshall.
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CHAIRMANROGERS:What is the pleasureof theC_nmission?Wouldyou like to askMr.
Davidssomequestionsaboutthis memorandumnow.:)r would you. want to come back and ask
him questions later?
MR. ACHESON: I would like to ask one.
This memorandum refers in the B heading on page 2 to unseating of the secondary O-ring
during joint
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rotation.
Is there a measurement of joint rotation made during flight?
MR. DAVIDS: There is no measurement taken, but Mr. Mulloy in his presentation is going
to cover that area very specifically. We actually have a joint to show you what the joint rotation
is all about, but we have no measurable measurement at all of that.
MR. WEEKS: Not in flight, but a_s he will show you it has been measured on the ground a
couple of times in full scale motors.
DR. COVERT: The suit blow-bys, is that case to case, or case to nozzle?
MR. DAVIDS: That was two cases by the primary seals. If you look at my memo, you will
find that the first part of it is just nozzle to case, and the second part of it is case to case. So I
specifically separate the two.
DR. WALKER: Do you have a thermal model of what temperatures different parts of the
assemblies see, and do you have any measurements of temperature of the various parts such as
,ILt)ili,_ ,vi _ ('I(-,"
MR. DAVIDS: I assume we have that.
MR. MULLOY: We do have a _,hermal model that shows some gradients of temperature, in-
cluding the motor through the propellant through the
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insulation, through the liner, into the case.
DR. WALKER: Could we have a copy of that?
MR. MULLOY: We can show you some results, yes, sir.
DR. WALKER: You have measurements, too?
MR. MULLOY: No, we do not have any direct temperature measurements,
MR. WEEKS: I am sorry, but I thought we measured some on the static firing out at
Morton-Thiokol's fac*ory. We have had many static tests. The static test is a single motor that is
fired on the ground horizontally, and I thought we measured a number of temperatures during
those early development cases.
Didn't we measure the temperature on the outside?
Well, we will dig into that.
MR. MOORE: Mr. Walker, we will provide you the data on thermal models as well as actual
measurements that have been made.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Mike, this letter by Mr. Davids says the prime suspect is the type of
putty c_ed, and he notes that you changed manufacturers after STS-10, yet there was erosion
way ba.:k in 1980, well before this change in putty on STS-10.
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So how do you tie the erosion to the change in manufacturer of the putty if you had that
problem before?
MR. DAVIDS: I think Larry will clarify this. If you look at all of the O-ring erosion that we
have seen, you find you can actually follow a path through the putty that goes to the spot where
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the O-ringerosionoccurs.And soit is obviousthat youaregettingsomeblow-bythroughthat
putty to thepointwheretheerosionoccurs,andsoyouseeacleartracebetweentheerosionand
theputty itself.
Now,yourquestionaboutwhywedidn't haveit onSTS-10,I guessmy answerwouldbethat
wedon'thaveerosionon every flight. There are times when we don't have it _nd times we did
have it.
GENERAL KUTYNA: No, I misstated my question or you misunderstood.
You had erosion prior to changing this putty. Therefore, you had these blow holes or what-
ever you call them, through the old putty, which you claim was good putty, and now you are
saying that after STS-10 you changed putty and therefore you had a problem.
Did you have it beforehand? Is that not true?
MR. DAVIDS: I guess that is true.
MR. WEEKS: You are reading where putty is the
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prime cause of the erosion, General?
GENERAL KUTYNA: Yes. And I am asking, you had this problem as early as 1980, well
before this time, well before the time you changed manufacturers.
DR. COVERT: When you say you received these things, I assume that when it comes back
after it is hauled out of the ocean, and this comes from disassembly and refurbishment- -
MR. DAVIDS: That is correct.
DR. COVERT:--and you take it apart very carefully to make sure that you don't interfere
with anything of the visual data?
MR. DAVIDS: That is correct.
MR. WEEKS: In fact, that is, of course, one of the neat things about the Shuttle is this is
the first time in history we have been bringing these things back. The Titan, of course, the only
thing we can look at there on erosion is the firings they have had on the ground.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Do you happen to know whether there is any connection between
these two memoranda, or did they just happen to be about the same time?
MR. DAVIDS: I didn't know anything about the Cook memorandum. I had never seen the
Cook memorandum.
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MR. WEEKS: The only connection is that in the New York Times article I elected to put
them in the order of their occurrence in the article as just a way of formatting this. (Rel'. 2 Io-_[
Number one, as you will see in there, it shows up in the article on the second page in your
handout up at the top where Mr. Cook, down about the middle of the second page is Roman
number II which is Irv Davids' memo, and number Ill is the budget briefing that is spoken to on
August 2i and then September 10 shows one of mine, which is the Propulsion Division of Mr.
Winterhalter's internal preparation, preparing to come to Jess Moore_ which is the next one.
The way we organize every month in the office is that we get the financial data, and then
each division, the Propulsion Division, the Orbiter Division, etc., prepare their charts in their
own house, and then it is brought to Jess Moore, and then after that we carry it to the Adminis-
trator, which is the final thing around the 17th, 18th of the month. And so we go through this
ritual every month of how we do this thing. Ir ,'l. 2 lo 7 I
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Let me go back just one moment to the Cook memorandum. You
will notice at the end of that he ties safety to budgetary considerations.
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He said [ would think that any NASA budget submitted this year for fiscal year 1987 and
beyond should certainly be based on a reliable judgment as to the cause of the SRB seal problem
and a corresponding decision as to budgetary action needed to provide for its solution.
Do you know whether any such action was taken or consideration was given to his memo-
randum on that point?
MR. WEEKS: I can state authoritatively that no action--_ think this is true of Mr. Moore as
well, because I didn't see this memorandum until yesterday.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Do you know whether anybody else took it seriously then?
MR. WEEKS: We certainly were alert, as you will see as we go through this whole chronolo-
gy, you will see that we were alert to a problem, but we had not identified a precise amount of
money that we thought would be required to fix it.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: In other words, as I understand it, your memorandum was, as far as
you knew, unrelated to anything in the Cook memorandum, so you were just considering the
facts that you were dealing with here based upon what had happened in previous flights, and
you were making a study of that, and you
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were reporting on it, and you end up with I recommend that we arrange for MSFC to provide an
overall briefing to you on the O-rings, including failure history, current status, and options for
correcting the problems.
Now, I assume that was done, wasn't it?
MR. WEEKS: Yes. _,_at is, as you will see, in the next set of charts that that occurred on
the 19th of August.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Now as far as we know from this book, was any follow-up given to
the Cook memorandum?
MR. MOORE: Sir, may I comment on the Cook memorandum?
Mr. Cook is in our budget office at NASA headquarters. He is in the Comptroller's office,
and that is where you see the BRC. That is a co_,e.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I understood that.
MR. MOORE: Now, he wrote this internally to one of the people in the budget office. Mike
Mann works in the budget office, and Mike Mann is one of our people who looks after the over-
all Shuttle budget. To my knowledge, no one in my office, at least in the technical program area
here, saw this memo from Mr. Cook.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Is Mr. Mann here today?
MR. MOORE: Mr. Mann is in the budget office.
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He is not here today. We would be happy to bring him, too.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But as of now, we don't know if he did anything about this? He just
treated it as another memorandum?
MR. MOORE: We do not. We are all seeing this for the first time.
I guess we saw it in the newspaper, just like you and other members of the Commission.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Am I correct in assuming that what you describe, that in
the normal chain of authority, neither Mr. Cook nor Mr. Mann would have anything to do with
deciding the technical aspects?
MR. MOORE: Mr. Armstrong, you are exactly right. They are budget analysts, and we at
this time of the year are putting together our budget briefing for the Administrator for fiscal
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1987.and I amsuretheCodeB e-_eopie,e,ur peoplethat youseelistedhere,aresitting backand
lookingat areasthat theyoughtto besensitiveto whenwecomebetbrethe Administratorwith
ourbudget.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Let me say I fully understand that, but we want to be sure that we
face the ['acts. The fact is you kave a memorandum, and Cook says certain things he thinks
should be done.
All I want to do is find out what was done. If
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it wasn't done, tell us why and we will understand and the record will be clear. That's all.
MR. MOORE: We will have to bring in Mr. Mann and Mr. Cook I think to make sure of
that, or we can provide you a written statement.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: No, we would like to have them.
MR. MOORE: Mr. Winterhalter, do you want to talk about this?
MR. WINTERHALTER: Yes. The very next document, document No. 3, will show that in
our budget briefing we referred to the O-ring as a budget threat. We did not specifically add any
money to the budget for that but understood that we were stadying the situation, that depend-
ing if some redesign and some improvement was decided upon, then we would have to have some
extra money to cover that outside what we had originally budgeted.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Are we going to find out through these papers that you as a matter
of jargon, you spoke about budget threat and safety together and related them somehow togeth-
er?
MR. WINTERHALTER: Not in anything that I have learned.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: You just spoke about budget
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threat.
MR. WINTERHALTER: We didn't lock at that as a safety problem.
MR. MOORE: We identify a budget threat as something that the results of tests or the re-
sults of flight may require us to go back and make some changes in it, and so therefore, for the
fiscal _87 budget which we were putting together, we identified this area as an area of threat
based upon the tests that we had planned on the segments which you will hear about later on in
this briefing, and that was the context of the budget threat.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Just so we understand it, because this is something that the press
will clearly dwel), on, I gather you mean when you say budget threat, that if you change condi-
tions to approve whatever it was that you were talking about, _hat would increase your budget,
and therefore it would be a threat to the budget.
Now, doesnt that necessarily relate to the safety of the personnel involved, and that leads
to budget considerations?
MR. CULBERTSON: Dr. Graham asked me to sit in a while in his absence.
Let me define what budget threat means within the Agency: anything that could affect cur-
rent
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projections on the budget is referred to as a budget threat. We ask each of the programs when
they submit the budget to do it as realistically as they can but also tell us where that budget
may be in error, what kinds of things it can cause. It can range from DOD aeciding not to fly a
mission on the Shuttle and therefore change our income. It can come from any kind of action,
including the results of tests which haven't yet been made, and it can certainly be based upon
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somebody's concern that there may be a safety item that could affect our planning and could
therefore affect our budget.
The word "threat" is an unfortunate word, but it is what we use, and it is a potential item
that may change the budget.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: So we are likely to find as we study these documents that from time
to time when there seems to be. a failure ef equipment or something that should be improved,
that it may be referred to as a budget threat, and therefore nothing should be done about it?
MR. CULBERTSON: No, not that nothing should be done about it.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, let me correct that.
By the use of the term and relating it to, as
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you did in this case, or as Cook did in his memo where he makes it very clear that that is what
he is thinkirg about, it may appear that from ti ,e to time that things were not done in the field
of safety because that would present a budgeL ::teat. I mean, it just seems to me it is clear, and
I understand it, but it seems to me it is clear, it is clear from this memo, the first one you have
here.
MR. FEYNMAN: Suppose there is an item which may or may not turn out to be a safety
threat, and there is some kind of difficulty, and it may be solved very easily. On the other hand,
it may require a large amount of reconstruction of equipment which is quite expensive, and it is
not yet known whether it is an important problem either for safety or fc- anything else, and it
is ne_'ertheless potentially a problem, and a problem that the budget h_- to appreciate may
arise. It doesn't mean that they have decided *hat they are not going to make this cha:,ge. As a
matter of fact, the very fact that they are aware that the budget is going to be threatened repro
sents a statement of the possibility that they will have to repair this fbr safety purposes, and
there may not be an obvious relationship between safety and the budget.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, as I say--and I don't think there is any point of having a fur-
ther discussion on it, but I think we can see that the way
473
these documents are written would sl,ggest that, and I think that that is something that you
would want to think about before we come to a public session because it says so. It says--well,
the l_st paragraph, I don't have to read it. It says there are certain safety problems. My engi-
neers tell me there are safety problems. You have asked me to make a check, and then he says
we have got to consider the budget action needed to provide for the solution.
So I think there is no point of saying that you haven't thought about it. I mean, as Dr.
Feynman says, it may very well, the documents would reflect that you did give full consideration
and you decided that it didn't have to be fixed I understand that.
But the phrase "budget threat" is very unfortunate.
MR. CULBERTSON: We do not use it as an indication that budget limitations threaten the
possibility of taking corrective action. I don't know that it is every really used in that way in
NASA, but you certainly can read that connotation into it.
MR. WEEKS: I want to make two points in this regard. In the manned programs, as I know
them, through their history, the people making those decisions first look at if it is safety and it
is mandatory, we find a way
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in the budget to get it done.
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Now, in our budget that Mr. Moore carries across to tho Administrator, we have two ways of
taking care of things like this. We have changes in upgradi_lg that we can absorb some of these,
and we also have a reserve account. In NASA it is called a PA. It is program activity to be
allowed for. And so there are ways.
And when we have over the six years I have been here in the program, _ :_en we find a
genuine safety issue, and we do quite often, we find the money, and have in the six years I have
been there, are able to some how, in some way change other things to fit and get the safety not
compromised. I cannot think of a case that we have ever said that we will not fix a safety item
because of money. Sometimes it has been rather excruciating.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Mr. Chairman, along your line of reasoning, I would ask Phil, might
there be some unfortunate choice of words here that ties safety to schedule thrcat also?
MR. CULBERTSON: Well, it could be used that way.
GENERAL I_UTYNA: Are there some you are aware of in your research of the documents,
because those
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could be misinterpreted.
MR. CULBERTSON: The way we use schedule threats as to the schedules is the same way
we use budget threat for the budget, and nothing further is inferred. The budget people _o,'ry
about threats to budget; schedule people worry about threats to schedule. The program worries
about the overall quality of it.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Because we are going to have a public session and this is going to be
discussed for a long time to come, in the Cook memorandum he says, he has talked to progress
engineers, and in discussion with progress engineers, shows it to be a potentially major problem
affecting both flight safety and program cost. And last, he says it should be noted that Code M
management, what is that?
MR. WEEKS: Cede M--Jesse Moore is the head of Code M; the Associate Administrator for
Space Flight is called Code M.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: He says it should be pointed out that Code M management is view-
ing the situation with the utmost seriousness. From a budgetary standpoint, I would think that
any NASA budget submitted this year for FY 1987 and beyond should certainly be based on a
reliable judgment as to the cause of the seal problem and a corresponding decision as to budget-
ary
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action needed to provide for its solution.
Now, that memorandum either had not received much attention, on the one b,'nd, which is
understandable, assuming that there wasn't much confidence in Mr. Cook or basecl upon his ex-
perience, or it was followed up, and some decisions were made on it, and I guess that is what I
*hink we have to keep in mind.
MR. MOORE: Mr. Chairman, let me just add one quick point to that, if I might. In the case
of a situation that Mr. Cook describes, we have been following up, and we have been following
up this O-ring concern for some *:me. I- fact, you will see a program laid out that we have had
under way leading up to some tests th,.t., ,'e scheduled for the month of February
So he is right in that particular as; -:t, and he m al_ right in the sense that it did represent
,n his common knowledge a budget threat, that we may come over and ask for a substantial
amount of money in the budget request.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS.: I think that is the answer to my questions.
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MR MOORE: You will _ee. Mr. Chairman. the program that we have laid out h:_ '=cen
under way for some time in this wkole question about O-rings.
MR. WEEKS: Now, [ think that we could
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DR. WALKER: Excuse me. When you have a situation where a system doesn't perfornl as
you predicted, do you have some mechanism where you look at that and decide wha, the impli-
cations might be for safety or schedule, or whether something ca_ be slipped'? Do you have some
procedures that you go through'?
MR. MOORE: Mr. Walker, we have two major paths that we undertake. One is we have got
a program path which people in my office work with the corresponding center people, and the
center people work with the corresponding contractor people to go and address that problem
from a standpoint of how do we resolve it. And then independent of that, using some of the same
people, however, we have a whole flight readiness review process to determine if this particular
problem is enough of a concern that we should not fly. That is done in parallel, and actions come
out both in our flight preparation process that we described the other day, as well as in our
pregram process where we go through that analysis. And I hope as we go through this today you
will see some of that come out.
But we have those two major paths that are followed up.
DR. WALKER: It might be useful to be sure that that documentation is available and in
place in
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case you might need it.
MR. MOORE: You will see, Mr. Walker, the program side of this whole question of con ern
about O-rings today. We have laid that out in very great technical detail today, and we will tell
you the actions that the program has taken in terms of trying to get a handle on this problem
and so forth. So you will see that as part of the data that is presented to you today.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, I tlave been urging members of the Commission not to inter-
rupt, and I have been the worst offender.
So please go ahead.
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MR. WEEKS: I rather think that Roman II, Mr. Irv Davids, will be in better context, be-
cause his memo was followed up by this August 19th which Mr. Mulloy is going to speak to in
great detail. And I think that will be a better context to put that whole memo in.
And then the next one is this briefing number three, which is the budget briefing material
on August 21st, which was, as Mr. Moore said, around the August time frame is when we are
putting together the budget, for the following February 3rd, 4th, whenever it is submitted to the
Congress.
And so this was a budget recommendation briefing that was going to the budget administra-
tor on the 21st. It was made up on the 16th, as you can see there on the front page, and as it
actually happened, this particular briefing because of the press of time did not get to the admin-
istrator in that particular case. A number of other briefings on the orbiter did get to him.
And so this is just a budget threat item that we in general tell the administrator about so
that he isn't blindsided that we haven't told him of some threat that he may have to help us get
money moved around in the agency to hold a tough problem together. Usually Jess Moore can
handle it within his own resources, but
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quiteoftenhecannotandtheadministratorhastojump into thesituation.
Thenonnumberfour,whichis Septemberthe V_th,whichis Mr. Winterhalter'spreparation
for this monthlymeeting[ _poketo youabout,this is just a checklistof the erosion of the par-
ttcular case on 5',.-I; that he is telling Mr. Moore at our monthly meetings about what the prob-
lems may be.
And then December U)th is the monthly status report. You will see there that number two
on that one, which is now--and now I'm on page 15, and there is the case to case, nozzle, O-ring
charring or erosion. When you see "'charring" you will see :,fr. Mulloy's pitch. Erosion--if you
will use those intevchangeably, j_,,r. _, t_
We are a little sloppy. We all know charring and erosion =re fundamentally different, but
sorr, etimes we get lax with the imprecise language.
DR. RIDE: Can I ask you a question? Back on number three--and I gue_ I am back on the
budget threats. You've got this SRM O-ring charring listed as a potential budget threat. What
sort of threat to the budget was it being considered as?
In other words, were people thinking of it as a threat because they needed lots more O-rings,
or were they thinking of it as a threat because there was a
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potential redesign of the solid rocket? In other words, how serious a safety consideration was
this and what kind of budget implications did it have?
I mean, when people were briefing this were they saying we may here a solid rocket design
or redesign, or were they saying we need more O-rings?
MR. WEEKS: We had seen some of the alternates of the type of design that it might re-
quire, and some of them were qui_e livable in Mr. Moore's budget and some would have been
very difficult to handle.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: What about this one?
.\II_ _VI'iEtxS: _3,cll. \*,li-_,,, _l-\l: \h_'.,r_'-!_ll_'(I. \_,_'_Ilx h_t\_'lll Ii_li_'d,_l _h_tl Ih>l:lilllt( _
I>,, ;11 ]_'il'-,[ l!I_l !{I III\ l(ll,_x_h,_IR_,,;IlliI '-,I_ ",.",t' }liI\('II'l t'(qll_' I!I)\'_II ill _|ll 3 \'_i5 ()II \'_II;II
MR. MOORE: Excuse me.
CI-YAIRMAN ROGERS: You're not answering the question.
MR. MOORE: Let me try and answer the question from a budget threat point of view. What
we had under way, we did not have a safety of flight concern in our program area that said we
should not fly the shuttle at this point in time.
We did look at this thing as being a long term, because we had a different design on the
filament wound case, that because we were seeing some erosion, that we might have to change
that design and it would be better off to change that design in the long term.
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So a program was put in place to look at the results of the fi]amtnt wound case activity and
some other tests to decide if we wanted to continue to fly with the erosion concern we had or
whether or not we wanted to go back and redesign.
And that was the context of the budget threat and there was a question of how much money
was in that thing. We didn't have a feel for particular money in there. We just said, we may
have to go back and get good tests out of this filament wound case, and we may have to go back
and redesign.
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_ theseweresomeof the _hingsthat we'_¢ere talking a_)ut in Ir_" David's memo and what
they were going to put into the _]lament wound case program, that we wanted to see how that
particular thing operate'].
DR. RIDE: [ guess what I'm cencerned about ts, you're saying you might want a potential
redesign because _';._u were concerned at some level about erosion of the seals, and if there's any
concern if the O-rings go you've lost the solids, and if you've lost the _olids you've lost the flight.
So that seems like a fairly serious consideration.
MR. MOORE: It was a serious _onsideration, and in the analysis that will be presented by
Larry
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Mulloy and the Marshall people here this afternoon it was given a very ,_erious look and every-
body in the program felt that we did not have a safety of flight concern and that we should stop
flying the program.
We also changed out after each particular flight. The O-rings went back for complete rafur-
bishment on the entire case. And we _xlso knew that at the same time there were some questions
about the O-ring erosion, and we were using some of the data that we were planning to get from
the filament wound cases and some of the other lab _2sts at the Marshall Space Flight Center in
order to decide what the size of that particular issue was.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Do you know whether there are any documents relating to the argu-
ments pro and con on that subject or any reportings of what was being said about it?
MR. MOOP, E: There are certainly a lot of documents on that, Mr. Chairman. There are a lot
of documents _,ading up to the flight and there were a lot of people involved in being sent tele-
coms certifying that they were ready to fly. We have all of the documents from everyone in the
program certifying the shuttle.
CHAIRMAN F:OGERS: I'm really less interested
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in that than whether there were two schools of thought, whether some people were saying we
should stop and others thought it was such a serious safety consideration that we should stop
and correct it, no matter what the budgetar:y considerations are, and other people say, no, it
cost_ too much, or we're not worried about the safety aspect, or it has some safety features but
were not very aware of them? Do we have that kind of a discussion? Because just these charts
don't really help us too much.
MR. MOORE: To my knowledge--and anybody else in the room can address the question
that you asked. To my knowledge, there was no concern on the part of anybody here who said
we should stop flying because of the budget threat potential and so on.
CI-iAIRMAN ROGERS: Was there anybody who said we ought to stop for a little while and
slow down and take the following corrective steps before we fly?
MR. MOORE: No, sir.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: As I look down this list, it looks--and you can correct
me, but at these seven bullets here, this is really the only one that i,_ of _, teclmical nature. Am I
correct?
MR. MOORE: Which one?
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Well, it ha_
485
"turn-around improvements" and "dual source" and "flight sets."
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MR.WEEKS:No.Thetopone.Mr Chairman.is a technical question. And you understand
the reason this is here is because it is in the New York T_."aes article.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG I understated
MR. WEEKS: A,T_d we underlined it because it (s the germane point. Bl.tt truly, the top one
is a technical question in getting the filament wound case comments.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: The filament wound case is a technical consideratior_,
but it's not a safety of fli_iht consideration in th;.s context because it is a potential improvement.
MR. WEEKS: Well. but it has to meet the full strength requirements or it indeed is just as
safety in flight as any other item.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: But what I'm trying to understand here. this charring
item on the chart is on there, and that says that there was a concern of some sort and Mr.
Moore is telling us that it wasn't a safety of flight concern. And what I'm trying to understand
is, what might have made it a safety in flight concern.
What is the difference? What is the dividing
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line that put it on this, and what is the dividing line that would put it into a safety of flight
consideration?
MR. MOORE: I will ask Dave Winterhalter here, who is head of that division, to tell you of
his perceptions on this fine line of the safety of flight concern, and also the concern we had
about the O-ring.
MR. WINTERHALTER: Firstly, if I thought at the time that that was a real safety of flight
issue that it wouldn't have been a budget threat. It wouldn't have appeared on this list. It would
have appeared as a mandatory change, a make-work change, that we would say we don't do any
more flying, we don't do any more testing, until we make some changes.
What we were talking about in this instance was we had seen some erosion on the O-rings.
We had taken some action to take a look at some changes in designs, et cetera. However, we
hadn't completed that evaluation to the point where we had scoped it moneywise to say, okay,
it's going to take maybe $5, $10 million worth of extra testing and improvement in order to
bring that on later in the program.
But we listed it as a budget threat, something that maybe would use up some of our APA,
whatever reserve we had in the program. Now, obviously if we had a
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whole list of things there that would also have the same effect on the budget. If they were an
overrun, they weren't determined to be a budget thr r,_t.
DR. RIDE: What amount of erosion would hav_ !_ven you a problem to call it a safety in
flight issue?
MR. WINTERHALTER: Well, we had test results on this and, even with the erosion on the
secondary ring, which was the only instance we saw, we had a safety factor sizewise of over two
to one in our tests.
DR. RIDE: What does that mean in terms of the amount of time?
MR. MULLOY: That is probably best explained with some charts that I have in my briefing.
MR. WEEKS: Sally, I don't think that you should get the idea that we weren't deeply con-
cerned about that first instance of the secondary O-ring having erosion.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: I find myself not really understanding the feeling of the
people that were involved in this.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: What is it that shows how you resolved your concerns?
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MR.WEEKS:We!l,[ think that if wecouldp: )ceedandgetpastthe NewYorkTimesthing
a_dget into thegenuinechronology.I think that wouldcome
488
throughalot better
GENERALKUTYNA:Beforeyoudo,Mr. Chairman,I wouldlike to call your attentionto
pagel? Andwhenwe lookat theCookmemoyouhavea statement that the failureof theseal
wouldcertainlybecatastrophic, and it was stated that that was overstated.
And if you look at page 17, here's another group saying the same thing. It says: "Failure
mode and causes," and then about the fourth of fifth box down, "failure effects summary."
MR. WEEKS: Now, this is the document that is the December 1982, and that is when it was
signed by myself, on the 28th of March in 1983. The critical items list were changed from a one
redundant to a criticality one period, which means the redundance was to some degree compro-
mised.
GENERAL KUTYNA: My problem is the New York Times kind of problem. Here it said
that Cook says it's going to be catastrophic and here is another guy says loss of mission, vehicle,
and crew. Somehow we've got to be able _o explain in the open session tomorrow why this is
different from what you said.
MR. WALKER: What action was taken as a result of this analysis?
MR. WEEKS: As you will see over the time
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period, you will see in Mr. Mulloy's testing many, many things that were done as regards this O-
r:rag seal deflection which he speaks to here as a problem.
MR. WALKER: Some changes were made?
MR. WEEKS: Changes were made and tests were done to identify how much erosion was
liveable, how much deflection really occurs as a result of this CIL back three years ago.
Now, this critical items list, as you can see there at the bottom, here we were, after we had
had eight static test firings, we had five flights. We had 180, 54 field and 126 factory joints that
were tested with no evidence of leakage.
We also had the Titan III program, which is a single seal instead of a dual seal, and they
had about a thousand joints that, to the best of our knowledge, had not had a problem.
MR. WALKER: It looks like the Titan seals have different characteristics.
MR. WEEKS: Well, in orxe of the critical things, it is not redundant. In one of the critical
things, the dual is better.
DR. COVERT: Maybe it's a different pressure.
MR. WEEKS: i can't authoritatively speak to the comparative difference in the two joints. I
haven't seen any
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numbers on that. We know what our deflections were.
DR. LUCAS: I think you said we changed something there. Are you speaking of the filament
would case? I don't believe a change was made on the steel case flight, was it?
MR. WEEKS: I stand corrected.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Could I make one comment? We're not talking about the New York
Times article now. The New York Times article called the whole thing to the public's attention,
Now we're talking about the documents that you produced, and let's forget the New York Times.
We're not analyzing the New York Times; we're analyzing your documents. As far as I'm
concerned, that is what we're talking about, and that is what we will be talking about tomorrow.
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[ mean,we'renot hereto decidewhetherthe NewYorkTimeswritesgoods_oriesor not. We're
here because of the critica. I nature of the subject matter.
We're here to consider what NASA did in view of its own internal documents.
MR. WEEKS: If I could I think go to page 2, which is page 18 that shows the test program
that was done, in which the O-ring withstood 1600 psi, which is the actual operating pressure.
The test program
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withstood--and this is back now three years ago--that the O-ring can withstand four pressuriza-
tion cycles before any damage to the rings can occur or did occur.
We had over 540 joints exposed to the pressurization levels at the mean operating pressure,
which is essentially 1,000 psi, with no leakage past the primary O-ring.
DR. COVERT: With the liner and the insulation in? What was the configuration in the
tests?
MR. WEEKS: In the liquidpressurization system, I'm quite sure that that is oilout of the
factory in Utah, and there isno insulation.
DR. COVERT: So there'sno insulationat all?
MR. WEEKS: None. This was a liquidtest.
DR. COVERT: So itisjust the steelshell?
MR. WEEKS: And the O-rings,et cetera.
DR. COVERT: Essentiallyan isothermal test?
MR. WEEKS: Yes. I'm sure it'sat room temperature.
And so this isa document that isour--
DR. COVERT: Isthisthing lying on itsside or vertical?
MR. WEEKS: I think they're tested vertically.
A critical items list is, if it is deemed to
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be category one, and you will see that this was changing from category _--R, which is redundant,
to category 1, which meant the redundancy was not full. As you can see here, full redundancy
exists--this is in the middle of the first paragraph: "Full redundancy exists at the moment of
initial pressurization."
And that is of course a very critical time, because the pressure in the motor is coming up in
about 600 milliseconds to the 900 psi. And this joint rotation--and the reason that this particu-
lar CIL was written was it was found that that joint does rotate, and in Mr. Mulloy's pitch you
will see a detailed picture of the amount of rotation which lifts off the secondary seal to about 42
to 60 thousandths of an inch.
DR. COVERT: Is this natural frequency?
MR. WEEKS: I can't answer that. Can anybody answer that?
DR. COVERT: I would appreciate that information, because that's going to relate to the ira-
portance of the 600 milliseconds.
MR. WEEKS: We will get that for you.
DR. COVERT: Thank you.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Could I suggest that you make the answers to the Commissioner
who asked the
question.
MR. MOORE: Yes, sir_
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MR.WEEKS:Andso,acritical itemonewhichhasto besignedoff at theassociateadminis-
trator levelis a safetyof tlight of"thecrewor the airplaneor both,andthere{breit ischanging
fromI-R to [ or signingoff acritical itemslist, Roman I.
DR. RIDE: So in late 1982 this was identified as a criticality one problem, and signed off
based upon tests and past performance and all that sort of thing. And then you had subsequent
problems with the O-rings, or at least subsequent charring on the O-ring.
MR. WEEKS: Correct.
DR. RIDE: Did you go back and revisit the CIL?
MR. WEEKS: Well, I think that you will see each step that we went througb as we found
each of the flights, Sally, that got different amounts of erosion, We were in effect re-reviewing
this document as to whether it was liveable or not.
MR. MOORE: Let me add, Larry Mulloy, you might camment on that, because each pro-
gram element in the shuttle is required to go back after an anomaly and carry it out through
the entire project.
MR. MULLOY: None of the data really changed.
494
It changed the basis for the acceptance of it as a criticality one item, but all of the data that we
received in terms of the joint rotation and the reason we were getting the erosion--so yes, we
did look at that, and we felt the margins we were seeing--and I will explain some of this--
during the time that it takes to fill the gap between the primary and the O-ring, that it is an
acceptable situation. And I have no data today to change that.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Not even today'?
MR. MULLOY: No, sir.
(Viewgraph._ It_,'t -' _" l"l
MR. WEEKS: Now, if I could go on to the Titan experience. And here is the history as we
best understand it on the Titan, that it is a design similar. But, whoever asked the question
whether it was identical or not---
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Could I go back to your last answer? Are you suggesting that you
have come to the conclusion that these things did not cause the accident?
MR. MULLOY: Sir, I'm not aware of anything that has caused the accident yet.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, I asked you if you would have a concern today, based upon
what happened, and you said no.
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MR. MULLOY: Sir, I said I have no data that changes the basis for that being a criticality
one item. The thing that changed it from a criticality one redundant to a criticality one is still
valid today.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I don't think that anybody who would hear that could understand it.
Could you explain it so that the public would understand it?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir. If I could get to my charts, I will explain what happens during this
rotation and why we think that it is a criticality one but the design is safe, given the criticality
one design, and redundant.
DR. COVERT: Mr. Chairman, might I suggest that some of these things might be resolved
by data? And I would hope that sooner or later we're going to get some numbers on these things,
so we can get a feel for what they are. And I would suggest that some of these judgments might
be withheld until we have some numbers.
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Yes, [ think what [ was suggesting is we want to be careful that
NASA doesfft suggest by his answer that nothing has changed. That would be a devastating
comment. I think the answer to that is, we're not sure yet, that is what we're studying.
MR. MOORE: Yes, sir, I think that's exactly right.
MR. CULBERTSON: The thing that hasn't changed, Mr. Chairman, is that this is still a
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criticality one item. It is not a redundant system. That is what that piece of paper says. it placed
it in a non-redundant category causing it to get a lot more attention than would have been the
case if it is a redundant item, and it remains that way.
DR. FEYNMAN: If I understand what "criticality one" means, it means it is important for
safety of the flight. Is there a higher category than that?
MR. WEEKS: No.
DR. FEYNMAN: So that a failure of criticality one doesn't mean it was safe.
MR. WEEKS: It means if there is a failure of a criticality one item you can live through it,
DR. FEYNMAN: It doesn't mean there can't be any failures, of course. I heard someone sug-
gest that something was criticality one and you would fly with it. So we still have to discuss
later, I presume, the evidence that this criticality one was sufficiently unlikely or something
that we could fly v, ith it.
MR. WEEKS: I'm going to suggest, Mr. Chairman, that I finish these two or three charts on
Titan. And then what I think would be more meaningful is that the chronology is there in your
documents, and I think that if we went to the technical briefing of Mr. Mulloy immediately after
that, we will get to the
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heart of this matter much quici er and most everybody in this room will be happy.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I think that's a good idea. Proceed.
MR. WEEKS: Okay. So just to tidy up the Titan thing. Now, General Kutyna may stand me
corrected. The 26 ground test, which is the only place you will see any of the charring--and
there was very little. And think we looked up something, and the worst one that existed was 10
thousandths on the single O-ring on the Titan, and there are 20 of the five-segment. That was
the earliest version.
There were four of the seven-segment, which nev,_r went into production, but was just a de-
velopment in the laboratory, and then two five and a half segments, which was a way of getting
a little additional performance. And I believe every one of them flying now is the five and a half
segment device.
And there is not any leakage, but there was this 10 thousandths. And there have been 77
flight tests, in which we have used 154 motors, and over SO0 joint experiences.
MR. WALKER: Are you arguing the Titan experience applies directly to the shuttle experi-
ence?
MR. WEEKS: I am inferring that in that CIL
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that was signed three years _go, that was a germane thing that gave us some degree of confi-
dence that we could proceed to sign up on it.
MR. ACHESON: Question: Would there be stresses set up by differences in design between
the Titan and the shuttle flight assembly which w_.uld produce different types of rotation and
different values for rotation?
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MR. WEEKS: It certainly would, I'm almost certain, even though I do not know of their
rotation numbers.
MR. ACHESON: Could those be simulated on the ground in any effective way?
MR. WEEKS: They certainly on those 26 tests--and ! don't know whether maybe General
Kutyna can tell us, but I'm sure they instrumented these and you can measure it on the ground.
That's your best thing to do.
MR. ACHESON: My question, though, is whether the differences in the stresses in rotation
between the two systems could be measured on the ground?
MR. WEEKS: I believe they could.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Let me address this. In talking to the space division, if they were on
the stand right now they might say that their joint was stiffer
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than the NASA joint and therefore the rotation was not as great as the NASA joint, and so the
joints should not be compared as essentially the same.
MR. WEEKS: I wouldn't quarrel with that. But when I signed that document, of course, I
did not know the details of the Titan joint.
(Viewgraph.) !m.i -' i() I I I
3:his is the detail of the single joint of the Titan, and it shows here, this _s the inside. The
centerline of the motor is here, and this shows the single one fitting down in, when 850 psi
comes down and it pushes up against that O-ring.
But it is similar, of course. This detail is very similar to what you will see in Mr. Mulloy's
pitch, similar, but I accept General Kutyna's point that the amount of rotation could be slightly
different.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Mike, let me point out what the differences would be. They say it's a
beefier joint, it's longer, it may be heavier, and actually there is a crosshatch section or actually
a compression and they have to sit for a while before they can get the pins in, to the extent that
almost all of the putty _- squeezing out of it. So there is very little putty within those two sur-
faces.
So it is a compression joint, versus the kind of joint that you will see on the shuttle, which is
an open one.
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MR. WEEKS: Well, General Kutyna, I sure wouldn't er_pect the stiffness coefficients of this
insulation to be the same overall.
GENERAL KUTYNA: No, not very much.
MR. WALKER: Is that insulation ceramic?
MR. WEEKS: I assume that insulation is rubber.
MR. McDONALD: I'm pretty sure it is NBRO I don't know. I didn'*, put it in.
(Viewgraph)
MR. WEEKS: Now, this chronology, which is in your second frame, let me tell you what it
is. But I think that if we went to Mr. Mulloy, which has extensive detailed numbers of calcula-
tions and so forth, I think we will be better off in this chronology, and then let us decide to come
back to that.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: All right, let's go to Mr. Mulloy. And do you want to swear him in.
(Witness sworn.)
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MR. MULLOY: Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission:
What I will give you today is an overview of the SRM case joints, some of the experience
that we have had with those case joints, the erosion that has been experienced in the O-rings in
those joints, and hcw we have addressed those as we have progressed through the program.
The CIL or critical items list document that has been under discussion as generated in De-
cember of 1982, we generated shortly after I took over the SRB program, where we had a recog-
nition from the structural static testing that we had done at Marshall and some hydro-proof
testing, where we actually measured the rotation of the joint, that we did determine that we did
not have redundant seals, which was the initial design intent.
Now, Mr. Chairman, as you have asked if we can explain this in some terms that are under-
standable, I hope to be able to do that. The simple fact of the matter is that, due to this joint
rotation, which I will explain, one of the seals is not effective, in that it is essentially lifted off
its sealing surface.
And the rationale for the retention of that is the analysis and
5O2
the testing that I will go through, as being we would like for it not to be a criticality one, we
would like for it to be a criticality three. What is done in the process is to look, is there any
practical way to make something a criticality three that isn't, and can you make it a criticality
two; and if you can't make it a criticality two, which is simply loss of mission and no loss of life.
then you make it redundant. And if you can't make it redundant, is it a reasonable risk to con-
tinue with the single failure of the system leading to a catastrophic failure?
MR. WALKER: Can I ask a question?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir.
MR. WALKER. Does that mean it's a single point failure, category one?
MR. MULLOY: Loss of mission and life.
_II_ \\.\l.Kl':l_: ll ,t,,',,tlt II:'__.'--',tlil\ m_'att it tul>. t_t,_,tt a tw_;tti\,' c, mm_lati_m'
MR. MULLOY: That is correct. It simply means you have a single point failure with no
backup and the failure of that single system is catastrophic.
(Viewgraph.) Ir,'l. 2 l, 12 I
To orient you as to all of the joints that we have in the motor, what I have here is a profile
of the motor. The two joints that I will be concentrating on because they are primary areas of
interest to NASA and to this Commission are the Nozzle-to-Case Joint, where at the aft end of
the motor case the nozzle is assembled into Lhe motor case. This is the aft dome of the motor,
and then the nozzle noses in. That is, it is bolted in with
285
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:_ bolt circle, and it goes around that aft segment.
The other joint--this is a factory-made joint. That joint i',- made at Thiokol.
The other segment joints that we show here are made at Kennedy Space Center, because we
ship the motors as an aft segment with its fixed nozzle attached, we install the nozzle extension
at KSC, and then have a center segment, a center forward segment, and then a forward _eg-
men*..
Those joints are--these individual casting segments contain a joint also. That joint in be-
tween there, is the same type of joint as the field joint. In ihct, when we recycle the hardware
what is a factory joint on one flight may become a field joint on another flight,
This joint we have never had any problem with, because we had the layer of insulation over
that joint, because that joint is made prior to laying the rubber in the motor and casting the
insulation.
The configuration of this nozzle to case joint is considerably differc-:__t, as you can see by this
diagram, than what we call the field joint, where we have this clevis. And we brought a section
that is a little easier to see exactly what you're dealing with here. This is a section cut from a
motor.
5O4
This portion here is called the clevis: and this is the direction that it is assembled. The
clevis is: .ointed up and the assembly is made. Fhe tang end of the motor segment is aft. It is
lowered into the clevis for the assembly.
There are two O-rings and two O-ring grooves that are in the clevis, and then there are pros
of one inch diameter, high strength steel pins. 'there are 177 of these pins that go around the
circumference, that secure the joint in place.
Then in belween where the insulation is, in this area right here, is where the zinc chromate
asbestos-filled putty goes, in here, as you can see in the diagram. These two O-rings in this case
joint are 280 thousandths, .280 inches, in diameter. They are of Viton material, which is a
Dupont fluorocarbon material.
We have a specification for the minimum squeeze, the squeez_, being the compression on the
O-ring when this is joined together. That minimum compression is 20 thousandths of an inch or
7.54 percent compression on that. That is a calculated squeeze. You can't measure it, and what
we have done is measure the dimension of the clevis, the dimensions of the tang, and then we
have ass'amed a minimum diameter O-ring, because
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there is a tolerance on it, of 280 thoubandths minus 3 plus 5 thousandths.
So we assume the minimum diameter. We assume the maximum stretch on the O-ring, be-
cause there is also a tolerance on the stretch. And then we assume a certain, about eight percent
compression set, because under that load the O-ring ',s sitting there for months in that configura-
tion. And so when it is energized and the joint spreads, there is some compression set. So we
don't count on that.
And we require a minimum squeeze on that O-ring. Tk, e purpose of having that minimum
compression in that C-ring is s'ach that when the motor is pressurized this putty in here will not
take 1,000 psi i don't know, we haven't found a putty that would sustain 1,000 psi.
So the gas has to go through the putty. The putty is there as a thermal barrier. What has
been happening to us is, you might get a very small hole through the putty. So during that igni-
tion transient when you're coming up _,o pressure, you essentially have a jet, a hot gas jet here.
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At the same time. due to the pressurization !Gads. :he j¢,_nt _._much _:lf!'er than _t:,' rr_. ,,t
the case, and s¢,, this part ,._' the case te_ds to expand wor_,
7,,,,:,
than the joint. ,\lso, you'v,., put::in_ tension loads into the jo_v,[ due :_J the prt,_;llr_, It, thr mot,_r.
and it's pulling on these pins. which tends to rotate the joint
So when we speak ofjnint rotation in this presentation, what I'm talking about i.4 durm_ the
pres_arization cycle this inner clevis tends to spread in this direction, which _ends t_} n'd:Jce th,'
squeeze on the primary and secondary O-ring.
DR. FEYNMAN: I'm sorry to interrupt but I think when you were explainin_ :he , i_m ,_f
the tension that you pushed your hands the wrong way, which way the mater;al bends
MR. MULLOY: I'm sorry. Inside out.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Could [ ask, how did you determine the number of pins you put in
there'? Are more pins better?
MR. MULLOY: Well, prir_arily it's based upon t_',e pitch, the design standards for the pitch
between holes in the structure. And we have 177 of those pins in there. There are three of them
that are aligning pins, so there's really lg0 of them, and they're divided at 2t-_. inches with l-
:,nch pins, and that's about as ,.'.lose as you want to go.
GENERAL KUTYNA: This is not meant to fit one against another The Ti_.,_n h;'._ 2;/7
MR. MULLOY: What size?
GENERAL KUTYNA: I don't know They might be
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smaller.
DR. LUCAS: Larry, mention the clips Do you want to mention the space there?
MR MULLOY: Yes, we have--and this was mtrvduced early tn the design phase of the F-:,>
gram. There Is a 32 or 36 thousandth inch shim. And Mike did mention that there had been
so:no changes made, and one of these was after some of the early testing. Th_ concern was for
getting a good squeeze on the O-rings.
At each pin we put one of these shims in here, the intent being to increase the sq,._eez,, on
the__'e two O-rings her_,. It's driven in with a leather mallet.
DR. FEYNMAN: That is in the 51-L?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, that has been in all the flights. That was in" rporated early in the test
program.
Now, there are other joints on the motor that I won't talk about today. One of them is _he
igniter joint. This is where the ignite.r assembly goes into the forward do,he. We did have a little
minor problem with that that concerned us.
We look very carefully at this hardware when we get it back. As s¢;meone mentioned earlier,
this is the fi_t for bringing back solid rocket boost,e_ and
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reusing them, and it also provides a wealth of information and it provides some learning that we
never had the opportunity to experience before.
But we did see a little miaor erosion in this ig-niter. We tracked tha_, to a problem where
this i_ not an O-ring, it is a gask-O, what is called a gask-O seal. It's a me_al seal that has a little
rubber bonded to it, and we _'_re finding that the manufacturers were putting an overfill condi-
tion in there and we weren't getting a good sea;.
And we subsequently fixed that.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: When did you discover that?
... C,, 287C 7
M_ Mt!I.I.()Y l'hat _,t_ ILMT. 1 t_.l.._,,-, ,,r [LM_; l'hat _,q,.4 th,-fllll ,.t 1'._",1 l'h;,t ',,,._ ,,n,'.
that .i_i|d, h.,v, _,er.._.ln_ _m1_,thlr'ig h,.r. thhlt w,. ,-mild _,_ b_ th.. ,w_',_n,htr_ p,_rt ,,f their wl_k
() ._d. _ml _,- 4till h,t,l a t,.rt,;trv _,,M th,.r,,, I third _r'_11. tt_,| th_.r..i _t ,l,,nut _*-.II .ir,,un,l th,.
l'h,,re'.| another J_)II'_t her. w,. w_nt _'_. h=Ikm4 _tl_ut t_l_v, except In [hll _'tlr_Itdl.t _L41 I l_t
t'_rth_r ,ll,_n_l 1"hl_ I_ th. l'il,_m,.nt w_und c._.,_ l'leh'] j,)tnt rh,. fil.lmel_t _.llnd c,l_ h,l_l 4t_.l
rlng_. JU.,_t like we, ha_e _lI the ,*t_._l m,_t_,r'_ that were. tlylng oIlt ¢:f Kennedy
.',_ .,
But it h,= anoth,,r clevi_ at the other end of it where, a I _; inch _'arh_m.ph,,nohc mat,,rml
or. excu_ me. llraphite epoxy material phenolic', _n the nuz_y.le, but Ilraphlte epu=y mater|a!
that is bon,ded rote another _r pinned into another _'levt_ And what we haw there i_ a much
greater )otnt ,,cc_,ntriclty. ,_) the rotation problem on thl_ one is tl'reater than it umon the ._teel
C_IL_I_,
Here you will see _m_ethin_( I will talk about later W_, p,R what we call a caplu_ feature.
which L_a little tanl( machined In h_re to ke,*,p thi_ joint from rotatlne That al,m can Ix, apphca.
ble to a steel case
MR WALKER I notice that where the O-r,nl¢_ are In the ,,ample there'_ a gap between the
pieces of metal Is that how it is actually"
MR MULLOY Between the tang and the clevu_, yea And I wall show you what the dimen-
_lon._ are We ._re d_'nlmg with a i |_;-inch dmmeter motor case here. wh,_'h 'al design,_l to be u__ed
'0 times And they're not perfectly round after you have brought them back thr_, _.f four ttmesa
and ,u_ _.here I._ a tolerance b*idt in there to _maure aam.n=blv
MR WALKI';R: Ordinarily with these O-rmg,_ the_ would be comproaal_m m the mot,=;, ho-
tween the metal groove and the clamp _)r contact
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MR. MULLOY: You try not to have me_al to metal
MR WALKER: Have you analyzed this difference',
MR MULLOY: Yes, sir We, have done that in a lot of our testing What it means ts you
b.ave a cavity, and in this ,_roaion _ttuatton. obviously, if you can get an interference fit and haw,
and an interference fit on the insulation and eliminate the putty, tt _ill be very hard _o get any
kind of fl_w down to the O-ring
The inference of what you're saying is there _s a volume here which take_ in between the
putty and the O-risE. and ther_ this gap here which tak_ time t_ fill, which allows flow to ira.
pinge on the O-ring before it can be sealed
The O-ring extrudes. This O-ring does not seat by compression It seats by e_trudinll into the
gap. or seals by extruding into the gap
DR. RIDE: If you were not go;ng to reuse the SRB segments, would you have designed that
to have metal to metal behind the O-ring?
MR, MULLOY: I still think you have to design it ao you can put i'. together, and that re-
quires a tolerance. And I think we have about the minimum tolerance that you can, even for
single use. And l'm just saying that that gets exacerbated by continned
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u.'4e.
We use a rounding procedure at KL4C by using a two-point pickup, a three-point pickup, or a
four-point pickup, and let the motor hang until it meets its mating part And the direct answer
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oi:pn R QuA .rlIF
"t_'tl,_ll ,,i I !l,lt '_h'lli ltl,,lll,ll_tftll
' i
-, 1 i
,_i,_w. litl, kind ,if er_iil,in tkilt we hilve t'i_n I,_lntl. wl,lth ,_tir l_tt_i (|t-monitrtite II :1 m:irllln
,if two ,if thre_ I_ql/ thtin what ii_, olin itltt¢i:rl ,<lnd trill Ill the, /).rlnll int(i the, iltip, li thll tsp, e
,if thinll h_rll from the #t imlttnlll_mi_nl
_ow. thul ul the ell_N_d lid# ill' the ().rlni{
.;l"
Ir_iinil inti_ 111_ llill tlow. herl= or here. tind then it t=r,ldl_l llwtiy And the lime lkil it take,_l l_, (ill
tl_ai ul ab_.lt '.UWi nr llWt mllhii_'_lnds of thai it,! Clew Tt,ll=n the ()rinl ellrtutl,1 into tht, ilr_wlve
and the prmure ¢,,qu=tll=$_ and the flow ttop_. **nd l *111 t=.ll you =_me mor,. about that
IlK ('()VKRT !._ that ttlw,_,t ,in the _w_n',. parl ,>f the perIpht*r)*"
,MR MUI,IA)Y I_,n_rilly y,.,=, hut ! -,ill _how _ _u sw_m_, diaw{rtimt wh_,re w_, have had ,vm_e
rather s_w.r_, _.nilon, wh_,r_, it d,w_n'i h-nd t. follow that But wIem, rally it m rt_ht there where
the _{i j_.t tm impln_Iir_ rib(hi in thb_ areti
I)R ('()%'KRT I didut _u,k my qu_tlon c.rr,,_.'tlv rh,.re _r,. ml_w_,w_m. iittlnils (in ihll _, h_.re
lho =llid rix'ki_t ni,_t,r _lliat-heql. _lnd if [ tall zhist li_r_ phtli_ _lnilll=. h_'alll, I don'i know, ;Int
thlnll @it, t(i c_lll il, then lh_le er_llun ;_tlintl tire tilwiyl in tl_ ,u_nt_ ch=ckWl#i_ p_iltio¢l"
MR MIFI,I,I)Y N- I will +how yotl that It hati bi_n on+ that we Pulvtl bi_n llliiklnK for
What is the, cornnl,,n den,mintih)r" Whtit u'eul_ ,_lnie ()-rlngq tll _,r,wte ,ind _)then n-t ill. _in(| i.q
ll'_ert_ tl comrriiin denof._llnat_lr in _lnythinl, rn=ltl, ri,lll, pr,x'_,ul, t.',tty, I(llp, r#l.l.qll i, ptlrtltuJtir j_llnt.
tern pe'r tit tl re"
.;l:l
liR ('OVERT tlow mbotit t_mp_rltur_, Krt_(iie, nt"
MR MIFI.I,IiY I cn:t't tlntw_.r that
,MR WAI,KKR What lihout the. _,,imLIthal _.lt,,:lll.ll _lf _.r_w=l_ln" lit that alway,I iih_)ut th_
iwtlR.I_"l
MR MULIX)Y No, it illnot. _nd I will ih,_ V,',um couph_ ,_f exlmpli_i It i{i_nerilly,for _ :13
rail erliion, the, mH_M.'t i'ltio il uJumlly ti_oilt law) to on_. it" the,3, hmv_, ;!:_ mill of _.r_lon over I
three-inch area
IVilnvilraph _ lll,._ • I,, i l I
I lhOW you in liorn_ Ire dl, tilll now on the jointa the dimerolion_l and to forth Thli ul
our cmio-ci joint A= I pointed r_t, we hive 21,_) thouMndtl_ O-rin_, plu ,3 thou._lndtl'ul lad
mintu= ,1 tho,.umnd_h_, with i deliKn _Isp in there which u_ IO thouMndth_, lad the _,rc.ove ii :105
to ;!10 on the bore _al_ and the pin ,. one inch diameter,
[ _u_'.'d. there are 1_40 or them, ilthoul{h thr_ of them =r_ ihl{nm_,nt pin_ ind they d0n't
have a retention pin in them And then we have I{lp dimenmon c-iteria that the, _,ffnn#nt hi to
m_t on inspection b_fore we u._, thtt motor
Now, what we haw, com*, up with. w_.'re I_glnninl( to Ket wh_tt w_, ,:all matched pairs W_.'_,e
_{ett=nK p_irt where the cl.,vi_ ham _pr_.ad to '=he I.wnnt where we have to u_ the h=,,'h ._u_, of
cau_ that h_ a wid,. tank on it in ord_,r to m_t th_ rew4uirementl.
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I)I( c'()_,I-:ffr
i'i 11'i_'t_Ii t_i 11_i.l,,II
MR MI'I,I.(i'I
l( r:t lib t;'t e.r rtlr
,I I
• l ..... , , ,
I'i'1,. drt_t, Lng l,.,i',,,-_ th. :mlJro+.i.4t,Jn h,.r,, th,lt tht. Inn_.r .lid,.,_l th,.,_tlt,.r cl@vi_i
N,,. ii. l,i n,)t ,ll.i I ,lh,_,_,,.d ,,.,_il in _l'It.rt., th.r,, l,i ,I _lhllll III th-r. rh,,t IS it
i;I':NI':tt,%I. KI"rYNA Y,,_l told th,. ti.n',pl.rtittirl, hiid tittll, i.ft'i_'t '
MR .%II!I.I.()Y I didn't lli t their I I_lid 1 ¢llnl get a correlation t_.llve,_n ().ring i.rll_lion,
bh;ll h_ _ln (),rinK, lad tl.nlp_ralure
I ;I':NI':R.,%I, KI'TYNA ,',l (' w,l_ ii pri.tty c'iJqll launch Tha: _lai January of hilts year
MR MI_I.I.(IY h vl,l_l ,-,,ld tlefore tke.n, but it llilal n(it tktlt much colder tkan _iher
hlunckl-i
Ilt:NtIRAI. KITI'YNA .'_ it dldn'l tlipprollllmali* thll particular .m.'
MR Mt.:i.I.()Y I:nfortunateli. that ul on_. you hk.k at and lay. aha. ,i it related t- a iem-
pl=rittture illr_Id,t, nt tind the cilht Tht. ti'ml)erlitur_ ,if the, (I-ring on 314' I b@heve wtlia .'_il deilrt_l
h that rlilht. Al*'
MR McliI)NAi.I) Yi._
",13
i;t:NI".RAI. KI'TYNA llnd what tla.+ th. t,.mi_.ratiir. ,,n 31 I.'
MR MUI.I.IIY rh+ tl._i_pl.rtlttirr ill thl. ()-ring i,i cilit'ulated Ill I'_ ill-lilt _D dtlllr+
(;i':NI,IRAI, KIrPYNA .Muck, much cold.,-'
MR MIIi.I,IIY Y_l I lhink the _._lde,_t wtl._ 1_ dl-i(r_l _ln ii 4tails" t_rll'li( rtlolol', If ! rt_call
I)tl Ril)t: lh, WiU haiti' ,i 'k_,rnltil nl(Nh, I ihilt villi t'llh, ullltt, Shill ripen, l_ti._4-d ill.in ski, ilm[_i.
flit ti_fll I)_ rllt u rl'_l _
MR MI_I,I.IIY Y,.+, !tii htll_l_| ill.in ilmhll.nt ilnl| th. t_,mpl.rat,lr, c'vclt. We hiiv. m, wleled
lht. pr(ll_.llant +tad w- h,ivl" nl<_t_,ll*t the. Iini.r and the. in_lultltllln atoll tht. ltt,_l c'lls_, iin(I th.n
given ;i t'li, il'lrlnltlg t, rlvlr(lnrlll, nt, wt, can tlikt' II .ll-h(lur pt, ril)d and calcuhlt_, the. mean bulk tem-
_t_rlltUr# ;inc! thi_ t.nll)l, rlltllr. (if the' _trtlcttlr. atoll let t1 templ, rattire tllr_ldi_.nt
VII't] ('flAIR.MAN ARM_TRI)NII Wail the prollimily of the e_t_.rnal tank includt_t in that
m(id..l'"
MR MIII.I,IIY Y_i. it il The I, ffl_t ill primarily throtilih hkP a heat _hort in a strut, ra_her
than a
conic'tire action The tl, ntp_rature ()f that tank i_ldom i_eiil I_ln_ frwe_inll on thl, _urfice itii_lf
(in very cold days you miilht let t)me ice formation on the, tank. hut that ill not a normal condi-
tion
Normally the tt, mp_rature of the, tank ul above fre_inl¢
DR RIDE Are you runninil thilt temp_rllture mod@l at Marshall pri=-Iaunch"
MR M|II.I,OY Y_, w_,'r, runninK it at Mar,_hall
DR R|I)F: And y()u muat haw. varloun t_.mp_.ratur_t_ that you ch_.ck"
MR MITI.|.()Y Iharing the. taint" Nm wr haw. nut b_r_ doing that Y()u m-an like 21 hour._
during the. count" W_. do pr_wlict the. temp,.rats..., on the. day of launch, but the. th_.rmal mod_.i ia
not. t() my knowl_lg,., ia n()_ run durmg the. :_l hotir.| to launch
2_
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the lau;_rh om_m_t crlt,.rla t.+ that the v.hlcl- ,'++n _ latlnch_l in ,i :_, L:I'k_r I_I+_ ,|n_t"l|l.|'It el'l_.|
r,mm,.nt, wLth ,I fi_,. d_,gr,_ .+k'+ |'hat t_ the |.('('
l'h_.r,, t_ ,, I'MX that ,.xplun_ h,,_ _+,,u appl_ t.h_tt m,.h.l We h,t_,, l_-,en It_,klf_ _" th,tt _tnd
•_trchlt!g t_tlr ct.rtll+Ic+ltlt+l_ a:+,| t|LltlltlIc+ItlOn ,)rt th,. m,)t,+r l'h,.r- ,_re twt) thr.rt:::ll rmlt, , .qtent,+
that th. m_)t,_r l_.rate_ at I,+ degr_" P.MBT. prt_p_lhlnt m+.+in bulk tl.n_p_r,_tur,., the
,;t 7
av-r,_l- +_t"all -f the. partwle.* tn the propellant, and that it _tll ,)p_rtlte In a :It degre_ ambient
envlremment, leaking at a five dmlrt._ _ky
i)R ('()VERT [_) you addre_ how long"
MR .MI_I.I.()Y That _ a TMX [ cannot allswer your qu_+ltmn Vi'e are re_+1rehlng that
now tio. m that to I_ applie_ t_r the TMX '+ i_ltionally, In th0 ab,_nce of that. we have be_n
dl_-u_l+lng thl+l +llnce- [ l(1J_ my opinion would be to .*tart out with a l_11de'tlff'e+' motor and you
+,m,t it in a 31 dt_lre*, environment until the propel|ant mean bulk temperature m 11) degree, and
thnt m the d_it_ environment That i_ one rational ,,pprm_ch to it
DR ('OVERT What m the griddle-ductile tran+=ition temptmrature on the Viton motor"
MR Mtrl.i.OY _lnee I've heard at_mt two ,)r thrt_ number,+ in the l_t two day+l. [ hP+,tate
t,_ quot_, one T+,._tm art, h_lng run. and the rea_)n 1+1t=_t+tt+are being run-and u you know. d_-
pendmg upon how you run +1 tt_t. you will get different re_ulta, and there t._ a range of that
right n,w
The literntur_ ,lay,i one thing Th+,l"+, are _w_n_*" t_lt+1 that art= flcJ_lting into the +lylt_,+m th_lt !
think hr. wr mE _ [ jtl,lt don't care t+) quote, a num_.r (+n whztt that im right n+.'_w
r_itlir¢,_l
I)R
tltJ_It i()n
MR
I)R
MR
I)R
r<)und, It
MR
I)R
MR
DR
now lt'+l
MR
I)R ,'()VKR'F But you're t|._lng +1band'
MR MIrI.I,()Y Ye._, _r ! will tell y,_,_ that the M,I Sp_" th+1t Viton material ,._ pr<_:ured to
that _t ol_.r:tte +it mlnu_ :fit to .'fiN) ,|egr_m_,1 F
["EY.NMAN I don't really under,+tand how thm ._eal work._, and let me +.xplain what my
I_ It .my, that you hay+, L_(). )(),.£ might +.yen have "..._7
MlrI.[.()Y That ,._ corre_:t
7['..'NM _N Now, it m round and _>metimet_ It _',,_=1(| be und-r compr_lion for a while
MItI,I,OY W. want it m compr+mn all thetlnle
FEYNMAN ._+ then we have a condition where., ff you open it, it d<_,_n't go back tn
+tay_ oval And that ia _bout ten percent
MUI.I.()Y We u.,_, eight. _lir
FEYNMAN Now, u_a, 2;'1 and usa, In
MUI.LOY That'. fine
FEYNMAN: That'+l eaay to do You have 10 I_rcent of :2m), and now it'+l only 232 wide
corn pre_t_.
MULII)Y' I'm _orry. ! miaquot¢_l The compre_nion _t m the ()-ring ie _1 mila and not )4
percent I apoh_(it_' There is _ mils allowed in a cnmpr_ainn ._t in calculating the minimum O-
ring at the
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tim,. it ha_ to ol_rate
I)R FEYNMAN: I will _o b_ck and chm:'k, l'_eaua_. I thought i _aw a t_t which had t#.n
l_rc,mt, hut [ may be inco_eet Therefore. that could aolw my arithmetic prohlmm il the p_r-
centage change w+_ that great, this would ju+lt fit. it would just touch _ I mu+lt be wang
l]Llt tht, rt, Is _ne to,Jr,, ,lt|_,_$t.ton theft [ want_i t_) make When ,fq)ki h_|v_ ,I_NJ _r ;'JMI l_)tln(|_
l_'r ',lu_Ir- inch _,n tht, l,,H _ind v,rtu4111_ r1(_trlll_K ,)tl l. ht_ _)tht.r _id_,. h()_ mu_'h d() [ ha__, t() hav_,
t()tl_'hlnll In ,)rde*r f()r thl_4 td) w()rk"
It' It'"l ,)nly t_)u_'hlnv; at a th(_usandth _I' _n _nch [ w,,tHd ,,x_w,_'t th,_t it w,,uhl _;,) thr,)uKh _)
_;_n _,,,t. t_,ll me an.vthm_ al_)ut h_)w much ,,x¢_,_ [ haw, t- _.nd up with _) I will _ able to h_Id"
MR MI_I,I.()Y [ h()p_ J'm c()rr,,_-t =n th=.,, but at *_) i_= y_)u (l_m't h_,w, t_) h_v_, _tny _)f tt ,n
c_)mpr_,-_,n, i_',lu._, _t ,_w1 Ix,_t the ().rlng ha.s _,_tr_ded _nt,_ th_ _(_p and tt s_al,_ hy _,_tr_d_ng
_nto thr gap and not by c-mpr_)n
MR I.['('AS [.drry. w_uld thi._ be a ¢,_ tm_e to explain the pr_ure ch_'k betw_n thu_
()- r_==g._"
MR MUI,I.OY Y_. { think it i_ a _ery good time I'm llloing to talk ahout =t later
We have a leak check port that t._ m_talled in
3'_1)
the tang tx.tween the two prewuru to th_ O-rir_l _al_. [n the prewl_r_ check we run, we take
th_ pre_ur_ up to :.*IX) I_i and hold that for five mir, ut_ with an ol_n _ource And what we
w_tnt to _._ L_au_U_ that w_, have _ated the _.'ondary ()-ring in a Ix_ition to ettrude rote the
gap
It unfortunately driv_ thi. ()-ring in the wrong direct=on, and the reau_)n we u_, 31X) I_l L_
b_.'atme the putty that m in this joint out here. that [ show_=d you on the previoum diagram, we
have found wilt ma_k a leaking primary O-rirtg _lt up to about. UM), l"fl)--wett. |IX) i_li. At t30 l;_i
tt alway._ blow._ through the putty _o the leak check i_ done by going to L._)4)p_i with an open
,v)urte, holding that fi)r t_ve m=nute_, and then doing a -_) p_i leak check for ten mlnut(_l, with
one p_i pret_ure dr_)p atl,)wahle during that t,.*n minute_
.',21
(II,;NI,;RAL KI.fTYNA: ()n 31.1.. f(); a matter ()f inteff'_t, the l_,ak check (_n thi._ one th_r_,
wa.,_no pr_ure drop ()n thi_ particular joint
('ttAIRMAN R(X;F;ILg: ('ou|d I just break in fl_ a minute her_. to talk al_)ut our _hedule')
lt'_ obv,)ua y()u have a lot more information to l)r_nt here. and w_. talked at lunch--_)me of ua
h._d lunch t(_ether--about repetitious teattmony and we're going to have to do pretty much the
,rome thing tomorr,)w, _) l think there is ,mm,.thing to Ix. *aid for coming to a conctuaion pretty
_,(_ _nd then _tarting again tomorro_
We will have the wnole day tomorr_ And [ think if we continue much longer today that
we will all Ix. tired I think that it would be helpful, at leut for planning purpoa_, if you could
tellus what you think you would like to preaent today to finmh up and then we will have the
whole day to pre_.nt anything el_ tomorrow
I think it would be a little repetitioua if we go over it all twice, and I'm aura you feel the
• ame way about it. I_ there anything that you would like to tell ua no_ that we ahould know
about that it would not 1_ wiae to diacloae in public at thia time? We want to try to be aura that
we don't do anything or aay anything which injure= or impai_ your inveatillation, but. on the
3_2
other hand. we want to diaclo=_ aa much aa we can in the public _ion
[a there anything that we _hould not diacloa_ tomorrow, a_ far aa you know?
MR MOORE: Certainly the O-ring ia an area we're spending a lot of time investigating
('tlAIRMAN R(X_EtLS' And everybody who is here today will be available tomorrow?
MR MOORE: Everyone will be available tomorrow a_ well and. Bill. 1 don't know Do you
have anything elae you want to add?
2_2
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I)FL I,|_('.._+"4 [ would ._ugg,,_t. If [ m,ght, theft _ut ,_I" [._trr_,'4 pr,...w.nt_di,,n _,_u might _,ant t_
4klp ,)v.r t,, th- .t_'tl,m+ th£1t w, _l_l,_lln tllklnj( Ill ;l['W+t+It .]IIll0' _)I' _.t.iw_.'L _+W_.'_|U_.I_. th,lt _t,'.l .tvrqw.l..+
thI. corr_l_mdeno_ th_ttwm.,t r_ferred t,)
I'iIAIRM:kN R(X;ER.H I think thitt w,_tlld be _,.rv helpful .Ik._ illt.IC)l ,t:l '_)t.i C_lll k_ht-ll v,,U
c()nie to chart_, ttrt_ thillg_l t,f thtm kin(|. I|" yt,u c+tn -xpbtlu It tL) bt.git', with tnd tht.n laty tht_ i.i
refl_'t,_| tn the chart or what,.w.r tt I.i. becttu.ce for ,t lot ,,t pt_,ple it 1.4 very difficult to under-
roland wh_tt it i, thttt yt,u've dim,
._) If yt,u c_)uld give the explanation _l you kit) _llonK And .,ay wh,tt this 11%t.ttu_ And thl_t when
we were told about tht._ particular problem that wt, did the t'ollowlnwI
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thintp,, and then we had a mooting and at that time it waa decided that we _ould do _o and so.
and rheim are the reuorm why we decided that.
MR. MOORE: I don't know what your thoulthts are SlX.cifically on tomorrow, but I thou, iht
we would go back thum afternoon and try to put a textual story tOltether to tire you tome con.
text. and then pro4tmbly uk [_trry to iIo through _)me of thm stuff" that he tM dotnff here tomor-
row
CHAIRMAN R(M}ERS l think that m good Well, let's go ahead and you do whatever you
think.
MR MOORE: Larry. let me t_u_k that you kto through the mcttonm that have been taken, the
chronololiy of the Manthali _cti_ru, that have boon taken, and kind of a ._ummary and conclu-
siena and rt_'ommendations _m part of yount And then if you would like to stop at that point tn
time. we can. and then we can di_u_, what you think we ou,iht to _ee tomorrow
CHAIRMAN R(X;Ei_q Well. tt would be helpful to summarize what you think will be pre-
:m,_nted. but you can do it in more detail As I _ly. the details we can watt and do tomorrow But
if you can summarize what it m you plan to prt,_ent, then when we leave ttxtay [ will have Mark
explain that NASA provided the material we aaked for. there w_m m full dtmcu.,k, tion of the mttt-
ter_
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contained in the documentm, and we will continue to di,.cu,_ that information in a public _ion
tomorrow Then we will start all over aciain and do it.
But you can make it m little hit briefer tomorrow What we would really like to acknowl-
odlit+--and I think we're xettinli a 10t of very useful information in the chronolowy of thing, it that
concerns, you--how you dealt with thoee ,'oncernJ, who made the jud4_ment_ about what went on
And [ think if you can do that it will aile date s lot of the problems that have developed.
DR. RIDE: Ls there _my internal correspondence on potetttial concern over the operation of
the O-ring or the joint _ Ik_cauoo I think that i,, probably the next thing Since we've dealt with
ertmion, that's iloinll to be the next qu,amtion.
MR. MOORE: [ will mumk Larry Do you know of any documentation at Marshall on O-ring
operation at low temperaturt_? And I will uk McDonald at Thiokol if they know of any docu-
mentation on O-rinlo,
MR. MULLOY: There are documenta that are test ret, ulta that are even now in progrem of
tome test_m that hnve been done previou_,ly to under_tand the resiliency of O-ring_ at various
temperaturtm
DR LUCAS: I believe l, lso. I.arry. that
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thert, w-c_ a dt,._'tl_amn m c[(_e proximlty to the launch oetween you and other people and Thio-
k.l
MR Mt;LI,()Y Ye_ Now that is not correspondence. What we did have on the evening of
the _.Uth that came out in your first hearing--Dr [_vingo_ mentioned that--when we stood
d.>wn on the. 2'_th it was known that the temperatures were predicted to be below freezing
during the night and into the morning on the 2_th.
A., a matter of routine, th(_e of us working the launch asked our technical people and our
contractors what concerns we might have for low temperatures, and that was immediately after
the stand-down. The only concerns that were presented to me were for the recovery battery tem-
peratures. The recovery batteries are located in the forward skirt, the forward end of the _olid
rocket boosters.
And there was ._me concern expressed for the adequacy of the GN to gaseous nitrogen that
went into the aft skirt of the boc_ters. That was analyzed and it was concluded we did not have
a problem at the recovery batteries,that we would be above the red line limit on the recovery
batteriesat launch time. given the temperatures, and we did not have any problem with that
amount of {;N to the gaseous nitrogen purge going into the aft skirt,the primary concern there
being becau_ the temperature of the fuel service module contained
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hydroz_ne fuel that provided the power steering for the _olid rocket booster
At about 7:1)o _)n the evening of the 27th I received a phone call from Stan Reinartz. who is
my" immediate supervi.qory, Stanley R,_martz. who is the manager of Shuttle Projects Office at
the Marshall Space Flight (:enter, who works directly for Dr Lucas, and he had been informed
by our resident manager that Thiokol had looked at the conditions for the solid rocket motors
and wanted to di.qcus_ the ._ituation as they ._aw it for launch and what they were looking.
And Stan Reinartz and [ went out to our resident office and we had a telecon. That telecon
involved Reinartz, my._lf and a Thiokol representative and Ai McDonald at K_e_--Kennedy
Space ('enter--a number of people at Marshall Space Flight Center, including the deputy direc-
tor of engineering, Dr. Loving(x_d, who is Stan Reinartz deputy, and John McCarty, who is our
deputy chief of propulsion, ari:! probably eight or nine other people and probably a dozen or _o
people at Thiokol.
Thiokol presented to us the fact that the lowest temperature that we had flown an O-ring or
a case. joint was ,_:gdegrees and they wanted to point out that we would be outside of that experi-
ence base
._7
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Who did that for Thiokol?
MR MULLOY: That was the Director of Engineering for Thiokol. a gentleman named Bob
I,und
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Were you there at the meeting. °
MR. McDONALD: Yes. I was there.
MR. MULLOY- Also present at Utah was General Manager and Vice President of the Wa-
_tch Division and manager of the .qpace division at Wasatch--they have three divisions there;
.qpace division, tactical division and strate_c division--all of the related propulsion people and
the project manager, who is Mr. Joe Kilminster.
After hearing the discussion, we all concluded that there was no problem with the predicted
temperature_ for the SRM and [ received a document from the _olid rocket motor project manag-
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er at Thiokol to that effect that there was no adverse consequence expected due to the tempera-
tures on the night of the 27th.
DR. RIDE: I guess maybe what I'm asking is we read in the New York Times about NASA
internal memos where people within NASA were suggesting problems with erosion before, and [
guess I am wondering whether similar memos exist relating to problems of launching with the
O-rings at low temperatures.
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MR. MULLOY: I'm not aware of any such documents at Marshall. That is not to say that
there aren't any, and we will go research the files to see if there are any.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Can we then make it clear that we have requested such documents,
if there are any, and that you will provide them?
MR. MOORE: Yes sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Secondly, there was a report not about Thiokel but about I think
Rockwell, that shortly before the launch, 20 minutes or something to that effect before the
launch, someone from Rockwell called and expressed concern about the icing conditions. Do you
have any recollection of that call and who made it?
MR. MOORE: As you asked Mr. Aldrich the other day, we had no direct contact with
anyone from Rockwell who made that phone call. What we did have was, we did have--Mr. Al-
drich held a meeting at about 8:00 in the morning of the launch--and recognize the launch was
at ll:38--with a group of technica_ people who sat down and talked about the ice conditions
down on the launch pad. And, as he reported the other day, Rockwell did express some concern
initially at that point about some ice that may be coming off the launch platform and
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impacting the tileson the orbiter--and that isthe only tie that we have been able to find out
that Rockwell may have had a concern.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Will someone from Rockwell be there tomorrow?
MR. MOORE: We will see ifwe can get someone from Rockwell there tomorrow. They are
out on the West Coast. I will go back to the officeand see ifwe can get somebody in from Rock-
well tonight.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, I'm not sure it'sessential,hut I think itis important that we
have an answer to that. If Rockwell was the one that raised th_ concern, then we want some-
body from Rockwell to say I raised the concern, we talked itover, and my concern was satisfied
and we said go ahead. As long as we stillhave that concern on the part of Rockwell, ifyou
testifyor someone testifiesfrom NASA that there was the meeting and everybody was reason-
ably satisfied,then someone from Rockwell comes along and says that'snot so, we told you net
to go ahead and you went ahead anyway, that isthe kind of thing we want to try to deal with at
these meetings.
DR. FEYNMAN: I just want to go back to something that I would need to know in order to
help me to determine what caused the accident rather than these
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other problems. When you were giving the thermal data, I've seen some thermal data which
may be the same as you are talking about about the O-ring response to the compression set at
different temperatures.
But the obvious question is how fast did it return, and I didn't see any data that told me it
was millisecond, a second goes by; how much do temperatures vary. I mean, that is typically
what a temperatur_ does, is it changes an apparent viscosity, and I would like to get some idea if
295
j
the low temperature could have re-.de it so that when things separated temporarily that the
joints moved, that it did not do the usual thing and close the gap so quickly so as to let the gas
go through.
This seems to me an interesting question and [ would like to know as much information as
you have on that.
MR. MULLOY: All right, sir, we will collect those test data.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: On that, might I suggest _.hat you deal directly with Dr. Feynman
and give him that information. Then he will give that information to _he rest of us. He can
perform a very useful function because of his background and knowledge of analyzing that.
After he's done that, then he wilI brief the Commission on his knowledge.
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MR. MOORE: Yes, sir. I have made notes where specific members of your Commission have
requested data, and I plan to supply that directly to them.
DR. FEYNMAN: I have another request, if I can ask directly, and that is that the leak test
point where you are putting pressure in at 200 psi and so forth that you are talking a.* ,ut, is it
an escape route that is a principal possible for any gas which goes past the primary seal, and the
secondary seal is no longer redundant for another reason; even if it was successfully maintaining
the seal, if the gas were to be able to escape through Chat port because it was closed effectively,
would you have also a danger?
Therefore, I would like to get information eventually, and I know you've got so many things
to do, but eventually I will be asking about the technique for closing the leak port to be assured
that it doesn't itself leak.
MR. MUV_LOY: Yes, sir. That is one of the trails.
MR. MOORE: Dr. Feynman, our task force which has been set up is trying to get all of the
close-out photos and we will make all of that data available to the Commission, hopefully when
they come to Florida.
MR. ACHESON: How many leak ports are there in a joint?
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MR. MULLOY: One per joint, and on the case joint it is located--one of them is on what is
called the minus-Z, the side away from the orbiter, and on the other booster it is on the plus-Z,
and they are all lined up on the case-to-case joints.
DR. FEYNMAN: On the right side booster which side is it on?
MR. MULLOY: On the right side it's on the minus-Z away from the orbiter, and the reason
they are are clocked that way is we can interchange from left to right the boosters.
DR. LUCAS: But it is in proximity to where the news media photographed, that the leak
port is on the same place where the flame was seen.
MR. ACHESON: That is why I asked the question. I can't visualize whether the axis of the
port is in the direction toward the tank or the orbiter, or where it is.
MR. MULLOY: The direction of the port is in a direction away from the bottom side of the
orbiter on the right-hand booster.
DR. LUCAS: At about a 4_degr_ angle up?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir. And there's one in each joint.
DR. RIDE: So it is in the same area as the
533
plume was seen?
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MR. MULLOY: The same quadrant, I would say, the same 90-degree segment. I can't get
any closer than that.
DR. COVERT: About the same distance from the nozzle-up?
MR. MULLOY: I cam_ot tell.
MR. ACHESON: I don't want to anticipate how it works, but at the Thursday meeting one
of the data we asked for was data relating to what conditions bring about cracking of the propel-
lant material ill the motor and if one were to pursue, for example, the hypothesis of not a joint
failure but a burn-through on the side, I would assume one would be interested in cracking.
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir.
MR. ACHESON: So at some point we would like to see that, I don't know whether when we
go to the Cape or at some time later, and I just wanted to remind you that that is a request
outstanding.
MR. MULLOY: That is one of the trails that the team is following also. The propellant tem-
perature on 51-L was about 56 degrees.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: My thought is if it is agreeable to the other members of the Commis-
sion that we have this public session tomorrow and we will go as long
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as we can. We want to be able to obviously answer all of these questions, but then we take a day
off and go to the Cape Wednesday night and be there Thursday and Friday.
MR. MOORE: Yes. sir. Our task force is preparing for the Committee to come.
MR. MULLOY: Mr. Chairman, A[ McDonald from Morton-Thiokol wanted to make a point.
MR. McDONALD: [ wanted to say a point about the meeting. That meeting was called by
Thiokol and [ got a telephone call to set up a meeting at the Cape, and the meeting was set up
at the Cape and we tied Marshall. in and Thioko[ back in Utah about the concerns of the lower
temperatures. The meeting was set up to send material on the fax so that people could review
-ata ant' concerns and the basis for that concern.
That data was transmitted to Kennedy and also to Marshall from our office at Thiokol. Our
Vice President of engineering, I asked him to give that briefing. He did that. The recommenda-
tion at that time from the data that was sent out from Thiokol was not to launch below 53 de-
grees Fahrenheit because that was our lowest acceptable experience base and did demonstrate
some blow-by from a year ago and also we had some data that indicated the poor
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resiliency of response of the Viton seal to low temperatures, so that was the first transn,.,tal of
information saying you should be aware of that, and where the data was discussed.
GENERAL KUTYNA: You said not to launch below 53, and what was the actual tempera-
ture?
MR. MULLOY: The actual temperature predicted at that time, based upon Thiokol's calcu-
lations, was 29 degrees.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Could you stand up again and say that a little louder so we could
hear it? I'm not sure we all understood what you said.
MR. McDONALD: What I said was when the concern of the predicted cold temperatures at
the Cape were transmitted to our plant our engineers were asked to examine that and see if
there was any concern about launching the SRM or any concern with any component. The
people who were working the O-ring seal problem were concerned. They called me at the Cape
and said we looked at these predicted temperatures. It looks like the O-rings are going to be very
cold.
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Wehaverun sometestsirathe pastfew monthsthat showsthe resiliencyof the O-ringis
very31uggishat lowtemperatures.It's very hard. And we would like to review that information.
And I said yes, I will set
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up a meeting .to review that information. We need to review the information and recommend
whether we want to launch or what temperature we're willing to launch.
[ called Mr. Mulloy at Merritt Island at the Quality Inn and didn't reach him. We had the
wrong number or something. And I called Mr. Cecil Houston, who is a resident office manager of
Marshall at Kennedy and told him the concern, and he said fine, I will get everyone on the
network. I have a four-wire system right off my office in the conference room and we will get all
the proper parties involved.
You tell your plant to be available at 8:15 and we will transmit the charts and the data that
you have both to Kennedy and to Marshall and I will contact Marshall av.d have the appropriate
people there. He set that meeting up. I went to Kennedy. There was a group of people at Mar-
shall and a group of people at Thiokol.
The material was a little bit late getting there. We waited for about a half hour and then
finally the material was transmitted from Thiokol, and in that material was the data that we
had on our erosion history and the fact that a year ago we did see some blow-by of the primary
seals of the case joint, That was the lowest temperature we calculated the O-rings to be in the
flight vehicle. That caused us some concern.
We also had run some resiliency tests on the
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O-ring where essentially they were squeezed in between the plates and we removed it very rap-
idly and the pressurization motor would not respond. We were concerned about what impact
that might have in low temperatures and as a result of that our recommendation at the time
was to not launch below 53 degrees, because we didn't know how much farther below that we
could go and be in the acceptable range.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Was that ambient?
MR. McDONALD: That was the temperature of the O-ring. To calculate the temperature in
the O-ring containing area based upon what the ambient conditions would be. And, of course,
the steel does cool off fairly rapidly. But the liner is somewhat of an insulator so we could toler-
ate some temperature difference there for a while. But t'-,e O-ring finally gets to that tempera-
ture. That is what we calculated the temperature of the O-ring at launch a year ago because the
local ambient temperature is actually higher than that.
But, if you recall, there were several days of very cold weather on that previous launch a
year ago, and we calculated from that history what we thought the O-ring temperatures might
be.
DR. COVERT: That was on 51C?
MR. McDONALD: That is correct.
DR. COVERT: What was that temperature?
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MR. McDONALD: We calculated it to be about 53 degrees Fahrenheit in the O-ring area.
GENERAL KUTYNA: And on this launch it was 29 degrees?
MR. MULLOY: No. That was the single dimension analysis that Thiokol had run during the
discussion we had on the 27th. Since then we have run a multi-node thermal model and I believe
it is 25 degrees. Bill, do you recall?
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Before we come to that, I'm not sure I understand. Am I hearing
you say that you recommended against launch and you never changed your mind?
MR. McDONALD: No, I did not say that. We did change our mind afterwards.
CHAIRMAN ROGER,q: What brought you to that decision?
MR. McDONALD: Well, the data that was reviewed, NASA concluded that the temperature
data we had presented was inconclusive and indeed a lot of the data was incol,clusive because
the next worst blow-by we had ever seen in a primary seal in a case-to-case field joint was about
the highest temperature we had launched at, and that was true--the next worst blow by.
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DR. RIDE: Which one was that!
MR. McDONALD: I can't remember exactly. I have it in my notes.
MR. MULLOY: I have it here.
MR. McDONALD: That was true. We did not calculate the effects of all that from the data
that we had, but we did have some data that indicated that the timing function of the O-ring
seal was going in the wrong direction, in the direction of badness. The O-ring was getting
harder. The grease in there was getting more viscous. The time to seat the O-ring took longer
and it would be more difficult to extrude it because of the hardened O-ring.
We didn't know exactly where the right temperatures were that would make it so it could
not seal, but it was in the wrong direction. And the temperatures that were being reported for
the 51-L were so much away from our experience base that we didn't feel comfortable operating
that far away.
MR. MULLOY: I don't remember which one it is. We could get it. But one of these it was 75
degrees.
MR. McDONALD: That is 22-A. If you will look at the double asterisk, we saw a certain
amount of soot in the primary O-ring even though we didn't see any
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erosion. Apparently some gas got past the prirr, ary O-ring between the two O-ring seals.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Could I say that on this--we)l, go ahead.
DR. FEYNMAN: It's just a matter of understanding and I want to be clear that I under-
stand that you said you launched at a temperature "that was below 50 degrees Fahrenheit".
This was presumably a temperature in the neighborhood of the O-ring?
MR. McDONALD: Yes.
DR. FEYNMAN: At the same time some estimate was being made as to what the tempera-
ture in the neighborhood of the O-rings would be as a consequence of the weather at that site at
the time of the launch?
MR. McDONALD: Right.
DR. FEYNMAN: The first figure was 50 degrees. What was the second figure?
MR. McDONALD: The 53 degrees was what the O-ring was from a year ago that had the
problem.
DR. FEYNMAN: I don't want that.
MR. McDONALD: We calculamd, on the projected temperature that was given to us from
the Cape, between 26 and 29 degrees Fahrenheit would be the O-ring temperature.
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DR. FEYNMAN: In other words, to make it absolutely tra;_.sparent to me, you are saying
that you said, at least at that time, that you didn't want to launch if the O-rings were below 50
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degreesand,_econdly,you madean estimate,in viewof the history of the weather, that the
temperature of the O-rings might be as low as 26 or 30 degrees?
MR. McDONALD: That is correct.
DR. FEYNMAN: Therefore, below 50 degrees.
MR. McDONALD: Well below.
DR. FEYNMAN: I just want to be sure. I got the 53 mixed up.
MR. McDONALD: I'm sorry if I mixed you up.
DR. FEYNMAN: So as far as 51-L is concerned, 50 degrees was your first statement, and I'm
going to find out what the change in their mind was in a minute• But there were two numbers
that didn't match--the 50 that you said you shouldn't fly and the distinctly below 50 they did
fly. I just wanted to be sure that I understood.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I still don't understand your explanation. Did you change your
mind?
MR. McDONALD: Yes. The assessment of the data was that the data was not totally conclu-
sive, that the temperature could affect .._verything relative to the seal. But tk ::re was data that
indicated that there were
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things going in the wrong direction and this was far from our experience base.
The conclusion being that Thiokol was directed to reassess all the data because the recom-
mendation was not considered acceptable at that time of the 53 degrees. NASA. asked us for a
reasaessment and some more data to show that the temperature in itself can cause thi6 to be a
more serious concern than we had said it would be. At that time Thiokol in Utah said that they
would like to go off-line and caucus for about five minutes and reassess what data they had
there or any other additional data.
And that caucas lasted tor, I thir_k, a half hour before they were ready to go back on. When
they came back on they said they had reassessed all the data and had come to the conclusion
that the temperature influence, based on the data they had available to them, was inconclusive
and therefore they recommended a launch.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: When you say inconclusive, what does that mean?
MR. McDONALD: Well, the fact is---
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: You told them the day before not to do it and now yeu've got some
more data and you say its inconclusive and so you changed your mind?
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MR. McDONALD: I was not back at Wasatch when that discussion was being held. I was at
Kennedy and I do not know what other data they were looking at other than the charts that I
had in front of me and others had in front of them at both KSC and Marshall. I do not know. I
do know they came back on and said they had reassessed it and concluded that it was OK to
launch, and at that point in time Thiokol was requested to put that in writing.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, I th" in view of the very serieus nature of this and the fact
that it will be scrutinized far years that we should have precisely what the data was before we
present it.
MR. McDONALD: I have that in my notes,, sir.
CHAIRM_N ROGERS: Well, you are just conveying intormation that pertains to a decision
_mebody else made.
MR. McDONALD: I have the Fax's that were distributed a_ both of those meetingz in my
book that were transmitted, all of the charts from the original meeting and the one afterwards.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Who made the decisi.".n from Thiokol?
3OO
MR. McDONALD: I do not know who made the final decision I do know that the' fax was
signed by Mr. Joe Kilminster. my boss, the vice president.
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DR. WALKER: So there's no evidence that the evidence was looked at in this caucus that
persuaded Thiokol that your first view was incorrect, that perhaps the first view wasn't based
upon solid evidence?
MR. McDONALD: I cannot say specifically about that because I was not there to see it. and
I think you need to get people that were at that meeting to discuss that.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I'm sure you can see the logic of what you're saying. You recom-
mended against a flight on one night and then you have meetings with NASA people and they
seem anxious to go ahead, or at least they were asking questions about it. and they gave you
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some data and you checked back with your home office and you got word back from home office
to go ahead because the evidence is inconclusive.
DR. COVERT: I believe, if I'm correct, he said that there was first evidence of the low tem-
perature in 51-C, where there was soot but no erosion. And this was a cold launch. This was a
50-degree launch. And you went back to the plant and talked to them and subsequently they
were looking around for other cases, if I understand what you said, and they found another case
where there was soot, and this was A, which took place in 75-degree temperature.
So at this point the thing suddenly be_:omes less clear. Do I remember that correctly?
MR. McDONALD: That is correct.
DR. COVERT: So that the additional data, ther,, was the disco_.,_-ry of 61-A in leafing
through the files, where they launched on a warm day and then they dec_ded they didn't know.
DR. RIDE: They also said that they had the data on rebounding or whatever it was of the O-
rings.
DR. COVERT: I just wanted to bring up what the other data seemed to be.
DR. FEYNMAN: It would seem to a raticnal person there might be some other reason why
there was a
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blow-by at high temperature and tha_ is there was a likelihood at low temperature that you
could cause difficulty because of the slowness of resl_nse and, therefore, there mvst have been
some technical discussion out there in the plant. And I wgs_,,_'t quite clear.
You said you had some things with you about the rates of flow. Is that material available to
us or could it be made available to us? I don't want to get involved with that as a specialist, but
the consequences would be that just because the decision looks like it was technically sound, so I
would like to know what kind of logic and so forth wa'_ gone into. Is it possible for me to have
thax ,°
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Oh, sure.
DR. FEYNMAN: I would like as much detail on the lo_ric or the apparent logic as was there
at that time from that plant; is that OK?
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Absolutely. And could I suggest that you give Dr. Feynman what-
ever he wants, but I would express the caution that it's hearsay as far as you're concerned. We
really want to get the people before the Commission who made the decisions and ask them why
did they appear to change their minds and ask them specifically. Unfortunately, you are just
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_on%'t, vtn/_ Irl['(_rF[A_tf loll
|)R FEYNMAN ttt,-_tIH _,_m_,rhtng ab,,u_ ha_:ng ,,,t_,.rh_rl_
('_IAIRMAN R()_;ER5 th, d,_,-_ ha_,. _,,m,, (t:tt.i rht, r,, If-m th,, p,.,,plt. _h,, _1_a(!,- rh_. ,i,._'1
r;ion. I _ue..,l_
.MR McIX)NAI,15 1 h_tv_. ,_onlt, of that, but I _ll_) h,t_t, th,. naat_.rl.tl thlt w:t._ r,.sl,.wt,_t _lt the.
r_lt_int_ by all three partly, b_'_u_,. I v_a._ party to that
CHAIRMAN R(X;ERS Which moettng now are _°, :alk_n_ ,tbol.lt"
MR McDONALD: Tht.s was the first mooting _-heduled to review why _e h_td _ny ¢o_cern._
atn)ut low temperature, and I have that as a matter of record
CHAIRMAN R(X;Ei_'_: l,et'._ be sure that we make it clear it it's on,, m_,ting, two meetings.
who was there, when wa.,; it held. because otherwise ttllets all blurred in the minds ,ff _he list_,n-
er. and 1 gather you had _everal meetings on this _ubjeet -two meetings, three m'.,etm_{._
MR. McDONALD: Well. there were probably three me_tings, yes
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, make that clear or have your people mak_ that clear
GENERAL KLrTYNA: In your opinion what is the t(reateat tndtcat:.on of the problem--the
amount of erosion or the fact that you have .,,ome soot. re..
M_
something that has a lot of erosion like this': Is that more o r a problem, than ._)mething that hM
a little soot and no erosion?
MR. McDONALD: I think soot was more of a pr('blem than the eromon That show,_ that y_u
had violated the primary ._,al tn _)me way to _e'. gas between the two _als The er<_ton itself.
as long as you don't violate the seal it still ha_ the integrity and ts not a problem
GENERAL KUTYNA: So on the cold(.,_t day of launch you had erc, aion and ..mot and ,,n the
hot day of launch you had very little erosion but you had soot?
MR. McDONALD: You had no _'cosion. but you had _oot
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Okay.
MR. MOORE: Larry. why don't you go to the last couple of charts there on the prog_ am an_¢
then let's kind of summariz_
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Why don't we take a short break?
IA brief recess was t_en.)
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: If we could get started again. I will take just a moment, if i may. to
introduce to the members of the Commission who don't already know him AI Keel. who is going
to be our Executive Director. He comes with the highest qualifications. He was a
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student of Dr. Cove_:'s, but. in addition, he has other minor qualifications, such as he is now and
has been for three years--well, you go ahead. AI. You were over in OMB, the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget
MR. KEEL: As certainly most of the NASA people around the room have seen my bearded
face and even _,en it when it had less gray in it, I have been associate director of OMB for
international af/.hirs and national security, which deals with everything in the budget except
Medicare, Medicaid, and NASA.
For about the last three years, and I've gone thro_gh four budgets and before that I was
A_sistant Secretary of the Air Force for Research. Development and Acquisition, and about the
la,Jt honest work I did for a living was one minor part of doing some space shuttle aerodynamics
about ten or 12 years ago.
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t,) do ,,_her th,nl, but h,,_',_u*,- the. _tGh,te ti-u. v, ant_t h=m t- _-rk _lth _=,0,_nd t'_.',_,l,_, h_.
au0he car
_l_'e want_ t,) ¢_ntlnUe t,, l{et la_ple w_lh the hl=lh_t qu_tl=fic=stt.nt f-r ,_ur st_tfT tw_.-_lt_r, wP
f_,l it. ver) _mport_nt
()ka_ I)1" .Mulloy'
.MR .MLr[.I,()Y .Mr ('hatrman, y_)u heard .Mr .M,_,r,. _ .u_e_t,,,n th=s¢ I t- t. the hut thr_.
tharta I h_(| here that we laid ,ut and have l_._n dora#
.MR MUI.I.()Y To _tttenlpt t- I_tter understand the phenomena th=_t v()u _=re ._._.lng he,'e
with the _:ca,_l¢)nal ()-rink ,-n_lon_, there h_u0 b_,n a =r_at deal _o=m¢ on up untd August. but ,t
w_u_ 4pe,¢I_¢ te._ttng th_;t wa.,= related t_) wh_t h;_d w_..h_,rv_.d -n th,. l_t
,',.; l
flight _tnd wh_lt w_L.* _)ur t()l_'r_snc_- h_ th_tt. _m(| h_s_ ;tnythinl( h:tppen_] theft chztrl_,.d _)ur ri|tl,_tl
z_te that we hzld trr_m th,, ('It"'
;_.nd wht.n w,. ,_,_, _t partlL'ul_lr ¢_'currence w,. h_tv. run tlnit]y,,l_sl _tn(| ,qa_.'lttl tt_te_ t,) det,.r
mine wh_t i_ the I:rniting rnechan=_m Are we ,_tnll m _ ,_ltU_ltl(_n when. we're _t_l,ltirt_| theft w,.
._tdl have _=.;at'e ¢rlt ()ne ._y_tem" ."_) they were kind .f, _n that |_,rt_| ¢,f t_me _t w;_._ m(_r,..r h,_,_
z=d h(x: te_tinK t'r,)m Right t. Right
And then. m_ .Mike Week._ explained in hn._ pre_.ntat._n, _=n_und April, _t_ w,. _'K=_n t. ,_._.
m()re ()f thi_l and decnd_t wh;=t we ne_te_| w_._ _ ,y_t_.m_ttlC et'f()rt t. _,e_, _ hat w-uh| h,. ,_ h)ng-
term permanent _)lut_.n t() thL,*, _c,_.ptxx,_d t- I=vtng w=th z_ hmited type th,ng, we c|ew, h)l_,'_t
and pr_._nted in that Augu._t I!)th hr_el_ng a plan that we h_,ve _.,_._nt.dly fl)llowed ._lnce that
time And it wu_ to better understand the mechanism and ,,u. _.ler_mce t. that mech:_nL, m_ ;_nd
what limiting me_hanl_lm.,I might be in effect to be .,lure that they were _till _he _lme
I will just de.,_.'ribe the,_P [ don't have any di_rarrL,0 ot" them But a cold Row te_t =_ e._en.
tially just putting air through a joint to understand Row in the joint and in the crevicem ro
what type. given the input fl(_w, what type (_f flo_, we're lilettinK at the ()-ring And we did that
on the nozzle becau._ the
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nozzle is _ubject to circumferential flow in the joint, am oppoeed to the ca_ acro_ the not.z.le
gimbai_ and thu_ get_ pre_ure differential a_ the nozzle swivel_ There i_ a dehcate pre_ure
from one side to the other which can be ,_et up in that ()-ring grove _._ a circumferential fl_w
So we ran t.ho_.e te_t_ to understand that, to support what _ark _alita hm_ done in the m,x'l-
eling of th_ particular event We decided that the ca.,_" cold flow wouldn't tell u_ anything We
dropped tho_e
I'hr' ,It_o.F I_.o.% |laHt_t .tql i tilt, nil,if|o,11 I,I ||1++ r, bf+ifl,ln ,l| th+tt j,_lttt _i_. ,,111_ h+t_e, t_*,, r ,,.+tt
,ir4..I ,|,lf.t |.)tll's ,,It _)t.it th.tt t',_t+sti,,lt r.+lll_, i+ )_tlt ,,fir, ,1| th.ftl _i{t9 ,ill ,,tit qtrtiuttlr:tl tL+_t
tFtl, I,+ u, hl, h w,,s+ th. fIr.it Ittul, ttlr;ll tl_ t. In;st _¢, did .tL the, .%l,_r,=h,lll _i_.t,'=. l"lidht t'¢ltt=.r, .lIed
th, o ,bth_r _+t.n ,,ll ,t h_,tr,b pr,.t_,it pr,_.,4tlr,, t_t ,_! .t Itghlw¢,tt(_lt ,'d_lt.. ;If|l| wr, ll_,)t tl.,} dlf|_,t_,n'.
r¢++tllt++ fh.+t'0.
"_t '+ka* l'r+ _tllf11_ ',D rtlr+ ,l*ll|l+. t+mlt_ll I;, l_.tt,+r tllld0.r.lt.ll1_l it
;'IIAIIt%I,+,N Itlmil.',R._ ('++. +,,t, _,.It u. _,h:tt In,+ _mf1'Jll't f111'%lf+<4' l.,.=kln,( ;It It fh,. rllt¢Ir+_l+l+
l,-r,_,+_ t|,w..,lll _ _.lS,,_ 'An,If It 41.A+_l It l,.'k+ l,k,. + _.r_m ,,f tat,+ _'mn +_,,u t,.ll u-, n,,t +'1=.t'o,l,t.++trll_
I,.LI+ v_h,tt th+, tmt,_ +h,;m'
MR .MI'I.I.()Y Y,,_, _tr, I can d,, that I w_nt i/'u"an_ furth,,_ _lth that on,,
MR .%II'I,I.()Y Th,.n the,, chart just ,,,mpl_ l_y_ that w_th thJt we ha_+e (_ur l-_t quallfica.
turn moi,)r, wh=¢h _ tailed _M.3. wh0¢h ws,, m the =ta,l_= of ,u,_mbly It 1.1 a Mam_nt.wound
ca_, qualll'tcatlon rr_mh)r and we wanted t,) take the o_lx_rtunlty for any im_ta thai w_
,',lUll| rlt+|ke 111 th:a )411111 ¢_ifiNgtlr_lll.fl Ill |_jt nt_)re marllln lnh) thl- critical Ix)fat ly, l¢4P,m and to
,ncurp)¢at,. that 0at,) what u, called t,t,%1,', That moh)r Ul r_zw wmbled ,It Thmkol
We h+ut been pl_nnnn=l t+_ Fire that (m February 1:1 We have that on hold rl_lht now But I
wtll _h(+w _-()u th+_t rest ,_f _11 ,)f thz. t+,_tmtl that waa tm that prev_o_ ¢l_rt what the _.'u_rtIhJullon
wm, tu_ t=_ _ f_x that dndn+t move Ill totally OUlande of the ezporlence _ that had taken us
throu=lh 1_ ,,ucceMful motor firm_ls ,n fl_ht and nm_ -u_-e,,mful mot_ flrtr_ mn the ,rrrmnd
l)H ('()%'F..RT I gather thae _,._,tl ;_,-_ ,u_t.,fi_l that the r,)tatmn tnn't the _)urt't. ,_f the I,.ak-
lag. that thll h_u, re.red t)ut of the realm =)f a hypoIh_lut into the realm _)f f, st.'t"
.MR +MI'I,I.()Y The. r,+tilthm l,l :I ntitj,_r +'_)ntrlhuh)r t,) the _)tlr¢_ *)f l'ak=_l'+" I +tnl 'lllltt_If+'ll_t_l
.:.; I
w_th thief I d<m't kno_, th+=t =t _. the,_)lr cauw
[)R ('()%'k:RT I ,{u,_, I haw, n't wn _tny data (m. way <)r the ()ther
._lR ML_I._,()Y That the mtaIl()n 1.4+)r _ n<)t"
I)R ('I_%'ERT Y,.., I,, th+.r, mm_+, d+=t+= w,. c_=n h.)k +at'
MR MI_I.I.(>Y Ye,, Th,. data t_, their the minimum _quee/.e ,+n the ()-ring u, 21) l,I}_)th_, <+f
mn Inch
l)R ('()V[':RT FI(,w d,d y.u d,,l'Prmin,+ the ,,_.paration d=.t+mce when y(>u pre_,,urize thim ex.
cPt,.d_ that _1), l,l)4)4)th_"
_R .MUI+I,()Y' Fly havinK n hole drilled into the clevu_ and = direct meamlrement t+f the.
r_)tatton _t th_t l_)tnt, [t dlre_+ meuurement under prt_ure =,nd Io=_d It u, meuured
DR. COVERT tlow many rnemmrement=?
MR. MULLOY: l'm not sure exactly on the hydroproof. Ther_ were =everal of tho_ mere,-
urement_. The m_n meMurernent ,m hydroproof turne_l out to be 42/l.IX)Otl_ rotation The
mean me_u, urement on ,,trueturnl t_t article turned out to be I,_)/l,IHX)tl'u,.
DR, COVF.RT: Thu, i_ a deflection really -nd not a rotat=on_'
MR MU[.LOY: It'.,, _.h., measu_'_ment of the spreading of the clevi, from the tang; that i_,
correct
;)_).)
[)R. (,_)V[';RT: And this is tl_rnugh the cl-vi._ and through the tang and to where the (')-ring
cavity i._?
_R MUI.LOY: That i.,, correct, a direct mem, urement
I()4
I)H i(ll)l'_ II_,,,. ,.,,Lj ,-,_h_l_t,.d .in,, ,h,,h,rt.,. th.lt _,,,t_ might ,._p,.. t If_ _h,. j-I.t ,..t r,...ll_
,,! _ho. t,,_d* l,_st ,,tl th,,, 41(}¢. t_.t,,r,, t_tt,,f! _,h,',r_ it ,, ,,till hr.ld ,t,,_l'
MR M|'I,i.I)Y Y,_i tL._t i, ,'=th'lilatm| rh,. J,Hnt |rofl'i lli[n|tHH_ ?h,* _,if_t is ti_,_¢ib_ liflde, r
[PIttI,tII _tlhlfl l,INf I|_tltlqNg',ll_t[4 ]'hI" |)rr*_ll_llr, ,l_Prrt,(o_l th_ L',lflt|)r_I_. I,,¢s,|. II1_llt_|ictlr'ls tt|l_r
_._b|_ "°. Iq Ill, fittest| it t_'ftt_a t=l _Llt prt_ll.aLlfe, ,if1 ,)lip qldp. tllor_, i,req_lre, ,ifl ,trip _ltdp thctft t)t_, ,ilh_r
|ttit th.tt Is _';tl_'_ll;tt_l :sfld the- d|,¢trtb,ltt,,ll ,,f th,tt i_ kn_rt
I)x FKY._._IA:' rh,, I_l jtist is r111f1,,r t_'hntt'_l I_..t _nd I .h,_lidn t _vp. |llt_rr_.lpt _tl, but
L|_lnt y,,Li h,llt( the ,, ,tdlide w|th _llflle kiltd o|' ,I .klrt _)r _sltt_thlnll 4lsd the, floL_le _|oe,_ln t iI_t _lfl_
ti_¢_lUi._ ;1/I It with wtndtf_l['
MR Mt'I.I.I)Y The .klrt t. held The skirt on the m,)tor I, held at fl)ur p_mt. and the
nt,_le 1. itt_:hed t,_ the _R t_m_ {11r the _R.M., u I ehowed _. that pf_vll_ml picture itut with
the twang, yet. ther_
MR M(X)RK l,_ me c_m,_ment That ta omp (X the erttt_ai thrown thilt we're Iookmal In terms
of the I_t.fltllht _nalyst_
MR tl()q'Z I can't he.r you
MR M(X)R_ I,_t me comment that we're tryin_ to under.|and completely the Io_u_ me the
t_me the ._4.%1E', came on the hltoff durmg the entire fl_ihc of ,_l.l. u__me of" the primary t_4mk_
that ,}ur iir,}up _. trvmll to work r.iht n,_w
John_m ,_lp_.-e ('enter U, work_r_( th(_ h_wbl ml well u the nther ('enter_ to try and under-
• t_nd the eff_r,_ _,f I,.td. ,m tht. partlu.ul_r fltKht, _nd we 4h¢_lld have q_)m_ mdlcatt,m ,_( the
_tatua of that when w_u come to l,'h_rtda _m Thur.atay We'r_ ,me .ur. we w,ll have a comp|et_.
h_d_ _n_lyqt_ don_-, hut we will ¢(.rtmnly _lVe you • _tatua of where we are
And the _)ther _hm_l we're h._k,ng ,_t ,n addltl.n co a I(,,_de analy_l.q, a_ | ,m_d the other day.
_.qa very (|et_llle_| time line q_._lu_.nce,_f evente of different kind_ of |'|)rce_ on the fhght aa a runt.
t.)n ,)f tm_e ."h_w_. w_ll try to _tve w)u what we can _)n Thur,_day of what we have avadable
DR ('()VERT I w.uld hke to _k .he more que_t,m and tha_. i_ thi_ typ, _)1"a te_t i.q vertical
:,:,7
and. theret'_)re. I it._lufne th|_ f_;rward part _._d(;wn and n_t the n,_.zle
MR MUI,I_)Y: Itdelx, nd_ upon which _,,_ment you are tt_lttng. The chx_ure i. <)n the aft
end and then there'_ a hydropr(xff dome put (_n the center _Plcment joinu, in order to put pre_-
._ure into the _e_ment
DR COVF,,RT: Do i mmunder_tand th_n when you hydro t_t that you have the whole
_embly in one biil Icmg--
MR MUI,I,OY Oh. yet. The hydro ttqtt is an individual cmttmg ,M_rment. which b, two tsar.
menU, with a factory joint
DR (.'OVERT: _ you have never done any pre_ure te_ting or any Icmd meaaurement of thia
think when it'_ all put togt_her u o_ to julst the_?
MR. MUI,LOY: Yet. The structural te.t article wu intended to simulate that. Th_ structur-
al te_t article m an aft a_ment, an external tank attach _g'ment and a forward _,gmert and a
forward dome And th_,.t had hmda and pre_aure on it
DR UOVI':RT: Is that vertical?
MR MULI,OY: No. sir. horizontal.
DR. COVERT: And you put tension on that to simulate the thrust?
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MI( MI'I,I,()_ Y,... ,,.,t ,_,. _,_lw It,M, I',1 ,', it .,l_,t th,.f_ It,at _h," I,,,uh '_h:lv ,_. ,h-,.-. _ *.
ffle t_f.t_dtl,,er h;:tdJ, .int| _P t_le:t_tire the. jOltlt defle_'tl_)fl d_lrtn_ :111 ,_f th,_. t,.,_t.4
I)R t'( IVI.;R r And v-u dl,| that _,lth the h_a_ _ _tu_ and thr. light c_..I,n_'
MR .MI'I.I.(W With th,.light ca_ and thr,h,,dr-pr,_fin_
<;ENEF;AI. KI'TYNA Sir Mulhv,, .n the 17 ,Julyletter l'r.m Mr I._:_.I_d.wu_,*,n_ th*-
ch_ng_,,_ th_t raN(hi t_, incorporate| I11 the I¢_11t. therP IS I1 sl_lltl,nce thnt qN_ly_l. ! httve r_._,rva.
lion, alhout :n¢,,rlx_r_tinK the than_,.= con,tdermg the =ltEqnlficance o! the _.M.,'_ flrznll quahfyinK
th,,_ c,_ f,w fltdht ' W,u thai ,t _'h_|ule ¢on,tderatton"
MR MVI.I.OY Nu I haven't b_,n able to ilo throu4h all of th_ reformat|on that I have
here, but that _u* _1very corre_'t rt_l_rtatlon a_ut ,iome ,)r the concept, thai wer|, h_lng ,.'on_id.
ere,d, _nd I think h=_ r_rvatlon w=|u=that ! hope none of the,_ concept,= _let _m the QM.;,, and
thaw co_c_l)(_* are not even pl'ollTamm,_ I_au4_ they were n(_l _x)d _de_ I l_llev,, that t_ cor.
re%'t
I want the (_M-:, to repre|mnt what we have out at Vandenber!t r_ht now. wh|ch t_ the _M
,-onf'|K,uratton and [ wdl
VI('E ('IIAIRMAN ARM,'4TRON(; Just one further que,,|tton Would you tell u_ _tmply what
w|_ mtend_,d at
,',,;9
the hydro teatm_l" It ,v_,m_ to me tt'_ primardy a h_d kind of test and tt wouldn't tell you much
_th_ut leak_le _r th_, ktnd,_ _,|" ¢on_tderatton_
MR Mtrl.l.()Y The main drtver. _u_I under,_tand it in re,_,arching r_cords on that. the main
drtv|,|- wa.-, that the Itghtweight c_u_, just h_k alx_ut 2fi I,_NH)th_ of an inch _fff of the .*teel ca..w_
rh,. concern wa_ that',_ i_Olng to mcr,.a.,_ Jotlat rotatmn fir,_t becau..m n_)w you've got a wet mem-
hran_ the jotnt h_u_n't b_.n changed and therefore w_u have mor,, joint rotatton That wa.,_ a
drlv,.r
And the other thing was ju._t to run th,, ultimah, h)ad te_t to Ix* _ure that that ca.,_ would
tak,. I It) p_rc,'nt of the. maxtmum extend_l olx*ratmg range
VI('E ('IIAIRMAN ARM,_TR()N(; ._, it l.* a h,ad_ defle_'ti,,n kind ,,f"mea_ur,.m*.nt"
MR MUI,I,()Y Ye_
VI('E ('HA!RMAN ARM,_qTR()NG What is the configurati,m atKaln of the tc_t article fi, r the
hydro tc,_t"
MR MUI,L()Y The config, uratton of the teat article, it ia mounted into the test fixture a
_,gment. a ,.a.gment that is ,_hipped to Florida and aumembled And then it has a dome. a teat
dome that ia put onto it. bolted and .,mah,<t. such as you would put pre_ure into
:ff;O
the .,_,_men t
VICE CtIAIRMAN ARMSTRONG What's the other end?
MR MULLOY: The other end L_ the test fixture You just _t the clevis down on the ,eat
" "" fixture, .,_al it, and the cl0_ure end on the top i_ the forward dome of the motor
VI(TE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: ,¢_ it is not con,_idered nece_mry in thi._ application to
• . have c_-to-ca_ joint'.'
_,; MR. MUI, LOY: That i_ correct Or an alternate presaure test. We u_e the structur_:l test
article, the single test article, to get all the jointa in, to put the combination of loads and pres-
,¢tlrt,-,J ,if1 fh,.f?l t,i [ Jib o,_i.rt',.flt ,J| tl'h, lifl|tt It_(td wtt_ t, xte.fl,lt,.t, tft,ltl'ttfl_eorlt_tttt_ft, 4rich .t.,I we. ,',_1[(_
_'_ h'qt .il'ttl,tll.tl_tiCCtJ ," 'r.t[_d.zthJl_ ,|U(tiif) the' I)¢laltt' _ltruL'turP
._n(| th-n r'_tLh .trttch. _l_,,, thr,Jtlgh .z h_dr_q)r,_)f r_,0t t_,l(_rr' ,t =4 u_r_| _sn,| r,,tl_kr,d, ubFlz,'h I_
t{.' $mrt',q;t ,_| th,- lVtAXlllli3lll,*.i._'t_( pr_,l_tzr,o ._l_,{ thrn _,v, thin the _1l[4 (|_iv_n AI'H_ '_e r't|n
) II I |w, rt'_,flt te,,,=t ,_i ,)Ill _ _trttch° t,, fnr,(t.,Itlr_, the, joint r,)t_itl,_n ,snd ,l.lmtlr(, the pr,,,_ur,, lllt_,l_rit_, ,I|"
the' thtflnt_] ,,tit_lil Jill'," h,lv,' i_,_,rlf"l_ina( that _Iti_',._'rs .k
MR WI'IEI_._ Mr ikrl'illtrl'ICh_, the' t_'_t he I'_ .qw.(iktng ,d )l.l.w ti,, ._-,t.,n,_ ((i (t ,ind thor,, ,_ .l
_'+t.i_'-t,_-t'it.._"joint thor,,, but It I_ +1/;tctory ]Olllt tint|
,t _._t',)w.r,,d with prol_,llant when it t,=_htpl_'d to the C_I_ for launch
VI('E ('}IAIRMAN ARM:_I'I'ION(.i la _t the ,am,. configurat,,m ,. the cr,_ _*_'tlon that we
p_wm_ around here'/'
MR WEEK._I Y_. it i_ the _me. but It _ not critical I:,_-au_ _t _ cover_l with prol_llant
and ther_ timno Joint. and wouldn't have putty or any of thai _rt of think _w) it m all cut in a
d,mhl_tded ('tank Each of th_ _.'tlon_ of the big ._te_l material _, ah_)ut lJ f,_,t long and your
whole throng is al_)ut Jl fc_t long when you ..ilip It. but there m a joint there, but It m a factory
joint and then covered with propellant
VII'E ('liAIRMAN ARM_rRONt; ! n_d to understand the question information that you
extrawt from _uch a t_t i_ apphcable to a ca_e-to-ca_ joint where ,t l_ not a factory joint and
there umn'ta propellant _-r't_m there?
MR WEEK_ Well. it i_ _ joint, but. you _. there I_ n,_ putty and n,_ thing f,)r the prt_urP
to eilter and br_ak th_ ,,eal
MR .M(rI.I,OY Dr Armstrong. when th_=t t,_t =._run. they would not know whether that
w_ a f_'tory F)mt or _t field joint _'_uMu_ at the time th# te,_t I_ run there i._ no prop_|l_nt and
,n.,_ulatmn in there
VI(°E ('IIAIRMAN ARM,q'rR()N(; "rh_tt w_c,_the ['_)int [
3+;2
MR M(X)RF: It'_t_ted and then taken out and then loaded and then _hippod
MR .MULI,()Y Mr ('hairman, the question )ou a.ke_, what i._the bottom lint-ofallof that,
i._th(ttwe concluded--we had planned to fire thi._QM-,',in [_'ember I made the decL_ion in
,qeptember to hold that configuration until we couhl _'(,mplete thi_ te_ting to look at what would
be th*, m_mt fem_ible improvement that would g_ tow_trd reducing the incident_ of erosion and
blow.by
CIIAIRMAN R()_;EIK'$:What w_ your concltmion?
ISlide._I_,'_: _, _',I
MR. MUI,[_)Y: The conclusion wau_ that the beet thing to do at thi._ time--and we ran an
aaeembly te_t to make ._ure we could do thi._, bt, t the thing that con_train_ the ._ize of the O-ring
that you can put in a groove i_ that in putting it together that you don't _hear the O-ring or do
damage to the O-ring in putting it togeth_,r.
We concluded through au_embly te_t_ that we could go up in the size of the O-ring in the
cn.,_=-to-ca_e joint from 2H0 to .292, and we demonstrated that that could be accomplished Now
what that doe_, it increa_t_ the initial compre_mon on the
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O-ring and enhances the capability for it to maintain a compree_ion such that when the motor
pressure hits it that it can extrude into the gap and give us a good prinlar_ _eal.
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l'h, • c,_nc,,rn l_r hA_,I/Ig lht' lll't_l'l" ,lltU(Itl_111 whl, rl, the .,,we_.'Ol'1(]ilrv _i_,_iI _'tnn,_t h_, pre-c,_tlrt, :If'Ill
.,t_l 1.wreduced .,,_rn.wh,lt
I'ht- _th_,r thing w,e ,lid ._nd [ c.ln ._h(,w,-_,,_u _I plctur,, h_.r,, l'r()m :ill ,)I' th,lt c()h| tl()w t,_t-
ll_.g 1.4111tht, n,)zzh. J_)Inl rhl.,l r,.f,,r., to _I 'rur¢,,n ,_p¢Icer, and 'rur,',,n ,., ,._ _In|]lh,d r_.fl,_n W,,
l(,,in,| ,_n _hl_ n(_zzl, jOlrlt
.%IR MI'I,I.i)Y -that thi._ _r_)ve had l'men made a.,_wlde i_.,_it t._ l'_..'ilU..W, th1_ n,)tzle ha_ t()
._lldeover th_ _'nd there'._,in mterference, almost an mterference fitat th_s lu_atmn The d,_,_ign
wa_l mantle with a very wide groove there to allow that ().ring to move a.,_you in._tall the nozzle to
_u_ure that we didn't damage that O-ring
We found that through _mbly test that if we can put the nozzle on in the vertical in_tead
of the horizontal, when you lay the motor ca_e d(_vn in the horizontal it ch,velop_ an ovality and
now you're trying
to mate a round part to an oval part We found that tf we would install the nozzle in the vertical
we could reduce the size of thi_ lisp
Now the effect that thai h_. we thought we would have a leak check port between the two
_eals such that when we run that leak pre_ure test at 204) p_i and then :)4)pei for ten minutes to
validate ;.hat we have a good _al that tends to move this O-ring in the wrong direction.
This is the motor pressure side over here. and _) now when the motor pre_ure comes
through thi_ putty and impinge= on this O-rinK that's '_ltting over here and it's not .,_aled--it
ha._ just got compression on it--that ().ring has to tr(=vel from thL_ s=de of the gr(mve to thi_ side
of the gro_rve and then extrude into this gap That is when you are getting your erosion, while
that hot gam jet is impinginil on that O-ring
what ,e.e concluded was put this Tureen _i_lcer in there ._uch that when we run the leak
check we don't move thi_ O-ring all the way back over to the other ._ide of the gap. which now
._hould reduce the incidence of erosion that we're _,eing on the nozzle jomts
I)R. FEYNMAN: Why? The ._ame gas comes.
MR, MULLOY: But the time of blow.by is not as long
.3H3
DR. FEYNMAN: There'_ blow-by either way?
MR. MULLOY: If you don't have initial comprem_ion there is. but if the O-ring ha., the 7.34
percent compression and it'_ over here, it i_ going to immediately extrude into the gap. If it is
over here, it ha_ got--l,000 Imi ha_ to move that O-ring to the other side during the time it leaks
through becatu_ that ¢omptetmion i_ not adequate to hold 1.000 p_i until the O-ring gets over
here and extrude_ in the gap.
So the bottom line of all that testing wa_ the,w_--putting a bigger O-ring in the joints and
putting a spacer in this is the best _olution of all of the te_ting that we did.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Is that what you did in C,t-L, then?
MR. MULLOY: No, sir. 5I-L is the same thing.
CHAIRMAN ROGEIK_: "l%is is just a consideration for improvements in the future?
MR. MULLOY: That is what we had been doing for the last year, is running all of these
tests that were on the bar graph to determine what kind of a fix might work to reduce the inci-
dence of erosion.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: This was for the future, though, and didn't affect .51-L?
3O8
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MR MI'I.I.OY It did n,_t affe_'t ",I-I.
¢'ii.\IRMAN R{_;ER.'4 The_eare_tuthesyou had _,n makmgtotrv to_mprove_t"
;_; 7
MR MUI.I.()Y Ye_. _lr. and my point is we vvould never put a change on a flight vehicle
before we qualified it
DR RIDE: Th_._ w'as just t\)r the filament wound cases'?
MR MU[.LOY: No. [ wanted to qualify tt on the filament wound ca._,, but the c_uqe-to-,:ase
joint other th_,n the rotation is not any different--m not really any different than on the ste_l
cases The nozzle joint is identical.
DR RIDE: So this really is _mething you are thinking of
MR MULLOY: What I wanted to do was qualify this on the QM-3. If ! qualified it on QM.3.
based upon the other testing that I have already done and the analysis that Mark ha8 done. I
would put the spacer in the nozzle joint, and I don't have to do anything. I don't have to get any
metal parts or anything, and I can improve that O-ring situation. As far as the cam_ joint..292, if
it would extrude into the gap on QM.3 where the joint isn't rotating, it would certainly extrude
into the gap on ,qte_l. and I am
putting a .292 O-ring in the seal.
DR. WALKER: What is QM-5?
MR MULLOY: That's the last qualification motor on the filament wound ca_ program. The
nozzle-to-ca_v joint on QM-5 ts identical to the ,_tee[ casing.
MR. MOORE: Let's get to the last couple of charts.
MR. MULLOY: That'_ it
MR MOORE: I understand that
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: We will have plenty of time to study the other things you have been
doing to improve things, but [ think the focus of attention is going to be what caused this acci-
dent.
MR. MOORE: Sir. what we tried to do with this briefing today was to bring you all the docu-
mentation that I have available in my office that deals with the question of O-rings L,_,cause that
is a highly suspicious
7_;9
area. So we wanted to give the members of the Commi_ion the data that we've got on the O-
ring situation, and [ think tomorrow that is something that you ought to talk about, [ guess,
after this briefing, what area do you think from the Commission's standpoint you would like to
dim:u_ tomorrow, and we will go back and work this thing.
Larry has get two more charts, and that's it.
IViewgraph._ IK,-I -' i. ISl
MR. MULLOY. I think we can wind up with this one. This chart is the one right out of the
August 19th briefing. This is general conclusions about what happens with O-ring eroeion. That
was good on August 19, and it is s'.ill good today.
DR. COVERT: Does it follow logically if you eliminate erosion or you eliminate soot?
MR. MULLOY: No, sir. As long as that O-ring has to move before it extrudes into the gap,
you will have gas blow-by. If the gas burns grease in the process, you will get soot. If there is not
much grease there, we have indications of blow-by where it has been clean.
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0DR ('(_VERT Mark. I_ It your view that there _,ulld t.. bh)_-hv
MR SAI,ZTA N_ intuitively I would ,_tv not "l'her_, are going to b,, re;my times
.',7t_
when _ou h_lve enough pressure or enou_4h O-rin/_ _lquee.ze that you wilt not have bh)_-by We
have already ._een four instances of _oot behind the O-ring. and we have fired 177 field ioints _o
f:tr. fltg'ht and test mot,.rs Of th., l';'l we have hx_ked at, we have only _,en t\_ur ca_.es of any
evidence of _oot behind the primt, ry O-ring
DR (.'OVERT: Well, if you could have blow-by without _ux_t
MR..qAI.ITA: Well, what evidence do we have that we have any heat effect in the zone" We
haven't seen any heat effect in the zone that I've seen
MR ACHI'L¢,ON: Could you explain why erosion in the nozzle joints is more _vere due to
eccentricity?
MR. MULLOY: Yes I w--q explaining we assemble the nozzle in the horizental. The nozzle is
round. The case is laying in the chocks and tends to get oval, and so you are putting a round
object into an ellipoe, so there is eccentricity there.
tViewgraph._ Ix... -' I,_ t,, t
MR MULLOY: Now, the recommendations that were prese.nted in Augl, l_t are these This
recognizes the concern that the lack of a good secondary ._al in the field joint is most critical,
and ways to reduce the joint rotation should be incorporated as soon as possible to reduce criti-
cality.
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Now. what we did in response to that-
_Viewgraph.} IX.'1 : I,, :"t
MR. MULLOY:-is even before that recommendation wa._ made in August. in duly I had
moved out to procure larger billets tbr the motor. The way these motor casings are made. la-
disch, a proprietary process, rolls these things with no welding on them. so we just told them to
build the billets with three inches less ID so that we would have extra material inside such that
we could machine a capture feature just like _ve have on the filament wound casing.
MR. FEYNMAN: None of these things went into 31-L"
MR. MULLOY: No. l was just responding to the recommendations of August. and we now
will have the first of those parts delivered in 19_6, in August of 19S& where we can reduce
them. and respond to that recommendation to reduce joint rotation in the field joints.
_Viewgraph._lX,.I -' I,_ .'t I
MR. MULLOY: This recommendation was to go do that testing that we did in order to deter-
mine what the proper fix was and incorporate it in QM-5. It was recommended that we use the
QM-5 or an alternate putty. It has nothing to do with a better putty. People who use asbestos
are stopping making that material, and the
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reason we went from Fuller-O'Brien to Randolph was because Fuller-O'Brien wasn't making it
and Randolph might quit making it. So we d'scussed what to do with the filament wound case in
that first flight out of Vandenberg. But agair, a recommendation to do additional testing, which
we have done, that was the program plan I showed you, and the conclusion at that time was
that the analysis of the existing data indicate_' that it is safe to continue flying existing designs
as long as joints are leak checked with a 200 psig stabilization pressure, and are free of contami-
nation in the seal areas, and meet the squeeze requirements.
DR. RIDE: How do you determine the contaminations?
3 10
,_IR MUI,I,OY Well, th_tt'._ _l visual inspection We go to great lengths to be sure that we
keep the ()-ring._ clean The joints _lre initially _rea._l and put into what we call the short stack.
The aft a.._aembly is put on the Mt _kirt and I'he motor and then moved over, and that ia all
degream,d and inspected and then regre_._'d, and great caution _a taken to be sure that the _ur-
t\_ce I._ clean, and when we _et the motors back we do a thorough inspection of that to assure
.hat we haven't gotten any pitting due to the fact that they have been _n the water We take
great care to be ._ure that we have got good seals And then the O-rings are br_ught in to Wa-
satch, in Utah.
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There the O-rings are inspected, cleaned, greased, and then they are sealed, and they are not
taken out of the bag until the O-rings are delivered at the a_embly point to assure that we
don't pick up any contamination.
DR. RIDE: Have you ever found water in any of the ._ot?
MR. MULLOY: It has been reported to me, and that isbeing verifiedbecause we have not
found any documentation yet that indicates it,but itis reported that on STS-9 that we had to
roll back and destack STS-9 because of the 8A nozzle eromon. It is reported that when they
pulled the pins on that jaint,that water came out of the joint
Itisalso reported when they broke a segment open one time, that water came out of a joint.
That is being--KSC is tracking that. and we are looking for any documentation that indicates
that That was reported to me after the 51-L accident.
DR. WALKER: That would be water trapped between the two O-rings?
MR MULLOY: No. itwould be water in the--if I went back to my joint that I ran. the
clevicewas up.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Go aqead, but I reallywant
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to get toa discussion ofwhat we are going _odo tomorrow
What you are saying iswe have conducted extensive testsof this type and that type.and we
have concluded _._fellows,and these are the recommendations, but anybody there isgoing to be
interestedin what are the things that happened that relate to 51-L. [ mean. others are going to
say that this isa filibuster.
Now, you have told us now, and we will have a chance _o ask a lotof further questions,but
ifwe appear to be ducking the issue,the issue is what happened prior to the launch of 51-L.
DR. COVERT: Sir.itseems to me when we firstsat down and went through the firstletter,
one of the concerns was have you fellowsdone anything to react to t_,is--Idon't want to use the
word "threat" because of the discussion today--but this problem that may come up in the joint,
and the last few viewgraphs here have been the result,as I understand it,of what they have
done in the lastyear to try to make the integrityof thisjoint be more satisfactory.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Yes, [ think that isgood. But I just think we ought to shorten it.
DR. COVERT: I misunderstood what you said.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Ithink that isfine,but if
57,5
you went through all of the things that Larry has gone through and then the last question is
does any of this relateto 51-L,and the answer isno, everybody isgoing to say well why did you
spend all of that time on it?I mean, he can say itand we can report itin our report and all of
these things,but I think these lastthree charts were fine.
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GENERAL KUTYNA: The next to the last bullet says it is safe to fly if you pass the 200
pound test.
Did 5I-L pass the 200 pound test?
MR. MULLOY: Yes. There were no anomalies reported to me yet. In fact, I understand the
people that did the psi leak ....
DR. RIDE: Do you have closeout photos on that?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, we have gotten closeout photos in my task force at the Cape, and we
also have had a very preliminary report on the leak check--the supervising of the leak check
process out at Kennedy Space Center, and the preliminaw ,ndication is there were absolutely no
anomalies in the leak check on this particular flight.
GENERAL KUTYNA: But Jess, do you see my dilemma, that it is safe to fly if you pass this
test and you passed the test?
DR. COVERT: Maybe the test we have been pursuing is not the source of the accident.
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DR. LUCL_: If it :urns out that the O-ring is a problem, and we haven't determined that.
V1CE CHAIRMA5 ARMSTRONG: I am concerned, Mr. Chairman, in looking ahead at the
perspective of the audience and the people listening, that we will have demonstrated that there
was a concern in this particular technical area, but it wasn't deemed dangerous to fly, it was
deemed safe to fly, but it was also deemed that it ought to be fixed and be better, and work was
going on, which makes an understandable story to me, but I am not sure that it will be under-
standable to everybody else.
Why was it safe? You know, they are always trying to simplify points to the things, of sive
me a black or white or yes or no answer, was it safe or not? And if it was, why were you fixing
it? And that concerns me a little bit.
MR. MOORE: It concerns us as well, too.
MR. FEYNMAN: If you look at this from a naive point of view, which many people will, I
am just emphasizing his point that it was--presented this way, it does look terrible because if
you juxtapose the first sentence, the first item, with the next to the last item, you find two sen-
tences-and I am just emphasizing your point to make it more dramatic--that
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say--and I am giving the report--the lack of a good secondary seal in the field joint is most
critical, and ways to reduce joint rotation should be incorporated as soon as possible. Analysis of
the existing data indicates that it is safe to continue flying.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: That is really what it is saying, but you are just making it more
dramatic.
MR. HOTZ: You have got a real problem with that.
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Space Shuttle SRM Segment Joint
f
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Past History Comparison
Nozzle O-Ring Erosion Patterns (Optical Comparat_T)
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QM-5 Options
• Puny optk)ns
- RandoJph putty, aabestgs-fllled _esently flight qualifmd
• Inmont-Canad41 0otty. asbestos-filled, tested on DM-7 aft field _o/nt and
nozzM-to-case joint
• inmont-St. Louis Ix,'tty. asbestos-free, tested o_ DM-7 cent_ f_eld jolnt
• QM-5 epproach end rationale
• Randolph putty in ignitor joints
• Presently inst.Mk_d
• Previous tests and flights verify acceptability
• Oth_r putty may be used later based on similarity to use in nozzle
joint
• Inmont-Canada asbestos-filled putty in field and nozzle joints
• Qualify lilternate material as beh_._ equivalent or superior to
Randolph putty while introducting least risk to firing
• Field joint layup per DM-7 aft and center joint configuration based
on known joint gaps
• Nozzle }pint iayup same as current flight configuration
[R_,f. 2 II) 1:;I
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Conoepts Implemented In OM..4
• O_JPZ In. dlametaw _r_O In cawt_r and aft flaldJo_ta (vo 0.200
•ta_dard)
* Ybrco_ oVacer ptuo #fandord 0273/n. dtam_t_ _rtnf In nolzle
• Ylv_Icol aaaembly of OM_ noule
• Inmont.CoModa p_tty/n oll fl.ldJolntx ond In no_Llo Joint uo]no
currently demonatrafed la)_4_ conMguratJo_
,l:, I -' I,_ IT,
OM-5 Nozzle Joint
hsulation
_0.062 X O. fiFO Turoon Spacer
\
\_ 0.275 + 0.003 dia
\ _- Standard O-ring
\ \
Vaouum Putty,
Inmont.Canada,
Asbestos Filled
m_
General Conclusions
• All O-rlng eros,on has occ_JrreJ where gas p,tths in the vacuum putty Ate
fo_rmed
• Gas paths *n the vacuum putty can occ(_r durln9 as,_emhly, leak check, or
during motor pressurt.'ation
• Improved filler materials or layup cnnflqt.,itlons wh,ch st,II ,tllow ,x v._l,d !.;ak
cheL'k of the wimary 0 rinqs may re(hJce frequency of 0 rln_ _roslo,_ but will
probably not elJmlnatu =tor r3duce the severlly ut erosion
• Elimination of vacuum ¢>utty in a ti(jhler _),nl area will ehn_,nate 0 rln(j erosion
if circumferential flow is not Wesent - d _t i1 wesent, some baffle arran._ement
may be requ_red
• Erosion in the nozzle joint is more _e, ,e due to eccentricity; howev'_r, the
secoMaty seal in the no=zte walt seal and wilt f_ot erode through
• The primary 0-ring in the field ioint should not erode through but if it eakl due
to e_rosion or lack of leasing the secocKla_y seal may not seal the motor
IK,'l " lJ_ l'_i
Recommendations
• The lack of a good s_condary seal in the field joint is most critic_aland way_s to.
reduce joint rotation should be incorporated as soon as possible to reduce
criticality
• The flow conditions in the joint areas during ignition and motor operation need
to be established through cold flow modeling to eliminate 0-ring erosion
• QM-5 static test should he used to qualify a second source of the only flight
certified joint filler material {asbestos-filled vacuum putty) to protect the flight
program schedule
• VLS-1 should use the only flight certified joint filler material (Randolph
asbestos-filled vacuum putty) in all ioints
• Additional hot and cold subscale tests need to be conducted to improve
analytical modeling of O-ring erosion problem and for establishing margins of
safety for eroded O-rings
• Analysis of exististing_d'_._ continue_existing
__-as all joints are leak checked w_l_ a 200 psigstabilization
.__pressure, are freeq_o_contamination in the seaq areas and meet O-r!._squeeze
requirements
Efforts needs to continue at an accelerated pace to eliminate SRM seal erosion
R*'f. 2 ll)-I
318
Capture Direction
• OIIlet Informal dlrectionmJuly f985
• Drawing release with inforrnal directionmOctober f985
• ECP delivered to MSFC_20 Jan f986
• Rohr/Ladish accelera,/on Informal discusslon$_4 Feb f986
• Planned forrnal releose to Rohr_ f4 Feb I986
* Will deliver first parts_A ugus ¢ f986
!l_,.f : It) 2o]
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Concepts Implemented in OM.5
0.2D2 In. dlmmoter O.rlng In cantor and aft flaldjolnt# (vm 0.200
atandord}
_roon spacer plua etandard 0.275 In. dlametor O.rlng In nozzle
Joint (ace cha_ O.2b}
Vertical aaootnbly of On.5 nozzle
Inmont.Canada putty In all flaldjolnt$ and In nozzle Joint ualng
currently demonotrated loyup configuration
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('ltAIRMAN R()_;I']R._ W_.II. th_lnk _.u _t.t'_ much
I+''tr'_ t_ilk ,' Iltth' bit +itx_ut tomorrow, W+, _ll[ 111,'_*t _tt lql IHI _(t'h_'k W+. u,_ll "_,l_ th_lt _,,, h,id
l]1.1tt, rl.l[ prt_,.,l_+nt_-. "I iii -,lOl]It 0 (J,.t_lll, ;I11(| WI, _,iltl!. [|) i_|) ovt0r pr_,tt_ much the. +ilnl_, ll1|_)rl11,1lhHl
_l'_ltl C_lll _Itlllllllill_Iv'+ " 4;)ll_; ° ill It i_l,l':It],_4, bq, i, h_',irc] I|, ,lll(] bl, l, '.l,,lllt t_) qJl+,II _It}'1 -iolllt. t)l the. t|tlt..,l
lltJt1..i th.ll h+l_,.' I>_'t'tl r,ll.,.i_,,tl Ant| th,lt ,,o+t.rt, i]t£|+[l_+']+, tlt,ldt.. ,ind _,_._. _,111 try, t_ r_.l.,t_. ,_tlr" In;,*..+t,_,_
it,in tt.n+_rr_,,+_, it, tht.-.+- l_ut +..,
N,,m. ++,. h,t'.,, t,, d,.tul... '.,,h , '.,+,. -+h,,uhl ._..,k t,, h",+t_l_, ,_r" t,, t+;,tk,...+t,trt.m,.t_t., .tnti I _+,,tlttl
thtrtk thlt [..irr+_, t+-, t]n,.. I+,£+ ++,,,+,, +,,,. h._.,. _,,t r,, _,,t d,,+,,t_ t,_ .It_-,,,,_.rtt;_ the. -+l+,,tlli_' q'£,...+tl,,tt.,+
,II'_+tlt %h,l| _,,I'+ d_','l_', ,lr]_] Ill '++I'.,,', _,,_tl hat] th,'+.,i+ ' +.t_flt.'l,l'tt,,+, .llt+_ It _i+_._.rl1_ t,, r1_,, ,,,i_tl1+,I+_mls, +h,,tll,l
tI,..ll _,._th I+ Lit ,hr,,n,,l,,_tc,tl ,,r+d,.r ._t_d +._+ +,.... +,,,, h.,d th,...,,. [,r,,l_l,,r_. h,'++,.-+ +,,h.lt ++,. ,if,+ +,,,.
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h,td ,t rn,','Tim4 _,.,. _r,_h. i r_'I,,rt, h,.r,.._ _,,h.lt ,,_,, _,,,d W,.-_ttll h,ul c,mc,'rn., We did the ° f'i,llt_Ml,.
in_ rh:n_., ll,,r,.-, h,,_ _,, did it. u_d ju4t h.t'.,...t chr_,n,d,_4_ Ul mtrr.ttt,,_, form _,f _,h,tt h,q._
p.,n,,d, b,.c,tu.,. ,,th,,r_.l.,..._ h,,,k_ .i_ it .ind I he4rd ._,m_. _,_ th,, p_,,_ph, th,. _,th_,, d.t_ h.lt Lt _,L-_
t,,,, i,,n_ ,,r _,,,_nd', W_,I]. I d,m't think ',_. h,s_,'to ,,,,_rr'. ,,_mt It it.,, hm_ ,t_ _," ,*'ll ,t n._rr_It_','e
.,iti_r', IIl ',,l, hb..'h tht, _.'l_I1l..'[[l:,.llt|tl_4 that ',_m rl.,ach ;it1,i [ lllt.,.tll, t?iHIClU.',llOFls l[l the:' 4(,n.41, th_It v,,u
•_',,_ w_,ll. ,flier th_e _ttldl_"_ _,_,_,re ll1,1de. ,Irltl ..I_ fi_rth, that w,, made the dec_4_,m_. ;rod here l._
wh_' w_, made thern _mleh_'_ly ha.,* t_ _av that
N _ } _r , _,vt, ryb_xly r_,cot_nlze-I tha;. V()LI life t,{(}ltll_ to n,ake mi.,,itak_,_l, ill judgment, hut lit h,a._t %_re
hav_, to _how that _t wa.,In't done in i| carett_.,,I !'a.,ihion and that there were i'neetinl,_,_ and you
thought about it and who wa.,i there and thina.,i of that kind
Now. whether you can do that tomorrow or not. I don't know
MR MOORE l would hke to volunte_,r to start it off tomorrow and try to put .._ome of thi.._
in context and _o forth to try to awe the flavor that you were ju:_t citing. Mr ('hairman. about
the context of the action._ that were taken
('ttAIRMAN RCRH:,RS: Would you give us a li._t of
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the people that you think ?ou may want to call?
MR. MOORE: l think the only two people that we would like to have testit:v is probably
myself and I think Larry Mulloy will talk tomorrow, and those are probably the two principal
()rl_gi
l think i would put a question mark on Mike, and l think Mike and [ can ._it down and talk
tonight and decide that. I don't know if we need that preci._e answer immediately, but I think we
will go back to NASA headquarters and begin workin_ on that.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: What documents can we pro_ 4e and make available to the public?
MR. HOTZ: Is this whole thing going to be available?
MR. MOORE: No, sir. What my proposal would be, I made these documents specifically for
the Commission. My proposal v, ou!d be to go back and take a subset of this documentation,
much smaller than that, and present it to you and the other members o_ the Commission as we
will testify on it tomorrow, and we will go through on a slide by slide basis the charts as we did
in our testimony to you on Thursday.
i \l._!_._ _;_I,h'hq,'_l I
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MR. ['-IOTZ: Mr. Chairman, l wonder if the memos that are specifically referred to in the
New York Times story will be pre_ente_ as part of our public record.
MR. MOORE: Yes. sir. [ would propose to do that in the morning, absolutely. I would pro-
pose to put those memos in the context is why l suggested, it" it was acceptable to you, that [
would plan to initiate this whole discussion to try to put those memos in context.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Are there any memos in here that haven't been made public?
MR. MOORE: No, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I mean, if we say some documents were gven to us but we can't
make them public, that creates a whole new question.
MR. MOORE: No, sir. The thing we also can't control, Mr. Chairman, is there is none of this
documentation that is, you know, of a classified nature and being held tightly. I mean, this is
information in our files, and it is hard ta tell where copies of the information are, and why we
tried to present you and the
?22
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pr|,_,d ill tht' t'uturt, b_, ._rnebq_|v 'QILI',_in_I up _,tth :in_ithor tlt_.'Llll1_'llt
l)R RIDE .\to thl.rt, any c],_'un1_,nt.._ in here that v,'ert, m)t made public in the. New Y,,rk
"|'l I_I I"4
MR MIX)RE Ye._. there was a do¢'uq_ent in therl, by Ru_._ llard_ wh¢_ _vr¢_t¢,a d,_.'ument t_i
.Mr Wiilterhaltc" ._u_estln_ that the SRM ._y_tern _hould continue to f'lv ,in(t w'e -d_,uld m,t
m,,ke any quick tix,_,_ to the SRM in preparation li)r the (_M-5 tll_ht testing
CHAIRMAN RO(.IERS: Why don't we make all of ttu_e d,×'uments public"
MR t[OTZ: That'._ a good idea
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I mean. tf
MR HOTZ: It would be very ._alutary if we n'ade a v_ry complete record public, more than
what the New York Times had. That would defuse a lot of thi_ issue
MR MOORE: Could I suggest that the Commi_ion consider releasing the document we pro-
vide you tomorrow which will have all of the memos and so forth'.' There will be the New York
Times data plus additional data. and [ would suggest to you, Mr Chairman, that that be the
document released to the public, although [ personally don't have any problem if
5_2
you want to release this
(%laleri_ldeleted.)
MR. HOTZ: No. just the relevant material.
MR MOORE: Sir, we may appear a little disorganized here today, but we put this stuff to-
gether very quickly, and I would like to have a chance to go back together and organize it.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, why don't you do that, but why don't you proceed on the
theory that all of this is going to be made public. If we don't do it tomorrow, it will be--[ mean.
it will be a mess for the press, and it is hard for us, and I am not being crii.ical, but you do what
you think you should do, and you say we are going to make all the documents available to the
press, and if there are any classified documents, we won't, but as far as we can tell. these are
not classified.
MR. MOORE: To my knowledge, in my office back there and my people that are working
there that have
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identified that, we do not have any additional data that is relevant to this subject that is not
compiled in this document here.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Mr. Chairman, I think it would be helpful if at some
early time they describe how the seal is intended to work. I think we sort of had to dig that out
of them here. If you could describe how it is supposed to extrude and so on, and what a normal
course that that seal would seek, the normal environment that it would seek, it would be helpful
for everybody to understand.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: We can also say, of course, tomorrow that we are going to meet on
Thursday and Friday when we have an opportunity to see them first hand, but I think you are
right, I think tomorrow if you could assume that you are talking to people who are not experts
in it, because you have got the public there, and explain it to them.
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(Deletion here.)
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MR M(_)RE W;'l,. about th," R_ck_,,ll p,,r_on.ll_,'
t'IIAIRM,kN RtR,I !+.'_ Wcli. I dont th_nk. 11 n,,btml+ kl',,_*._ ,tn+thtn4 4t_,ut it. I mean. +<_u
ha_e .dreatt_ t,'stltied t_ th.t' here tLutav
MR M(RIRE I t,,Stll]cd---.\rnle Aldrich and 1 du| m)r r,.ktqv_, [,J rll; kn,,wh.d_e ,m_ c,,m-
m,,nt,._ ()r ,In', calI_ t'r_,,n R,_:kwell rn.snage, mcnt per,_ons
t'JI:klR.MAN R(R ;ERS: .\nd rm ,,m.,shere t'r, ml Rockw,,ll t_,da_"
, ',, 5
MR M()')RE No. -ur N,)one 1.-¢here from R(×'k',ell
('HAIRMAN ROC, ERS: Well. l think it might be a good idea for you to check and ask then:
so we are not surprised again
MR MOORE: I will do that. Someone is suplx_ed to Ix, doing that down in Florida. and I
just haven't gotten a report back
flow long should ;,c plan on going _omorrow, Mr. (?hairm-,,n'?
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, [ would gues_ it would go all day. maybe not. If we could get
out ear',ier. I would rather do it. but I think you will find tremende::., interest as we expected I
mean we have been shown a list of newspapers and networks, l mean. we want to try to be--I
tell you. I like the questions that were asked today, and I wouldn't hesitate to ask the same
questions tomorrow because it shows that members of this ('ommL_,6on have a lot of background
on this subject. -ind I don't think we should hesitate to ask these questions again, and I thought
they were all good.
DR. (_'OVERT: We might dig up some new ones overnight.
GENERAL KUTYNA: We spent all day on the seals. What if we were to ask you what other
avenues
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you are pursuing?
MR. MOORE: We would be able to talk about that. As a matter of fact, [ wgu'd be able to
tell you in general terms what other avenues we are putting, not fault trees but problem trees, if
you want to call it, together in all areas. None of the systems in the Shuttle system have been
exonerated at this point in time. My task _'_rce is just getting started, and I see it running tbr
many months, and no system has been checked off as being completely exonerated from an}
cause of the 51-L incident, and that is one of the opening statements that I was going to make in
the morning about the activities that we are going through.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And another thing you could say is that when we are down there we
are going to meet with the head of the team so that we get a better idea of how they are pro-
ceeding and how we can cooperate and coordinate our activities.
MR. MOORE: Maybe I should give a brief status of what the task force that I have been
charged with is doing down there.
Sir, do you think on Thursday and Friday's meeting, will you want to have it closed, or do
you want to have it open?
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, I think it has got to be closed. We are not going to have a
meeting. We are
587
going to look at things, and we are going to have a lot of private discussion. So we are not
baving a meeting as such.
And let's decide whether we want a meeting on Friday or not. Let's just say we are going to
be there and we have no meeting scheduled.
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.....a. - _I /
MR .M_)_)RI*: We _.Ir_t t_ r','.Ike _ure that v_)u ._'e -q_me ,,t the hard_Jro af_d ._ee the .";RB-_
:rod the .q_wkin_ ar.t those ktnd._ ,_l"thtn_s
t'II.\IRMAN RiflER."; .'4,, it" l'htlr,_dav elI ¢v_e_lecid_' t,, havo i _h¢,rt me_'_m;g, _ort .f _umma-
rizlr_: what _t' h.lvo _o_-r'__r !ellin_ p_.oplt, wh,it w.:. _Liv_. d_,:l_', _' cLIn (]() th,tt, i;ut [et'_ P()t
pre_.mpt ou r_e[ves
DR ('()VERT I.q there a travel ,_chedule prepared'
C[IAIRM.\N R(X;ERS Do we have anv _chedule"
MR TII()MPS()N Whaz l would like t{) d() i.-; sit down this e'.'enmg with AI and try to pu_
together bet weet_
CHAIRMAN R(N.;ERS: Are we all _oing to be leaving l'r(_h-t Washinglon?
MR THOMPSON: l am anticipating that.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I said when we had lunch that I will not prevent any question from
being asked. At least I won't answer any question that relates to
anything more than 12 hours away
Laughter. )
_R. WALKER: When _vill we start on Thursday?
MR THOMPSON: Well. we tentatively plan to start at iO:O0 am. on Thursday
MR. KEEL: The notion that .John had was to have a plane leave early from National on
Thursday morning so we w'_uldn't have to stay overnight.
We will stay overnight Thursdav.
MR. THOMPSON. There are a couple of things I would like to talk to the Commission
about.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Do y( a want to do it in executive session'.'
MR. THOMPSON: Yes.
MR. CULBERTSON: If" I could say this, and I have not been involved in the investigation
and all, and that is this, that there is a concern I always have. We have internal investigations
about everything, but I can see it coming. NASA is by its nature an organization in
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which we try to encourage everybody to express his point of view, and the meeting that we have
on the kind of decisions that we have gone through here today, we go around, and if anybody
has a dissenting point of view, we want it expressed.
When we get ready for a launch, as ,Jesse said, he polls 27 people or some sach number, all
the contractors and all the government people, are we ready, and in a lot of the kinds of things
that we do there are no black and white answers on these issues. They are grey. And I don't
know, if what I am going to say is going to influence what you are doing, but I would hope that
the system that we use to draw out points of view is not impugned by the Commission judging
the way we do things. It is an important process.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, if I understand your question, it breaks down into two parts.
Anything that happened prior to the launch or immediately after is public property. It is all
going to be in the public domain, no matter what you think.
MR. CULBERTSON: I'm not saying that. I think we ought to be tbrthright in giving all the
data we have got, including every point of wew, but don't expect not to find r_mny points of view
which would say don't do that or make a different decision becau_ those were
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_'_ expressed, and a_s you go through this, you will find many, many times eight people said yes
•.rod one, person said no. and that person may have been right, and you are going to have to
evaluate al! of those things.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: That is true throughout government generally. Everybody knows
that. Anybody that has lived in government in Washington knows all of those things come out,
v,'hether it is the President of the United States or anyone else. I mean, he h_s all kinds of
people saying what they told him and so forth.
I think the more difficult problem is it is your investigation. We don't w.mt to intrude on
your investigation, and you should go ahead and try not to. At the conclusion of your investiga-
tion you will give us information and you will come to some conclusions, and we can then take
that and not--we are not going to tackle everybody who has been involved in the investigation,
but let me tell you--and I told some of the members of the Commission, I have two letters from
Congress, one from the Senate, one from the House, saying they are going to not do anything
while we are going through this process, but as soon as it is over with they are going to analyze
the report we make, and they are going to have an overview of us. So at that time we will be in
the same position you fellows are in now. We will
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be spending three or four or five days up there and trying to say why we said what we said in
the report.
And that is jus_ the way it operates.
MR. CULBERTSON: Well, as I said_ I don't know how what I said could influence what you
are doing, but you must expect that you probably haven't seen the last of these memos where
somebody says hey, don't do it. You will probably come across many.
We are searching our files to find thor things.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, that's fine.
MR. McDONALD: Could I find out when you want the people from Thiokol?
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: It won't be tomorrow. Maybe you will have to say something tomor-
row, but if _ou do, depending upon how l_ goes--but if you do, I will just say that we have asked
you to have other witnesses with firsthand information a littl_ later on.
DR. WALKER: Where are we meeting tomorrow?
MR. KEEL: In the State Department.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Okay, thank you very much.
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(Whereupon, at 6:05 o'clock p.m., the Commission recessed, to reconvene at 10:00 o'clock
a.m., Tuesday, February 11, 1986, in open session.)
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PROCEEDINGS
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I would like to call the Commission to order, please.
Yesterday we had a meeting in executive session, at which time the NASA officials and
others produced documents at our request, and memoranda, dealing principally with the O-rings
and seals on the booster rockets. They complied fully with the request that we made and were
very forthcoming in discussing all aspects of it that we were able to discuss at the meeting.
This morning we will start the meeting with officials fro,_ NASA, particularly dealing with
the matter of seals on the booster rockets. And I would like as much as possible tc limit our
discussions today to that one subject matter.
We will attempt to advise the press of our plans as they are formulated, so that you can
plan your own schedules. We are contemplating at the moment tomorrow having a day off, hope-
fully to get a little better organized and getting our staff organized. On Thursday, we plan to go
to Kennedy and probably stay over Friday in order to see the facilities, discuss with the NASA
officials all aspects of the launch, and to be available to have presented to us any other matter
that
595
NASA feels would be appropriate.
During that time we will have informal discussions with people. We expect those will not be
open sessions, because physically it is impossible. We may divide into subcommittees or we may
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hare _,,divutu:d _nter_lews. but we w_ll keep you advised about that We would hope at that
_Irl_o. kt'_*_.)lI_ Ill rilltld that we are _mn,g to focus today on tile seals of the booster rockets, we
-,_,u!,t h,,p*' .it that tlctlt' that NASA will be. in a positim_ to show us and to show tb.e media more
,,f the p_,'tur_'e ,_f the t!i_ght _tself
.\r<t .llso. "ve b..)pe that we w,ll be, _tbLe to _et some more infecrnation about telemetry and
mea.*urem,'nts that ,,re be,ng studied now. We want to do this in a way that will not be intru-
,_,, ,,, tar as the it_est|_atlons _drlder way are concerned, but we want to get as much informa-
tL,.,n as quickly as we possibly can
laI,'r on -and I'm not sure when. probably next week--we -a'ill have meetings, either in
executive ._sit)n or cio,_ed meetings, dealing with the problems involving the weather and all of
the weather-related problems, _nd we will take testimony from the Thiokol people and from
NASA oftScials and ,;et information about meetings that were held prior to the launch, all as-
_,ct._ of the weather ,and how the weather might have related to
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the launch
So teday we will ,:;tart with NASA officials, and first I would like to ask Dr. Graham, the
:\c_i|',g Administrator of NASA. t;: take the stand and address the Commission.
597
STATEMENT OF DR. GRAtlAM. ACTING ADMINISTRATOR OF NASA
DR (;RA[IAM: G(_ mornieg. Mr, Chairman. Do you wish to swear me in or shall I pro-
ceed )
('IIAIRMAN R(XIERS: No, you have been sworn in. Yc'u may proceed.
DR. GRAHAM: Thank you.
Mr. ('hairman, members of the Pre'_idential Commission on the Challenger Accident: i
would like to assure you that NASA is continuing to review the facts and circumstances sur-
rounding the acmdent that occurred ,_eith the Challenger.
As NASA cor_tinues to ar:alyze the system design and data, a,s I said at the meeting last
Thursday. you can be ce_ain that NASA will provide you with its complete cooperation. In
keeping with that, we I_,_.ve implemented several r_rocedures.
One of them i._ _,_at all NASA testimony that is Wen to the Commission will be reviewed on
a word by wo,'_i basis by a knowledgeable NASA technical review team. Should any error, par-
tial. or ir complete statement, or potentially misleading statement be found in che testimony, an
am,_aclment to the testimony will be filed in order to c!arif}" the issue of concern. That will cer-
tainly be called to your attention.
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In addition to that. the NASA policy concerning the release of material is that NASA is
making available to the Commission and then to the press and the public all information related
to the tests that we have in NASA reviewed and which we find to be reasonably factual and not
grossly misleading. We will continue that policy and, while I am sure that there will be concerns
on NASA's part and as well as eta;ewhere over the time it takes to review some of this mass of
informat:on, to pull it together, and to provide it in a form that can be distributed to the press,
nevertheless we are making very, very substantial efforts to have that information available to
you and then subsequently to the public as quickly as we possibly can.
128
baT.; _
Do you have any questions, Mr. Chairman. concerning that, betore l go on to introduce the
next speaker"
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Yes. I would Like to have a discussion with you about "_hat first. Are
there many confidential or classified documents among the documents in your possession?
DR. GRAHAM: There are ver:_ few that we have tound to date. Mr. Chairman, _hat are of a
national security" naturo that are classified.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: So you will be able to make
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,_11the documents available, in the final analysis, to the public?
DR. GRAHAM: Within the constraints of the law, either constraints concerning national se-
curity issues or constraints concerning technical export er transfer, we may have to exercise
some discretion on a very, very small set of the documents. But in general, and certainly the
vast bulk of the intbrmation, the relevant material and the data will be released to the public.
And of course, all data is accessible to the Commi_ion.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Now, there is no feeling on the part of NASA that the work of the
Commission is in any way interfering with the disclosure of information, I hope?
DR. GRAHAM: No, sir. In fact, the work of the Commission is very much in accord with the
work that NASA is undertaking and conducting internally, and we find these to be in general
complementary.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: In fact. you asked me to have this public session today in order to
make it clear that NASA was not trying to brush anything under the rug, isn't that right?
DR. GRAHAM: Yes, sir. [ suggested to you that you consider having a public session today
on
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specific characteristics of the SRB's, the solid rocket ,.:,,:osters, a_d any other matters you saw fit
to question the NASA officials concerning.
CHAIRMAN ROGEP_'_: I assume that there are thousands and thousands of documents that
you are now considering for purposes of the investigation and for purposes of this Commission, is
that right?
DR. GRAHAM: Yes, sir, a large number of internal documents that we have in review and
consideration. We plan to release to the press today at the conclusion of this discussion the ma-
terial that will be presented to you or is being presented to you today. And then tomorrow
NASA wilt have a press briefing, and at that time we plan to release the entire bulk of the
material that was released and presented to the Commission yesterday.
The amount of that material alone is a stack probably close to three inches high, and that is
just a small part of the total data that we are reviewing and preparing for transmission to you
and to release.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: In light of the memorandum which has appeared in the press, writ-
ten by Mr. Cook to Mr. Davis--and incidentally, those gentlemen are here today and will appear
and testify--I assume that there are a lot of other documents of that nature, which make
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suggestions about how matters should proceed, pointing out ri_:ks that were involved in
launches, et cetera, is that correct?
DR. GRAHAM: Yes, sir. In any highly sophisticated technical operation such as the oper-
ation of the space shuttle system, there has to be a continuing dialogue within the agency that is
responsible for operating it concerning the performance of the system, the characteristics, how
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well _-,._ design is behaving in comparison with the operational data and the design expectation
of the system.
All that is being constantly cross-checked and reviewed and re-analyzed, and you will find
that there is a substantial volume of information that documents that process inside NASA, and
we will make that available to you as soon as we have a chance to accumulate it and put it
together in a ibrm tl',at is comparable.
CttAIRMAN ROGERS: The point I'm making is it's not unusual in an agency like yours to
have employees make critical comments, suggest dangers that might be involved in the program.
That is the way the system works, isn't it':
DR. GRAHAM: Yes, sir, It is very, very important, in fact, for the system to work to be
somewhat
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self-critical, and in the process of operating these systems to constantly review the issues, the
engineering decisions, the performance. That internal self-criticism is in fact one of the strongest
characteristics of NASA and one of the things that makes it in my view such a high quality
technical operation.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And it may very well be that there will be a lot of other memoranda
that appear in the press that neither you nor we know about? That would not be unusual at all,
would it?
DR. GRAHAM: I wouldn't be in the least bit surprised if other issues come forward as we
proceed through this review process.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And if we lOCUS today on, to some extent on seals and O-rings and
memoranda that are written by Mr. Cook and others dealing with that subject, the fact that we
!bcus on it doesn't mean that that is the only area of concern as far as you're concerned or as far
as the Commission is concerned, is that right'?
DR. GRAHAM: No, sir, it is not the only area where we will find memoranda expressing
engineering issues and engineering concerns. And it certainly doesn't mean that the NASA in-
ternal analyses has singled out any one area at this point--the O-rings, the seals, the field joints,
or any other specific are_---
6O3
as a unique source of concern and analysis.
We are still looking across a broad range of issues to try to establish what actually occurred
in the Challenger accident.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Very well. Then the Commission will try in an orderly way to con-
sider each one of those aspects, so at the end of our deliberations we will have a complete record
of all of the docurr.ents in your possession and a complete record of the pictures and telemetry
and all other aspects of it, that will help us make a judgment.
And I thank you very much for this colloquy. Maybe other members of the Commission
might want to ask some questions.
DR. FEYNMAN: I wanted to say that there's as aspect of trying to figure out exactly what
happened, in that first something looks obvious. Then, it is 1he experience of Commissions who
have looked into accidents that what looks obvious at first turns out later to have a little flaw,
and, when you make a long list of things that are out of the ordinary, that are called anomalies,
you discover that there is something that doesn't quite fit, and then the theory has to be com-
pletely changed.
So that kind of work we don't want to have to drag the public through. We're thinking of
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possibility A. possibility B, possibility C, and as we go through all of theso things all the newspa-
pers are always saying, now they think it is this, now they think it is that.
We don't know what it is. and we would like to investigate that 9hysical question, [ should
hope. if it is at all possible, without the public directly, and then we can give a complete report.
But when we are discussing this particular matter, it doesn't imply that this is what was the
cause of the accident, but as an example the kind of thing that we have to investigate.
I don't think you should conclude that we know that this is dmctly related or whether it is
or it isn't directly related, Certainly it is information we have to have to the actual accident.
DR. GRAHAM: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I think there is one other aspect that deser_'es some comment at this
point. Usually in investigations of this kind, you find that the press is not very knowledgeable
on the suoject and therefore the reporting is not very accurate. It seems to me that in this case
the reporting has been quite fair and accurate on the part of the press, partly because they
know a lot about it and they have followed it very closely.
605
And so I hope that we don't develop any friction between tile media and NASA and this
Commission, because we are all working to the same end. And as far as I can tell up to date, it
has been a very fair process on the part of the media, and I hope we can cooperate with them in
all ways to deal with this very difficult and tragic accident, which is of such importance to the
nation.
All right, Doctor, you may proceed.
DR. GRAHAM: Thank you. Mr. Chairman. And that is certainly our intention, to proceed in
just that manner.
I would like to now introduce the Associate Administrator for Space Flight, Mr. Jesse
Moore. Mr. Moore plans, directs, and executes the development, acquisition, testing, and oper-
ation of all elements of the space transportation system within NASA and, as I mentioned last
week, he has also been named as the director, the new director of the Johnson Space Flight
Center at Houston.
Mr. Moore.
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STATEMENT OF JESSE W. MOORE, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR SPACE FLIGHT,
NASA
MR. MOORE: Mr. Chairman and members of the Presidential Commi_ion:
What I would propose to do today is to give you a short status report of what my task force
is doing and the areas we are focusing in on, and then I would like to call on the project manag-
er of the solid rocket booster from the Marshall Space Flight Center to discuss with you and
members of the Commission the solid rocket booster aspects and to try to address some of the
issues that have been raised before the public here and to let you, as well as the public, know
what actions have been taken with the solid rocket booster and what its functions are and so
forth.
So that is kind of the agenda that I plan to cover this morning.
(Viewgraph.) IR,'r. 2 l i.i I
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I would {;ke to*a_ a" the our, set that I think the discussion nat you and Dr Graham had
[,.Iv_ .l very _o,.)d tourldation fer the type of work we're conducting m our task force. We plan to
cooperate v_,rv fully wi:h the ('ommissioc, and provide the data to the Commission as required.
As you [r:d_c:lted .uld [)r (;raham indicated.
_it17
there is ',in enormous amount of data that is available on all aspects of the space __huttle. and we
will pull and are pulling all relevant documents together related to the 51-L tragic accident.
On February 5th, Dr. Graham formed a data analysis design task three on the 51-L mission
incident I am chairing that task force.
!View_raph)])',) -' i l zi
This was a transition from an interim mishap board that I had been chairing previously,
and we're in the process now of formally establishing our charter and our membership. We had
our first organization meeting at the Kennedy Space Center yesterday. I was obviously unable to
attend, but the group is meeting, and we are preparing a list of and setting up a group of panels
to address specific areas associated with the space shuttle 51-L mission incident.
We are plannin_ to include on our panels, as well as the overall task force, members not
only from NASA. but members from the outside to address specific areas of expertise as far as
this overall incident is concerned.
Where we are taday is we are continuing our salvage operations to try to find as much phys-
ical evidence as we possibly can that would allow us to piece
(;OS
together the set of' circeinstances that caused the 51-L tragedy.
IViewgraph.) llt,,i -' l i :;l
In the area of data analysis, which is one of the most complex areas to try to look at, our
primary concentration is to try to reconstruct a mission events time line. and this time line will
tell us in great detail zhe sequence of events that went on from launch until the incident hap-
pened, some 70-plus seconds later.
We are looking at photographic data, and you mentioned that earlier in your opening com-
ments. We will share some of that data with you in Florida on Thursday, and we are also trying
to understand what load effects might have been applied to Challenger's launch, meaning there
are different forces chat we don't understand that happened during the trajectory: Were there
any unusual set of circumstances happening prior to launch that we need to know about?
And our eftbrts are aimed at trying to get what I'd call an integrated load picture of what
the flight looked like during ,,re-launch as well as during its ascent.
And you mentioned weather. Weather is certainly an issue that we're going to be working
very
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hard and are working very hard to try to understand what effects, if any, the weather played.
We will be looking at temperature effects. We will be looking at wind conditions, not only sur-
tare wind conditions but upper atmospheric wind conditions, as well as moisture conditions, rain
content, and so forth.
All these will be looked at in very great detail, and we will be happy to discuss weather
activities with you and the Commission at your discretion,
CttAItlMAN ROGERS: On that subject, i,. preparation for hearings it would be useful if we
had a scenario worked out of conferences and -oeotings and discussions, so that we can have a
narrative form of what happened, in addition to all of the weather data itself.
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MR M(._)RE: I presented to you and the Commission. l guess last week when we had the
public hearing, that there were a number of mission meetings held in the chronology of this
laurch. We will _o back. and are doing it right now, expanding that chronology, so we will be
able to talk to you and the Commission in great detail on the weather aspects associated with
this launch.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Very good.
MR MOORE: In addition to things like
610
weather, loads, and other kinds of effects, it is critical to understand the pedigree of the hard-
ware, how the particular hardware was processed, who handled the hardware, what kind of
safety inspections were performed, and how many times the hardware had been used, and so
tbrth. So these areas are also being looked at in very, very great detail.
There is a very complex procedure set up to apply and reuse hardware from the various
shuttle flights and, as you know, there are two major elements that are reuseable from the shut-
tle flights. The shuttle orbiter certainly is reuseable, as well as the two solid rocket boosters are
reuseable. They are launched and deployed, and we bring those boosters back in, refurbish those
boosters to a certain set of specifications, and then felly those boosters on subsequent missions.
You asked a question of us the other day that I would like to answer. A new set of solid
rocket boosters, flight set, meaning two of them, costs about 65, $66 million, is what a brand new
set costs. A refurbished set costs on the order of 22 to 23, $24 million.
So there is about a factor of three in terms of cost relative to buying new flight sets of SRB's
for
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each flight versus the reusing of these flight sets. And so I thought I would present that piece of
data to you, to answer one of your questions _hat you talked about.
.ktlIllll_'F t'l¢'lllOll[ lilill Is k¢_'l'), illll)_'l:|lll i_ t}li'n I};l|'_i_'!ll;l|" l;|t|l_ch is 11_' I;ttlIl_'h p;J_l. ';']_:s
\\_1'-, lil_' !i|"gl [i1|1_' \vo h:141 1:11111_!1¢_'_t :| llll:--,'gi_l| I_lLl ' 4_1" I_:1_t t{. ()ill' t_l'_'\'i_tls _-I
launches had been on launch pad A at the Cape, and we are clearly spending a lot of time look-
ing at any differences there may be relative to the two launch pads that were used.
We were carrying some cargo on board this flight. We were carrying a Tracking and Data
Relay Satellite system, as well as a Spartan-Halley. We had flown the Tracking and Data Relay
Satellite system and the inertial upper stage before, but we are trying to find out, were there
any unusual circumstances associated with that.
No STS element--and "STS" is "Space Transportation System"--will be left unturned. No
stone will be left unturned. We are not exonerating any aspect of this particular mission as far
as free from either being a cause or an effect from the tragic incident that happened on 51-L.
We are putting together, as has been
612
previously discussed, several of what I would call failure scenarios. These are things that could
go wrong, and we are putting those together across a!l parts of the program. And our job in this
task force is to try to go and prove each of these scenarios did not contribute to this accident,
and we are doing that by analysis and by tests that are being conducted now.
(Viewgraph.) II_,,t. _ I J II
And also by test data that has been previously run in the program. And so that will be a
process we will be going through to discount and to say conclusively that this particular failure
scenario was not a contributor in the 51-L mission incident.
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Jesse. based upon what you told us before, though, you have been
dotn_ that each time. haven't you? I mean. this analysis is not new to 51-L"
MR MOORE: We have {hilure modes and effects analysis tbr all elements of the shuttle.
and that has been done and documented, and we're using tt_ose failure modes and effects analy-
ses that are in the program as starting points tbr the kind oranalysis that we're doing right
now. Mr Chairman.
CtlAIRMAN ROllERS: Good. because we wouldn't want to leave the impression that you're
doing it just
6l:t
because of this accident. Your recorJs indicate you have been doing this on a regular basis,
MR. MOORE: Yes, sir, It ha_ been done since the program, since the start of the program,
as part of the normal analysis of a system like this where you do go through and do deta:iled
failure modes and effects analysis and so forth.
And what we're trying to do is make sure that what has been documented and known and
done in the program is consistent with the postulates that we're putting forward now, that may
have been a cause relative to the 51-L mission.
We are also trying to be very careful and discriminating between cause and effect, and it is
easy to say, here's a picture that shows a piece of information, but that piece of information may
have been the result of some other cause. And so we are trying to be very careful and discrimi-
nating between cause and effect as far as where we are focusing in on the problems with respect
to this accident.
The solid rocket booster is obviously one area that we are focusing very heavily on, and I
will say a little bit more about that, and that is the purpose of our agenda here today, is to try
to tell you and the Commission what we're doing in
614
the solid rocket booster area and some of the potential areas that are of concern relative to the
solid rocket booster.
The external tank is also involved in one or more scenarios as far as potential failure modes
in this whole program, as well as the other elements, as I said earlier, And I would like to em-
phasize to the Commission that we have not exonerated any aspect of the 51-L mission as of
now.
Finally, with respect to the solid rocket booster, we are looking at things like design specifi-
cations, materials that are used, the manufacturing process that was used, how the system was
stacked and how it was prepared for launch, who was involved, the safety aspects of it, the qual-
ity assurance aspects of it, any photography that we have v_hich closes out the work prior to a
launch, and we do that on a routine basis, take photographs--
(Viewgraph) I'_,'1 _ I I :,l
--of the flight hardware at various stages during its preparation for launch. And we call
those closeout photography. And that data has also been impounded and is being used in our
process of trying to understand what happened.
We're also going to discuss seals. That has
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been a very visible topic lately, and Mr. Mulloy of the Marshall Space Flight Center will go into
a fair amount of detail on seals.
And we're looking at environmental effects. So there is a range of things that we're focusing
on, Mr. Chairman, in our task force, that we will be working and interacting with you and your
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Commission to make sure that all the data that is being generated by our task force is available
to you and you understand that particular data.
And I think a point that was made earlier tbat I would like to just close on before I intro-
duce Mr Mulloy is that. you know. a lot of memos have been written about different concerns
and issues in the program, and those memos, there are hundreds and thousands of those kinds of
memos throughout the whole program.
Those concerns are looked at by the engineering and the technical analysts in the overall
program. They are thoroughly reviewed its a part of our flight preparation process, which starts
out at the contractor and then goe-_ to the project of|'_ce at a particular center that is responsible
for this. and then goes up to the ,enter management and then <oes to what we call level two
management at the ,Johnson Space
Center. which we described the other day, and then comes to my [eve[.
So there has been a thorough look at all of those elements that are critical to the launch of
a space shuttle. And [ would just like to say that on the solid rocket motor we believe that has
been done as well, and you will hear that from Mr. Mulloy.
And we're also going back and looking at the engines, the tank, and so torth with that same
degree of thoroughness to assure that all of that has been done for those elements as well.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I would like to turn this over, if there are no questions.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Let's see. There may be some questions.
No response.
MR. MOORE: I would like to introduce Mr. Larry Mulloy, who is the project manager of the
solid rocket booster at the Marshall Space Flight Center.
{Witness sworn, t
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TE_I'IM()N_ ()F I,A_,_RENCE B. MII,I,O_'. PR(),IE('T MANA(IER. _Oi,!I) ROCKET
B()O_TER_, MARSllALI, ,_PAI'E F'IIGIlT CENTER, NANA
MR. MULLOY: Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission:
As Mr, Moore has stated. I intend _o give you a briefing on some aspects of the solid rocket
booster assembly, the details of that solid rocket booster, and then concentrate with a bit of in-
formation on how the solid rocket motors are assembled, how they were refurbished, and par-
ticularly on the seals and the joint.
(Viewgraph.) Ira.,. _' I, ,,]
The solid rocket booster is made up of a number of assemblies. The forward assemblies here
are manufactured and refurbished by the United Space Boosters booster production corapany,
and the forward skirt and forward frustum and the nose cone. That assembly contains the elec-
tronic devices and also the recovery system for the solid rocket boosters. It has three main para-
chutes, a drogue parachute, a pilot parachute, in that assembly, which does return the booster to
the ocean, where it is retrieved by retrieval ships, brought back to the Kennedy port for disas-
sembly, and returned to the manufacturer for refurbishment.
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The aft assembly, which is known as the aft skirt, which is the hold-down point for the total
shuttle system, is also manufactured and refurbished by the United Space Boosters booster pro-
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ductioncompany,andthen the centersectionhereis the solidrocketmotor,which is the pri-
maryareaof interestthat wehaveheretoday.
Thesolidrocketmotorconsistsof four castingsegments.Eachof thosecastingsegmentsis
about24feetlong.Theboosteris 146inchesin diameterThecastingsegmentitself is madeup
of twotanksegmentsandjoinedbya factoryjoint.
Whenthe motorsare castat Thiokol,they are then shippedby rail car to the Kennedy
SpaceCenter, where they are assembled into the shuttle stack. This center factory joint here .is
covered with the insulation that is inside the motor. There is an insulation, then a liner, mid
then the propellant.
The end joints or the field joints are metal joints with a tang and clevis that I will describe
in more detail, and sealed with two Viton O-rings. When the boosters are recovered and re-
turned to the Kennedy Space Center and disassembled, there is a very thorough inspection done
of those assemblies immediately after retrieval
619
Steps are taken to preserve the hardware, as you will see in this model or this section, out
of flight hardware that I will show of an actua! section of the joint. The D-6 steel material is;
very susceptible to corrosion, so immediate steps are taken to wash down that metal and apply
grease to protect the joints particularly from any corrosion.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Mulloy, could you as much as possible relate what you are
saying to 51-L?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: How many retrievals were made'?
3,11{. MII.I.( ¢1: 'l'lk*' ill) n_'R I1_'111>, ,_1| 7,1 1.. l lw ri_hl tla,l_t i_,u,_.lcl. It1_, alll :.t,gtnwt!t It:at tu'_,tl t>,
1'(1 1\ _, i('('. _)111'(' ill :t 11",1 Ill(lll)l' ;ln(I (HI((' ill ;| I'lit_ lll(fl'q'. ']'h(' _lll ((,lll_,l -,_'<ltl(q Jlatlt })1,('11 t1_,(,(1
(Jill(,. \l_l, ]lil\(, II_q'_l ",('R Ill'Ills |111 I(I l',)lll ll]ll( '_,
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And is there data on how each segment was handled, both in re-
trieval and in Utah'?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir. There is a complete record of the inspection results immediately
after retrieval. Then when the booster segments are returned by ra}! car to the Wasatch Divi-
sion of Morton Thiokol, there is--the process that goes through is a washout, initial washout
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of the remaining insulation material, then a grit blast, and the amount of material removed
with that grit blast to take the paint and remaining insulation off is measured and recorded.
There is a detailed inspection then made for cracks, surface blemishes, and dimensionai tol-
erances, and a structural analysis made to assure that that is acceptable. Then that segment is
put back into what we call a hydroproof test, where we apply 112 percent of the maximum oper-
ating pressure that that segment has to sustain in the next flight.
Subsequent to that hydroproof test then there is what is called a magnetic particle inspec-
tion made of the case segment, to assure that there aren't any flaws that are not visible to the
naked eye. And then that segment is put back through processing.
One of the critical things in the acceptance of that .segment is a dimensional check to assure
that particularly the mating joint, the tang on one end and the clevis on the other, is within the
dimensional tolerances for new hardware. Reused hardware has no different tolerances than
new hardware.
We do have a procedure whereas a hardware that doesn't precisely meet the drawing speci-
fication can be dispositioned by material review boards or a waiver can
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mh,. '.<l,,d ()n .... f rh,, !hin)4_ ti_at i_ beln)4 inv_,_tuaated, of course, for 7,1.[. ! if" any of those things
appl!,.,t _,, ,:n_ ,ff the .e_ment._ _,n ! ,"_. -',!.I, vehicle'.
|',, t_,_ k[,,,_ l.d_,. :Ill o" the nar, lware in tee sohd rocket motor on 51-L met all of the re-
}tllt't'H'lt'fll",_ [_H" ;1_'_, h,lrd_are
DR RII)E tJa_e v,_u ,._er r.covered an_ t)t" the solid ._e_ments that didn't nleet the criteria
MR MI'I.I,()Y I believe _r'i ST%:, either 1 or 2--and perhaps Bil! Lucas may remember--
th,.r_. _a.,_ ,m,' -_,_ament, duo to the _plashdown loads and cavity collapse Ioads--I would point out
tt at t,,ere are _tiffener._ The._e tin;as that you see back here on the aft segment are stiffener
_tu_. I r_,lu, ve my recollection is that we added an additional stiffener into the segment to pre-
clude th.' h_ of the aft se_'ment.
A,_d I d_ b_eheve that in the early tlights one or two segments had gotten outside of dimen-
_,,mal tol,,rance_ and could not Ix. reaL_ed.
."ilnce .¢,T.¢,-3,which i._ when [ to()k over the program, we have had no Ices of segments due to
t'l_h_ h_ad,_ or _pL'_._hdown load._
I)R Rll)E |k., you X-ray any of thorpe segments?
MR .MI'I.I.OY Y_._ The segments are X.rayed ira
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l'rah In rh,, tnltklt ._tage._ of the protrram, there was fiR) percent X-ray, i00 percent to the
e_tent that you can get to l_}l) percent X-ray of a large structure like this The maximum possi-
ilte Xra> _a': d, me ,m all ,,f the -tevelopment qualification motors, and through a period up
thrm_gh th,, first ._ flight sets. to assure that our" process that we had in place was producin :
re_,,tt,tble product
We r_,,ver f-u_d any problems a.a a result of X-ray, and what we are doing right now is a
per_odtc X-r,L', to aasure that the process controls that we have ie _,iace f_r the propellant, liner,
and _n_ulatmn. that we're no_ getting outside our experience on that.
And _o _,_,,ntu_lly, what we're doing ril_ht now is X-raying about one segment a month on a
• _ilrn plintg ba._i._
VI('E ('tlAIRMAN ARM,qTRON(;: Anything other than K-ray? Ultrasound or NMR or
,_ther appr_mc he_ u_ed ?
MR ._IUI,I,OY: Ye'_. attra,_ound is used. and visual in,%aecttons, part_ ularly visual inspec-
tmn_ ol the end of the ,_elgrnents. wl_ere you can determine whether there i_ any de-bond of the
_,rl*tl[ilti,)n to the liner or the insulation to the case wall.
I)R RIDE What percentage of the _egments is
_;23
,m.._'ilment per month'?
MR, MULI,OY: Well, of court,, at the rate we've been going now, at a rate of 12 per year,
we are castin_ eight ,,_elaments per month, and so it is one of eight, essentially.
_IR. WALKER: }lave you X-rayed any recovered segntents?
MR. MULLOY: No. there has been no X-ray of the recovered segments. There is nothing
there but the steel. We do not do an X-ray of the steel. We do a _urface dye penetrant inspection
_I"that _teel ._,grnent and a proof te,_*.
('tIAIRMAN RO(;ER.R: ,qo you will have a history, a full history of these two booster rockets
th,,t w,.re on 31-[,"
MR. ,MUI,I,OY: Ye,_, ,_ir.
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS. Has there been anything that's come to your attention that was un-
usual about the two boosters on 51-L?
MR. MULLOY: No, sir. In going through--and I will cover the readiness review process that
we went through--there is nothing that is in any of the records that I have reviewed that is
unique about the boosters on 5I-L.
DR. RIDE: What kind of effect would you
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expect from the corrosion on particularly the O-rings and the putty'? I gnJess what I'm interested
in is, if you recover the solids from 51-L do you expect to learn anything about the O-rings and
the putty and the joint, or do you expect corrosion?
MR. MULLOY: What we are particularly interested in--and perhaps I should get into the
details on the joint here. From a corrosion aspect, the primary concern for corrosion--and let me
turn this in the flight direction here. The primary concern for corrosion is in the sealing sur-
faces of where the O-rings, which are these two black 280 thousandths diameter devices you see
in these grooves here.
We are particularly cor_cerned for pitting that may be inside of that sealing surface, because
a pit obviously can provide a path for hot gas to get by the O-ring.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Could you describe what you're holding?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir. What we have here is a section from an actual solid rocket motor.
The bottom section is the upper portion of one of the casting segments. The black on the inside
is the propellant insulation.
The piece on the top is what is called the
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tang end of a motor seg nent. This is the field joint. It also is the factory joint, case to case. A,_ !
mentioned, two of these 12-foot segments go together to make one casting segment, and that is
what goes to Kennedy for assembly.
On the factory joint, there is no discontinuity in this insulation, because the insulation is
applied after the joint is made. So you have insulation over this joint.
On the field joint, however, there is this discontinuity in the insulation, since you have to
put it together at KSC, at the Kennedy Space Center. And this gap between the insulation is
filled with a zinc chromate asbestos-filled putty. That putty is laid up in strips prior to assembly.
We use strips of putty that are e__ghth inch and quarter inch thick and an inch to an inch
and a half wide, to lay that putty up in a precise drawing pattern such that we are sure that the
putty, when laid into this joint, does not extrude outward, but you have a good fill of the putty
between the insulation surfaces, but that it does not extrude down into the O-ring gap such that
it would tend to unseat the O-ring.
These O-rings in here are Viton rubber, provided by Parker Seals, and they are, as I say,
about
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280 thousandths in diameter, and there are two of these at each one of the joints on the vehicle.
The assembly is done in this position, with the tang end up and--excuse me, with the clevis end
up and the tang end down.
Looking on this side, you see a pin that is a one-inch pin that is a high strength steel, that
there are 177 of those pins in a joint. That provides the structural integrity of the joint.
You also see what looks like a little clip here on the outboard leg of the clevis. That is a 82
to 36 thousandths of an inch shim. The purpose of that shim is to assure that we have a con-
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trolled dimension on the outer leg of the tang to--the outer leg of the clevis to the tang, to maxi-
mize the O-ring compression or the squeeze on these O-rings between this inboard tang, the in-
board leg of the clevis and the tang.
MR. HOTZ: When do you get that squeeze?
MR. MULLOY: On assembly.
MR. HOTZ: You don't get it during launch?
MR. MULLOY: Sir?
MR. HOTZ: Do you get it during launch?
;)_R MULLOY: Yes, sir. The design is to assure that you maintain that compression during
launch, such that, the way these seals operate is it is a
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pressure-actuated seal, that you want compression on the seal such that when the motor pres-
sure is applied to the seal that the seal will extrude into the gap downstream of the pressure
and provide the pressure seal.
MR. HOTZ: Is there any particular phase of launch when that pressure is the strongest?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir. We go from zero up to the maximum pressure in about 900 millisec-
onds, and so it is instantaneous. And then we hold that max pressure for 20 seconds. And I will
show you a pressure profile later in the briefing.
And then that pressure drops down to about 600 pro, and then it ramps back up slightly, and
then you go into the thrust t_iloff at approxivoately two minutes into the flight. And I do have a
profile of that in the briefing.
DR. RIDE: Could you describe the corrosion on the joint?
MR. MULLOY: Yes. You can see the corrosion. What it amounts to is pitting in the metal,
and so you see the corrosion that is on the outside of this piece here, is what we don't want to
have inside the O-ring groove. That is why we take extra precaution to assure that we immedi-
ately preserve that hardware, because when we get it back i*_has been in the sea water
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for perhaps 30 hours longer with rough sea.
DR. RIDE: What about corrosion of the pi-*tty and O-ring? Is that a problem?
MR. MULLOY: Corrosion? Extrusion of the putty?
DR. RIDE: No, I think what I really want to know is how does the sea water affect the O-
ring and the putty. "Corrosion" is the wrong word, but do you expect to find the O-ring intact
when it has been in the sea water ibr a long time?
MR. MULLOY: Oh, yes. And we also find the putty intact. And as we have shown you in the
data that we have presented to the Commission, where we have all of the data about our experi-
ence with this joint post-flight, you can clearly see the putty is still there in the joint. You can
clearly se, hot gas paths through the putty, and you can see very clearly " _y erosion that has
occurred to the primary O-ring, and that is definitely attributed to the flight motor operation
and not any effects of sea water.
DR. FEYNMAN: Can I ask a few questions in succession to help explain h_,w this thing
works?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir.
DR. FEYNMAN: This rubber thing that is put in, the so-called O-ring, that is supposed to
expand to
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make contact with the metal underneath so that it makes a seal, is that the idea?
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MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir. In the static condition it should be sealed to--it should be in direct
contact with the tang and the clevis of the joint, and be squeezed 20 thousandths of' an inch.
DR. FEYNMAN: And if it weren't there, if it weren't in contact at all and there was no seal
at all, that would be a leak. Why don't we take the O-rings out?
DR. FEYNMAN Pushing the putty through, and so on'?
MR. MULLOY: Yes. You will always push the putty through, because the motor pressure is
900 psi nominally, 1,000 psi at max, and that putty will sustain about 200 psi.
DR. FEYNMAN: Now, we couldn't put instead of this some sort of material like lead, that
when you squash it it stays? It has to be that it expands back, because there is a little bit of play
in this joint and it has to be able to come back. I mean, it is a rubber material, so that it comes
back when you move a little, and it stays in contact, is that right?
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MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir, that is the purpose of the putty, as a thermal barrier, a thermal
barrier. In the data that we have presented to the Commission, as you noted yesterday, we have
looked at other alternatives, some of those alternatives are things like--
DR. FEYNMAN: I'm talking about the rubber on the seal?
MR. MULLOY: I'm sorry?
DR. FEYNMAN: In the seal, in order to work correctly, it must be rubber, not something
like lead?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir.
DR. FEYNMAN: Because when the seal moves a little bit when there is vibration and pres-
sures, it would lift the lead away, which the rubber expands in place?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir.
DR. FEYNMAN: So it is important that it have this property of expansion and not be plas-
tic, like lead. And I think you call that resilience, right?
MR. MULLOY: That is correct. It has to have resiliency, and that is why we use, an elasto-
reeF.
DR FEYNMAN: If this material weren't resilient for say a second or two, that would be
enough to be a very dangerous situation.
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir.
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DR. FEYNMAN: Thank you.
MR. MULLOY: if it was rigid.
MR. HOTZ: Mr. Mulloy, could you tell us whether the shim that you have put in here to
damp out some of the vibration is an original design consideration, or is that something you
added as a result of experience?
MR. MULLOY: That was added. It has been on since the first flight vehicle. It was added as
a result of experience during the early development testing on the motor. It is not for the pur-
pose of damping vibration. It is for the purpose of assuring a uniform gap on the outside and
maximum squeeze on the O-ring on the inside.
DR COVERT: Mr. Mulloy, for purposes of my own understanding, I would like to have you
go through the ignition process. And I find that I understand things best if I can feed them back
to you so I want to ask a series of questions, and I will use this as an example.
This gap here is filled with the zinc chromate asbestos putty-like material.
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir.
DR. COVERT: And it's designed to more or less be plastic?
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MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir.
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DR. COVERT: Now, when you pressurize this side of it there is a little volume iv here be-
tween the termination of the putty and where the O-ring lives, is that correct'?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir.
DR. COVERT: And when you pressurize it, then, because the plastic is able to flow, 1" flows
into this gap and compresses the air in that gap until the pressure is equal to the pressure in
the combustion chamber, is that correct?
MR. MULLOY: That is one thing that could happen.
DR. COVERT: Don't confuse me with a lot of alternatives at this point.
[Laughter. ]
DR. FEYNMAN: Why don't you put up the picture two from now, the one called "SRM No.
MR. MULLOY: Would you put chart number three on, please.
(Viewgraph.) tm't. -' II 7 I
DR. COVERT: Now, the point I want to get to at this point is that this O-ring then is sub-
jected to the pressure that is caused by the plastic deforming and helping to fill this little cavity,
and that in turn drives the O-ring into this crack in back of it. That
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is called extrusion, I believe'?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir.
DR. COVERT: And so that is the mechanical joint that carries the pressure seal, is that
correct'?
MR. MULLOY: That is correct.
DR. COVERT: Now, if" there was a flaw of some kind, then what would happen would be,
instead of the plastic deforming and coming into this, then there would be hot gas flowing in a
narrow jet into that cavity, is that right?
MR. MULLOY: ,__flaw in the putty?
DR. COVERT: Yes, sir.
MR. MULLOY Yes, si,:, a flaw in the putty would cause a hot gas jet to impinge on the
primary O-ring.
DR. COVERT: So that would in turn then, that hot gas, would be what would drive the O-
ring and cause it to extrude and carry the pressure load?
MR. MULLOY: The hot gas jet erodes the O-ring, and the pressure rising in the cavity tends
to seat the O-ring.
DR. COVERT: So you have sort of a redundant system, then. The way the design works out
is that there is--if the putty holds, the gas compresses the O-ring and extrudes it into the gap;
and if the putty
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for one reason or another has a flaw in it and a little jet of gas comes in there, there is still a
pressurization in there, and that causes this to be sealed?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir.
DR. COVERT: And the second O-ring then is a backup just for safety purposes'?
MR. MULLOY: It was a backup to make the--to provide a redundant sealing capability.
DR,. COVERT: Thank you very much.
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir.
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MR. WALKER:I havea question about the O-ring. The manufacturer generaliy specifies
the amount of compression on the O-ring by specitking the depth of the O-ring groove. Is the
compression that you get here equal to the amount of" compression recommended for O-rings of"
this diameter?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir. The minimum O-ring compression that we have here is 7.54 per-
cent, and that is within the recommended levels.
MR. WALKER: What was the impact of adding the metal plates which you put at each
place where you have a steel pin? Was that to increase the compression, or what was the exact
purpose of that?
MR. MULLOY: The primary purpose is to assure
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a uniformity of gap, and also then to assure that we would achieve the minimum compression by
pre-shimming that to the 32 thousandths.
MR. WALKER: So are the shims placed on all 177 of the pin locations?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir.
MR. HOTZ: Mr. Mulloy, how are these materials, this putty and the rubber, affected by ex-
tremes of temperature, both hot and cold? Do they change their characteristics at all?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir, there is a change in the characteristic. As elastomers get colder, the
resiliency decreases, and the ability to respond ....
MR. HOTZ: Now, the elastomers are what?
MR. MULLOY: That is the Viton O-ring.
MR. HOTZ: The rubber?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir.
Now, the putties are not as sensitive as the elastomers are to the temperature over the
range of temperatures we operate. Of course, temperature--
MR. HOTZ: How about moisture? Are the putties affected by moisture?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir. And in order to control that, we maintain the putty in a refrigera-
tor and have limits on the time that it can be outside of
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the refrigerator before the joint is mated. What we have tbund, especially at the Kennedy Space
Center, with the putties, that they do tend to take on moisture, and as the putty gets more mois-
ture it becomes extremely tacky and sticky, which makes it very difficult to lay into the joint
and to work with.
And it can take on enough moisture such that the putty loses its ability to hold together. So
we control the humidity that that putty sees prior to installation into the joint until we have the
joint made up.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Was the putty on flight 51-L the same quality putty you used on
other flights?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir, it is the same putty we have been using since STS-8. It is a Ran-
dolph type two putty, zinc chromate with an asbestos filler.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: The same manufacturer?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, that is the manufacturer, Randolph. We did have a change of putty in
the program because the original supplier of the putty, which was Fuller-O'Brien, went out of
making this particular putty because of its asbestos content.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: When was the change made?
MR. MULLOY: STS-8. And somebody could help me with the date on that.
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: How far _ack in terms of number of flights?
MR. MULLOY: This was the twenty-{burth, so 16 flights.
MR HOTZ: Were you considering any further changes in the brand or the _ype of" putty?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir, because asbestos products, of course, people are going out of the
business of making ,_sbestos every day. We were evaluating other pntties. We were looking at a
non-asbestos putty, as well as an Inmont Canada putty, which is asbestos-filled, and we have
done some testing on that in some of our development motors that we have currently in test in
the t_lament wound case program as an alternative to the Randolph putty.
But none of that has been implemented into the program yet.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Is there any reason why you were thinking of changing the putty,
except for the asbestos problem?
MR. MULLOY: That's the only reason, sir, to have another source, not because of any con-.
cerns for the performance of the putty.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Then there is nothing unusual about the putty that was used in 51-L
that you
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want to call to the Commission's attention?
MR. MULLOY: No, sir. not that I'm aware of. As I say, we're looking at all of the records
and the paper to assure that the handling of the putty was as it was supposed to be, that the
joint was mated within 12 hours of the time that the putty was first removed from the storage,
MR. HOTZ: But you did have some very high moisture conditions on the pad just before
launch.
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir. But we haven't seen any indication that, with the exposure of the
putty, as Sally mentioned, even to sea water, we don't see that kind of breakdown in the putty
when we get the hardware back for evaluation, just even after 30 hours in the ocean.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: W_en we go W Kennedy, will we be able to se • how this
putty is applied?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir.
DR. COVERT: Do you throw away the O-rings after each use and put new ones in?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, the O-rings are single use items. You fly new O-rings on each flight.
MR. WALKER: A fairly detailed question. On your diagram, there is a gap at the end of the
inside
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leg of the clevis--I mean, of the tang. The U-shaped device is--I mean at the other end, right
there. Is that gap filled with putty or is that gap air, and the putty extrudes into that gap
during launch, is that correct?
MR. MULLOY: That is air. And as I say, we take precautions to be sure that we hold the
putty back off of here, such that during assembly the putty doesn't extrude down into the O-ring
gap and unseat the O-ring. And yes, under pressure the putty tends to extrude into the gap.
It does not extrude totally into the gap, because, as I say, the putty won't sustain 1,000 psi,
and in almost all instances, rather than the situation that Mr. Covert described, rather than a
uniform decompression of putty, there is usually a breakthrough of the putty up at the 1,000 psi.
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We don't see when we get it back. We see putty getting further down than it was on assem-
bly, but we don't see it extruded all the way into the O-ring gap.
MR. ACHESON: Have you experimented with material as a substitute or alternative to
putty which would tend to fill that groove under high pressure and temperature?
MR. MULLOY: Fill this groove?
MR. ACHESON: Yes, sir.
MR. MULLOY: No, sir, because that is not a desirable situation to have anything that
would fill and get into the O-ring gap at all. We have experimented with materials that are
alternatives to putty which is in the data that I presented to the Commission yesterday, looking
at carbon mesh, wire mesh, and channels that would allow uniform pressurization of the cavity
to eliminate the hot jet impingement that goes through the putty and other alternatives.
At this point, with the testing that we have done over the last year, we have concluded
there is no better alternative than the putty that we are using based on the testing that we have
done.
DR. RIDE: What methods do you have to verify that the putty has been laid properly? Do
you have any
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way of examining it after it has been laid to make sure that there are no air gaps?
MR. MULLOY: It is examined after it has been laid on, and I wish I had a diagram, but you
will see it Thursday at Kennedy as to how that is laid up. But literally, what you do is you just
lay these putty strips directly on the surface, and we use quarter inch strips here and then
eighth inch strips, and they are laid up in a prescribed pattern. It is not an operator option to
put enough putty on there to be sure you fill the gap. It is a drawing, it is controlled and it is
inspected and signed off by quality inspection that the putty strips are installed in accordance
with the procedure, and that procedure is to assure that the putty is laid in tightly onto the
insulation and that you don't have air gaps in there.
And we have shown by tests that that provides the best thermal barrier. We have also
shown when you deviate from that that the thermal barrier is compromised. So we are very,
very careful about how that putty is laid up.
DR. RIDE: Have you had a chance to go back and look at the quality assurance records on
51-L and verify that those were signed off properly?
MR. MULLOY: That is in process now under Mr.
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Moore's Design and Data Analysis Task Force, and that is in process, and hopefully Thursday at
KSC you will be able to see some of the certification of the rereview of those records. All those
records are at KSC where the assembly is made. All of them are under the control of the NASA
investigative board, the interim board, and now the task force. But nothing during the assembly
of 51-L where I get involved in that assembly process, if there is some requirement to deviate
from the requirements that we have for the assembly, then I would get involved in that because
it would require a waiver to deviate from that.
I have checked with my managers and with the contractor at Morton-Thiokol and the man-
ager of the solid rocket motor project who works with me at NASA, and they assure me that
they have no recollection of any deviations being worked in the assembly of 51-L.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Mr. Mulloy, we have had a history of some problems with these O-
rings since about 1980.
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Couldyousummarizethe historyof the erosionproblemsand the blow-byand whenthey
occurred,theconditionsunderwhichtheyoccurred?
MR.MULLOY:Yes,I can.I think it wouldbeuseful,if I may,to proceedthroughthe next
diagram
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andthenmoveintowhatcausesthe erosion,andreview--it isnot in this presentationtoday,but
to reviewwith you thenumbersof instancesthat _e havehadin a summaryfashionthat sum-
marizesthedetaileddatathat I presentedto theCommissionyesterday.
Next chart, please.
(Viewgraph.! Ire," z 11 _1
DR. WALKER: Before you leave that chart, I have one more question.
MR. MULLOY: Go back to Chart 3.
(Viewgraph.) [ref. 2, 11-7 I
DR. WALKER: How wide is the gap between the insulation pieces of the two different sec-
tions where the putty goes?
MR. MULLOY: Let me get those dimensions out of the presentation from yesterday.
The gap size on the field joint varies from .01 down at this narrow sectien here up to .4
inches at the top, and the length of this channel right here is 3.:_ inches.
DR. WALKER: So is the putty just laid into that gap, or is it worked into the gap?
MR. MULLOY: No, the patty is laid on before the joint is assembled. It is laid on to the
surthce here and then assembled in a very precise, precise'y
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controlled pattern to assure that we don't get any voids, or minimize the voids that we have in
the putty.
DR. WALKER: And then it is visually inspected after the joint is made?
MR. MULLOY: Well, you can't inspect it after the joint is made. All you can see is that you
have extruded the putty out of the joint which you would expect to do under the configuration
that we have it in prior to the lay-up. You would expect to see this kind of a bead here. The
inspection is. if you didn't see the putty coming up to here, obviously it wasn't laid up properly.
But the inspection is made prior to pushing the joint together, and we have many, many tests
that assure that if' you lay the putty in that way and then assemble the joint, you will get a fill
with minimum voids.
Let me back up one chart to talk more generally about joints.
Let me have Chart 2, please.
(Viewgraph.) [i¢_f. z, t l-sl
MR. MULLOY: The joint we have been talking about is represented here for these three
field joints. These are the three joints where the four segments are tied together, i_s I men-
tioned, there is an identical joint in each one of these segments which is covered
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with the rubber in the casting process at Thiokol. There is another joint which has erosion histo-
ry on it that is not the case-to-case joint but it is the--where the nozzle is attached to the aft end
of _he solid rocket motor. That configuration is significantly different than the case-to-case joint.
Ana in tLe case joints we have two O-rings in series on the same bore, if you will. On the
nozzle joint it has this right angle sealing surface here, and when the nozzle is inserted, and I
will show you on a bigger diagram, there is an O-ring that is a face seal as well as a bore seal.
S._ let me go to Chart 5, please.
350
tViewgraph.tIm'l -' 11_i
MR. MULLOY:Chart 5 is a largerdiagramof that nozzle-to-casejoint wherewehavealso
experiencedsomeO-ringerosion,and this showsthe two O-rings,this beingthe facesealand
thisbeingthe boreseal.Becausethetolerancesaresomewhattighteron this joil't tnanwehave
on the case-to-casejoint, this O-ringgrooveis somewhatwider than the O-ringgrooveon the
casejoint to assurethat wecanassemblethis nozzleto the casewithoutdamagingthat O-ring.
Now,let memovetbrward.
MR. ACHESON: Let me ask why the tolerances
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are less tight on the field joints?
MR. MULLOY: Well, because the 146 inch diameter that has to be mated to assure that we
don't have any gathering of the material when we mate the joint or puckering, there has to be
somewhat more tolerance in that. This is 103 inch diameter versus 146 inch diameter.
Okay, let me go to the next chart, please, which would be Chart 5.
lViewgraph.) Im,l. z 11 I. I
MR. MULLOY: Or 6.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Excuse me.
Would the television people, is it necessary to have the lights on so bright? It is really intol-
erably hot here.
Is there any way to turn them down a little bit'?
MR. MULLOY: General Kutyna, I am going to get to your summary, if you will allow me. I
would like to give a little precursor to that that I think leads in to how we dealt with those data
relative to 51-L.
And as Mr. Moore has menticned, we do have a very thorough preflight review process for
the solid rocket booster. That preflight review process starts with the recovery of the hardware
from the last flight,
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because we are very sensitive to anything that we see on the last flight that, might pose a consid-
eration that we should have for the flight readiness of the next one. So we have had that oppor-
tunity to go back and do a detailed examination of the hardware from the previous flight prior
to committing to the next one.
The key thing in our flight readiness review is that previous flight performance. We look at
the ballistic performance of the motor, and then particularly any problems from the previous
flight.
Now, we have not had in the solid rocket motor in terms of ascent performance, we have
had no anomalies related to ascent performance in the motor. What we have aeen on recovering
the hardware are some things that would indicate that there are some improvements that could
be made in the design to provide more margin, and the particular point of interest here is the
case joints and the nozzle joints, and particularly the erosion of the O-ring seals. So we have
dealt with that finding on all previous flights in the flight readiness for all subsequent flights,
and 51-L was ne different.
Sometimes as the flight frequency increases we are in a situation where we have something
from two flights back, maybe, that is still under analysis that we, even though we were able to
continue with the
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previousflight, if that isn't closedout, we look at it evenfor the secondflight downstream.
Thereareseveralthingsin theSRBworld that havefit in that category'.Oneof them has been
some damage that we have been getting to rate gyro assemblies just due to the splashdown and
the tow back and the porpoising as we tow the boosters back. We have been trying to work that
problem. That is a reuse issue.
The thing of interest here is what have we seen in the O-rings. Now, the fact is, before 51-L
we hadn't seen any anomalous erosion for about a year. The O-rings had been performing very
well. The last time we had seen any erosion on O-rings was the January launch the year before.
But we were very sensitive to, mainly because of the activity that we've had going on in the last
year to try and improve the margin in that joint, we had been very sensitive to how that was
going on, and we were continuing to look very carefully at the previous flights to assure that
nothing had changed in that area that would change our rationale that we had developed for
continuing to fly in light of the erosion we were seeing on the O-rings.
We considered that in 51-L, and concluded, particularly since we had not seen any signiti-
cant erosion in the last year, and we had no test data that
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changed our rationale, the same rationale then applied for 51-L as it applied to the last year in
the flight readiness review.
Then we looked very carefully at the flight performance requirements for our next flight. In
the case of the solid rocket booster, those performance requirements are in terms of the ballistic
!r,erformance of the motor. And we review the small motor testing that was done at Thiokol to
characterize the ballistic performance of the propellant that is in this particular motor. That
was done in this case.
And then we go through our complete certification and verification status, and this is where
I gained my confidence that there wasn't any kind of a waiver or deviation in the assembly proc-
ess of 51-L because we review all of those at that point in the flight readiness process, and none
are in the record, and I am confident none were brought to my attention.
Next chart, please.
(Viewgraph.) [m.J. 2 J l Ill
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Could I say on that that the only thing you say that you have had a
history of one year's success with the O-rings previous to flight 51-L.
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir.
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: The only thing that might be different or that might affect the O-
rings differently was the weather then?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir, and I am addressing at this point the flight readiness review proc-
ess, and at that point the weather was not a factor, and I will get into the one day prior to
launch consideration of the weather.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Okay. I think we prefer, and i don't want _o di_,-upt y otis p_e_iiga-
tion, but I think we should have a full session just on weather so we can focus on it.
MR. MULLOY: Okay. There are no charts in here on that.
Okay. The levels of review. In the case of the SRB, we do require that our contractors have
a flight readiness review process that covers all of that information, and that is documented.
That is chaired by a Senior Vice President at Thiok_l above the level of the program manager.
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And heusesotherpeopleat the WasatchDivisionwhoarenot on the SRMprojectto do that
flight readinessreview.
Thenmy elementmanagers,I pointedout that I haveessentiallytwo contractorson this.
MR.HOTZ:Couldwehavehisname,please?
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MR.MULLOY:Yes.ThatwouldbeCalvinWiggins.
MR.HOTZ:Howdoyouspellthat?
MR.MULLOY:W-i-g-g-i-n-s.Heis the SeniorVicePresidentin chargeof theSpaceDivision
at Thiokol.Thiokol is organizedinto threedivisions,the SpaceDivision,TacticalandStrategic.
TheSRMprogrammanagerworksfor Mr. Wiggil_s.TheSRMprogrammanageris Mr. Kilmin-
ster.
MR.HOTZ:Howdoyouspellthat?
MR.MULLOY:K-i-l-m-i-n-s-t-e-r.
MR.HOTZ:First name?
MR.MULLOY:Joseph.
Thenmy elementmanagersthengo throughthat samereviewprocessat a minutelevelof
detail,andI think whenthe flight readinessreviewproceedingsarepresentedto the Commis-
sion,youwill find that thereis a greatdealof detail reviewedrelativeto theconfigurationand
theperformancepredictedfor theparticularsolidrocketmotorthat is goingto fly.
And thenI chair a reviewwith seniormanagersat the MarshallSpaceFlight Centerin the
ScienceandEngineering Directorate there where my element managers and contractors present
that to me. I am then required to review that with the manager of the Shuttle Projects
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Office at Marshall and then we have a center review with Dr. Lucas which includes all of the
elements of the Marshall Space Flight Center, and that is a very thorough review. And then the
level 2 National Space Transportation System manager reviews the flight readiness, still using
the same agenda, the same agenda items in every one of these.
And then Mr. Moore, who is the Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight has the
level 1 review. And then one day before launch what we call now L minus 1, we used to do it L
minus 2, but la_ely it is L minus 1, the level 1 has a review to assure launch readiness, and the
purpose of that review is to assure that nothing has changed in the two weeks since they had--
Mr. Moore had his level 1 flight readiness review. Any deltas that occur are then presented to
that board.
I can give you one example of where nothing was presented relative to the solid rocket
baoster until we got to the L minus 2 day review, and that was because we were at a frequency
of flight that we did not get a look at the joint between the nozzle and the case joint until after
the level 1 review, and you will find in the record that at the L minus 2 day review I presented
the details of our observation there and the rationale for
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flight for that.
And then m the case of 5i-L. up Lhruu_h ....tiic L i_,_intIs 1........d2y .... i_,L,, na..............ranoarn_ regarding
SRM joint O-ring erosion were expressed during any of that process.
Now, I would like to get into what the basis for that was at that time. If you will go to, I
guess it is Chart 7--next chart, or Chart 8--
(Viewgraph.) Im,l. 2 i i 12]
353
MR. MULLOY:--ourexperiencewhenwewerelookingat 514,that wewerelookingat--
andthis is a summaryof the detailedintbrmationthat wasprovidedto theCommissionyester-
day-our experiencewas that prior to 51-Lwe had elevenstatic:test motorsand 48 flight
motors.Thefield andnozzlejoints of those57motorshadbeenexaminedwhichrepresentsome
288joints with 456O-rings,andthis isa summaryagainof thedetaileddata.Sixof the 171field
jointsexhibitedsomeerosionoftheprimaryO-ring.
Now,if I may,I wouldlike togoto Chart 10 and then come back to this one.
(Viewgraph.) II_,.,. 2 !l l:_I
MR. MULLOY: I think it is helpful when we say some erosion, what kind of mechanism we
are talking about there. This is the nominal configuration I have
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already shown you where we have zero pressure in the motor and we are ready for ignition. We
have these two O-rings in here which are specified to have a 20/1000 inch minimum compression
such that when they are called upon to do so, the primary O-ring can be extruded into this gap
and form a seal.
If it did not have the compression on it, the gas--and I will show you a scenario there that
does that--the gas can blow by the primary O-ring, and it will never seat. So you have to have
that compression, and we are sure we have that from the dimensions of the clevis and the tang
in the steel, and assuming a minimum O-ring with--and some compression set in that O-ring, to
account for the resiliencies that it has to follow the metal as it expands.
Now, as the motor is pressurized, and if I may take that down for a moment and bring up
Chart 9--
IViewgraph.) In¢,'t 2 I I _lj
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MR. MULLOY:--this is a typical pressure time trace. Full pressurization of the motor from
time zero occurs in 600 milliseconds, .6 second. And then we are up here at the maximum pres-
sure, operating pressure, nominally 900. It is qualified for 1004, but 900 is the nominal operating
pressure, and we stay there tbr about 20 seconds, and then we have a thrust tail-off to limit the
G forces on the Shuttle vehicle to 3 Gs, and this thrust profile is designed to do that in conjunc-
tion with the throttling of the engines to such that we don't exceed a 3 G load on the vehicle.
And then at about 50 to 60 seconds, we start ramping back up again, and that is what this
bar indicates. And so there are two times in the motor operation when the motor is increasing
in pressure, and that is in the first 600 milliseconds, and in the 50 to 75 second timeframe.
So what is going on in this first 600 milliseconds, if I may go back now to the previous chart,
Chart 10--
(Viewgraph.) IR_'f. 2 11-13]
MR. MULLOY:--the nominal situation, and I pointed out to you that only six of 171 have
exhibited any erosion, and so the other 165 of them performed as you see in this diagram here,
which is the intended function
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of this joint.
Two things happen with that motor pressurization. The additional tension loads are put into
the case due to the pressure. The 1000, getting up to that 1000 psi tends to want to pull this joint
apart. That pulling on these pins then tends to rotate this clevis outward as you pull with ten-
sion load on the pins. The other thing that is happening is the outward pressure on the motor is
tending to want to expand the motor more out here in the membrane area of the case than it is
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in the stiffer joint section,whichfurther tendsto causea rotationof this clevis upward, which
tends to reduce the initial squeeze on the O-ring.
Well, what has happened in 165 of the 171 cases, when this O-ring was caF.ed upon to exer-
cise itself, it did so by extruding into this primary groove. You see no erosion on the O-ring You
don't see any soot biow by the O-ring, and the secondary has not even been energized because
the primary has done what it was designed to do.
Any questions about that?
MR. HOTZ: Could you describe the rotation again? i am not quite clear on that.
MR. MUI_.LOY: Okay, sir. The motor is at zero
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psi, zero pressure. We come up in 600 milliseconds to 900 psi. So there are two things that that
case is wanting to do. It is wanting to expand outward due to that pressure, and it is also want-
ing to expand longitudinally. The longitudie'_l load pulling on that pin tends to want to rotate
that clevis. In other words, if you ca' visualize, if you pulled on that long enough to fail it, the
clevis would open up until the tang d pulled out of there.
The other thing that is happening is that that joint is much stiffer. It is like having a belly
band, if you will, around a balloon, a belt around a balloon. Now you blow up the balloon, or say
an elastic belt around the balloon. Now you blow up the balloon, the balloon will expand more
where the elastic belt is than where it isn't. And so you get this exaggerated shape like that
which further tends to rotate the joint.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: What holds the pin in place?
MR. MULLOY: The pit; is held in place by a metal strap. After all the pins are put in, there
is a metal strap that is put around the pins and cinched down just like a container strap mecha-
nism, and then that is closed out with cork. A quarter inch of cork is put around that just over,
just over this section of the
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clevis, and that cork is there to assure that during ascent, since *he heat _,ink of that band is
,'nucb less than the heat sink of this whole mass here, if we got any aerodynamics under that
band, that band could heat up and fail, and we could lose the pins during ascent. So the cork is a
thermal protection for the retair, ing band on the pins.
DR. WALKER: I have a couple of questions on the O-ring. T[:ere are some tolerances on the
diameter of those O-rings.
Do you inspect each O-ring to see that it is within tolerance?
MR. MULLOY: Yes. The tolerance is plus 5 and minus ;5, and the O-ring is inspected with a
micrometer on receipt to assure that it is within tolerance.
DR. WALKER: Do you inspect it at many places along its length?
MR. MULLOY: Yes. I believe it is every two feet, and relative to 51-L, all of the O-rings that
are in the inventory are being re-inspected to get a statistical data base to try and understand if
possibly there could have been an undersized O-ring, for instance, in 51-L.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Is there a tolerance on this pin and these holes that isn't
shown in that
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diagram?
MR. MULLOY: I am sure there is, Mr. Armstrong. I am not sure exactly what that is. It is
not an interference fit. There is a tolerance. I can get that for you.
355
_'tl.IIRM IN R(XI_R,'4 Mr Mull,_. ,m v_ur t)-rlng ht._h_ry, _hlch ,._ ,L very useful review, l
thtt_k, l,,r ,,'_Ir pur|_,,-0,.._. _-uhl _,Du mlt,d taking each one ,_I"the.,_ ob_,r_atlon_ _ind just making
_,ii_,, _,,Inlll,.llt ,_11them' l",)r ,.xdmple. y,_tl .lay th;it y,Ju eganllne(l 22,'_ jotrlt:.l with 1.3¢;()-rings.
['h,, lit,,, :Jl_r_,ith_n i_ _ _Dl.ltof [7l exhlb_t .._me eru_lOll L_I" the prlmary O-ring
MR MI'I,[AIY Y,._._tr
I'IIAII'IMA.N R(_iI':R.'4 rh_tt dld n,,t disturb you. I _upp_,," You would !ike to correct :t. hut
i_.a,t(n t. tn and _)l It_a,lf. it d,dn't disturb v()u t(a) mu_-n"
MR ML'I.I.()Y It wasn't disturbing from a st_Indl_)int of safety becau_ the O-ring. even
th_),dgh tt wa._ _,rtx!_,d. had d()ne what It w_t._ designed to do It wa._ disturbing from the _tand-
_._)lnl thai *r *ere lu_)k|ng I'or wa_s h) mcreua_ the margin such that we wouldn't even have
tha_ m¢td_.nce of erosion
t'tIAIR.MAN R(XiKFLg t;omg to the _.cond, you _ay that two of tho_e joints, there was ::ome
_x_ behind the primary O.ring
Wa_ that a _.rloua problem, and if ._o. what we.a the problem'?
MR MUI.I.()Y That m more du_turbing than just having the O.ring erosion and then the
joint, or the O-ring then _.ated, although this, too, ts in the population ot" the six The six with
ertmlon, two of the _tx with ertmlon aho_ed _x'R. The concern there is that there is ._ome blow by
the. pr,mary which _ys that we are concerned that we have adequate squeeze on that primary
_uch that we won't get that blow-by, and it will energize and g_ into. e_trude into the gap with-
,_ut hl.w-hv
And y_. that la where we started looking at things like how can we decrea_ _he joint rota-
t lCln
('HAIRMAN R(X;KIL_' And were th_,e lnatanco_ just prior to ;31-L or a long while back?
MR MUI.I.OY No, _tr A,0 ! _d, theft, ,*ere no instances of that for a year before 5t-L
('HAIR.MAN R(_;I':RS (ha the nest one. 1_; of the 37 nozzle jo|nts exhibited ._me er(_ion of
the i,rmhtry ()-rings
ll,,w d_d treat relate In term_ of conc_.rn to the '_'her two" Was that more _rious or le_
_l_flllUq _lr tth_lUt the same"
MR MIrI.IA)Y It i_ al_ut the ._ame There, i_
mor_. c_mcern for the cam_-to-cuma, join:_l because ¢_f that rotation In the case of or in the instance
_f the. no=_.h..to-ca_ join_, we don't I_,ve that same rotation of the joint _ we deemed that
ti_ttng. ,mpr.vtng the wargin in the ce._. joints by reducing' the rotation to put it in the shame
imputation a_ the noc.zle jo=nt would be a desirable improvement
(°HAIRMAN ROGgRS The next one refers to _oot in the nozzle joints, eight out of 57, and
would the an.w_r Ix, th,_ same_
MR MUI, I,OY Y_. s_r
('tIAIRMAN ROGI_I_: And then you have one nozzle joint ,_-condary O-ring which has been
eroded Wa_ that of particular significance?
MR MUI.LOY: Ye_, sir. it wan because until we saw that, we wer_ always a_ured that even
though _ were causing _,_- initial damage to the primary O-ring. that the primary O-r;ng was
functioning in the instance,, f that n_rt.zle jeint, we were now .,_eeing a violation of the ._.econdary
.a.al, and we did afh.r that and before we would commit to another flight., we went and did _ome
.at_.nswe te_ting _f the. toh, rance to that, and did an analysis that matched that testing ._o we
could determine what the hmtting mechanism was, in other words, how long, if you-since the
_i_,e .f that cavity behind the
I_
I /
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primary O-ring is of limited volume and you are pressurizing that cavity with a very large
volume of gas, which is inside the solid rocket motor, there is a limit of time that that gas can
flow into that cavity.
Once the gas flows into that cavity and the pressure becomes the same as in the motor, flow
stops. So our rationale was through testing, can we get enough damage to the secondary O-ring
bafore the flow stops such that we would have a failure of the secondary O-ring? And our analy-
sis and our tests which the analysis correlated very well with, said that we had a margin of
three---we could take three times what the maximum amm:nt of erosion that we had observed
and have a margin of two on what was theoretically probable under the limited time that that
flow could occur. And thus, we concluded that that was an acceptable situation.
We have not had any other secondary O-ring erosion on any joints since that instance.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: So you were satisfied based on that experience that you did not have
a problem with 51-L in that connection?
MR. MULLOY: In that connection, yes, sir.
MR. ACHESON: If soot blows by the primary seal, will it lodge between the secondary seal
and the wall of the chamber to prevent a tight squeeze?
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MR. MULLOY: No, sir. We haven't seen that. What we tend to see is that that soot is very,
very fine. It is the products of grease, the pyrolysis of the grease and some pyrolysis probably of
the O-ring itself, the primary O-ring, and it is a powder, and blowing--it would have to blow by
the secondary before it could compromise that, and we have seen no evidence of that at all.
You see a kind of a fan-shaped sooty spot in the putty, if you will, impinging: but not into
the g_'oove generally. You will see that in the primary groove, but you do not see it m the sec-
ondary groove.
DR. WALKER: A question on the six incidences of erosion of the primary O-ring in the field
joints.
Was each of those associated with some channel or damage to the putty?
MR. MLILLOY: Yes, sir. There is a track through the putty to that erosion.
DR. COVERT: Mr. Mulloy, on the six rings that exhibited some erosion, do you have num-
bers comparable with those on the nozzle joint erosion? In other words, you eroded half of those
needed or what?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir. Theoretically we have a factor of two, based upon tests and analy-
sis, over the maximum observed.
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MR. FEYNMAN: Sir, you suggested that if the primary O-ring were to fail, it is still ,lo big
problem because the secondary O-ring might hold.
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir, it should energize.
MR. I_YNMAN: But there is a way for the gas to come out, at least possibly, and that is
the leak test port that you put in to make a pressure to test the O-rings, and I wonder how good
we can expect--how was it sealed? How was it closed, and how good is it? Can we guarantee that
Lhat might not fail, that is, the gas come out through the hole that you used to put the pressure
on to test the O-rings to see if they were okay earlier on?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir, that is installed to a torque requirement and inspected anti signed
off. It is installed to that torque requirement, and then there is extensive test data that indicate
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with that test plug, and it has the O-ring sealing surface also at that torque, will not leak at
1000 psi.
But if a human error was made and the test port plug was left out, obviously--and you went
by the primary seal, that would be a leak source, or if it wasn't properly torqued, there could be
a leak source through there which could lead to failure of the secondary O-ring.
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: How many checks of human failures do you make? In other words, if
one person--do you have to rely on the one person's activity, or does somebody supervise that
one person? How many checks do you make to avoid that kind of human failure?
MR. MULLOY: Well, the first check is the technician who makes the installation. The
second check is by the contractor, quality inspection, of whoever is making that installation, and
then there is a government inspection check on that.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Who makes that? Who is the government?
MR. MULLOY: In the instance of the leak check port, for instance, that is Air Force Quality
at KSC.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Yesterday we talked about the orientation of the leak ports on the
two solid boosters. Since we have a model here, could you indicate where those were?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir. On 51-L, on the right hand booster, it is located on this axis, and on
the left hand booster it is located on the other axis.
MR. HOTZ: Mr. Mulloy, while you are at the model, could you indicate and describe for us
the pressures on the solid rocket boosters that are caused by the so-called Twang maneuver just
before launch?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir.
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The main engines ignite approximately 6 seconds before the solids ignite. That timing is set
such that when the main engines ignite, and the Shuttle stack is bent over, the hold-down point
for the whole stack is here on four points at the bottom of the aft skirt on the solid rocket boost-
er. That is restrained. So there is a bending in this direction.
So the stresses that are put on are bent--it is a bending moment.
MR. HOTZ: They are bending forward in the same direction as the Shuttle?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, in this direction because the only thing that is applying force are the
main engines over here, which is an eccentric kind of a load, which tends to rotate it this way.
And then the timing of the ignition of the boosters is timed such that you are back in the verti-
cal position at ignition.
MR. HOTZ: Have you any measurement of the quantity of the force that is put on the SRB?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir. That was done in the facility verification vehicle early. There was a
stack made, and then there was what was called a Twang test and a deflection test that was run
on the boosters where they were deflect,_ for the maximum predicted amount and the strains
measured, and that is accounted fo, in tile
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design.
In other words, they were actually pulled over from this forward--
MR. HOTZ: What was that maximum predicted amount, do you recall?
MR. MULLOY: The deflection?
MR. IIOTZ: Yes, sir.
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MR. MULLOY: No, sir, [ don't recall what that is at the tip. It is very visible in watching
launches.
MR. HOTZ: Thank you.
DR. RIDE: Have you--when you have gone back and inspected the O-rings that have experi-
enced erosion, have you seen the erosion occur at the same point circumferentially on the differ-
ent O-rings?
MR. MULLOY: No. In the data that I presented to you yesterday, you will see on the field
joint that there is no preferred location on the ease field joints, and those six occasions, you find
that scattered over all 360 degrees of the circumference, and the same is true in the nozzle-to-
case joint. There is no preferred location. It seems to be random in circumference, more r_lated
to the point, i th,nk, where the pressure breaks through the putty as opposed to any loads or
gap dimensions in the joint.
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Mulloy, just to clarify for the record, the material you presented
to us yesterday is not any different than the material you are presenting today, is it?
MR. MULLOY: No, sir. What I have done today is on that one chart that we are dealing
with here is summarize the details of all of those detailed observations by flight number, degree
of erosion, location of the soot around the azimuth, etc.
DR. WALKER: A couple of times you referred to the vacuum grease that you use on the O-
ring.
Is that silicone grease, and could you explain the purpose'?
MR. MULLOY: That is an HD-2 grease, and it is not silicone.
DR. _qALKER: What is the purpose of putting grease on the O-ring?
MR. MULLOY: The purpose of putting grease on the O-ring is to ease the installation of the
O-ring into the joint and assure that you don't damage it. _[he p,_rpose of having the grease in
the joint is to keep the D-6 from getting into the condition that that sample is in.
Are there any further questions on this particular chart?
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I guess not.
MR. MULLOY: Okay, sir.
Let me move forward to some other conditions of primary O-ring erosion.
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MR. ACHESON: In the examinations of either the test segments or the flight segments,
have you ever found test port damage?
MR. MULLOY: No, sir, no evidence of any heat damage through a test port.
DR. RIDE: What does the plug on the test port look like?
MR. MULLOY: It is a cad-plated steel, oh, about a quarter inch in diameter, and then it
has--it looks like a screw, and it has--on the head it has an O-ring. Let's go to chart 11.
(Viewgraph.) ll_,'l, z 11-1-,1
Continuing with the physical explanation of what we have seen, this is a ease where we see
two of the six that did erode on the primary. We show soot passed the primary O-ring with no
damage to the secondary O-ring, and that soot we're talking about is in this area here, between
where you see the two O-rings on this diagram.
What is happening there is the pressure rises from about zero to 200 psi, on its way to 900
psi. We have a concentrated hot gas jet through the putty that impinges on that primary O-ring
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g / :_i 11....
andbeginsto erodeit while it is beingt_ansportedto its seatedposition.Whileit is beingtrans-
ported,thenthereissome
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blow-by,andthat is whereyou see the soot deposit, and then the O-ring extrudes into the gap
and the erosion continues for a short time and then stops, and the pressure rises to operating
pressure and the primary O-ring remains fully seated, and erosion on the primary O-ring stops
at that time.
And that has been observed. We have had the erosion on the six of the 171, and that is the
mechanism by which you can Imve erosion on the primary, the primary seats, but you still see
soot behind the primary, because that soot is being blown by in the seating process and extrud-
ing into the gap.
(Viewgraph.) [R,.r. 2 I IJ,q
Chart number 12 is a case where we see soot without any erosion. There is a deposit of soot
behind the primary O-ring, but there is no observable erosion on the O-ring, as we reported. And
that happens very early in the ignition transient from zero to 50 psi, where you have the blow-
by.
But it is of such short duration, in that first few milliseconds, *,hat no erosion occurs to the
primary O-ring, and it then extrudes into the gap and seals. So that is a configuration that goes
with that observation.
And so all of these are what we expect the
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joint to do, primary O-ring sealing. Now, what we have not seen on any of the 171 joints exam-
ined is what I will show on chart 13.
(ViewgraDh.) Ira" _ " 17]
Which, as we're going from zero to 200 psi on the way to 900 psi, the primary O-ring does
not seal. The secondary seal is energized and seals, because all of the pressure now is on the
secondary seal, and it does what it is supposed to do.
It extrudes into the gap. The pressure rises on up to operating pressure, and during that
blow-by of the primary seal, primary erosion occurs, and erosion of the secondary occurs, but it
does not compromise the integrity of the seal. On any of the hardware we have examined, we
have never seen that condition.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: How can you tell that, because the primary seal is essen-
tially intact?
MR. MULLOY: No, sir. Because the secondary seal is not eroded. That is a condition where
the secondary O-ring erosion occurs, and we have never seen that on a case to case joint.
MR. ACHESON: Does erosion depend upon blow-by, or can you have erosion just because it
is in the presence of the heat and the pressure without
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blow-by?
MR. MULLOY: That first case that I showed, six of them, that is that case. There is no
blow-by, there is erosion, but no indication of blow-by of the secondary seal or the primary seal.
That says that you've got compression on the O-ring. As the pressure hits it, nothing gets by it,
just due to the compression on the O-ring.
The O-ring is--there is a period of time, though, that a jet is impinging on that O-ring, until
such time as the cavity between the putty and the O-ring reaches motor pressure, flow stagnates
and there is no further flow and no further erosion.
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That is the highest incidence of what we have seen, erosion without blow-by. This is just
something, Mr. Armstrong, that I'm saying can happen with this design, but it hasn't.
Okay, if we could go to chart 14.
(Viewgraph) Im.i _ l i I._i
Now, this is a case of a failure of the joint, which on any of the 171 joints we have examined
we have not seen. The motor pressure rises from zero to 200 psi, the primary O-ring does not
seal, it doesn't have sufficient compression to seal. The joint rotates during the pressurization
cycle and the O-ring squeeze
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is lost on both of these O-rings.
As we go up to the maximum predicted operating pressure or, in the case of 51-L, 900 psi,
the secondary O-ring seal does not seal, and we have hot gas blow-by and we have eroded the
seals where they are no longer capable of sealing in the rotated condition, the hot gas blows by
and exits through the joint.
As I say, we have seen certainly no evidence of that on anything we have examined to date.
Okay, if I might go to the next chart, please.
(Viewgraph.) lih'r. 2 i J ]9 I
I have taken you through kind of our flight readiness review process and our rationale for
accepting the conditions and tried to explain with some sketches the configuration that matches
the observations that we have had. We have understood that condition for some time, and our
rationale for accepting that is, as shown here, the jet impingement erosion has been shown by
test and analysis to be within acceptable limits.
The analysis that is done is gas flow, heat transfer analysis, and structural analysis, by tests
of full-scale motors, sub-scale motors, and a test that we did of O-rings that were damaged to the
extent that it was two to three times, between two and three times the
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maximum observed erosion, and two times greater than is what is predicted can occur with the
time that flow can exist.
And we subjected that to 3,000 psi, which is three times the maximum expected operating
pressure, and we had successful sealing with the O-rings in numerous tests. That is not a single
data point.
And the other thing that leads us to accept that is that the detailed post-flight inspection
that we have been doing, the very detailed analysis of those results and the tests run, to under-
stand the limiting mechanism that does exist in that, assures understanding of those observa-
tions and a logical engineering judgment that the safety is not compromised by what we have
observed.
The next chart, please.
(Viewgraph.) lih'l . 2 II 2o I
In summary, I have discussed for you primarily the case joint, because that is the expressed
area of interest, and the data and design analysis task force has not concluded that the failure
that we have discussed here or the scenarios that I have discussed here is the cause of the 51-L
incident.
However, the joint also has not been eliminated as a cause or as a factor in the accident,
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andof course the media and all of us have seen the film that shows the plume coming from the
side of the solid rocket motor. But we have not yet determined whether this is a cause or an
effect.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Mr. Mulloy, might I ask, what further tests will you do in this area
to determine whether =t is a cause or an effect?
MR. MULLOY: The testing that is going on now is primarily aimed at understanding the
behavior of this joint and the O-rings under the specific conditions of the 51-L launch, particular-
ly the temperature, the humidity environment, the loads, and all other factors associated with
51-L.
And there is extensive testing and analysis going on now in this area, as well as other, as
Mr, Moore mentioned, in the other areas of the investigation as a potential cause.
GENERAL KUTYNA: When might we see some results of these tests?
MR. MULLOY: I think you will see some of this on Thursday.
MR. HOTZ: Have you been able to analyze any further exactly where that flame first start-
ed on the casing?
MR. MULLOY: No, sir. I have looked at the
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film many times, and we know that the flame is in the vicinity of this attach point in this quad-
rant here. But in what I have seen we have not been able to pinpoint the location of that at this
time.
MR. WALKER: How far away is the attach point from the nearest joint?
MR. MULLOY: About 12 inches, I think. Yes, about 12 inches above this ring that you see
here, which is the ET attach ring, and the joint is approximately 12 inches.
MR. WALKER: The joint is above the ring?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir. The ET attach is part of the aft segment.
MR. ACHESON: Can you show us on the model where the test port would be located?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir. In the joint on the right-hand side--is this the right-hand? No.
On the left-hand side, it is on the plus Z axis, which is the crew heads-up position of the
orbiter; on the right-hand side. it is at the zero degree position on the minus Z, and they all line
up.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Any other questions for Mr. Mulloy?
/No response.)
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: If not, I would like to ask
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one or two questions.
Have--as you know, the press has reported a letter, the contents of a letter dated July 23rd,
1985, written by Mr. Cook to Mr. Mann. Prior to the accident, had you seen that letter?
MR. MULLOY: No, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: You have seen it now, I presume?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Is your' assessment that you've given us this morning affected in any
way by the letter? Has it changed your views at all?
MR. MULLOY: No, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Cook is here and we are going to ask him to testify and give his
comments, and he can refer to anything he'd like to. I would like to suggest that you listen to
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what he has to say and then we, it' you would like, after that some time this afternoon, to make
further comments about "'that• letter and anything he may say.
We want to give him the opportunity to appear and for the Commission to consider his
thoughts, particularly because of the visibility that resulted from the New York Times story,
and to have you and anybody else that you want comment upon the contents of
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that letter.
Is that okay with you?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Then why don't we have a ten minute recess and re,oonvene after
the recess.
(Recess.)
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Could we ask the Commission to reconvene, please.
Before we start with Mr. Cook, Dr. Feynman has one or two comments he would like to
make. Dr. Feynman.
DR. FEYNMAN: This is a comment for Mr. Mulloy. I took this stuff that I got out of your
seal and I put it in ice water, and I discovered that when you put some pressure on it for a while
and then undo it it doesn't stretch back. It stays the same dimension. In other words, for a few
seconds at least and more seconds than that, there is no resilience in this particular material
when it is at a temperature of 32 degrees.
I believe that has some significance for our problem.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: That is a matter we will consider, of course, at len_h in the session
that we will hold on the weather, and I think it is an important
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point, which I'm sure Mr. Mulloy acknowledges and will comment on in a further session.
Now, if I may and if there are no further comments, I would like to ask Mr. Cook to come
forward.
(Witness sworn, t
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CHAIRMAN ROGEt<S: Mr. (_'ook, the Commission asked you to appear today because or'
recent stories concerning particularly a memorandum which you wrote on the 2::rd ot' duly,
1!)_5, and we will let you make whatever comments you would I_!:e _o make on that memoran-
dum. And we will of course make the memorandum available to the press. [u0,r : J l _'l I
You told me before the meeting was reconvened that you would like to make some prelimi-
nary comments, and of course you may go right ahead and say anything you would like to.
MR. COOK: Thank you, sir.
All I wanted to do really was just give a little bit of background about my own background,
what I do at NASA, and set kind of a context for this particular memo that we have here. By
background, I have been a program policy analyst for the federal government.
I started working for the government in 1979. I worked at the Civil Service Commission and
the Food and Drug Administration. I worked at the White House Consumer Affairs Council tbr
both the Carter and Reagan Administrations.
Then [ went out of the government. I got mv
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introductionto this kind of htghtechhardwarewhenl wasworkingona projectat TRW,ona
defenseintelligencehardwareproject,immediatelybeforeI cameto NASA.
And I wasbroughtto NASAas the resourceanalystin theComptroller'sOffice.and it is
di_'idedup by hardwareandthe hardwarel wasgivento work onwasthe external tank. the
solidrocketboosters,and the Centaurupperstage,which is nowpart of the shuttleconfigura-
tion.
Thememorandumin questionI wroteverysoonaftermy arrival at NASA.It wasoneof the
first assignmentsthat I wasgiven,to doa little backgroundon this. And the reasonthat wedo
thingslike.this isbecausewehaveto preparethe budgetfor NASA.Wehaveto costout what
thingsaregoingto require,particularlyif wehaveengineeringquestionst_,nrcome up that are
going to require some kind of additional funding or some kind of change in the funding profile,
to be able to pay for it.
So tbr this reason, we have to keep pretty much in touch with the project people in the
Office of Space Flight. and we also go on field trips down to Marshall or Kennedy or other
places, to try to keep as informed as we can. And then when issues arise that
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look like they might be budget threats, we have got to report back on it and try to come up with
some kind of estimate with the program office of what it's going to cost to repair this type of
thing.
When l first got the assignment, now. [ did go over it and ! did talk to the people over there.
the engineers over in the Office of Space Flight, who are an extremely cooperative group of
people and very helpful in this type of thing.
Ancl it became apparent to me that there were some real concerns with the O-ring problem
at that time concerns from an engineering standpoint which, as [ understood it from what I
d_scussed with people had tlight safety implications and potentially major budgetary concorns.
because with something like this. as [ understood it, if you fix something like this you've got
quite a range _t" cost implications.
If it is somethln_ simple, you might be able to absorb it in your budget. [f it is a major
redesign or re-en_ineerinff, where you've ffot to retrofit or you've got to fro out to the contractor
and have him ca,_t new SRB -_egment.s or _omething like the:. you migLt have a major budgetary
hit and you have _ot to come up with the money
And at that ttme the SRB budget on
t;,_ 1
development, th ,_ development side wa._ pretty much winding up. SRB development was coming
'o a close We had a fi, w thing._ that were ._till in the budget and had to be covered, but as far as
major budgetary concerns, if _mething came along we would have to think real hard, work with
the Office of Space Flight on figuring out how to cover something like that.
And wt, f_.,It that the ()-ring problem- and I think it was our impression from the Office of
Space. t"light--wa., a t_tentially major budget hit When _e went through the monthly briefing_
over at the ()ttSc_. ot _pace Flight, the (J-ring problem was one of the---there was a list of budget
I'hr,. it,_ that was print,'d -m'h nlonth
[';w,r_ m_mth the. ()-r_ng probb,m _r (,_-rlnlZ ch,.rrin_ problem wa_ _,n that l_-_t S_mu,t_nu.s it
wa_ tir,,l on th, Iz;'. _ometame,4 it wa._n't But [ d,m't think that m.cessarll_ rt'flected prmrity
But thpr., wa_ no que,_tmn that the ()-rin_, lm_bi_.n_ was con-_derml a l_tential budget threat
tn.mth Mtpr m_mth fr_m_ th, _umtner and on int_ the fall
And [ understandit was.evenwhenit went up to the Administratorin Augustwith the
annualbudgetreview"to theAdministrator,it wasalsolistedon that presentation as a budget
threat.
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I reported back to my management monthly on the assessment I was getting from across the
street on what the O-ring situat;,on was. And I know, I'm not an engineer. I can't talk in engi-
neering detail. I think I understand the basics of the joint configuration and all of that stuff.
although I certainly couldn't comment on an engineer's analysis of it. But there were some
things that were being factored into my analyses that I think have some bearing on this.
For instance, it was mentioned that an effort was going to be made to keep the secondary O-
ring from unseating in flight or at least from breaking the seal in flight. Now, the secondary O-
ring, as I understand it. we went back a couple, three years, when they first started to discover
that this rotation, this joint rotation, was unseating the secondery O-ring, and that was reducing
or eliminating in some cases the redundancy feature on that join_
And so there was a lot of concern about how we could get ..-_tradancy back in that joint
without having to throw away half a million dollar SRB segmev_, ::nd starting all over again
with redesigning and recasting them. There was a 13 month lead t ,.ae if you wanted to order a
new segment from the manufacturer, and so if you had to throw" t fis stuff out you had a prob-
lem.
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And so we were looking for ways to get the thing taken care of m a reasonable manner. And
as I understand it, the capture feature was going to be on the QM-5 firing, which had been
scheduled this week, but I think has been poa'*_ _,:_ _ And it was my understanding--and this is
just what I gather: I have it in my documenta: .., t think, somewhere, but you would have to
check with the program people As I underst, _ _t it" the O-ring--the capture feature got
through the review, the QM i]ring, a-d whate,-,- other reviews Marshall and the Office of
Space Flight were going to do ,*e were gt;,_a_ to try to get that on the booster segments around
January of l.qS7.
But a_ain, that was my understanding, and t: ,,_ ',' ould be somethin_ that you would have to
check on.
There was another issue that "_me up on the leak test port. It was my understanding that
the leak test port had been mentio _eu as a problem back when the redundancy requirement was
reviewed for the unseating of the _econdary ()-ring. because at that time. as I understand it.
there was no gtx,nt test ior checking the oressur_ on it once you plugged that thin_ back in down
at Kennedy,
Now that may be something you just have to check. I cannot vouch fi_r that talking to any-
body recently It was just another related problem they were trying to solve. _he redundancy
i_sue on that field joint.
Now I do have one que,,stion, and i'm certainly not competent at all to ,-omment on Mr. Mul-
,oy's pr¢._entation thin mor,_inl¢ I won't even attempt to do that But from my _wn _,r_pec_.ive
as the _uv who t.-_suppo,,ed to b_, w:dchin_ thin issue for the ('omptrolh.r',_ _fft'ice. it was nay tm-
der_tandint_ that there ,has _,t lea-, ,4ome erosion _oing on in 1!1_4,'_in the ()-r_ngs
I under_tand. I hilv_, b_,en toid there is a Thiokol d,wum,.nt f'r_m_ August I'A that d_wuments
,t I km_w I have _een _n my _wn files a ret_rt from ('_nh, M indicating _m_e erosion ," _ a l'li_ht.
[ I'M.lievl. in August. Now the d_wum,,nt I l_.,[i_.w, ['rll referring t_ ,._
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in September, and I would have to go back and check that.
But I would urge the Commission to work from--if you want t,) analyze my report, the thing
to work from is probably the monthly reports of the Propulsion Division to the Administrator
made every month, where it lists the propulsion issues and it lists sometimes the specific find-
ings from the various fl;ghts. To me that was a very helpful documer, t in kind of keeping track
of what was going ox,_
And since I'm wo'. ing from essentially secondary documents--you know, I was never in on
the primary observati) J of this stut'f or the analysis--to really analyze my document I would say
you should go to the Propulsion Division, look at their documentation and their engineering
staff'.
But I must say that I take full responsibility f)r what I said in my memo of last summer. I
realize that what I was saying in there was of some concern. I felt it my obligation to report to
my management, and I understand my reports went all the way up to Mr Newman, as they
should have, and I felt I was being as fair as I could to present a balanced view based upon what
I had been told.
So that s just kind of my introduction. Now
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I would be glad to answ_" " any questions about it.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you, Mr. Cook.
[ ,_vould like to ask a few questions. First. your memorandum was sent to Mr. Mann. He was
your superior:
MR. COOK: Yes. sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And your tbcus of attention was primarily budgetary: is that cor-
rect'?
MR. COOK: Yes, sir.
CtIAIRMAN ROGERS: And. to summarize it. you were, I gather, thinking about whether if
changes were required fbr safety reasons or any other reason you had to think about how much
it would cost':'
MR. COOK: Yes.
CtIAIRMAN ROGERS: And therefore your questioning of people in NASA was in connec-
tion with that budgetary matter?
MR. COOK: Exactly.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: You didn't, [ assume, make any attempt to weigh budgetary consid-
erations and safety considerations, did you?
MR. COOK: Not at all.
CHAIRMAN RO(IERS: You weren't qualified for that'?
MR. COOK: No. sir.
b.,o
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And you assumed other people were doing that?
MR C(X)K: Yes
CHAIRMAN R(XIERS: You h_,d n_ reason to think the other people were not qualified to do
that. or you had n,_ reason t,, think that pe,,ph, wh,, were weighin_ those considerations wele
not qualll]ed t(, d(_ it"
MR ('(X)K: [ had no r_,a._,m. (,xcept [ would have, tn ,lualify that not from the _tandpoint of
criticizing anybrMy, but it relato,q to _omothing that I _aid _,arlier--and ! know that I have the
highestregardfor tbeprofessionalismin NASA;I workedin severalagencies,and it is themost
professionalagencyI haveworkedfor--asfar asthedepthintowhichthesethingsareanalyzed.
AndsoI wouldn'twantto reflect,at all on that, andparticularlyin theComptroller'soffice.
But goingbackto what I saidearlier,wehad a developmentalbudgetfor the SRBsthat was
comingto an end.Wehavea budget,a developmentalbudget,that is dividedinto threeparts.
Wehavefilamentwoundcase, which is, as you know, is the substitute lightweight solid rocket
booster that is being developed right now.
We have tooling, which is mainly based upon an effort to get the tools in place at the facto-
ries, so
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that when the flight rate got up to 24 per year we could support that flight rate.
And the third thing is residual development, and that was special studies that came up and
other things. I'm sure others could explain it mere fully than I could. But it was special studies
that came up, either anomalies or improvements. I think we had a n_zzle erosion study going on
that was funded under residual development.
Plus, we were trying to figure out how we could qualify a second source to build the SRBs.
That was in residual development. But that budget was coming down very steeply, and, at the
same time, the flight rate was going up very rapidly. And, to me, that creates a very difficult
situation where a lot of judgment is required to figure out what you're going to spend your de-
velopmental money on.
I had no reason at all to question anybody's--the way that was weighed. All I am saying is
that it puts the Agency, it put me, having to analyze it and make recommendations, in a spot
where you just had to use real good judgment to say what was needed and what you were going
to do if a surprise came up and you had to come up with a whole lot of money to cover one of
these things.
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But still what you've just said relates to the budgetary consider-
ations. My question was did you have any reason not to rely on the recommendations of the
people who were highly qualified to make recommendations insofar as safety was concerned?
MR. COOK: No, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: So you don't now and you never have said that you distrusted or
were unable to rely on those people who were primarily responsible for safety features?
MR. COOK: Not at all, no. | didn't.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And so you felt that to perform your job in terms of the Comptrol-
ler's office you were anxious to find cut, if you could, what plans were being made that might
impact on the budget?
MR. COOK: That's right.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And you didn't feel that you were in a position or should you make
those decisions about what should be done with tile space program?
_'" COOK: That's right
CtiAIRMAN ROGERS: And .no that the memo, which has been given a great deal of atten-
tion. sort of suggests that you were taking issue with the people who
6!)3
were highly qualified to make those judgments, when in fact you weren't at all. You were I_k-
ing to ._ee how much it might cost if certain change_ had to be made; is that right':
V i /
MR. COOK: That is right. In fact, I have made a point on the second page here. "It should
be pointed out that Code M management is viewing the situation with the utmost seriousness."
And I had no reason to doubt that, and I didn't as time went on. In fact, in the fall the reports I
was getting, because every time I had to make my report I would ask the program people about
the situation and about the O-rings, what was happening with the O-rings, and in fact we were
seeing, as I understood it, there was erosion, according to the records I was given in the summer
of 1985.
But, as I understood it, what was reported to me was there was a flight in the fall of 1985
where there was no erosion at all, and I reported that kack to my management. In fact, I was
reporting at that time that it looked to be as though the fix for the O-rings might be less serious
than was earlier indicated. At the same time I reported or at least I was told--I have to look at
my own files, my own documentation--that because they weren't exactly sure of what was caus-
ing the
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erosion, for instance, the putty was an issue and it was mentioned, and we had somewhere
around a $50 million estimate to requalify new putty if we had to do that.
In fact, I think we were going to have to do that an)wcay because the asbestos was going to
have to be gotten rid of. And so there was that. There was the unseating of the secondary O-ring
that the capture feature was supposed to take care of.
So we still weren't sure, but at the time I was reporting that it looked as though we might
not have a major budgetary hit during fi._cal vear 1986 from the O-rings. They were also, as I
understand it, combining the te_t of the capture feature with another test to save money.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I think the Commission and I certainly understand what you are
saying. And you were reporting back to the Comptroller's office, and to perform your job on
budgetary considerations, and you were picking up information from different sources as to what
they might be thinking about. You were not passing judgment, though, yourself on what they
should or should not be doing, were you?
MR. COOK: Not at all. In fact, I was new to the program and I felt I was hearing things
that I expected. I wasn't the only one that was hearing in the
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Comptroller's office I had no reason to believe that. But [ felt for my own education and for my
own professional judgment that I would write it up as I heard it, and that is what I did. I was
not passing judgment.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Since the time of the accident--well, let me withdraw that.
We!l, since the accident occu,'red have you had discussions with people about your memo-
randum of July 23, 1985? l_f. z l_. ,J l
MR. COOK: Yes, particularly since it showed up in the newspapers.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Did you have discussions with people before it showed up in the
newspaper?
MR. COOK: I had given it to my boss just as a matter of giving him documentation.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But no one else?
MR. COOK: Someone else? Well, my boss and the other, the former SRB analyst that I.
worked with very closely.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: ihnyone out of the office?
MR. COOK: No.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And so you were not involved in the publication of the document
yourself?.
MR.COOK:No,I wasnot.
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CHAIRMANROGERS:Sincethe accidenthaveyouwritten anothermemorandumin con-
17ectionwith the accident?
_R. COOK: Yes, I did.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: W_,at prompted that?
MR. COOK: The heat of the moment. I did write another memorandum and what I was
saying essentially was that, given all of the information that was coming in, I felt at that time
that, number one, it had not been demonstrated what caused the accident. The evidence that
points to the SRB is either circumstantial or interpretations of photographs.
But I felt that the problems that I had been apprised of during the course of, now it wasn't
just the .']rst weeks on the job, it was several months, ought to be looked at seriously enough so
that whatever happened this needed to be taken care of. The O-ring problem needed to be taken
care of before we could look at the shuttle program as being completely resolved.
And we had some other major budgetary issues that came up in that connection.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: You still were doing it in terms of the budget? I mean, was that the
purpose of writing the memorandum after the accident?
MR. COOK: Yes.
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Did you have reason to think that efforts would not be made after
the accident to investigate it thoroughly?
MR. COOK: No. In fact, I knew that across the street they were doing the same analyses we
were doing.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Then will you explain again why you wrote the memorandum?
MR. COOK: To document what I felt were all of the budgetary implications of the situation.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Only budgetary? Was there any other purpose? Well, if you'd rather
not answer, that's all right. I'm just curious about why you wrote the memorandum. [ mean, it
doesn't sound as if you had budgetary considerations in mind. It sounds differently. But I just
wanted you to have an opportunity to tell the Commission why you wrote it.
MR. COOK: I wrote it because I felt that it was a serious enough situation that I didn't
think that until these various i_ues were resolved with the SRBs that I had been involved with,
that they had to be taken care of before the shuttle could safely continue.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Did you think your engineering experience, based on the short time
you had been with NASA, improved your ability to pass
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judgment on what others had decided? Well, here again I really don't want to press you.
Do you have anything else to tell the Commission?
tNo response.)
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Any other questions?
DR. WALKER: When you referred to "across the street" did you mean Code M?
MR. COOK: Yes, sir.
MR. HOTZ: As far as you know, in the preparation of the fiscal 1987 NASA budget were
there any provisions made for an O-ring or a seal improvement program'?
MR. COOK: For fiscal year 19X7?
MR. HOTZ: Yes. tbe current budget.
! /
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MR. COOK: Not to my knowledge. Now there was to be, as I said, a firing of the QM-5 test
article this week, which is a budgetary item, but to my knowledge there was not a separate
budgetary proposal going into the 1987 budget at that time for this problem.
MR. HOTZ: But in your last paragraph here you expressed an opinion or a recommendation
that there should be some sort of a provision in the fiscal 1987 budget.
MR. COOK: Yes, sir. I thought there should
be.
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MR. HOTZ: And to your knowledge there was none?
MR. COOK: Well, but this is just beginning, really, the thinking about what--to my knowl-
edge, NASA has not yet put together a complete--well, how could it--analysis of what will be
needed to remedy any requirements that grow out of the investigation of the accident.
MR. HOTZ: Yes, we understand that. We're talking about their judgment before the acci-
dent, just as an ongoing program improvement.
MR. COOK: There was no separate item that I know of now, at the level I was dealing with,
the composite numbers that I was dealing with. I'm sure there were studies and analyses that
were part of a total project support number, for instance, that dealt with it, but there was noth-
ing on the order of, say, the nozzle erosion study, which was a $3 million or $4 million study.
MR. HOTZ: Thank you.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Cook, I just received a copy of the memorandum that I referred
to previously, which is dated February 3, 1986, and the other Commission members have not had
a chance to look at it. [m.r. 2 nn-22]
7O0
I would propose to let them take a look at it during the lunch hour and then we can resume and
they may have some questions to ask and you may have some comments to make.
Okay. Let's have a recess for lunch.
iWhereupon, at 12:50 o'clock p,m., the Commission recessed, to reconvene at 2:30 o'clock
pro. the same day._
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AFTERNOON SESSION
t2:25 p.m.)
TESTIMONY OF RICHARD C. COOK--(Resumed)
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Cook, is that chair convenient for you or would you rather have
a different kind of chair?
MR. COOK: I am much more comfortable just to stand up.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, let me begin by saying that I had a chance to talk a little bit
with Mr. Cook during lunch and learned that he had in fact been asked to prepare a memoran-
dum subsequent to the accident on budgetary matters, and Mr. Cook pointed out, and we dis-
cussed the fact that in the initiation of the memo he included some material in there that did
not strictly come within the budgetary request that was made.
Nonetheless he said in his testimony this morning that he did it in the heat of the moment,
and I thought maybe, Mr. Cook, you would want to follow up on the discussions we had about
384
d
how you relate to the engineers in NASA and the others in terms of their ability and their
qualifications.
MR. COOK: Kind of to paraphrase what we covered this morning, it is a requirement of my
job and of everybody in the office, each of which has its own
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hardware, to handle, to try to understand as much as possible about the engineering side of
things as we can. There are plenty of guys there who do it a lot better than I do, and even some
cf the more complicated parts of the program, sach as the space shuttle main engines, and we
rely on the program office in the Office of Space Flight and we rely on the conversations we
have with the Centers, with Marshall and Kennedy and other places, and we try to come as best
as we can to an expression of what the engineering issues appear to be, because we want to give
accurate cost estimates when they go up to the Congress.
And the kind of support we get from the program office is, by and large, superb. I mean, the
proiessionalism and the cooperation that we get from these people is excellent. And we have
kind of a middle man role of trying to translate these things back into language that can be
used for the cost and price analysis and also to give our budget presentations to the Congress.
One of the things that, immediately after the accident--and it is still going on--is that our
office was required to come up with some very fast estimates of what the implications were of
some of the possibilities that were being talked about at that
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time. And, of course, the external tank and the boosters fell into my area for analysis.
And so essentially what I did was to try to pull together all of the possible budget implica-
tions that I could think of. Again, I spent a lot of time across the street, a lot of time talking to
people, trying to put into my own words what I felt would be needed for NASA to address the
SRB question, if it happened to be an SRB problem or perhaps even if it didn't, because, even if
it wasn't an SRB problem in the accident there were still things that we had been concerned
about that had been well documented during the previous year, including the putty, including
the O-rings, that we wanted to take a look at.
And I felt--and I think the people across the street felt also--that this was a particularly
crucial time to kind of lay it all out, all of the problems we saw, all of the things that would
need to be examined and really understand if we were talking about a four-month delay, an
eight-mc, nth delay, a year delay or exactly how long it was going to take.
And right now 1 believe we are running those options in more detail--different length of
delays depending on in large measure the outcome of what you folks are deliberating.
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I don't know if it would be useful to run down the issues that I had included. I don't think
there is anything new in there that has not either been before the Commission or shortly will
be. But I would be glad to do that.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, why don't you do that, Mr. Cook? I think that--you are speak-
ing now about the memorandum subsequent to the accident.
MR. COOK: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Our plan is to, because we don't have a machine we can do it here,
to ask NASA to release this memorandum that we're talking about a little later on when we
finish today. But I do think it might be useful to have you summarize what is contained in the
memo and any comments you care to make about it.
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MR.COOK:Let mejust briefly run throughthosethings,then.Therearejust a fewitems.
Oneis that the capturefeaturethat wasto betestedon theQM-5,I said,is somethingthat has
not yet beenacceptedfor useon thesteelSRBcases,so if tbis is goingto bea solutionto the
unseatingproblem,then that wouldbesomethingthat during the next fewmonthswouldhave
to betestedandqualified.
Thesecondthing wasit is clear that the field joint putty plays a sigmficant role in O-ring
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erosion. It is also an asbestos problem. And so flight qualification of new putty is recognized to
be a major unbudgeted cost item, meaning up until that time, the time of the incident, it had
not yet been costed out and put into the budget we were submitting to Congress.
Any effects of environmental and weather factors on the putty and O-rings may have design
implications which require further investigation. I noted that eight SRB segment sets are in
manufacturing flow at that moment, and that meant simply that from the time Thiokol pulls
them off the shelf and starts loading them up with propellant until they get in to the Cape to be
assembled for flight we have eight SRB flight sets that are moving through that process. And
depending on any action that we have to take to retrofit those cases with either a capture fea-
ture or any other new design feature, something has to be done with those.
We have either got to scrape that stuff out. that propellant out, or they have got to static
fire it, or, I suppose, conceivably think about doing a retrofit with the case segments in place.
Now again what I am doing is reporting on the resource implications. I have no idea what the
dotal.led engineering implications are here.
Again, what we're trying to do is come up with
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a cost estimate of what it's goi_,_g to take to retrofit case segments. Five flight sets of hardware
remain on the shelf at Thiokol which should not be loaded until the O-rings are repaired, and so
there is a possibility of a shutdown or a slowdown at Thiokol while they wait to see what can be
done with those flight sets.
I noted here the problem with the leak test polts, because this is not something that I had
put in any previous analysis that I had given to the Comptroller's office, that something needs to
be looked at as far as those leak test ports, and if there is anything that needs to be done in
regard to assuring that those are put in place properly or tested properly.
And another question had come up at some point whether we had any case cracking or case
rupture, and I simply made a note that the procedures for checking case cracks, I think there
was a test at Thiokol where there was a burst of a case because of a crack in a stiffener ring bolt
that raised some question about whether we have got to take another look at that. And that
relates to our budgetary issue because we have been watching very carefully the attrition rate
for solid rocket motor hardware.
We have got in our budget an assumption that somewhere around five percent of all of our
flown case
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segments will be lost to use either because they are damaged when they hit the water after the
SRB comes down from flight. We lost a couple of flight sets when they were sunk. We lost some
in an accident out at Thiokol, and we have got some segments under repair.
So we are trying to come up with the best estimate we can of how many flight segments
over the lifetime of the 20 per use configuration have to be replaced by new hardware. We have
been working a 5.1 percent projection. It has actually been higher than that. And so we're won-
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deringat this pointwhetherthe possibilityof a crack occurring might lead us to have either a
higher attrition rate cr additional expenditure {'or detecting these.
Another issue was this thing that has been debated in the news--and again this is just
something that cam_ up in this context as a potential cost implication--as to whether anything
was going to have to be assessed to see if instrumentation, software or launch and training pro-
cedures would be implicated, if the agency thought there was anything we could implement to
have an abort mode during SRB ignition.
Now, as I understand it, particularly from Mr. Aldrich's testimony a few days ago, at this
time I'm not aware of any possible abort mode that is being
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discussed--and again that is something that would have to come from the engineers--but I cited
this in here as something that from a budgetary standpoint we might have to take into account
if the agency made a decision to install an abort mode during SRB firing.
The next item is that if the capture feature cannot be qualified for the steel segments and
we have to reengineer the field joints, then there are three SRB segments for each booster, six
per flight set, that one way or another will have to be reengineered.
And if that is the case, the lead time to tell the manufacturer to make a new segment that
we have been working with is about 13 months, and so that has serious budgetary implications if
we have got to remanufacture case segments and we're looking at that kind of lead time. We
either have to have a crash program to manufacture them or we have a delay of that length of
time. So that was kind of a crucial variable and that is another reason why we needed to cost
out the test and cost out the capture feature as soon as we could.
The other thing is, I guess Number 9 is the attrition rate on the SRB segments which I just
mentioned has been higher than the planning projections, and we just lost 22 more segments
because of the accident. That throws us behind considerably in our
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manufacturing flow because we're only producing, I believe, one of these segments a month, or
maybe two a month. And so now we have to take a look at that, and even if we suspend flights
for a period of months we're going to have to come up with a program where we can make up
for those lost segments and get them back into the flow.
Again, that is--that depends on the capture feature or any other fix that is made to the
SRBs to accommodate whatever the results of the investigation is or, as I guess some people felt
ought to be done anyway and was going to be done anyway--I mean even before the incident--
the capture feature was to be tested. It was to be tested this week and installed. So the presump-
tion is that that was going to happen and would be going on anyway.
The other item is that the filament-wound case project needs to be examined because it, too,
had safety issues. There was a test where under pressure the case showed a rupture. The case
was to be retested and there was a difference of opinion as to what the likelihood was going to
be of the case passing muster as far as its overall flight safety posture was concerned.
And that too had to be factored in because our ability to meet the Vandenberg launch
schedule after
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July depended very much on having those filament-wound cases and the filament-wound cases
were also a part of the third production contract "hat was about to be negotiated between the
agency and Morton-Thiokol.
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Sobasedonall of thoseconsiderations,if wewentthroughwith this programI wasproject-
ing--and againthis is just a budgetaryanalyst'sestimate--!wasprojectinga nine-monthor
longersuspensionof flightsto dealwith all of thesethings.
CHAIRMANROGERS:Thankyouverymuch,Mr. Cook.I appreciatethat.
Summarizingyour _rst memo,of July 23,1985,as you have said several times, it was done
for budgetary considerations and you did not intend to pass judgment on any of the engineering
features as such. You were looking at it for budgetary purposes?
MR. COOK: AbsoLutely. That was all I was, that was all I was able to do.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And you were satisfied with the performance and ability of the engi-
neers that you dealt with at NASA?
MR. COOK: Yes, and I would say particularly the fellows in the Propulsion Division at
headquarters. I thought it was an extremely professional group. It was a great deal of help to me
particularly getting on
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board and getting up to speed on all of these things. And I thought they were an excellent team
that had the interest of NASA and the program entirely in mind, and I had complete confidence
in the information that I was receiving.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you very much.
Now I asked you this morning about the reason for the memorandum subsequent to the ac-
cident, which is dated February 3, 1986. And it subsequently turns out that you were asked to
provide a memorandum to the effect along the lines of your summary just now. In other words,
you were asked to do that by Mr. Mann?
MR. COOK: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And the memorandum that is dated February 3 that you have just
summarized was in response to that request, and I think your summary of the memorandum is
very good and it explains to the Commission your motivation.
I would like just to ask one question about the memo. You say at one point when you are
referring to the engineers, I believe you say--well, let me read the whole thing. "It is also my
opinion hat the Marshall Space Flight Center has not been adequately responsive to headquar-
ters concerns about flight safety,
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that the Office of Space Flight has not given enough time and attention to the assessment of
problems with SRB safety raised by senior engineers in the Propulsion Division."
Now this is the part I want to ask about. "And that these engineers have been improperly
excluded from investigation of the Challenger disaster." In light of the work of this Commission
and the investigations that are being conducted now at Kennedy, are you still of that view?
MR. COOK: Well, let me just comment very briefly on that paragraph. I editorialized a bit
at the beginning and the end of this, and I did so on the basis of my general point of view in
retrospect on some of these issues, and since I wasn't prepared to comment on this memo at all
today I'm not going to try to go into a lot of detail about the first two items.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, it is really not necessary. I think the thing that concerns me
most is whether you have confidence now that the investigations are being properly conducted.
MR. COOK: Well, if I had access to my files and time to write, I would try to be more specif-
ic. That is all. But let me say this. The last item, frankly I was amazed that when this incident
occurred the engineers in Washington were over there in their
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offices getting the data on the investigations from the newspaper and the media, and now and
then phone calls from guys down at Kennedy about what was being tbund.
These were the top propulsion engineers who prepared reports for the Office of Space Flight
and for the Administrator and for us. I just couldn't understand why that group wasn't down
there going through the data and looking at the photos and everything else. Frankly, and I will
be honest with you--and I'm not intending to explain why that was or criticize anybody--I was
just, in a way I was glad because I could go over and talk to them and get my information from
them.
But I just couldn't understand why the headquarters propulsion office didn't have their guys
down taking part in that. I have no question whatsoever about the investigation or the Commis-
sion's work. I don't feeJ I'm really competent to make much of a comment on that, although I
must say I am glad that you all are having public sessions and that it is a presidential level
group. I think that is absolutely in order and really needed.
The only thing that I would urge would be that as much as you can to get just the ordinary
working guys, such as me and the engineers and the guys from the
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Marshall S&E Lab, and if you can get them in from Thiokol, just the ordinary engineers who
break these things down, who look at them, who call each other on the phone and say hey, look
what I found here. You've got to take a look at this. And that is what I hope will be included.
And I think that if everybody who has firsthand knowledge and experience and feels they
can come up and talk freely, I think that you will have a good investigation.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, I assure you, Mr. Cook, we do plan to do that, and we have
plans made.
Secondly, you told me during the lunch hour that you had great confidence in Jess Moore
and the people who work for him--that is a fact, isn't it?
MR. COOK: Yes, sir.
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: When you wrote the second memo of February 3, you intended that
to be used for internal purposes only?
MR. COOK: Absolutely.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: You have no objection now, in view of what has transpired, if it is
made public, because we want to be sure as a Commission that we don't appear to be holding
anything back, and President Reagan has wanted us to be sure to lay all of the facts on the table
and to let all be known, and so you have no o_ection if we make that memorandum public?
MR. COOK: No, sir, I don't, although I must say that I think everybody who really works on
this needs to understand, and I am not addressing the Commission, I am addressing I guess
people who would be reading that, the complexities of the situation and the difficulties that any
individual has in coming to conclusions.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Yes. Thank you.
You also mentioned this morning that you wrote the memo in the heat of the moment, and
I assume you were, like everybody else in the country was, terribly disturbed and upset by the
accident, and it was in that spirit or at that time when you wrote the memorandum. You didn't
really mean to adversely criticize for public
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consumption your associatesor people around you, did you?
MR COOK: No, l didn't, but I must say, l didn't say anything in there that [ didn't feel [
had--that I couldn't back up and wou!dn't stand by.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: No, I understand. I am really not asking [br you to back down at all.
i think to understand the contents of the memo, _t is helpful to have you say what you have
said, I just mean that it was done in the heat of the moment, and I think that has helped us
understand the memo.
One other thing, and then I will stop.
Sometime subsequent to this, I understand that you decided to change jobs in the govern-
ment.
Could you tell us about that?
MR. COOK: Yes, sir. This had been going on for some time. As a matter of fact, I had
worked before at the Treasury Department, and it just so happened by coincidence that I got an
offer from them to return to the Treasury Department last week. This had been something that
had been in the works for several weeks, and I wili be reporting to work at the Treasury Depart-
ment next week.
But it is a coincidence, and it doesn't have anything to do with this.
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: It was voluntary on your part'?
MR. COOK: Absolutely.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you very much.
Are there any other questions?
/No response.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you very much, Mr. Cook. We appreciate your appearance
and your frankness.
Mr. Mann?
(Witness sworr_ I
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Mann, I want to ask you a few questions about the memoran-
dum that was from Mr. Cook to you dated July 23, 1985.
What were the circumstances surrounding that memorandum, do you remember?
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MEMORANDUM 71231O5
TO;
FROM:
SUBJECT:
BRC/H.Mann
BRC/_.Cookf_
Problem with SRB Sezls
ORIGmAL ]P_
OF POOR n,'_' '-'_
Earller this week 9ou esked me to Inwestlg_te reported
problems with the charring 0¢ seals between SRB motor segments
during flight operations. Discussions with program engineers
show this to be & potentiall9 mejor problem m#fec¢ing bot_
• llght safPt 9 and program costs.
Pres_ntlg three seals between SRB segments use double O-rlngs
seal_d with putty In recent Shuttle flights, chlrring of
these ring_ h_s occurred. The O-rings are designed so thl_ If
one fails the other will hold _g_inst the pressure of qiring.
However, at least in the joint between the nozzle mnd the aft
segment, not on]g his the first O--ring been destroged , but the
second has been partiall_ eaten away.
EnginePrs have not 9et determined the cause of the problem.
Candidate_; include the use o_ m new tgpe Of putt9 (the p6tt9
• orm_rlg in use w_s removed _rom the market b9 £PA becLuse it
contained asbeslos) ° _ailure of the second ring to mlip into
the groove which must engage it for it ¢o work properZg, or
new, and &s 9e¢ unidentified, _ssembl 9 procedures at Thiokol.
MSC is train 0 to identi_ the cause of the problem, includlng
on--site inves¢ig_tlon at Thiokol, and OSF hopes ¢o have some
result5 from their mnalgsis within 30 d_gs. There is little
qu_stZo_m, however° th&t #light safer 9 his been mnd is still
being compromised b 9 potential failure of the se_ls0 _nd I¢ is
ackno,ledged that f_ilure during 1munch would cert&inl9 be
c_ta_¢rophic. There i_; m]so Indication that stsff personnel
knew o_ this problem sometime in edvmnce of management's
becc_m;ng apprised of _hat was going on.
The potential, impact of the problem depends on the ms 9et
undiscovered cause. I# the cmuse is minor, there should be
litt]c ur no impact on budget, or flight rate. A worse c_se
scenmrio, however, would lead ¢o the oumpenmion o_ Shuttle
fZights, redesign o# the S,B. _nd scrmpptng o# exilttng
stockpiled hardware. The laplct on the FY 2987--8 b_dge¢ couZd
be immens(.
It should be pointed out that Code H slnagement l| viewing the
situation with the utmost seriousness. From • budget•r9
m t_mndpoint. I would think ¢hlt ln_ NASA budget mubsitted this
_emr For FY 1987 mnd begond should certminl_ be billed on
reliable judgment ms to the c_use o# the SRB oe_l proble_ and
m corresponding decision as to budget_r_ _ction needed to
provide for its soluliofl.
IRrf. 2 11-21 1 of l]
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Na_r_ A_onaudcs and
Soace Adn_n_ra_n
W'_h_r_o_, D.C.
20546
rebPu_ry 3. 191B&
TO :
FROM :
SUB_CT :
BRCIH. Ha, nn
BRCIR. Cook /_
/
_quired SoZid Rocket Booster Improvements
There is z growing consensus that the ¢luse of the Ch&llenger
explosio_ _s a burnthrough in a Solid Rocket Booster m¢ or
ne_r & field joint. Z¢ is &1so the consensus of" engineers in
the Propulsion Division, Office o_ Spa_o Flight, th&¢ if such
..
t bunnthrough occMrPed, _t _s probaLbly prevent&bZe and that
for _ell over & ye_r Che Solid Rocket Boosters have b_n
flOing in _n unsafe conditioq. This h&s been due to the
problem of O-ring erosion ind loss o_ redundancy ciused by
unse;ting aT the sc_ond;rv O--ring in flight.
The ¢_hnic_l details of the O-_ing problem _re described in
the _ttached memorandum _r_ Zrv O_vid_ ¢o the _ssoci_te
_d*inistnttor Tot Sp_c_ Flight in _une 1_. _lso _t¢_ched _s
t cop 9 of the sesor;ndum I _rote on the sub_ec¢ on Jul_ L_3,
Z_q_, in which Z stmtwd: "There is 1i¢¢1e question...thmt
f_ight S_fet_ his bNn ;rid is still being compromised b_
potenti;1 flilure o_ the seaL, S, _nd _t is axcknouledged ¢hi¢
• &ilure during l_unch _ould ffrtlinl_ be c&tutrophic."
Even i£ it c_nnot be &scert&ined uith _bsolute cert;in¢_ that
burnthro_Jgh precipitzted the explosion, Jt is ciezr thz¢ the
O--ring problem Bust be repdred before the Shuttle c;n flV
_gain.
Zt is not cle;r° however, how long this _ilZ t&k_ or wh;_ it
will cost. The _ccs _re:
I) The c;pture Te;ture to be tested Turther on the
Fil;ment Qound Case is not vet i d_monstr;ted T',x to
the pnoblea ind ;t_s not been ;ccepted b 9 H_rsh_ll
5p_c:_ Flight Center for use on s¢_l 5RB ctses.
_) It is cle&r th&¢ the Tield joint putcV pla_s
significant role in O--Ping erosion. Z¢ Bust be
repla_d in &no cmse. bec&use it contains _sbes¢os
;nd is & potenti&l hea_th hm_;rd ¢o worbers. Flight
qualification O_. new putt_ is r_ognized to be ;
atjor unbudgeted cost item.
[Hef. 2!1-22 I of 3]
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3) The effects of environmental and weather factors
on the put¢_ and O--rings may " have design
implications which require further investigLtion•
4) Currentl_ eight SRB fligh_ sets are in
manufa_:turing flow'. Segments of these flight sets
must either be retrofitted with the capture Teiture
or field joint segments must be re--engineered and
repla_d. In either case, the propellant must be
removed, either b 9 hand--scraping under careful19
controlled conditions or b 9 static airing. One
million pounds of propallant per flight c_se must be
removed, a_ a cost for propellant alone of $2
million per flight set.
5) Five flight sets of hardware remain on the shelf
at Thiokol, but should not be loaded until the
O--rings are repaired. Consequentl_, we are looking
at a probable factor_ shutdown•
6) A further potential safety hazard has been
identified which can take away O--ring redundancy. If
the leak test ports between O--rings are not properlg
capped before flight, a small leak in the field
joint can result if the'primer 9 O--ring is eroded.
Consequently, proceMures to assure proper capping
must be reassessed. Further, the instance of case
rupture during test following failure to detect
crack at the stiffener ring bolt hoIe must call into
question Thiokol's safe¢_ procedures and
orientati:n. It should be determined _hether this
situation has any implications for the current
negotiations for the _hird productio_ buy regarding
failure penalties.
7) Given the known O--ring problem, it could be
construed as negl_gen¢ not ¢o have installed sensors
on the surface of the 5RB which could have detected
• .i thea burnthrough or ¢o provide a sgstem to jet" son
SRBs when loss of control is detected such as w_s
a4_paren;ly the case _ith 51--L. Videotapes show the
burnthrough commencing twelve ¢o ¢wentg--five seconds
before the explosion, and I understand that loss of
SRB control w_s evident eight seconds before the
explosion. Correcting this situation will require a
considerable investment ¢o revise instrumentation,
soft--re, and launch and trainin_ procedures.
8} It is possible that the capture feature will fail
to be flight--qualified for steel segments and that
re--engineering of t_e field _oints will be required.
In this case, three of ever 9 eleven 5RB segments
will have to be discarded, and re--engineered
segments manufactured by Rohr. Manufax:tur_ng lead
time would be thirteen months after successful
acceptance testing.
IRef. '2 1 1-'2"2 "2 o1" :_]
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ORIGINAL PAGE IS
OF POOR QUALITY
9) The attrition r_te of SRB segments Following
flight has be_n four higher than the planning
projections and has _n mide even worse by the loss
of bath boosters in flight 51-t-. More intensive
inspection for cr_cks and other anom_lies _ill
probaJ)ly lead to further unanticipated mttritian. It
seems clear that the planning assumptions are
unremltstic mnd must be revised. This _ill hive
major budgetary implications.
10) The Filament Wound Case project now needs _o be
re&ssessed, as there is an opinion among ___f
e_s that it should be discontinued for s_fety
reasons. It is essential that such misgivings no_ be
taken seriously.
Given these facts, it is my considered opinion that NASA
is facing m suspension of Shuttle flights due to SRB problem_
of I minimum of nine months and possibly as long _s _wo years
or more. This issumes that the agenc9 makes a rapid decision
tO proceed with the required SRB improvement pragrim, along
,ith improvement s in Thiokal's safety management. The
financiml planning _ssumptions also need to be re--done. The
commencement of this prograum does nat depend on the outcome
_nd final conclusions of the Challenger investigation,, since
it would have to be done even if the explosion _ere due to
some jther CaUSe. The delay could be longer, of course, if
_dditional findings require re--engineering of the external
tank or other hard,are.
It is also my opinion thmt the M_rshall Space Flight
_nter has not been adequ&tel_ responsive to headquarters
concerns about 4light safety, that _he Office of 5pace Fligh_
has not given enough time and attention to the assessment of
problems _tth SR8 safet_ raised b_ senior engineens in the
Propulsion Division, _nd that these engineerS h_ve been
im_roperl_ excluded from investigation of the Ch;lleqger
disaster. For these re_sons _ recommend that the SRB
reissessment be led, _ightl_ controlled, and adequa_elg
staffed &_ the he&dqumrters level. I _Iso recommend _hat the
Acting Administrator be in_orsed of the his_or_ aT _he S@B
problems as outlined in this report.
cc: d. Brier
_.Allison
M.Peterson
[Ref. 2 11-22 :_ of 31
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TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL B. MANN, CHIEF, STS RESOURCES ANALYSIS BRANCH.
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINIS-
TRATION
MR. MANN: Yes, sir.
Rick Cook was a newly assigned employee, and the issue of the charring of the O-rings had
come up in the normal course in the Office of Space Flight discussions. It was a perfectly open
issue. It was discussed in an activities meeting, and as part oe his training, I asked him to go
talk to the engineers and to give back to me a report on what was exactly involved i.n the char-
ring and what the budget implications were, and that was pretty much a normal part of the way
we work. We try and keep, as Rick said, keep abreast of all the technical issues that have a
potential budget impact.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: What is your title, and what are your responsibilities?
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MR. MANN: 1 am the Chief of the STS Resources Analysis Branch. It is within the Office of
the Comptroller. We do the--we prepare the budgets. We work with the program office to pre-
pare the budget for the Office of Space Flight and the Space Station. W- also do independent
reviews periodically of the issues
719
that have a cost or a budget implication such as pricing policy for the Shuttle or particular c')st
issaes.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And how long have you worked ,"or NASA in that capacity?
MR. MANN: I have been in the Comptroller's office since 1980.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And you are Mr. Cook's superior officer?
MR. MANN: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Now, when you received the copy of this memorandu:._, do you re-
member what you did with it or what consideration you gave to it and what actions you took?
MR. MANN: I did several things. One, I talked to Rick about it. One of the things I wanted
him to develop was the ability to do a cost estimate, to actually take an issue like this and talk
to the engineers and be able to come back with alternatives, programnlatic actions, and the costs
of each, and some judgment as to the relationship between the alternatives, And his memo
hadn't done that, but it was kind of early, frankly, in his training to expect him to be able to do
that.
I also took the memo to my boss, the Deputy Comptroller, and the Comptroller. I asked Rick
to take
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it back to the engineering staff in the program office and discuss it with them, one, so that they
knew what he had written, and two, so that if they had any--if they wanted to comment on it,
that they would have that opportunity.
So I discussed it with my immediate supervisors, and I had it sent back to the Office of
Space Flight, and then I also went to discuss with the engineers if the memorandum really re-
flected the situation as they saw it. And in those dise'nssions which I got the feeling that maybe
the memo overstated the concerns, that there were quite a few actions being taken within the
program office to resol,_e the issue, that there were extensive reviews going on, as there are in
almost any technical type of review.
So I was satisfied that it was in the proper technical channel, that it was being handled
properly, that it was being handled rigorously and thoroughly, and over time, over the next
couple of months, as I saw the report come out, the reports and the statuses witbin the program
office, the immediate concern died down.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: So you thought the points that had been raised by Mr. Cook in that
memorandum were being taken care of, and • .u thought adequately as far
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as you could tell?
MR. MANN: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Are there any questions for Mr. Mann on this particular letter?
DR. WALKER: I have a question, Mr. Chairman. I know that developmental programs
within NASA have a contingency as a part of the budget to take care of unanticipated costs.
Now, with the Solid Rocket Booster Program, which I presume was operational at this point,
was there still a contingency in the budget so that some of these problems identified with the
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seals, ibr example, could be handled without additional monies being authorized or appropri-
ated?
MR. MANN: Sir, there are three levels of reser-e within the budgets. There is a project
level reserve wh,.:h would be within the Solid Rocket Booster Project. That particular level of
reserve would not be sized to handle any kind ot significant redesign effort. It is more an oper-
ational type of reserve.
There are then level 1 and level 2 reserves that are held at the headquarters or the Johnson
level, and those reserves are really available to handle and to rebalance the program for particu-
lar problems, and those
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kind of reserves would largely be used ',oi any kind ef significant effort.
There is a third reserve mat is called the Changes and Systems Upgrading Line, and it ap-
pears specifically in the NASA budget, and that is a reserve that the Administrator reviews,
that he has available for improvements or significant upgrades to the program. And there was
no--although in the Solid Rocket Booster, there was no specific reserve for this particular situa-
tion, there were reserves within the program that could be applied to it, and there was no
budget determination made in terms of was there adequate funding? There was no impact on
the engineering process as a result of the budget.
DR. WALKER: I understand that the July letter of Mr. Cook's was essentially a training
letter. I was a little surprised to see that it didn't discuss whether or not these problems would
be v:ithin the contingency or would require additional appropriations.
Would you have expected that this letter would have discussed that point?
MR. MANN: Yes, sir. What we really do is we try and size a vroblem. It is one thing to
understand that there is a problem. It is an altogether different issue to be able to put a cost (,n
it and then to
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determine where the Agency can come up with the funds to resolve it.
And so [ wasn't particularly dismayed that in this parlticular instance i.t was, I believe, the
first one that Rick had done, the first issue ne really reviewed, that he had not been able to do a
thorough cost analysis of it. But typically, that is exactly what we would expect. We would
expect that here are the alternatives, here is the cost of each alternative, and this is where we
_hink we can find the money within the overall budget to support it.
MR. ACHESON: For the record, Mr. Mann, does the Budget Division have its own engineer-
ing staffi_
MR. MANN: We have some engineers on the staff, but they are not on the staff to be engi-
neers. It just so happens that that is their technical background before they got involved in cost
work. Our office doesn't try and do any kind of engineering evaluation or safety evaluation,
which is why when T was assured that the i_ue on the charring was being resolved in the
_..roper engineering channels, we pretty much stopped working on it.
MR. ACHESON: So on engineering and safety questions you are entirely dependent on the
other engineering divisions of the Agency, is that not so?
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MR. MANN: Yes, sir.
DR. RIDE: I think it might also be appropriate to point out that Mr. Cook referred to some
detailed engineering analyses earlier and recommended that t.he Commission review tho_e, and
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weweregiventhoseMarshallandThiokclengineeril,_reportsyesterday,andhaveaccessto all
or thedatabytheengineersonthe program.
CHAIRMANROGERS:Thereis nodoubtaboutit. Mr. Cookreferredto thesedocuments,
andsomebodyis suggestingmaybethat wehavenot hadaccessto them,and in fact wehave
them,asDr. Ridehassaid.We haveall of'the documentswehaveaskedfor, andtheyare in--
eluded.
On the subsequent memo that I talked about, February 3 from Mr. Cook to you, I gather
that you requested a memorandum of sorts from him after the accident?
MR. MANN: Yes, sir. We were trying to frankly size the potential impacts to the NASA
budget as a result of the incident. I asked Rick to specifically do a cost estin_ate for the SRB
project in the event that we had to make some change to the cases, and I specifically asked him
to do that particular type of evaluation to try and size the budget impact without
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really knowing what it would be, that we were doing the same kind of analysis on the main
engines, on the external tank, as a part of trying to see what the size of the budget problem
would be.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: He testified that he responded to that request in the heat of the
moment and wrote the memorandum which we have referred to.
Were you surprised at the contents of the February 3 memorandum?
MR. MANN: Frankly, I was. I had specifically asked ibr a cost estimate, and I specifically
needed a number, this is a $20 million problem, this is a $100 million problem, to integrate that
with other estimates that we were doing on the rest of _he program, and frankly, the memoran-
dum didn't provide that kind of inibrmation. It had some useful insights into the particulars of
the program, such as how many motors we had in in-entory_ but it didn't t'eally come down to
what i was trying to accomplish.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Any other questions?
iNo response. }
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you very much, Mr. Mann.
Mr. Moore?
Mr. Moore, you have heard Mr. Cook's
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testimony, and his testimony specifically about the two memoranda that we talked about.
Do you care to make any comment on this memo?
727
TESTIMONY OF JESSE W. MOORE, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR SPACE FLIGHT,
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION--Resumed
MR. MOORE: Yes. I would like to make a fe,;" general comments, Mr. Chairman, and then I
wc_,u!d iikc to introduce the division director,, if I can, of my Propulsion Division who manages all
of the NASA headq,,arters engineers on this, to also make some comments.
The two memos that were in question, I guess I saw the first memo that was dated on July
23, I believe, was that date. I guess I saw that for the first time on Sunday, and I think that
there are some statements that in general are fairly correct in that memo. I think there were
some areas that were somewhat out of context or a little bit exaggerated, but in terms of the
activities that were going on in the program, I believe that our Propulsion, Division, and I be-
lieve the Marshall Space Flight Center were taking all of the prudent actions to try to lay out a
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programthat wouldhelp usget a better handleon what wehad beenseeingin someof the
previous flight experiences.
With respect to the memo that you just talked about on February 3, I just saw it last night,
I guess,
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tbr the first time, and although there is some good information in there regarding the number of
flight cases in inventory and so forth, at this point I didn't know the intent of that memo was
the budget, and I was very surprised at the last paragraph in there where it seemed to say that
we were not paying enough attention to flight safety. And under no conditions had I heard any
of my people come up to me and say any of the flights were not safe for launching. So I was a
little bit surprised by that pa_icular comment in the memo.
And I also think we have had extraordinary cooperation out of the Marshall Space Flight
Center in terms of working with us on this problem. The Thiokol test program has been under
way for a number of months now, since back early in 1985, and in fact, back in the July time-
frame some money was expended on long lead hardware in the event some of the tests that we
had aimed for the QM-5 program, which was a test program that we were planning to run
coming up this week, as a matter of fact, in the event it showed different kinds of data, we
would have a leg up on this problem so we could go and fix it.
I would also like to emphasize to the Cammission that we were simply trying in this pro-
gram, in this demonst ration program and in the test programs, to try to get more margin into a
situation that we felt
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was safe tbr flight even though we had seen some of these O-rings and so forth. And so our
programs focused on trying to get more margin in this thing.
And as was indicated in the previous testimony, we had planned to fly the filament wound
cases on the upcoming Vandenberg launch. They were lighter weight cases, and we did have
some different concerns. But that QM-5 test, which was a full scaie test of the filament wound
case, was an important article for us to test some of the analysis that had been done and also
some of the laboratory tests that had been done to try to get a better handle on exactly the
behavior of this overall joint.
And our plan was to take those tests and then make a decision in terms of what our next
steps were relative to the continuation of this program.
And I would like to ask Mr. David Winterhalter, with the Commission's permission, who is
my Division Director for Propulsion, to come up and give you a little additional in-depth insight
into this whole area, if that pleases the Commission.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: That is fine.
Let's see if there are any questions for you.
DR. RIDE: I have one. I think Mr. Cook implied that there had been a decision made to
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incorporate a capture device in the field joints.
Had that decision been made?
MR. MOORE: That has not been made to my knowledge, no, Sally. I was not aware--we had
not made that as far as the overall program was concerned.
MR. ACHESON: One more question.
Are you aware, Mr. Moore, of any personnel at the Marshall Center or elsewhere who have
been excluded from the accident investigation who have anything to offer?
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MR. MOORE: 1 am glad you raised that. I was thinking about commenting on it, but I did
not. "['he Marshall Space Flight Center has hundreds of people at the Huntsville Operations
Center, which is a support center to every Shuttle launch involved in the detailed analysis of
this accident. They are propulsion people. They are worried about the Shuttle main engines.
They are worried about the external tank. They are worried about the solid rocket booster. In
addition, we have contractor personnel there from all the supporting contractors on this pro-
gram.
I think what Mr. Cook was referring to was that at the outset, when we set up the interim
board, immediately after the accident, we basically impounded all the data associated with this
tragic incident so
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that we could get a handle on the control policy on this particular data. We are now in the
process of setting up formally our task force, and we plan to involve the Marshal] Space Flight
Center and other NASA centers, headquarters personnel in that analysis.
And so I think Mr. Cook's observation was probably correct at the outset because everybody
was not allowed to be brought into the picture right up front, and that was because we impound-
ed data, and we were trying to put very tight controls on access to any data associated with this
so that we could preserve it for our accident investigation.
MR. ACHESON: Thank you.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you very much, Mr. Moore.
MR. MOORE: I would like to introduce Mr. David Winterhalter.
tWitness sworn.)
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Welcome, Mr. Winterhalter.
Please proceed.
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TESTIMONY OF MR. DAVID WINTERHALTER. ACTING DIRECTOR. SHUTTLE
PROPULSION GROUP, NATIONAl, AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
MR. WINTERHALTER: Mr. Chairman, members of the Board, first let me just tell a little
bit about the division that I have. My title is Acting Director of the Propulsion Group at head-
quarters. It is a division. Within the division we have the overall policy type generation and
overall direction of the major projects dealing mostly with the people at the Huntsville Marshall
Space Flight Center. That includes the external tank, the solid rocket boosters, and the Space
Shuttle main engines, and the various testing programs that go along with those.
I have a group that is broken up pretty much into those projects. They are small groups, one
to three people per project, very senior people. I would say that they average over 20 years serv-
ice in engineering and in manned space flight in the propulsion area, most of those years spent
by these people at NASA, very well respected throughout the Agency, called upon many times
for their outstanding judgment.
I don't want to address Mr. Cook's memo paragraph by paragraph at all, but I would like to
mention that to my knowledge, the things that he said about the engineers not taking part in
the
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investigation--I mean, I knew that the time would come, as Mr. Moore mentioned, that they
would have their opportunity, and about the noncooperation with the Huntsville folks, as Jesse
mentioned, I feel like we are a real team. We interact well, we work well together. Like any
401
team,we._)metimeshaveourdifferences,but weareusuallyable to work them out and carry a
coordinated recommendation [brward.
And that would go pretty much to any type of situation in what might come up within the
program.
If we see something that is somewhat out of the ordinary, either in our test programs or in
o'Jr flight programs, obviously there is an immediate evaluation to try to find the magnitude of
the situation and see if it might have some type of effect on upcoming flights or upcoming tests,
etc., to try to understand if maybe we should slow down whatever we are doing and take another
look•
Usually what we find is that in the initial evaluation it doesn't take drastic action to stop a
program and stop a test program. What we have been doing is we have some low level analysis
go on with prudent funding, and as we find out more about the situation, we decide that we
don't need to v_ork on it anymore, or in fact, we may need to step up the effort.
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Now, to get the specifics here on this particular area, in the nozzle joint and the field joints
on the solid rocket boosters, as soon as we started seeing any indication out of the ordinary of
what we had expected of the situation, somewhat small nozzle O-ring erosion, there was immedi-
ate, an immediate effort set up at the Marshall Space Flight Center to start looking into that
area.
Now, as the situation evolved, in 51-D the secondary nozzle joint O-ring erosion, the eftbrt
was stepped up somewhat, and that brings us up into the late spring, early summer of last year
when, as it was discussed with you yesterday, the test program at Thiokol, their analysis pro-
grams, etc., were beefed up and put into a regular plan, and that has progressed through the
summer, through the fall timeframe of a more and more intensive analysis and investigation,
etc., culminating in a November-December timeframe where they picked some of the better can-
didates for joint improvement to be tested in the next resource in the test program. That hap-
pened to be a filament wound case, but a full-up solid propulsion motor.
Now, it is very expensive to do all of the testing in solid propulsion system so you try to
•_ake use of whatever resources you have at hand. So they picked some of the
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better candidates to put into this test that has been described to you, and it had been planned
for Thursday of this week, but it has since been postponed.
And that is sort of a summary of how we go about it in general, in that specific example.
I would rather defer to Mr. Mulloy for any more detailed discussion of that, but I just
thought I would give you an overall feel for how we at headquarters look at things on an overall
basis. My people work on a day to day basis with the Huntsville people. I know right after the
accident everybody really wanted to get in and try to find out what happened, etc., but at our
level we have other things to do. We try to take a look at the overall system and try to under-
stated long term impacts, etc., and think through some various scenarios about how we might
have to react to the total situation, not just on an individual system basis but on an overall
basis, how do our systems interact with other systems. For instance, if there turned out to be a
problem on the tank, what do we do in the engine program, what do we do in the solid rocket
booster program to maybe free up some money to work on the other to make a more balanced
program?
That is our job. As much as being an engineer, we like to jump in and really dig into the
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details and roll up our sleeves and look at all of the data and that sort of thing that is not our
job at this time. However, [ expect, as Jesse mentioned, as he forms his teams, we have some
particular technical expertise within my group, and I am sure that he's going to call on some
specific people for help.
So that is what I am anticipating now.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, thank you very much.
It is fair then to say that after, or at about the time Mr. Cook's memorandum was written
in July 1985, that yeu and your team were--had been and were at that time conducting a lot of
investigations and doing a |ot of work about the O-rings, and that you continued to do that all
during this period up until the 51-L flight so that intensive work was being done by engineers
who were highly qualified to do it, is that correct?
MR. WINTERHALTER: That is correct, sir, and I think some of the material that we pre-
sented to you yesterday will show that our own internal division meetings and our discussions
with Jesse Moore, and our monthly meetings, etc., we talked about this area, we talked about
what we were doing about it. We tried to talk about potential impacts it', in fact, various scenar-
ios might work out, depending upon how much redesign might be required or desired, this is
how it
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would affect the budget, how it might affect schedules, when we could get it incorporated, etc.
And so we were doing that pretty much for the last year. And as I mentioned, it sort of
intensified as the year went on. But that is just sort of the normal way we do business.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And it is a very open organization, I gather, in terms of exchange of
views and ideas, and everyone is permitted to write memo_ and make comments as he sees fit?
But in the final analysis, the qualified people, the engineers and others who are assigned the
responsibility make the decisions, have to make the decisions.
MR. WINTERHALTER: That's true.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And the decisions in this case were made pursuant to that policy.
MR. WINTERHALTER: That's true. I pride myself in our division to be particularly good
team workers. We have our differences. We work them out. We can work them out with the
centers. We do it all the time. And we carry a unified front forward, or we say, okay, this is the
way we feel and we also give the other side, if that be the case.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And I suppose you have some confidence in your judgment because
in 24 previous
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flights you have made good judgments.
MR. WINTERHALTER: That's true.
Let me mention, at no time during that period did any of my people come to me and give
any indication that they felt like there was any safety of flight problem in their area. We all
worked--we were all working on the situation, but we were all involved in the flight readiness
reviews that have been described here today. We take an active role in that, we can make
inputs.
Mr. Moore is particularly good, and his deputy, Mike Weeks, involving everybody in these
reviews, in these monthly reviews, and everybody is encouraged to feel free to speak out in any
area. And let me tell you, sir, it happens. People aren't afraid to speak up. They are not con-
m.
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strained by saying someone will take some action against them it' they bring up something that
is unpleasant.
VICE CHAIRY _,N ARMSTRONG: Was it the view of your division, the Propulsior_ Group,
that the seal design, as it was installed and operating in the Shuttle System. was safe and ade-
quate?
MR. WINTERHALTER: It was.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: But it was further your group's view that the margins on
the seal design
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were not such that it would not benefit from improvement, is that correct?
MR. WINTERHALTER: That is correct. We felt like it could be improved. We weren't happy
wl_b the situation the way it was. We understood that the testing had been done, the margins,
etc., but as you are well aware, we are always striving to make things perfect.
MR. FEYNMAN: If the matter of Mr. Cook is more or less covered, I would like to ask some
detailed questions about seals either from you or anyone else you wish to call, like Mr. Mulloy.
MR. WINTERHALTER: I would just as soon that Larry came up and talk about seals since
he did such an adequate job this morning.
If you have some general questions--
MR. FEYNMAN: No, it is a specific, detailed question.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you very much.
MR. FEYNMAN: We spoke this morning about the resiliency of the seal, and if the material
weren't resilient, it wouldn't work in the appropriate mode, or it would be less satisfactory, in
fact, it might not work well.
I did a little experiment here, and this is not the way to do such experiments, indicating
that the
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stuff looked as if it was less resilient at lower temperatures, in ice.
Does your data agree with this feature, that the immediate resilience, that is, within the
first few seconds, is very, very much reduced when the temperature is reduced?
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TESTIMONY OF LAWRENCE MULLOY. SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS PROJECT
MANAGER, MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir, in a qualitative sense. I just can't quantify that at this time.
MR. FEYNMAN: Then you would say that I would conclude fi'om that and the various
things that you told me about the need for resilience and the lack of resilience within the first
few seconds, and of course, it comes back very slowly, isn't it true, then, that the temperature at
a low temperature increases the chance of a joint failure?
MR. MULLOY" The low temperature increases the time that would be required for the O-
ring to extrude into the gap, and that would allow greater erosion on the O-ring, yes, sir.
MR. FEYNMAN: Did you have available--there was some kind of a temperature limit, then,
on when you would say a seal was safe? Was there some kind of criterion that if the seal was
lower than a certain temperature we cannot consider it safe enough?
MR MULLOY: Yes, sir. The data that we had--as I stated, we are running extensive testing
to understand the response of the seal under the specific conditions of 51-L, but the data avail-
able to us was the
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procurementspecificationfor the material that saysthat it will operatefrom minus30to 500
degrees F, and also, a great deal of test data in motors down at temperatures where you can see
a difference in the resilience of the sea,, for instance, going from 75 degrees down to 50 degrees,
you can see that. We had those data available.
We had data that was presented on the 27th by Morton-Thiokol, some test data, that indi-
cated a further reduction in the resilience of that if the temperature was down to 20 or 25 de-
grees. It was the judgment that with the resilience that we saw there, the shrinkage of the O-
ring, and under the circumstances of the leak check that is done, that at that temperature the
O-ring would perform its function.
Now, the data that we did see is refuted by some other test data, and that is why we are
carefully running controlled tests under the specific conditions of 51-L to understand the re-
sponse of that O-ring seal, and will it perform its function in that environment?
MR. FEYNMAN: Of course, after the event is a different circumstance, and I am not really
considering that. That is not a fair question. It could be that you didn't notice the circumstances.
I just want to know, before the event, from
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information that was available and the understanding, was it fully appreciated everywhere that
this seal would become unsatisfactory at some temperature, and was there some sort of a sugges-
tion of a temperature at which the SRB shouldn't be run?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir. There was a suggestion of that, to answer the first question. First,
the data that was presented, it was the judgment that under the conditions that we would see on
launch day, given the configuration that we were in, that the seal would function at that tem-
perature. That was the final judgment.
There were data presented, as we have discussed, by some--by Thiokol engineering that
there was a suggestion that possibly the seals shouldn't be operated below any temperature that
it had been operated on previous flights.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Are there any further questions?
MR. ACHESON: One or two questions.
What is the pressure at which the tests have been run postflight to simulate this condition?
MR. MULLOY: That is the hydrostatic proof test, which is 112 percent of 1000 psi, or 1120
psi. But that does not simulate the rise rate that you have
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with the motor ignition. That is a static pressure test.
MR. ACHESON: I assume that it would just take a very short time for the O-ring to become
the same temperature of the surrounding ambient air since there is no insulation between the
outside and the O-ring, is that correct?
MR. MULLOY: That is correct. There is a lag, and that is another part of the thermal anal-
ysis, to look at specifically, with transients in ambient temperature, how does the steel, the pro-
pellant and the O-ring track that ambient temperature. But your statement is true, it tends to
track the ambient with some few degrees of lag.
DR. COVERT: What was the temperature at the time of the launch, please?
MR. MULLOY: The ambient temperature?
DR. COVERT: Yes, sir.
MR. MULLOY: I believe about 38 degrees.
Jess, is that correct?
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MR.MOORE:That is the number[ have heard, 38 degrees.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Unless everybody is really eager to press this on, I think it would be
helpful if we considered this in detail and carefully at the next session, and I would hope that
we could ask individual
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questions when we are at Kennedy, and we would prepare very carefully to have answers for all
of these questions in a full session.
I would think that in order to do it with care and deliberation, that it would take probably a
full day, and unless the members really want to press it now, I would prefer to do it at that
time.
MR. MULLOY: Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a clarification of testimony.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Can I say that at that time we will consider the weather, tempera-
ture effects, environmental effects and all of those considerations which I think deserve a full
day of testimony.
MR. MULLOY: May I clarify some testimony that I made this morning relative to the
events on the 51-L and our observations, the rationale that we used given the O-ring erosion?
Some of the questions I have had from the media indicate that it wasn't perhaps as precise
a statement as it could have been. As I stated, what I was concentrating on this morning was
the case joint since that was the primary area of interest. All of the data that I presented, the 6
of 171, the 2 of the 6 and so forth was related to the case joints. I stated that in leading up to the
51-L flight readiness review, that we had had no significant erosion or no
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erosion in the past year,
That is a true statement for the case joints. It is not a true statement for the nozzle-to-case
joints. The April 1985 is when we had that secondary O-ring erosion on the nozzle joints, and we
were watching that very closely, and we did have some subsequent cases of erosion on the
nozzle-to-case joints which were well, well below the threshold of what our limits were on that.
So I wanted to clarify that in my statement, that was related to the case field joints as op-
posed to the nozzle factory joints.
MR. ACHESON: But was that erosion on the primary ring or the secondary ring?
MR. MULLOY: In April of 1985 is the one case where we saw erosion of the secondary ring,
and that was on the nozzle-to-case joint. And that is when we went back and did some further
extensive testing on that particular configuration, and we did have some after that. We did have
some subsequent erosion on the primary ring, but never again on the secondary ring. And it was
a very low level of erosion and deemed to be within the rationale for the flight after we had the
secondary O-ring. We didn't have anything like that magnitude of problem as we continued up
through the 51-L
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on that particular joint.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: What do you mean by erosion? How do you describe erosion?
MR. MULLOY: Erosion is absolute removal of the material. It is like an erosion of a ditch
by water. The material is totally removed, and it is a divot in the surface.
MR. ACHESON: By absolute, you don't mean removal of all the material.
MR. MULLOY: No, sir. I mean, when I speak of 38 mills of erosion, I mean that the erosion
of the 280/1000 inch O-ring, that there is a bite in that O-ring, and it is a bite shaped elliptical
type of erosion that is 32 or 38 mills deep, and it tends to be anywhere from 10 to 50 times the
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lengthof thedepthof theerosionis what l am s_)eaking of. But the material is totally removed,
and the eroded surface, the sheen is gone, but it is a very smooth surface.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Is the band that surrounds the pins on the critical items
list'?
MR. MULLOY: The steel'? No, sir. That is a steel band, and it is not, because the--we have
the cork over that to retain that. And on our analysis--and the reason again it is not is because
the cork is a first failure point, and then when the motor is
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pressurized, the band is so taut that analysis shows that it can't lift off, and therefore its heating
is the same as the basic structure, and no thermal protection is really required in that area. The
steel itself is sufficient to take that
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: The cork isn't a structural member?
MR. MULLOY: The cork is not a structural member. Initially it was there for thermal pro-
tection, based upon the early flights. It also served the function of holding the band as we got
the ascent thermal environments, and concluded that really, that the cork wasn't reqmred
there, we left it in that position because we still had to have something as a secondary restraint
on that band, which provides a second protection device that keeps that band from being a criti-
cal item.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: If the band which is under tension, as I understand it,
were to snap, what would the effect be'?
MR. MULLOY: No2hing as long as the cork is there. The cork would retain the pins.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: It wouldn't destroy the cork?
MR. MULLOY: I guess to get enough--I would
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have to look at analysis. I suspect to get enough strain to snap the band, you would probably
crack the cork, but to get enough strain to crack the band, you have also overpressurized the
motor. I don't know what--I don't know what the margin is between 1000 psi on the motor and
how much stretch you could put into that band before it would break. But you would have to
overpressurize the motor in order for that to happen,
MR. FEYNMAN: You spoke of erosion. There is also a phenomenon called blow-by, and I
would like the answer to two questions, and the first is, during the last year where you said
there was no erosion, was there any blow-by in the field joints? And second, are you more wor-
ried by blow-by or by erosion?
MR. MULLOY: Well, I am more worried by erosion with blow-by, and the reason for that is
the erosion reduces the cross sectional area of the O-ring, and the erosion can be caused by two
things, which is the direct impingement, and then the blow-by erodes it in a different area which
further damages the O-ring and reduces its possibility of sealing.
Let me look at the data that I have provided you yesterday, and again, to be precise about
my statements, the statements were leading up to the 51-L FRR, and I did state that after the
51-L FRR, we
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disassembled the 61-C where we found some almost immeasurable erosion on the primary O-
ring, almost immeasurable, like .004 inches of the 280/1000s. On the 61-A, which flew in October
of 1985, we did record soot behind the primary O-ring with no evidence of erosion, and so what
we were seeing there, again, the primary" O-ring was displaced during the initial pressurization.
There was some gas blow-by for probably from zero to 50 psi, probably very, very low, and then
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the O-ringwasseated,but that wasa hot gaswhich pyrolysedthe greaseand putty,which is
whatdepositedthe soot.Noneof that camefrom the O-ring,becausetherewasabsolutelyno
erosion,thesheenwasn'tevengoneon theO-ring.Therewasno indicationof heateffecton the
primary O-ring.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I just want to add to what I said beibre, that at the hearings that we
have that will deal with temperature effects, and weather and environmental effects and so
f'Jrth we will want the Thiokol people there.
Yesterday we had a representative from Thiokol there, but he did not have as much first-
hand information as we would like, and so we want to be sure at that hearing to have firsthand
information and a chronology of all of the events preceding the launch that dealt
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with weather and environmental problems.
DR. WALKER: Mr. Chairman, I had at. additional question on O-rings, if I might.
The O-rings are not one continuous piece of material. They are bonded in several places.
MR. MULLOY: They are vulcanized together.
DR. WALKER: If the erosion occurred at the location of one of the splices or bonds, would
that do you think pose a more serious problem to the seal?
MR. MULLOY: I don't know the answer to that, and I don't know that we have any correla-
tion with erosion at that joint, and I would like to take that as a question and look at that. I
really don't know whether erosion at that point would be more critical or whether it erodes
more or less in thp vulcanized joint.
DR. WALKER: Presumably the erosion is occurring where there are penetrations through
the putty, so if the penetration would happen to occur at a joint, then presumably the problem
would occur there.
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir.
Let me take that as a question and look at our test data, whether we have even tested it at
a splice joint, and whether that is better or worse in terms of the erosion rate of the O-ring.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you, Mr. Mulloy. You
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have been very helpful. We appreciate it.
I would like to close the session now today, and as I have said, we will plan to go to Kenne-
dy on Thursday.
I would also like to remind particularly those from the media that the Commission was
asked to conduct a calm and deliberate investigation, which I think so far we have managed to
do reasonably well. I would, though, suggest that we, because of the press attention, we are not
going to continue to be available individually for individual press conferences, and I hope the
media will understand that. We are going to provide as much information on a regular basis as
we can, probably principally through a spokesman, and therefore we would ask your indulgence
and not to intercept our progress in and out of the building.
(Laughter.)
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I realize it is a laughing matter. I realize nobody will pay any atten
tion to it.
(LaL'ghter.)
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Anyway, it's a good try.
Thank you,
(Whereupon, at 3:40 o'clock p.m., the Commission recessed subject to the call of the Chair.)
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PROCEEDINGS
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I would liketo say that we're very pleased that you made provisions
for us to be here so quickly and so thoroughly, and how busy allof you have been, and thank all
of you for making itpossible.
Secondly, I would like to suggest that, in view of the story this morning in _he New York
Times resulting from yesterday's briefing,that you get the appropriate people to start thinking
about this criticalityone problem, because itcame through in the newspapers as ifthe waiver
was of tremendous significance,and itappears as ifthe waiver only applied to this particular
flightand this particularproblem.
And so I think -re may want to,after we've had a chance to talk to you about it,pointing
out that this isnot al_ that unusual, that itisnot a waiver as such, that you've isolateda criti-
calityproblem and the_ you've thoroughly considered whether that should resultin the stopping
of flightsor not or whether itwas something that was an important factorand you had done all
you could about it,but you decided to proceed.
Now, ifyou can show that that isalso not an
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unusualcircumstance,the samepapersandthe samedocumentationwou!dshowa lot of other
aspectsof"theshuttleprogram,that _,'ouldhelpyou.
If yousawthepaperthismorning,it soundsverysarious,just in thecaseof theO-rings,and
youwaivedsomethingthat wasdangerous.Sogivescmethoughtto howwemighthandlethat
possiblythisafternoon.
MR.MOORE:Yes,sir. Let mejust commenton that. Westartedanactionyesterdaygoing
backthroughtheentireprogramlookingat category one items, and there are a number of them
in the program, and I think we will put that particular situation in context.
Mr. Chairman, let me also make a couple of other comments quickly. We have people here
from three NASA centers--the Kennedy Space Center, the Marshall Space Flight Center, and
the Johnson Space Flight Center, to try to support you and your Commission here today.
You will see reports from our various teams that have been eormed in terms of where they
are in their analysis and the results of the work that they have done to date on this i;::ng. And
we have tried to sketch the agenda out so we can give you reports, and tomorrow, I would like to
close tomorrow, if I could,
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with telling you what our kind of tbrecast, being a schedule of activitie, to encompass the addi-
tional analysis that we plan to undertake, as well as the additional tests that we plan to under-
take tryipg to validate various phase errors.
So with that, I would !ike to turn the meeting over to Mr. Dick Kohrs of Johnson Space
Center. And Dick is prepared to cover in detail the environment and the events time line, which
I think has been of high interest on your list.
So with that. let me turn it over to Dick Kohrs.
STATEMENT OF DICK KOHRS, DEPUTY MANAGER, NST PROGRAM OFFICE. JOHNSON
SPACE CENTER
MR. KOHRS: I'm Dick Kohr_ from Johnson Space Center, Del:aty Manager of' the NST Pro-
gram Office, and I work for Arnie Aldrich.
Jess mentioned I was going to talk about environments today. I'm not going to talk too
much about the ,mvironment. I'm going to give you the weather that we had cn launch day
during our final mission management teams, and we're building a more detailed enviroriment
and discussion of the weather that we hope to have ready later on this week.
(Viewgraph.)lmq. 2 _:_ I I
Cou!d I have the next chart, please, which is the outline.
(Viewgraph.) Im'f. 2 ;:; 2 I
I'm going to go over a few charts on the pre-launch time line and the weather summary I'm
going to give you is the weather summary as we dealt with it in our mission management teams
that we had ",he last day, starting with the L minus one review, and just highlight that for you.
And then I'm going to go through the ascent time line, and then I have some detail of the data
base that we used to build the ascent time line, m,d show you those data
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points.
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tIt is both telemetry data and data that we recreated from the photo,: which you're going, to
see next and Charlie Steve,._on is going to present.
The next chart, please.
_Viewgraph.t ll¢,.l -' J:_ :_l
The first part ef the time line, which is really kind of gross. It is a pre-launch time ime
which takes us all the way back to the ET _;n dock at KSC back in August of last year The
orbiter from the last mission returned to Kennedy on the llth of November. The SRB stacking
for this stack was the 4th through the 10th.
ET SRB mate was on the 10th, and it's a little bit out of sequence here. At the same time
while the orbiter was in the OPF, we were putting in the Spartan Halley into the orbiter cargo
bay in the horizontal.
MR. KEEL: Mr. Chairman, could I make one suggestion, that you don't use the acronyms,
for the benefit of the Commissioners.
MR. KOHRS: I will do the best I can.
The external tank on dock is the ET. ORB is the orbiter. Of course, the SRB the solid rocket
boosters. Then the mating of those.
The orbiter-external tank m_lte is on the
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16th. We transferred the total stack from the "rawler to the pad on the 22nd of December, se-
cured the vehicle, essentially powered it off. F_'om the 24th to the 3rd was the time for upgrade
here at Kennedy.
In the meantime, the cargo, the IUS, and the TDRS data satellite went out to the cargo
prior to Christmas, stayed in its payload canister until after the holidays, and then was installed
in the orbiter here on the 5th of January.
The TCDT is a terminal countdown demonstration test. It is an all-up test of the flight vehi-
cle with the Kennedy team tb_at goes through a simulated countdown down to T-zero, then after
T-zero they run a couple of anomaly cases in plus time just for training primarily.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Are you going to be explaining that a little bit later, because I really
don't understand that. I don't understand what you just said.
MR. KOHRS: Prior to every flight--and it's normally about two weeks--with the stacked
vehicle in its flight configuration, with the flight crew on board, here at Kennedy we conduct
what is called a TCDT, which is a terminal countdown demonstration test, that exercises the
flight vehicle and the flight crew and the ground crew.
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We do not tank the vehicle, the external tank, during th _t test, and we do not run our aux-
iliary propulsion systems, we do not run the APU's or we do not run the booster HFU's. But it is
the best we can simulate is a detailed time line countdown that we're going to do on launch day.
DR. COVERT: When you say you don't tank it, does that mean the tanks are empty?
MR. KOHRS: The orbiter OMS tanks and RCS tanks are full. And when I say don't tank, it
is the external tank, the liquid launch.
DR. COVERT: And the RCS, this is the rocket control system that you use?
MR. KOHRS: Yes, that is not tanked. And the reason I put that on here, the hyper load
came after the terminal countdown demonstration. The hyper load is the OMS and RCS, et
cetera. And I apologize for these acronyms.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Dick, one detail on stacking. Did you take out one segment? We
heard the aft center segment?
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MR.KOHRS:That'sgoingto becovered,I think, on this afterqoon's agenda. You will have
a detailed discussion of that. Here I was just trying to give you a view of how things progressed
here at KSC.
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CIIAIRMAN ROGERS: But as far as TCDT, did you take and have the astronauts out _here
and the whole crew'. )
MR. KOHRS: Right.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And you planned to try to shnulate v,'hat it would do in term, _. of
time, what each person has to do?
MR. KOHRS: Right.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Does any inspection occur at that time?
MR. KOHRS: Not to my knowledge. We don't really do any detailed inspection. It's just a
dress rehearsal.
MR. RUMMEL: Does that include a system checkout?
MR. KOHRS: The best we can. It powers up the orbiter subsystems. We don't--the fuel cells
are not powered up. We use ground power and the best we can simulate we power up the guid-
ance system. Primarily, it is the guidance system we power up.
MR. RUMMEL: How about the telemetering data system?
MR. KOHRS: All the data is telemetered to the ground through the umbilicals. Some of it is
RF and that data is recordea.
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MR. RUMMEL: But at that point you check the propellant meter system out to be sure all
the circuits are working?
MR. KOHRS: To be sure all the data flows and all the red lines are passed that apply to
that dress rehearsal yes, sir. It is as close as we can get to--the best words are a dress rehears-
al, with the flight crew and the ground crew.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Dr_ Ride was just saying, in addition, what happens to the engines?
DR, RIDE: Well, we don't--I guess the best way to put it is that it is a dress rehearsal for
the crew and the launch control center and the orbiter systems, and you go through an entire
countdown, including the data and information that you would be getting on launch day.
In the launch control center and on board, you go through the regular countdown, and
really you go down to zero. But we don't light the engines, obviously, and you don't load the
external tank, and you don't start the auxiliary power units, and you don't light the engines.
But basically everything else is a dress rehearsal for the launch.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And that is for the purpose of a dress rehearsal. You don't learn
anything about
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the condition of the shuttle at, that time?
MR. MOORE: No, you do learn about the orbiter system and so forth, sir, at that time.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: What do you learn?
MR. MOORE: We learn if some of the orbiter avionics systems on board are functioning
properly. We also learn if we have got any problems with the ground processing system to get
ready for launch in the launch control center.
So we do learn a lot, and that allows us te put in ,_.._ kind of corrections required prior to
actually doing the launch. That is a very important milestone that we go through on each mis-
sion.
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS. And I suppose you will be telling us later what you learned?
MR. MOORE: Yes, sir.
MR. SUTI"ER: When you take the system out of the assembly shed and you put it onto the
moving transfer plate--
MR. KOHRS: The mobile launch platform and the crawler.
MR. SUTTER: This introduces--you take it under one loading condition and you put an-
other load on, like the solid rocket boosters. How is that controlled? Is that done the same way
every time, and
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are there checks after you take it from one place to another the shifting in load hasn't affected
the mating bet._een the solid rocket boosters and the external tank?
Or could something happen there to say affect the loading of the joints and the seals? And
how is that, you might say, inspected to make sure that a movement like that is consistent and
in line with all of the documented specs?
MR. KOHRS: The best way I would describe that is, when we stack the vehicle in the verti-
cal assembly building we have the strain measurements of the holddown posts, and that data is
recorded as we stack the vehicle. We have level-in requirements that the vehicle has to be to a
certain level requirement to get the loads balanced between the eight posts, and I think that
criteria is something like 10 thousandths to start a stack.
We have criteria dimensionally that says, when you get it to the top where the ET attaches,
you have to have a certain dJ.mensional criteria that you have to pass.
MR. SUTTER: But do you continue those measurements as you make the_,e transfers?
MR. KOHRS: Yes. After the vehicle is stacked, y,_u roll out to the ]au:ach pad. Then you
again
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have measurements to tell you what the loading is on the stack out on the launch pad.
And we also have that data coming down during the liftoff of the loads that we are putting
into the holddown posts. And you will see in my later time line one of the things that we
haven't completed yet is to accurately reconstruct the liftoff loads based upon that data, strain
gauge data, than based upon the film analysis, to make sure that this vehicle has lifted off
within our envelope that we had on the previous 24 flights. And that is ongoing.
MR. SUTTER: So you are checking those loads against your previous flightS_
MR. KOHRS: Yes, and the film data, because we have film data in terms of the drift as you
go out of the ascent.
MR. CRIPPEN: Dick, just for clarification, what were the measurements that you had on
the holddown points? We don't instrument, nor do we measure, the joints per se after the stack-
ing?
MR. SUTTER: What about the loads attached between the solid rocket booster and the main
tank? Is that an important load thac could vary?
MR. KOHRS: Let me back up. In the OFT program which you saw last week, which was our
first
766
five flights, we flew one--we flew one of two that it was heavily instrumented, as were the
SRB's, as were the struts.
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We havegatheredour databaseduring that time frameand haveusedthat databaseto
say.it' westackwithin thesedimensionaltoleranceswe'regoingto bewithin our loadaccept-
ante.
MR. SUTTER: But since that time, you've changed the structural characteristics of the
center tank. You took 5.000 pounds out of it. You've increased the po._'er of the solid rocket
boosters, not by much but like about five percent. And you had a margin you were dealing with
at that time in those other flights.
But what has happened to that margin for this flight?
MR. KOHRS: Analytically we have done that. We can show you anal_ically what the mar-
gins are with the new configurations. We have no t passed--STS-5 had what I would call a heavi-
ly instrumented DFI. That is development flight instrumentation.
That is not real time. It was recorded in on-board recorders, and once we landed we ana-
lyzed that data on the first five flights. But based upon that data, based upon our structural
models, we have analyzed
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what the new loads are, and it is based ulJon that that we proceeded.
MR. SUTTER: You are tMking about doing some more tests, though, to verify that?
MR. KOHRS: Yes, sir. And I think George Hardy is going to talk a little bit later. 1 think he
is, on that.
The hypergolic load, which is the OMS and RCS, was done on the 16th, and on the HPU, is
the solid rocket booster.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Just before we got to that, what does that mean, hyperload? What
did you do?
MR. KOHRS: Sir, the OMS and RCS, which are our maneuvering systems on board the or-
biter, are hyper propellant, and roughly the OMS is in the nei;,shborhood of 23,000 pounds and
the RCS is in the neighborhood of 7400 pounds.
GENERAL KUTYNA: These are bypergolic propellants. They don't need any ignition.
DR. COVERT: And the OMS is the orbiter maneuvering system. _[hat's the rocket that
allows you to rotate.
MR. KOHRS: And the reactio__ control system are the small jets described last week.
MR. MOORE: Dick, let's make sure we cover
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each of the acronyms up here, because that is a communication problem we've got with some
members of the Commission. So let's make sure we explain the acronyms.
MR. KOHRS: The data on the 17th is the HPU, which is the propulsion system for the
SRB's. It is very similar to the orbiter's auxiliary propulsion system. And we did roughly a 20
second hot fire prior to launch in the 17th time period.
And finally, at 1/23 we picked up a point m our countdown that is called the beginning of
the final count or the beginning of the terminal count, and that begins at T minus 43, which in
calendar days, 43 hours in calendar days is roughly three days befi)re the planned launch.
You've got some built-in holds, but this is in our clock counting terminology.
MR. RUMMEL: Could you explain the HPU a little more fully?
MR. KOHRS: The HPU and the SRB control the actuators that drive the nozzle for the
flight control.
MR. RUMMEL: How is it powered?
MR. KOHRS: By an auxiliary power propulsion unit, very similar to the orbiter, which is
basically a hydrozene powered system. And the only major difference
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betweenthe orbiter and the SRB ts the orbiter has some reqmrements where it has to go
through the total ascent. It has to be able to restart it on flight, and it's used durmg entry fbr
elevon control and surface control.
The SRB HPU basically only needs to work during this 20 seconds prior to liftoff and
through the 128 seconds of burn. It is recovered, it is reused t'o- tbllowing flights.
MR. RUMMEL: Thank you.
MR. KOHRS: Could you put up the next chart, _qease?
(Viewgraph.; Ira',. _ J:; 'I
What we have done here at Kennedy is, for this flow which involves the orbiter, the exter-
nal tank, the SSME, and the solid rocket boosters, we have gone back and are _t,_ lewing all of
the paper that was generated during that flow, and we have appointed special teams, different
than the guys or the people that did the work. t(, go back and relook to satisfy ourselves that
that paper was properly closed out.
To date, that amounts to about 2,000 pieces of paper of different actions and things that
were done since the 26th of August. That data we estimate we will have complete probably
within ten days to two weeks.
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MR. WALKER: Is that a fairly typical level of paper?
MR. KOHRS: That is typical of a flow. And the chart on the right is just an example. I
won't dwell on it, but it is an anomaly that occurred when the orbiter !anded at Dryden from its
last flight, where we had a platform interference with the orbiter and we nicked a couple of
tiles. And the people went back to relook at that to make sure that that was satisthctorily closed
out.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Is there anything in that time line that is of significance in terms of
anomalies or anything else that was suspicious that might have affected 51-L so far?
MR. KOHRS: No, sir. The only thing I would think up here--and we've had a lot of weather
discussion--is we did go to the pad.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, we will come to that later. But I'm just thinking as far as this
chart, the time line, is concerned, there is nothing unusual about it, and this was the way you
normally handled it, and what you're doing is describing how it worked, and it worked in this
case without any problem as far as you could tell?
MR. KOHRS" Yes, and the amount of paper we
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created on this flow I would say is typical of other flows.
The next chart then is going to take you from the T minus 43 point, which is the start of--
the next chart, please.
(Viewgraph.) trot. 2 la--I I
--which is the start of the terminal count. And it extends, and I will have to go through my
acronyms, it extends from the pickup at i0:00 a.m. on the 23rd of January, goes through our
final launch down here to 11:38, which was our launch time.
Basically, at T minus 43 hours there's a standard set of terminal count flows that were
being followed with no unusual circumstances. On the 25th at 11:00 a.m., we had our L minus
one day. And "MMT" stands for mission management team. We talked a little bit about that
last week.
Next chart, please.
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(Viewgraph.)Ira', " I:_-,1
At that briefing the projects and all of the cargo gave their go for launch The only question-
able item we had on that day is, we had a questionable weather predicted for the Sunday launch
on the 26th.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: ttow large is that MMT team?
MR. KOHRS: We have some charts. The MMT team
on L minus one is done both here in person and by telecon around our loop. If you count up all
those people, we probably had close to 100 people: primarily all the field centers, their contrac-
tors, the cargo people and their support, the Kennedy people and their support here locally.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Are the telecons recorded?
MR. KOHRS: No, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Were there any summaries made after the conversations?
MR. KOHRS: Normally, at the L minus one mission management team the record isIthe
presentations that were given at that meeting, that is in the record.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But no record of the comments were made?
MR. KOHRS: No, sir, no formal record has been made. That is a good point. At the FRR
action items are documented and s I said last week, we close out the action items that we have
from the FRR at the L minus one, and that closeout of all the open action items are documented
and in the record as closed out formally.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: When you say "closed out," you mean checked? Everybody says
okay?
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MR. KOHRS: Jess Moore and Arnie Aldrich sign them.
MR. MOORE: And the generator for the action item provides the data for the action item.
They are then reviewed by and signed off by that person. They are then signed off by the respon-
sible project ma_lager, and they are signed off by Arnie Aldrich at level two, and then they're
presented to me and I have the final signoff on them. And that is the formal action tor any
s;gnoffs that we have at this L minus one day review or the flight readiness review, as we dis-
cussed before.
We've got records of those.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And everyone who signed off, the only real question then was the
weather?
MR. MOORE: The only real question that we had at the launch minus one day review was
in fact the weather. There were no system problems identified at that time.
CHAIRMAN ROC,--LRS: And how did you leave the weather?
MR. KOHRS: I was going to go through that next. The right chart is a couple of bullets on
each of our meetings on the weather. Now, as we meet later this week or next week, we will give
you a detailed briefing. We actually have charts that were presented
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at the meeting. We have the videotapes that were presented at the meeting.
But if you look at the top of the chart of the right, at that mission management team, the
cold front approaching, that was forecast for low clouds and rain at launch time. Temperature
forecast for launch on that day was going to be in the mid-60's at launch time. And just for
information, it was also reported at that meeting that the rainfall that we had at the pad since
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the rollout on the 22nd was approximately seven inches, versus a normal of two and a half
inches tbr this time period.
DR. RIDE: Did anybody express any concern over that? Were there any systems that
thought that might be a problem?
MR. KOHRS: No.
MR. ALDRICH: I would like to comment, Sally. We did discuss that throughout this period,
about the amount of water that the orbiter might have picked up in terms of additional weight,
and that was closely monitored, and the amount of waterproofing on the ort)iter had been re-
viewed to show that we were well within the minimum pickup.
DR. RIDE: And I assume that all oe the appropriate systems people, like SRB people, to pick
a
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relevant example maybe, had heard that there was more raia than usual?
MR. ALDRICH: That was clearly reported in a very formal way, the same way we're report-
ing it today.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Had there been any evidence that on previous launches that rain
had created any problem?
MR. ALDRICH: Early in the program, we had a problem with water pickup in orbiter tiles,
and we have had an ongoing program of techniques to waterproof the orbiter and prevent that,
both from the extra weight that was carried and from the freezing of that water in orbit, caus-
ing tiles to fracture as the freezing expands.
That has been well understood and researched through the whole flight program, and there
are techniques and ways to deal with it, including the ones that were discussed here, including
51-L. And we felt that was well within bounds.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But that related to the tiles and not to the launch itself, or to any
danger involved with the launch from the view of the amount of rainfall?
MR. ALDRICH: It related to the launch with respect to the orbiter and any related causes
or dangers
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that might be involved with the launch of the flight.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I guess maybe let me ask the question a little differently. Did you
have any previous experience with rainfall that had created any possible problem with the
launch or with the O-rings?
MR. ALDRICH: I don't believe so.
MR. MOORE: I think George Hardy from Marshall Space Flight Center, I would let him
comment on that.
MR. HARDY: No, we had no problems of any kind that we attached in any way to the rain.
MR. WALKER: I understood that the putty was thought to be rather sensitive to moisture
and there was a concern that humidity might somehow affect the putty.
MR. HARDY: There is a procedure for handling the putty and storing the putty prior to the
time that it is applied. And then of course the segments are stacked. And part of this procedure
is relative to the fact that we want to minimize the moisture pickup of the putty.
The experience that we have had is that when the putty does pick up moisture that it gets
tacky and sticky and softer.
DR. COVERT: Is there a seal at the bottom of the skirt, or the nozzle, rather, so that the
inside of the rocket is isolated from the environment?
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MR.HARDY:Yes,Gene,there isa plug,whatwecall a nozzleplug,that is bondedin place
in the nozzlewhile it is sittingon the launchpador while it is beingshipped.And it doeshave
thermalprotectionsystemmaterialonthebottomof it
DR.COVERT:Thermalor humidity?
MR. HARDY:Thermal.Now,the bond,the bonditself of coursefbrmsa seal,whichwe
think is a goodseal.Wedon't proposeit to bea hermeticseal,but wedothink it is a goodseal.
DR.COVERT:This is actuallyan insulator.Whenyoustart the mainengines,with current
circulatingaround,it cancomeupandcausea problem.
MR.HARDY:That iscorrect.
DR.COVERT:Is this anepoxyseal?
MR.HARDY:Yes,it is a epoxyseal,and that plugactuallyblowsout whenweignite the
solidrocketmotors.I forgettheexactpressure,but it's 15or 20or 30psi.
MR. MOORE:I wasgoingto say,Mr. Chairman,that at the time of this launchwe had
not--wewerenot awareof any waterexperiencesin anyof the joints.We are lookingat the
waterhistory"nowforthe programin a lot of detail,andwe'retrying to seeif in facttherecould
havebeensomewaterin that
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particularjoint.
That is oneof thefailure analysisscenariosthat weare lookingat, andwearetrying to go
backin thehistoryandprocessingof all of the segmentsandretrievingof all of thesegmentsto
find out if wedid seeany evidenceof water.I did hear a report the otherday that wedid see
oneinstancepotentiallywherewedid havesomewater,andweare lookingat that right now.
And I donothavea detailedreportto offeryounow,but I will tell youthat mytaskforceis
really lookingat that, becausewaterin this joint in my opinionhasto belookedat veIy, very
carefully.
CHAIRMANROGERS: Well, I think that answers my question. In other words, you still
have some suspicion that the rainfall might have affected the joint?
MR. MOORE: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And you are studying that.
MR. MOORE: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But at the time of the launch you had no reason to think that the
rainfall in and of itself was part of the problem, going to cause a problem?
MR. MOORE: That is correct. That was my
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feeling at the time, and ! will let Dr. Lucas and Arnie and the other people who sat and made
the final critical decision that we had no reason to believe, other than the tile, absorption of
water had anything to do with any concerns relative to the systems in the shuttle.
DR. LUCAS: Yes, I am Bill Lucas. That is correct, at the time of launch we had no evidence
that water would be a problem.
In the first place, these joints are put together with very heavy grease on the tang and on
the clevis side of it, and then a bead is put around the top. That is primarily to protect the joint
from corrosion as you tow it back through the sea.
But we had not had any evidence that water had been captured in those joints. Since that
time, since the launch, we have heard that there may have been one instance in which there
was evidence of water in the joint, and we are pursuing that to see if that is in fact the case.
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Without drawing any conclusions, of course, how far back was that
experience'?
DR. LUCAS: The experience that has been reported to me, which is not confirmed as far as
I'm concerned, is on STS-9, which was--and this would be
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25. so that was several launches ago.
MR. MOORE: STS-9, sir, I think was launched m November of 1983, and it was the first
space lab launch in the shuttle program, I believe, November of 1983, I believe.
MR. ALDRICH: Mr. Chairman, could I make one more comment about the weather, because
over and over again that will come into our discussions. This mission management team focuses
extensively on the weather for every launch, because of a variety of considerations with respect
to the orbiter--the fragility of the tiles from ice impact, the crosswinds at our landing site, and
the approaches for the landing site.
I mean, we have one here right at Kennedy adjacent to the launch pad. So we had extensive
discussion of the weather and a review for the orbiter, and that is why that comes up so much in
our discussion.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I understand that. But for our purposes, the first objective we have,
or the first request by the President to this Commission, was to try to find out the cause of this
accident. We have other considerations later on. But I mean, that is our first mandate or part of
the mandate.
And so I am trying to focus and we're trying
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to focus on things that might relate to that. And obviously, there are a lot of aspects to the
weather. The rainfall itself, there was unusually heavy rainfall, and the question I was asking,
did it occur to you that that rainfall in and of itself might affect the joints?
And now of course you're tellirg me you didn't think s_ at the time, you are reviewing the
previous launches to see, and there is one that might be suspicious.
DR. LUCAS: Mr. Chairman, may I clarify one aspect? And George Hardy has just reminded
me that if this moisture or water was uncovered allegedly in the joint during the process of
stacking, it was necessary to de-stack. The vehicle was de-stacked, one segment was removed
from the other, and water was discovered and of course removed.
To our knowledge, STS-9 did not launch with any water in the joint.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Jess, one last rainfall question. How many launches experienced this
much rain since the orbiter got rolled out to the pad?
MR. MOORE: I don't have the data. We will have to go back and track that data and give
you a history of the rainfalls as a function of launches. Early in the program, a lot of flights set
out a fairly
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long period of time and so forth, so there have been instances where we've seen a number of
instances of rainfall.
GENERAL KUTYNA: The point I'm trying to make, this is not necessarily the wettest or-
biter you ever launched?
MR. MOORE: Well, I don't know that, Don. I can't commit to that right now, but we are
going back and researching that weather history and so forth on the systems.
MR. ALDRICH: A clarification. We reviewed how much water we thought this orbiter had
picked up and we felt the pad protection, the launch pad weather protection, and the water-
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proofingcausedthis orbiterto notbeexcessivelyheavy,andthoughtwehada maximumof 200
pounds, which is a low number given the total an unprotected orbiter could pick up and well
within the bounds that we've accepted on other flights. And we felt it would fly with no signifi-
cant effect.
MR. RUMMEL: In addition to the water question, I assume you're calculating the loads im-
posed on the various attachment fittings, both the shuttle and the SRB, as best you can that
were exi"_rienced during this flight, is that correct?
MR. KOHRS: Yes, we are.
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MR. RUMMEL: Do those calculations take into account what has to be a very complicated
structural dynamic situation between the main components? Have you found any structural de_
formations? Has this occurred? Is this being done?
MR. KOHRS: Yes, sir. I will show you what we call our detailed ascent reconstruction. We
are probably a couple of weeks away from the detailed reconstruction of the loads that we think
we saw on launch date, based on the environment, which primarily is the winds aloft environ-
ment.
The liftoff loads we got: At SRB ignition we had the strain gauge data, and the wind data
we got from our wind balloons that were sent up, and that is ongoing. I will show you some
chal_s later that will show you the wind profiles and some of the Q levels. And I have some
backup charts that will show you in a preliminary fashion, for example, the strut between the
SRB and the ET, what we predicted pre-flight and what we have reconstructed to date based
upon the winds of the day.
And Tom Moser will also show you that.
MR. RUMMEL: Does the recorded information show the relative G loads between the shut-
tle and the SRB's and the main tanks?
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MR. KOHRS: I don't have it today, but the reconstruction does do that.
MR. RUMMEL: It does to that?
MR. MOORE: Yes, sir.
MR. RUMMEL: Do you have similar data on earlier flights. I'd be interested in how the
structural loads might have been affected by the dynamics between the main tank and the SRB.
MR. KOHRS: Yes, sir, we have it for all of our flights up through STS-5. We had our struts
instrumented_ so we are actually getting measurements for that I call our OFT flights or oper-
ational flight test program. We have that data, which shows you what the interaction was for
those five flights, and then we have the analytical data modeling that tells you, based upon the
wind measured that day, what the strut loads and what the vehicle loads were for all of the
flights.
MR. RUMMEL: You don't know yet how that came out for this flight?
MR. KOHRS: Well, on a couple of preliminary things, for example the strut that holds the
orbiter--I'm sorry, the external tank, to the SRB, we have reconstructed that, and the load
levels are down into like the 50 percent level.
MR. RUMMEL: Were there any unusual wind shear
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conditions?
MR. KOHRS: Yes, sir, and I have a chart here later that will show you that we did have a
wind shear around the 60 second time frame. And I think what we will build during these sce-
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nariosisa combinationof thewindshearandthe othereventsprobablyweresomecombination
to *hisfailurescenariothat isbeingdeveloped.
And I will showyou.her_,whatthe effectswereof the wind component of that. The winds,
though, were based on our balloon releases. We released balloons at 13 hours before launch--
actually, it started 48 hours belbre launch--24 hours before launch, 13 hours be|bre launch, 7
hours, 5 hours, 3 hours, 2 hours, and then 10 minutes after launch, on this particular flight we
did.
DR. COVERT: Does the balloon data correlate with the plume distortion in the 35, 40,000
foot altitude level?
MR. KOHRS: I will show you that, based upon the wind data and what the act'_al vehicle
rates were doing, we have a delta force that we cannot account for.
DR. COVERT: But the plume data also shows a strong shear in this altitude.
MR. KOHRS: And that is the analysis still ongoing.
GENERAL KUTYNA: At Vandenberg, when we let
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our balloons up, since they go much slower than the rocket does, the darn balloon goes way the
hock down range before it gets to 50,000 feet, while the rocket goes up through here. Do you
have that same problem?
MR. KOHRS: We have the same problem. We have that modeled, and downrange we are
looking at a device called a wind orofiler, which is installed here at Kennedy, that can give you
more accurate wind data. And that is ongoing.
MR. SUTTER: You know, the wind shear and wind is an instantaneous effect. What does an
hour before reading do for you to tell you what kind of wind, shear?
MR. KOHRS: Well, we have developed our math models based upon a lot of historical data,
for every month of the year, for different times of the year. And in our wind models we put in
what is called a persistence factor, that says that the wind is this at seven hours and we've got
the data from the last 48 hours; mathematically, from a modeling standpoint we predict ahead,
and that is why we try to launch our balloons as close as possible to launch.
Now, our data has shown--and we generate the load profiles for each of these winds, and
our data has shown a pattern that pretty closely follows the last 10, 12 hours.
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MR. RUMMEL: Has there been, may I ask, any evidence of fatigue or other structural prob-
lems in the reusable part of the attach fittings during past launches?
MR. KOHRS: George, you may have to answer that for me.
MR. HARDY: I have no recollection of that. We will check that. Well, my recollection is
there has been no problem.
MR. WAITE: Along that line, you were on the pad for a month, is that right?
KOHRS: The 22nd to the 28th.
WAITE: What load margins are represented with the weather conditions? How much
weather put into that once it's on the pad?
KOHRS: The vehicle is installed at the vertical assembly building, then rolled out to
WAITE: I mean while it's on the pad, do you monitor it during that month to see what
history is?
MR. KOHRS: No, I do not believe we do. We do not monitor the holddown posts during the
time ;t is on the pad. We do it after rollout and then we do it prior to launch, and of course we
have get the data during the launch phase.
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DR.COVERT:Doyoumonitorloadswhileit is
7_
on the moveable vehicle'. )
MR. KOHRS: No, we don't.
MR. LAMBERTH: Dick, we've looked at them. I need to go back and look at the effect. And
I'm Horace Lamberth, I'm sorry. Director of Shuttle Engineering for KSC. We have looked at all
of the data that we took on the initial stacking, during the launch, and prior to launch.
But I will go back and see in the periods between that.
MR. WAITE: Well, is it ten percent of max load or five percent? It may be so low it's not
significant.
MR. KOHRS: It is very low. We will have to get to those details.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Why don't you go ahead. I think we're getting ahead of you, and
you've probably got other people that have information. So why don't we move along.
MR. KOHRS: Okay. If we move to the top of the right-hand chart, I've got you down to the
point where we had the qaestionable weather, and what we did at the first mission management
team meeting was decided to meet that night at 9::30 for the purpose of reviewing the weather.
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At 9::30 we went through the weather briefing. Again, here's just a real quick summary, but
essentially the cold front had progressed this way, as predicted. The forecast was unchanged,
and so the mission management team, with all concurrences, decided not to start the tanking,
which normally would have started about 1:00 a.m. that next morning.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And what wasmthe decision was to scrub?
MR. KOHRS: The decision was not to start tanking or try to launch on the 26th.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Why was that decision made?
MR. KOHRS: Primarily, oP the top, we preaicted the multi-layer cloud decks, and in our
launch criterion we ha_,e both c,.iling levels for return to the launch site and we also do not
want to do ascent through any rain. That is our basic criteria that told us that if we tanked--
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: So it was cloudy and rainy?
MR. KOHRS: Right. So if you come down then, we decided to come in at 2:00 p.m. here on
Sunday to again review the weather, and the weather here is listed on this set of bullets. And by
that time the cold front had moved into the area. The weather, though, had not deteriorated as
quickly as projected the day before.
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However, the weather forecasters thought that a clearing was behind the frontal passage,
and the onJ.y concern then on that day was the high forecast of surface winds and upper air
winds for that day. We decided at that meeting, though, that we would go ahead and proceed
with the tanking, and that was given at this time frame, and then the scheduled launch time
was 9:37 a.m. for the 27th, which was a Monday.
On the 27th, we basically started the tanking at 1:00 a.m. For the 27th launch, we st_,rted
the tanking at 1:00 a.m. in the morning. The ice team at 5:00 a.m. went out, like they do on all
launches, to do a vehicle inspection.
And our ice team and their criteria is basically one of ice on the external tank, and primari-
ly it is concern of ice formation that during ascent could cause debris that would impact the
orbiter. And we do have a set of criteria that says in certain areas of the tank, like very forward,
the criteria is no ice, and in other places of the tank you can have up to a sixteenth of an inch,
and by analysis, it is areas that if it came off would not damage the orbiter.
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That ice team came back at 5:00 and gave that gG.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Can I interrupt you just a
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second? I guess then that the consideration of' ice did not relate to the launch itself; it related to
whether there would be damage to the orbiter. But you didn't think the ice on the external tank
would impair the launch capabilities?
MR. KOHRS: Yes, sir, on this day. The next day it changed a little bit, because then we had
the concern for the facility ice. And I will go through that.
MR. WALKER: Could you say a little bit about how much ice was on th _ external tank? Is
that documented?
MR. KOHRS: That is documented. We have an ice team, and it's headed by Charlie Steven-
son, who's going to be the next speaker, to show you the film. But that is documented as a
record. We are documenting that data, and also I believe they take voice recorders on their ice
inspectio,s and that data--don't they, Horace?
Anyhow, that is documented.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Is this ice only--are you talking about glaze ice or are
you also talking about frosting?
MR. KOHRS: We're not too concerned about frost. The areas of concern are ice that forms
on
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protuberances, where we cannot have the right insulation, when we've got the expanding joints,
because when the tank is loaded it essentially shrinks and some of our joints really become ex-
posed becam_e the tank has shrurk, and the members attaching it are changing load during the
loading.
We are concerned about protuberance ice, but mainly it is acreage ice on the launch tank.
And this same team has gone out and done this inspection, basically the same people, I
would say 85 percent of the same people, since STS-1, have gone out and done this ice inspection.
What happened at 9:18, we had a hatch anomaly, which Arnie Aldrich talked to you about
last week. Because of that hatch anomaly we got ourselves into, we had e,_sentially--nur IMU_s
had come out of their realignment. That's inertial measurement units.
MR. MOORE: That's the gyros and so forth, for attitude control.
MR. KOHRS: And we have a constraint that says that they can only give you a hold time of
90 minutes. So as we were working en a hatch anomaly we had a three hour launch window. We
decided to go back and do the IMU realignment, which delayed the launch to 12:37 at the close
of the window.
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And at 12:36, what happened to us here is we had a launch scrub. We had a high return to
launch site crosswinds, and our criteria there is not to exceed _5 knot crosswinds. Based upon
that data, we decided to call off the mission for that day, aild we then proceeded.
And our normal course of business as soon as we can is to de-tank the external tank of pro-
pellant, and that started at 12:41. We then decided to have another review with the team to talk
about a launching attempt for the 28th. That meeting was held at 2:00 p.m. on the 27th, primari-
ly to talk about the weather forecast, which is on the bottom chart on the right.
And here again, it was forecast continued clearing, decreasing northwesterly winds, but the
temperature there was expected to be below freezing, into the low twenties in the eariy morning
hours, primarily around 6:00 a.m., but over a period of below 32 degrees for about eleven hours.
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We had a concern expressed at that meeting on our ice on the facility. That goes back to
Jaouary of 1985 on the 51-C launch, where we also had a launch, I cail it, a scrub, where we had
below freezing temperatures and we decided not to tank because of the weather forecast, and we
did launch the next day of
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5l-C, the following day.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: What does "the capability of facility" mean?
MR. KOHRS: The facility has a lot of circulatir_g water for things like eyewashes and water
spray after liftoff, where we keep that water primed ready to use. Iri the meeting, we decided
that the way to--I'm getting a little bit ahead of myself, but we decided that that water would
probably freeze and bust some lines.
So we decided to go out and do what we call a little trickle, like you do with your water
faucet at home to let the water run overnigM.
The bottom line there is that at that weather briefing the temperature was forecast to be
near 30 degrees, and I put the actual temperatures down there. At 9:00 o'clock it was 29 degrees,
and at 10:00 o'clock it was 32 degrees.
DR. RIDE: You said that before 51-C you were faced with similar weather forecasts of below
freezing and you decided not to tank. This time you decided to tank. What did you learn since
51-C?
MR. KOHRS: What happened of 51-C, Sally, is we did not have the procedures in place for
keepi_lg the facility from freezing. We have a terminology, Horace,
795
that is called freeze plan. For 51-C we did not have that, and the night that we had our low
temperatures we actually broke pipes on the launch pad, and so we had to take the next day to
really repair those pipes before we could get into the final launch count.
This method of trickling water kept the pipes from freezing. However, to lead you down that
path, we gave _he go for a tanking. Tanking was to start at 1:18. It was delayed because we had
a launch processing system, LPS, anomaly in the flow of the vehicle.
In the meantime, this ice--
DR. COVERT: Wait a minute. That is an image I have difficulty accepting, the flow of the
vehicle. Do you want to explain?
MR. KOHRS: The tanking of the vehicle, the processing flow, is what I meant to say.
DR. COVERT: The processir_g flow?
MR. KOHRS: The tanking flow.
DR. COVERT: So you're pumping in oxygen, liquid oxygen or something, and it's not right?
MR. KOHRS: The control system, the launch processing system, which is a computer
system, had a problem with one of their control cards that would r::,t allow us to safely tank.
And so we took the time out to fix that.
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DR. COVERT: Fine, I see now.
MR. KOHRS: Which got us into about a three hour delay. So during that time frame we
decided to send the ice team out at 1:30 a.m. in the morning to take a look at the facility, and at
that time they reported that we had heavy ice accumulation on some of our areas, es_Jecially
where we l-ad this trickling water.
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We did start tanking at 3:55 a.m., and then roughly three hours later at 7:00 am. _he ice
team went out and made their normal inspection of the vehicle, primarily concerned again with
the externaI tank.
In the meantime, we decided that, based upon their report, we needed to have another
review of the temperature data and we called a mission management team, which convened at
9:00 am. on the morning of the 28th to re-review the ice cond;.tion at the pad.
The concern at this meeting, though, was primarily, was the concern that ice that was on
the facility during the ignition of the main engines and during the liftoff of tha SRB would fall
off of the pad or break loose from the facility, aspirate into the flow of the vehicle, and a poten-
tial damage to the orbiter.
We had an extensive review, aa_.d Arnie discussed it last week with the orbiter project, at
this
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meeting, and _fter a lot of consideration, we had a go for launch on that day.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Is this a fair summary, then: that the ice problem was assessed in
terms of the facility, whatever you call it, the capability of facility, which means the water runs
in the orbiter, I guess, and you checked that out and you checked out ice conditions because you
were worried about the condition of the orbiter?
Was any check ma_.:_ by the ice team or anybody else how the whole temperature would
affect the external tank or the booster rocket?
MR. KOHRS: The extornal 7:00 o'clock ice team inspection was a normal inspection. They
did the_.r normal temperature survey of the external tank, and as a matter of course they sur-
ve:,ed the SRB temperatures.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: What did they do in that connection, the SRB temperatures?
MR. KOHRS: They just recorded the temperatures in some locations on the SRB and the
external tank.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: How aid they do that?
MR. KOHRS: Horace, you will have to help me on that.
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MR. LAMBERTH: Yes. The ice team that went out at this time, basically the vehicle was
very clean of ice. They did it with an infrared pyrometer all the way up and down the stack, and
that is just for a reference item.
DR. RIDE: You're going to go into that more?
MR. LAMBERTH: We hadn't planned on going into it today, but we would go into it later.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: I think we would like to have a review of that.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Why don't we talk about it a little bit today, because I have trouble,
if it was that cold and you knew that the orbiter--I mean, that the booster rocket might be
affected by cold, why wasn't more attention paid to that aspect of it?
MR. CRIPPEN: I was just going to say that they do and did take temperatures of the solid
rockets. However, they had no criteria with regard to that, and that was just a matter--I don't
want to mislead you that they were looking at the SRB temperatures.
MR. MOORE: In the meantime, I guess Marshall in the Marshall projects office was looking
at temperatures and so forth, and maybe Dr. Lucas can speak to that.
DR. LUCAS: Well, I can comment on that.
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There was a meeting, which we're going to go i,_to in detail, I believe at 8:00 o'clock tomorrow,
that evening which I believe went on from about I l:00 p.m. until about 1 l:00 a.m., at which time
it was concluded that it was _atisthctory for the launch, the solid rocket bocster, and in terms of
the tbrecast that we had,
DR. RIDE: What were the temperature readings on the SRB's from the IR readings?
MR. LAMBERTH: Sally, we've got those documents and we've got some discrepancies be-
tween the left md right that we are running tests on now trying to understand those readings
and how much they were affected by the night sky. And we had a team out last night looking at
that. and we're trying to correlate that to give the best temperature estimate we can.
The left.hand SRB read what you'd expect, in the 23, 25 degree range. The right-hand shows
lower readings than that. We feel like the right-hand is somewhat lower than the left due to the
night radiation, but we don't believe they're as low as some of the readings we have, and we're
trying to understand those and be able to put some logic into those.
MR. MOORE: As I understand it, Horace, we did see some readings as low as, data I have
heard--and I haven't seen the actual data--is down as low as 10
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degrees, is what the IR pyrometer said.
MR. LAMBERTH: Yes, we had some readings on the right-hand SRB as low as nine degrees
and seven degrees on the nozzle. We do know from last night's data that that is affected some by
the factor that you have a night sky looking from that side when you make those readings, and
we don't think it was that low. We think it is lower than the left side, however.
DR. RIDE: Did that get fed back to Tbiokol, that you saw readings that low?
MR. LAMBERTH: Sally, I'm not sure. The recmirement that we had when we go out with
the ice team, as Bob said, the requirement we give _be ice team is to assess the pad conditions,
At this particular time we were looking very heavy at the ice on the facility, the ice in the hold-
ing troughs underneath the SRB, and any other ice on the facility, as well as ice on the vehicle.
And like I said, the thcility and the holding troughs had water underneath. That was our
big concern. We did talk a,L _,ut the temperature we read in the holding troughs, ten degrees. To
my knowledge, the temperatures as we read off the SRB's were not discussed at that time.
We did discuss the readings we got in the
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troughs, though.
DR. COVERT: Do the troughs see the night sky?
MR. LAMBERTH: We were reading temperatures in the trough of about ten degrees, and
we were taking those basically from the same_
DR. COVERT: But the trough looks up at the night sky and it's out of the wind, so it is
essentially a calm, good radiation reading?
MR. LAMBERTH: Yes. We had a ten mile an hour wind, the way we were taking the read-
ings.
MR. SUTTER: Would the wind affect the temperature of one versus the ether?
MR. LAMBERTH: The wind, by all of our analysis, the wind would be the effect that you
get from the sky radiation, yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Just because we are in closed session, I don't want to be unpleasant,
but--and maybe I am being unpleasant, but it wotlld seem to me that if the temperature at that
time you've got down there was in the low 20's at 2:00 o'clock in the morning and it had been in
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the low 20s for approximately'11hours,and everybodyknew that that wouldprobablyhave
someadverseeffectaz_dthereweresomelimits of somekind aboutthat, why that wasn'ta
matterof major
_02
concern':
I canseewhyyour teamthat wasprimarily concernedabouticeanddamageto the orbiter
andthe facility, whetherthe water faucetwasworkingandthat staff--but I wouldthink that
that wouldhavebeenamajorconcernto everybody.
And it wouldbehelpful in this closedsession,becauseyou'regoingto bestruckwith it in
public.Whatwasit?
MR.ALDRICH:Couldl speakto that?As I mentioned,I reviewedthe detailsof the situa-
tionwith respecto theorbiterandthephysicaliceonthe facility.At notimeduringthis period
wasI awareof a concernfor the temperatureof the SRBwithin the rangesaswehadfrom the
weatherforecaster.It wasnot knownto me as a constrainton the performanceof the solid
rocketboosterasa systemor anyofits elements.
GENERALKUTYNA: But,BobCrippen,yousaidthat therewerenocriteria on tempera-
..... _................. m _,....... testimony.... ,..... somebody.... don't launch
_u,_on anyof ,u i;_, _._ ,,_+ • .. .... ; ..... ,,_ i.._
outside of 40 to 90 degrees.
MR. CRIPPEN: I'm saying there's no requirement tbr us to go out and measure tempera-
ture, like with an IR gun on the solids, and play that back
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against the criteria. Yes, there is a bulk temperature requirement on the solids.
GENERAL KUTYNA: But when you qual a system, be it an airplane or be it a spaceship or
whatever, and you do qual it within certain temperature limits--there was no such qual done on
this and no temperature limits that these solids were qual'ed for.
MR. REINARTZ: Stan Reinartz, Marshall Space Flight Center, Projects Manager fbr the
propulsion element that we had at Marshall.
The q,mlification of the motor is, yes, as Larry Mulloy, project manager stated, it is for the
mean bulk temperature of 40. That was considered in the forecast that was made the night
before, and we h_,ve a plot for weather, temperature, in the various conditions we could sod.
And that was calculated, and it was calculated to be in the 55 to 56 degree temperature
range. And when we launched that, at the time we then launched, that was what we were still
predicti:ag, in the 55 to 56 temperature for the mean bulk.
GENERAL KUTYNA: So mean bulk was the only constraint you had temperature-wise?
MR. REINARTZ: That was the constraint that we had.
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Do you mean you were operating under the prediction that it was
goiDg to be 55?
MR. REINARTZ: No, sir. There is in the total solid propellant, you have an encrmous heat
sink or mass, and during the course of the weather changes down here at the Cape that mass of
the propellant changes very slowly over time. And the temperature that we had predicted,
knowing the conditions that were coming in starting 48 hou_ ahead and then for our meeting,
is we were predicting we would be at a mean bulk temperature of the 55 to 56 degree range.
We have had a previous launch that launched at 52 degrees mean bulk temperature on the
previous launch, and so it was within our experience base that we had for launching the wMcle
at that temperature.
427
0 /
¢CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Put it another way, then, if" the temperature was 20 below or 20 de-
grees for eleven hours, it was thought that that would not affect the solid fuel in the booster to
reduce it below _-_67
MR. REINARTZ: That is correct, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But there was no _,'ay to measure that, and so you did it on a prooec-
tion basis?
MR R_INARTZ: It is analytical, based upon some early data that we had done on the pro-
pellants at
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Wasatch, where we had some instruments that measured internal temperature, and then it was
done from calculations based upon those types of measurements.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: How low would the temperature have had to be before it would have
be_en a ,roblem in your thinking, and how long? Suppose it was eleven hours of zero tempera-
ture?
MR. REINARTZ: It would have had to have been for several days of time.
MR. HARDY: If I could help, in the model that we have, as Stan said, the model was cali-
brated from instrumentntion ........ that wo had on th_,_........ r- vv_,,-,,_l_"_ early in *_'"_,,,.program, ,,,u_-aalso
from the Minuteman program, which uses essentially the same propellant.
But the model was, say, in effect it follows ambient temperature of' about 20 days. That is
how big the thermal mass is, the mean bulk temperature. And so to get the temperature of" the
propellant down to 25 degrees_and this is rough--you would have to cold soak it for, let me say,
15 to 18 or 20 days, in order to get the temperature down that low.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: That's another way of saying that as far as, based upon the previous
experience, as fhr a_ you were concerned, that the coldness of the weather really wasn't of" con-
cern as far as the solid
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fuel boosters are concerned.
MR. HARDY: Absolutely correct.
DR. COVERT: George, I have a question related to mean bulk temperature, and I under-
stand what you're getting at here. But there's also a problem of temperature gradients, and de-
pending upon the degree of rapidity of the change of the temperature, you could have a tolerable
mean bulk temperature, but you could have fairly high temperature gradience which could give
rise to anomalous effects that you've had previously.
Have you any estimate of the rate of temperature gradient?
MR. HARDY: Yes, we have analytically celculated gradient across the range for 51-L. I
don't have those numbers, but this afternoon I can tell you what that was.
DR. COVERT: And I would like to see also the difference in temperature gradience between
the middle of the panel and the neighborhood of the rings for where the field joints are made,
because of the difference in thermal mass of the steel. Can you get that for me?
MR. HARDY: I will do that.
Let me just mention one other thing. The primary concern--And I'm sure many of you
know this--on bulk temperatures in solid propellant is the strain
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of the propellant and the potential for cracking the propellant.
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DR. FEYNMAN: Why is the mean an appropriate number, rather than the differences or
the lowest values'? Where it cracks isn't very important. The mean only :ells you it doesn't crack
on the average, where it could crack where it's lowest, right?
MR. HARDY: The effect of the temperature in terms of cracking would obviously be where
it is lowest. The highest strains in the propellant are near the bore of the propellant. The bore of
the propellant in where the mandril is. You have a mandril with the propellant around it. The
highest strains are typically around the bore of the propellant.
Now, the highest strains that propellants will see in the motor are when the propellant is
cured. There's a fairly rapid cooldown of the propellant under transportation conditions or
under storage conditions. When you ignite the motor, then the pressure is uniformly inside the
bore, pushing against the propellant. Then of course the effect of temperature strain rates at
that time are much less.
DR. FEYNMAN: You mean cracking deeper in would be closed by the pressure, presumably,
so when the burning got down to there it wouldn't penetrate the
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cracks and the rate of burning would be uniform, even though the material may have in fact
been cracked and crumbled near the outside?
That wouldn't, presumably, be of much importance becaase the pressure holds it together.
MR. HARDY: That is correct. And if I could just add one 'other thing, one other bit of infor-
mation, in any sort of failure analysis on a solid rocket motor, looking for propellant problems,
propellant cracking or anything of that nature, you look in the pressure-time trace.
And if you crack propellants and increase the burning surface any significant amount at all,
that will show up readily in the pressure-time trace.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Are there concerns other than cracking with the lower
temperature?
MR. HARDY: Not with regards to the propellant.
DR. COVERT: Are you saying, George, no anomalous pressure-time behavior in these boost.
ers?
MR. HARDY: We will talk about those events. There are none which we can associate with
the anomalous propellant parameter.
MR. WALKER: One other question. Then there is no temperature specification or require-
ment on the
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steel case? Presumably the steel case follows the ambient temperatures, although in this case it
was lower than the ambient in some cases.
MR. LAMBERTH: The requirement is for an operating motor at 40 degrees, the operating
motor.
MR. WALKER: But the steel case is going to be colder than that.
MR. LAMBERTH: But I don't know--and we will be furnishing at the time we talk about
the detailed weather discussion, we will go into the entire set of qualification data and require-
ments, and each piece that goes with that for the environment it is to survive and what qualifi-
cation tests were done to assure that
MR. WALKER: But what I was asking, is there a specific requirement on the temperature
of the steel case, as opposed to the bulk temperature?
MR. LAMBERTH: To my knowledge, there is not a specific requirement on the steel case.
MR. WALKER: So ever though you actually mea, ured this temperature with the pyrometer,
nothing was done with that data?
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MR. LAMBERTH: Yes, that is a correct :_tatement. There is no requirement to take the
measurement or to act on that data.
DR. RIDE: Let me ask that another way. I
_i0
guess the question would really be what launch commit criteria there are related to cold t.emper-
ature.
MR. ALDRICH: I was just trying to fit that in if I got the floor again, Mr. Chairman and
Sally. The launch commit criteria we have for cold temperature is to launch at an ambient out-
side temperature at launch time of 31 degrees or greater.
Now, the prediction was for that case to be greater than that, and that in fact is how the
data turned out. There are no more definitive or solid element-unique criteria specific in that.
DR. RIDE: So the assumption is that, back when the solid rocket boosters were, to pick an
example, were qualified and built and certified for launch on the shuttle flight, they had to
prove that if the ambient temperature was 31 degrees, all parts of the solid rocket were go for
launch?
MR. ALDRICH: That would be implied, and it ha_ been for a series of launches.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Withot, t going through this whole discussion, because I know we're
coming to it later, but did Thiokol--why did Thiokol advise against it the night before because of
the weather, as I understood it? At least I gather that they did.
MR. LAMBERTH: Mr. Cbairman, their concern
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that they raised at that time--and we will give you a full discussion of that, and Thiokol will
also explain their position. But it was related to the O-rings, was the only point for consideration
that they raised in that discussion on the potential lower temperature.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Of the O-rings?
MR. LAMBERTH: Of the O-rings, and the possibility that you might have increased erosion
due to the lower temperature.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, we will come to that later.
MR. WALKER: But there is no such written requirement? That is just something they
brcqght up and were concerned about, and it is not written down and it is not a checklist item?
__IF. LAMBERTH: That was not a checklist item against the launch procedure.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Okay.
MR. KOHRS: I think I will get off the pre-launch and move on to the ascent time line.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Before you do, one more question on launch. What were these delays
costing you in terms of either future mission processing or experiments flown on this mission?
Were we losing any experiments because of these delays?
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MR. KOHRS: No, sir. We had a three-hour launch window that we had signed up with both
the TDRS projects and with the Spartan Halley projects, and there was no constraint beyond the
three hours.
GENERAL KUTYNA: So you weren't goi,lg to mi,_s Halley's Comet by going beyond the
28th?
MR. KOHRS: No, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Go ahead.
MR. KOHRS: The next chart, which is starting the time line for ascent, and let me say a
few words.
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I've listedtburpageshere.Tostart at thebeginning,the mainenginestart command, which
is 6.6 seconds betbre the SRB command. And I have listed the events in the center of the page,
and I will try to make sure I cover all the acronyms. And I have listed over in the right-hand
column in _'remarks" whether the data was nominal, and the nominal data as we read it is on
our telemetry data that comes down.
And then our other data which talks about this anomaly is data that we have recreated
from our cameras, different camera locations. And here I've just listed camera number 60,
camera number 20"7. Charlie Stevenson will talk next and show you those cameras and more
details on their locations.
S13
What I will do later on, then I will bring up some charts on the right that show you what
downlink or telemetry data we use to pick off these data points. And the camera data data
points were picked off really from time tags and the count of frames in the cameras.
We'd look--like I said, the main engines, the SSE start command is the nominal 6.6 seconds
before SRB, At about 3.7 seconds into that, the engines build up to 100 percent of rated thrust,
There is a series of internal cheeks that say, we're ready to launch, all automatic within the
computer.
And then the zero point which I've listed here, which was 1i:38.0.010, is the best estimate of
the SRB ignition command.
Now, at the top of the chart I've labeled this data as of 2/12/86, which is yesterday, and
we're still refining the detailed times between us and all the other projects. We are within a few
milliseconds on these time tags. You may see some data later that is maybe a little bit different
here.
DR. RIDE: Was there anything anomalous at all within the main engines?
MR. KOHRS: No. Let me say, all of our engine data from post-flight reconstruction, all of
our orbiter data from post-flight reconstruction, we don't see any
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anomalies to date.
MR. MOORE: I would qualify that to say to date. It has not been checked off the list and say
it has been exonerated. It is still going on. But as of now, we see nothing anomalous in that
data.
MR. RUMMEL: May I ask, do the computers check this in some way or another?
MR. KOHRS: Yes, sir. During the engine startup, the engines have their own managing con-
troller that has a series of red line criteria built in that it has to meet certain gates, of valve
openings, throttle levels, and time levels and temperature levels to proceed to launch.
If we don't pass those gates during the 6.6 seconds, we call those internal red lines to the
computer. We will get what we call an automatic cutoff.
MR. RUMMEL: Let me ask it differently. Is there redundancy in the computer recording
setup?
MR. KOHRS: Yes, sir.
MR. RUMMEL: Have you checked one against the other?
MR. KOHRS: We do have criteria that our redundancy has to be there at lifto_f. So we have,
like if you have two measurements up until the time of SRB
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ignition command, you have to have redundancy in our critical measurements.
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The first movement was ph_s .05 seconds. The key thing here, you will see on the pictures at
.445 seconds, is our first evidence of black smoke from the right-hand SRB near the aft field
joint, and we will show you that coming up.
MR. SUTTER: Could you show where that is on that model'?
MR. KOHRS: We think it was back in this quadrant over here.
MR. STEVENSON: That's right.
MR. WALKER: Could you point out the lower field joint?
MR. KOHRS: That's right here, this white line.
MR. LEE: This is Jack Lee. You might point out from the camera angles, from the photogra-
phy we have, it's not obvious where it comes from. It is emanating between the right-hand SRB
and the external tank.
MR. KOHRS: You see it right in this area in the film.
DR. COVERT: I assume you've gone back and looked at a lot of other films since then of
other,
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earlier launches, and this is the only case that you've seen this black smoke?
MR. LEE: Yes, that's true.
DR. COVERT: Thank you.
MR. WALKER: Are there indeed over 200 cameras that you use?
MR. KOHRS: I think I've looked at about 82 or so films from this flight. There may be more,
plus you had the TV cameras.
MR. WALKER: But the film cameras we're talking about here?
MR. KOHRS: These are 16 millimeter here, and we also have 70 millimeter.
DR. COVERT: Yes. Do you really know the framing rate to a millisecond?
MR. KOHRS: Yes. The 70 millimeter has a time tag on it. The 16 millimeter we're having a
little bit of difficulty, and that is why you see some differences in persons looking at the film.
These two events you will see were abnormal. The roll maneuver was at 7.7 seconds, where
the vehicle rolls. That was nominal.
If I could have the next chart up.
(Viewgraph.) ira'1 2 I:_ ;}
GENERAL KUTYNA: At liftoff do you measure
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loads on the holddown bolts?
MR. KOHRS: Right.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Was there anything unusual in that?
MR. KOHRS: To date, we're still developing that data and going back through what we call
our liftoff load reconstruction, and that still is about a week away, a detailed analysis.
Here again I will just show you--and it is in your handouts, and I know you can't read that
chart. But in the right-hand upper corner in your handout will be a time that is tagged here.
And the only reason I'm pointing this out--I'm sorry, right here, 7.7 seconds. The only reason I
point this out is this is where we pick off the start of the roll maneuver, is our time tag.
And I'm not going to dwell on the details of that chart, but that particular one is the roll
rate gyro on the vehicle, and it is normal as predicted.
The next chart.
(Viewgraph.) I'_,'f. 2 l:_-,_]
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The next event is--let me talk about this one. This is an approximate. The last visual indi-
cation of" the black smoke coming out of this area is in the 12 to 13 second time fYame, and that
is still
under study with differeltt people looking at the film and looking at it with different cameras.
This time I suspect we'll refine probably within the next week to get that pinned down.
The throttle maneuvers, and here it is picked off with the chamber pressure movements•
This is chamber pressure of the engines, and it just shows you our nominal chamber or SSME
throttle setting We lift off at 100 percent, we throttle up to 104. As we gpt into our max Q area,
we throttle down here to 94 percent for ten seconds, and then down to ,4;5 percent, and then back
up to the 104 percent, and fly at 104 percent for the remainder of the mission•
DR. FEYNMAN: What is measured on the vertical axis?
MR. KOHRS: That's chamber pressure, engine chamber. I'm sorry, it is chamber pressure
that has been converted to throttle setting. But the reading is really PC or chamber pressure.
DR. COVERT: Which one of the engines is that?
MR• KOHRS: This particular engine is main engine 2, and they are all the same, though.
DR. FEYNMAN: In making this conversion, is it a simple mathematical formula or is it
some kind of
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guess? And the reason I ask is that the lines are extremely straight and flat, and I wonder what
you measured so accurately that didn't have any wiggles in it.
MR. KOHRS: These are commands that we are measuring, but it is based on the PC meas-
urements.
DR. FEYNMAN: PC measurements are measurements of chamber pressure, measurements
of a physical quantity, and there are all kinds of noises and vibrations, and it has been extracted
from this?
MR. KOHRS: It has been smoothed out.
DR. COVERT: Well, there's also the zero suppress.
MR. HOTZ: Do the solid motors change thrust in synchronization with the throttling back of
the main engines?
MR. KOHRS: The solid rocket motor is cast to a specific burn rate versus time, or thrust
versus time.
MR. HOTZ: But does that change during the course of this?
MR. KOHRS: It does change during time, and I think last week we did show you, I think.
Jud Lovingood did show you a thrust versus time for the solid rocket boosters.
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MR. HOTZ: There was some other testimony, though, that it didn't change.
MR. KOHRS: In my terminology, the confusion--there were some people thought there was
some way to command to change. That is cast into the motor.
MR HOTZ: No, I understand .Ltlia_._.But it is a _,,,_,_ ........ is ,v_,s,. _ ......... 2 ......... -
tling back of your main engines?
MR. KOHRS: Yes. If you superimpose the throttle back of the SRBs, it is throttling down in
the same time frame the chamber pressure is going from 900 to roughly probably 500 or 600.
MR. HOTZ: The curve that he gave us showed _ "t.mL, down and up.
MR. RUMMEL: On the burn rate inside th_ solid rockets, for clarification, I take it the
motor burns longitudinally from the aft end forward, and then outward?
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MR. KOHRS: No, it burns radially, uniformly throughout the length.
MR. RUMMEL: So the exposure of the hottest gases would be toward the end of the burn,
then, on the various joints, is that correct'?
MR. KOHRS: Yes.
MR. RUMMFL: Well, is it correct to assume
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that the exposure of the seams toward the nozzle are exposed at the same point in time as the
rest of the seams or earlier?
MR. KOHRS: I would have to ask George Hardy, but I think it is uniform, I believe. Now,
George will have to give you the specific answer.
MR. LEE: That is accounted for in the insulation inside the case. There's a different thick-
ness in the aft sections, if that is the answer to your question.
MR. RUMMEL: So you take that into account by varying the insulation thickness?
MR. LEE: Yes.
MR. RUMMEL: I see. Thank you.
MR. SUTTER: I assume you are studying where did the black smoke come from?
MR. KOHRS: Right, and we're going to show you those photos, and that is still being stud-
ied. And we are also using the best enhancement techniques we have to try to pinpoint that.
MR. SUTTER: But what would make black smoke?
MR. KOHRS: That is what we're still trying to determine. There is grease in this area, but
there has to be some ignition source or some temperature source for that to happen.
822
(Viewgraph.) [R,.r 2 I:_ _l
The next ckart will drop you down to the roll maneuver, and here again I'm just showing
you the data we picked off of the gyro. And this event here again is completed here at 21 sec-
onds.
I showed you on the previous chart the throttle-down to 65 percent. At around 40 seconds--
during ascent we get our normal actuator movement responding to wind,
We saw a little bit more activity during that area, well within our experience base and not
any concern with the loads that were created within that time frame.
The next chart, please.
(Viewgraph.) [R,'r. "21:1 lo I
Oh, back up one. I need to finish.
(Viewgraph.) Im,r. '2 l :+-:q
We did the throttle-up which I talked about, and then at 58.7 seconds was our first indica-
tion of smoke from the minus Z side, in this area of the right-hand SRB, just forward of this, we
think just forward of this aft ring.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I can't quite see your pointer. Did the smoke come from the same
place?
MR. KOHRS: The same area, the area we are seeing the smoke up here on the films and
then later at the 57 time in this area here.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And you're pointing to the right booster?
MR. KOHRS: Yes.
MR. HOTZ: Is this a different colored smoke you're seeing now?
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MR.KOHRS:Hereyou'rereally approachingtheflameandthe hotspotin this area.Here
youwill seein the film that this is definitelywhat I call blacksmoke.I think youjust need to
see that in the upcoming film.
GENERAL KUTYNA: So this thing at 58 seconds should not be called smoke?
MR. KOHRS: Well, it's the first indication. In the next slide I'll put up, it shows how it
progresses.
MR. CRIPPEN: But that was not black smoke you saw at 58?
MR. KOHRS: It was smoke; it was not black smoke.
The next chart, please.
(Viewgraph.) [m,f. 2 l:_-]o I
At about 59 seconds, we hit our max dynamic pressure. And I think I should have a chart 15
on the right.
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Here is just a plot of recreated max dynamic pressure. The NAV derived on top is just a
reference based upon the monthly mean winds. The solid line is the max pressure in pounds per
square foot versus elapsed time.
And you see here we approach roughly 720 at around 59 to 60 seconds, and we have tagged
it here from a detailed look at 59 seconds. At 59-1/4 you get a well-defined, intense plume, which
you will see on the camera, and then the next slide will show you at 60.1 you start to get a
chamber pressure divergence from the right-hand to the left-hand SRB.
The next slide, please.
(Viewgraph.) Im,I z I:_ Izj
Let me back up one. While I have this one up, I was just going to show you what the wind
profile was for that day, reconstructed. The point to make on this chart is that at about 60 sec-
onds we were also getting this change, high rapid change in the wind direction, which is in our
normal design base, experience base, but this happened to occur around the same time as you
see the build-up of this smoke area and plume area.
MR. WAITE: Also, max Q.
MR. KOHRS: Max Q was right around 59 seconds,
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right here. And the thing that makes max Q right here is that the vehicle is flying and this
actually is a headwind to the vehicle's nominal flight path. The vehicle is trying to fly up
against this wind and here, as it sees this apparent headwind to what it's trying to fly, the head-
wind is going to up the max dynamic pressure.
And that is really what you see on that chart I had previously. You see that hump in the
change of the dynamic pressure, which is just reacting to that wi_d.
GENERAL KUTYNA: That is all happening, that zig-zag is happening, after you had a
problem? Is that right?
MR. KOHRS: Apparently it occurred right after the first 59 seconds. This is the in-plane
wind. The next chart just shows the out-of plane component of that same velocity plot.
The next chart--
(Viewgraph ', ll_,',. 2 ]:_ ]3 I
--which is at 60.164, and what is plotted here is the left-hand solid rocket booster and the
right-hand solid rocket booster chamber pressure. And, as we discussed earlier, the chamber
pressure in this time frame as you're in the SRM bucket gets dcwn to the
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600psipressurelevel.
Thisdifferencehereis not abnormal.Whereyou realDysee:t:" ght-handSRBis it starts
divergingouthere,andthis pointis thepointwepickedfor _ '_'" dine frame.
Other people, just {'or background, you may see a little differe,_ (me, may pick this point or
that point, and you will get a few tenths of a second time d, fference
MR. WAITE: Is that monitor real time?
MR. KOHRS: This data is sent down real time. it is run through our mission control center.
It's processed, displayed to the flight control team at one sample per second. The data you see
here is data that is recorded, that is coming down and then played back and analyzed at the
higher sample rates.
I think this sample rate is probably up at the 100 samples per second. But in terms of what
the person on the flight control team sees on the ground on launch day, it is displayed to them
at one sample per second, and the data through the processing time is in the three- to four-
second time delay, in that time frame.
DR. COVERT: And this thing really can read two psi out of 1,000?
MR. KOHRS: Yes.
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MR. WAITE: How is that chamber pressure derived?
MR. KOHRS: We actually have on each booster two or three--three chamber pressure meas-
urements that are ted directly from the SRBs over to the orbiter and then down.
MR. WAITE: Is that a direct pressure measurement or a strain gauge?
MR. KOHRS: It's a direct pressure measurement, a transducer.
DR. FEYNMAN: What is the horizontal scale? I can't read the numbers. It goes from 55 to
zero' _
MR. KOHRS: That is time, sir, If you slide this chart down a little bit--to put this in Eng-
lizh, down a little bit further, slide that right chart down if you can.
Up here I have put the time. 60.164 is this point right here.
DR. FEYNMAN: I see.
MR. KOHRS: We didn't have time to go back and put the right readable plots on there.
MR. WAITE: When do you think the control room first saw the pressure change, four sec-
onds after that?
MR. KOHRS: I don't really think, in terms of the control room display, they--and I will
have to check this--ever saw a pressure
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change. By the time they recognized that--they really didn't see it until this data was played
back and looked at in detail. This type of pressure change was probably not recognized.
The next chart, please.
(Viewgraph.) Im'r. 2 J:_ I_ 1
During this time frame, which is also the time we're reacting to the wind load, the max
dynamic pressure, and we've got. now a plume, the elevons and the gimbals are moving to react.
And all we're showing here in this sequence of telemetry data from 60.2 seconds is that we've
got elevon movement and actuator movement.
And I can go through these charts pretty quick. The charts on the right--or on the left. are
just showing you these time points and how we picked them up. And you can see here a spike
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andherea differentialpressure.But you'vegot to lookat a lot of missionsto pickout that this
isa changein differentialpressure,this li*desoikeright here.
Thenextchart,please.
(Viewgraph.)I_,', 2 I:_ i-, I
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MR. KOHRS: This timeframe is when we started the SSME pitch variations, and you would
expect the SSME to come down this line right here (indicating), and you've got a variation here
¢¢hich says that the vehicle is reacting to some external forces. The next chart, please.
(Viewgraph.) II_,.t 2 l:_ I. I
DR. COVERT: Could I ask a question on the previous chart that you just had? If you look at
that mean slope, and then it seems to pick up the mean slope again, so that this is probably a
wind shear, and it is not probably any other anomaly?
MR. KOHRS: That, sir, is what we have to sort out, because at the same time this event is
occurring, you've got this wind change. You've got a normal reaction; then we've got an external
force. And what we have to do is try to separate out those two variables.
The other thing I would mention here is this wind data is based on balloon release that is in
this case based upon a balloon that was released about ten minutes after launch, but it in itself
is not totally accurate. So you can also have a different wind environment than we actually
measured.
DR. COVERT: That is why I asked you before if you had watched the plume spreading and
worked backwards.
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MR. KOHRS: We are in the process of doing that.
DR. FEYNMAN: What does "pitch" mean?
MR. KOHRS: "Pitch" is the angle from the horizontal you are changing out of plane and
looking forward at the pitch plane, and the yaw plane is to the right or left.
The next chart, in the center--well, let me keep that one here. We al:_o saw some other
deviation,_.
DR. COVERT: I guess I really want to go back to that other chart, please.
MR. KOHRS: Could you go back to that previous chart, number 16, on the left?
(Viewgrapb.) I_,.r , t:ri,q
DR. COVERT: Now my question, the real thrust of my question is: Is that sort of gradual
slope down there, ignoring for a moment that little thing, is that pretty much normal?
MR. KOHRS: It is pretty much normal. The vehicle is normally trying to control through
the CG as we are depleting propellant. So you're normally going to get some movement of the
actuators to keep this thing trimmed cut.
DR. COVERT: But if we sort of put an average on this, the points that are labeled 07-001
are within a
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fraction of a degree of where they would have been normally?
MR. KOHRS: Right.
DR. COVERT: Thank you.
MR. KOHRS: The next chart on the left, and here again let me pick up.
(Viewgraph.) [m,t. z t:_ ,7 I
The next chart on the left--and I need a new chart in the middle, ctmrt 9 in the middle--
(Viewgraph.) IRef. 2'13-171
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Here at about 72 seconds, 72.141 and 72.661, looking at the gyros we're seeing a rapid
change acceleration, which means we're getting a side ibrce on the vehicle. Y acceleration, this
is the Y direction out the side of the vehicle, so the vehicle is moving on one side in this case, as
compared to the other This is at 72 seconds. At 72.4--we also had a tracking data relay system
on board, which has its own gyros.
That data was telemetered te the ground. We have gone back and looked at that data, and it
confirms that it matches the gyro data that we were seeing in the erbiter. And there is nothing
anomalous with the TDRS. It just is another data source that says that it matches, and we hap-
pened to lose this data at 72.4 seconds.
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I pointed out the lateral Y acceleration. Here we see the MPS, which is the main propulsion
system, LOX, LO2, and hydrogen inlet pressures drop slightly.
DR. RIDE: Could you go back to the 66 seconds? Were you going to say anything about the
LH2 pressure?
MR. KOHRS: I wasn't going to say anything, Sally, other than we see a slight drop in the
LH2 pressure. I did not put a chart in this. Well, I guess I did put a chart. It's really 66.484. It's
really figure 23 that shows that deviation.
_Viewgraph.) Im'l. _ I,_ z,N
And if ! could, I could put chart--here it is over here. By the way, we have three LH pres-
sure transducers that Jrive three, or provide information to three flow control valve_ in the or-
biter. What you are seew'_, here is Iullage} Lhey track each other pretty well, and then you get
down to this point and you start to see a deviation. And this one is SSME engine number one,
and these are engines two and three, which are still tracking each other.
DR. FEYNMAN: By ullage pressure do yoa mean the pressure above the fuel, or the oxidiz-
er?
MR. KOHRS: Yes, sir.
DR. COVERT: I guess, sir, I don't want to
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argue with you, because you know more about this than I do, but if I just take my pen here and
try to see what the discrepancy in these two lines are, the difference persists pretty much across
tile whole chart. It looks closer because of the steep gradient, but if you just sort of measure and
count the number of dots involved
MR. KOHRS: These are very subtle changes, and w_,at we have looked tbr are anything that
is abnormal. We may find in later analysis that you are indeed right, and this is normal.
DR. COVERT: I'm not saying it is normal. What I am objecting to is that your arrow is
located there, where I could locate that arrow anywhere on this chart.
MR. KOHRS: I would accept that.
MR. ACHESON: Is your lateral movement in the direction you would expect it to be if it
were driven by a combustion leak back there?
MR. KOHRS: Tom Moser I think will have _ome charts later that will take this data and
build you a failure scenario based upon tiffs data. I'm trying to present the data in a cut at the
time line of these major events.
MR. MOORE: Well, really, the answer to your question is, yes.
_34
(Viewgraph.I Ira', . _ J:_ I!'l
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MR. KOHRS:Fo!iowingon this chart i:. tl,e TD_.S dot.:. We had the chamber pressm e drop
which showed up on the other chai_ in this t,mt-framt,. I( I _,_tzld have the odmr oF,art, ! t}nr, k it
',-,mllriju_t- --) ':n :_orry, i;. !_ :.ol Che ney., chart. These. last ,_no.s ,re "s_._.ial]y had based all of
,,u. Jam and tir_Sqg on the came 'a Joe;_tians. And you wi'.l see .:nes:- ca.: ,'r ,; :. mmg :m. Chart
l O in the ee,',_:er.
(Viewgraph.) I.q, s : _._2. i
'/'err)ins temperat'_re. That is ju_:, the uit,-i_ r_'_,,, d.iver.,eece. The c.tk._r tl::z*_, th,,.t s
found-.-,_nd this data is ._ SOUl-h-. o? "_.,.ys u!d-as we I eked further at _.ur dew i ',ist o e data, is
the( the _.,;ain engines, the SSMEs, w:-rf a>'pro.)ching lheir redtb,_ li_,its fit :hi h[g t, press_ re
rue! _u_impuwr_. Tl-,e redline limit I ,,:t,lnk _t, t;us cez_e is abe _t !960 degree_.
DP. COVERT: This 1_ es-aer, tiall3, t_ c turt)ine te,r.7_rai:ure_
MR. KOHRS: Higb pressure ?uel tu__pt:mp di_ha.-ge ter, p__rature. That is whut the HFFT
_tonts %r, high pressurP, fuel il,rbopump ,_'t:.;ne Temperatm'e. A..d then I.rer whtre "re thi.,& -
and this data is still being revi(-.wed at th:_ t,::_e,'ame--we aetual:y bed a .=hurdown of SSME
engipe numbei ,*_a'_ At 73.605 was our iast _,alida,,d date. And if ! ha " the nez_ chart, I
a.3.5
c_,_'l_ sb_. 'v ysu--and that ;.-: a "_ery s _btle cban_e. I need el a.t 29 ula en t,_:e r,jh¢.
DR. COVEET: ts the :_u:nber oae e.'glne ,re the i i.gm?
ME KOtIP, S: "_hat's the top vne. Here agm 5 .arc the ff.C_._ 3eta,. whine, are ._ne ,'eaction ccn-
trci system jet_, wt ich are located up kere _m the ,'ebic_._, arm_'t i%ing aurir, g th_s qweframe.
They do have pressur.. :3easu-eme._ts. 8" v<J-.n we d,, fire q._em, ._e _ee rk_ _ressu.'e in the
el,amber. And the only thing tt;a_ is h_ypeniog Ls:-e iz t,ermadg durb g as.:ent the c,_ai, ber
t're_s'n'e shc uld just 3e dropp;og fl,:m 14.7 "atmospheric down te _'or, tial!_ a zero r.reesure.
:ViewgrapL.) i11,,, : ,:_ 2,_
Now m this tirneftame, whi¢:, :s noted over h_re, you 'moult. -_e ._ust betbr_ tke loss cf data
ae ca:, _ a "-,aildup t.het says ti, at it uas see'. g s,=me cbm_t_e in prtssure up in ,.bib area, prol>
_bly f_m the plume or the exp!osion a_d t_at was our laat v,Ci,l,_ted _cta. A: d a _.-v tm_li_,c-
_p.ds la_er we ¢, oar last de_a f,'_ me. And then -,n ti-.e =,ictur,_ _.t _../,5, we :aw u, : d-o_h_ ch'l_
eom-_g o_'_..ff t:_e right-kand SNi? _d you w;3i s,e that. KrO _h_z.n a', 1119 s_onas, th.. righ'-
._,_nd SR:t _ange desnu_,t syatem aes_rketed tl,at _s(__r. A_at_ then at **0.2 _conds, t.he renge
sme,y _y_terr. des:;rueted ti_
_,3,6
le_'.l hand boostez.
MR. CRIPPEN: Dick, ju:,_ _ people {Im.'i think tie;'e were-., anorr.,a._k:a. You wine taik't_g
ak_),.,t _he m_,i_: _.ngine temps gett;_g high That ,v_,r exp_air, ah!e.
MR. I[OHRS: Tnat ...yes a r._ction t,_ tke _.,,._.:,t. W..• f__C, that t5_', was the ,'eactlon ;?,at we
were P_osing LOX or hydrogen to the pump.._n ! it wan _vertemp_ng.
OEN. KUTYNA: Wbere we-e those, boc.,_-s at impact?
v_[I)NEL LINDSAY: Their normal impact ._reu is abou 1.10 knots or ab,.w 9e miles off-
shcr_. ,'30 a no.emal flight veo_,]d carry them o'S,out 140 knots.
GEN NUTYNA: Whe,e _ere these go: =,g tc gc tba_ ca:u_e.'l you ',.o b)o_ ll;,.m up?
COLONel. LINDSAY: I don't kno_'. When the explosion occt'rr_-_J, oil C _ta w_, losi. _/'hn
next set ef information we ba'_: was i'isua] from ti_e videos tl:at ,re dif)alay_:l, a._,'] you mere abie
to see, depending on which video you "¢,'e.re toekb:g at. or,.e prop:flsi':-; SRR ,:oming act of tb?
cloud, and later you could ,_e 'm other ser{_ens, too, and disylaying some err.-'._t;c _]ight: as far au
we could sc_.
DR. COVERT: You could see some tmabling of t.he right-hand bo_._ster _
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COLONEL L_.NDSA'I • I wouldn't call it
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"'tumbting.'" It wa.,_ '.ishraAipg.
I)R. "" ": ":-....
__t:_ _lx t' Did you h'a_e enough time to actually see it come back'? Or just veering off?.
COLONEL LINDSAY: 1",o, you could see it do a turn.
GEN. KUTYNA: I think there was some insinuations that if we hadn't blown those things
up we woul'] have had wcw,'mfu_ dnta to retrieve.
('_o'-"_" LINDSAi: I douSt that. One motor, the one that you will see later, the right
motc.r G:at we have the _.,:t data on was still climbing at 122,000 feet when it was destroyed.
E_:imac_s on its impact wouId De. very significant damage, maybe fracturing when it impacted
on the water, and, if there was propellant left in it, probably detonation of some percentage of
the explosive content
MR. MOOI_E: Don, we do have a detailed presentation on range safety, if the committee
would like to look at it We are p!anning to cover some of that.
GEN. KU'I_'NA: There was at: article in The Post that, gee, if the Air Force hadn't de-
stroyed these things, we would have bad wonderful data.
MR. KOHRS: This was the last timeline chart. What I put together on my last chart is kind
of a_
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observation chart of this ascem timeline, which is on chart 30. But basically, as I said earlier,
the orbiter data and the main engine data, up until the start of this event, all appeared nominal.
And the areas that we are concentrating on in our further analysis are the photoanalysis of the
SRB and the ex_,ernni tank.
DR. FEYNMAN: You say "nominal" up until when?
MR. KOHRS: Up unti, we etarted to get these divergences. That was about 59 seconds, in
that timeframe. And the last chart, chart 30, kind of summarizes that.
(V_.ewgraph. ' i_,,,_. 2 I:_ :2 I
The only twng we t'ilked earlier about the angle of attack profile, critiques this deviation,
based on this _,il_d shear we kad, but when we try to reconstruct it, we cannot totally recon-
struc_ it. We have got some external force which undoubtedly is this plume, and we've got some
uncertainty in ore" wind _,'ofile. That is what we will be refining within the next weeks to give
you a better backo_ of the effect.
And the other point is that our wind load indicators, which are the measure of the stress
that the vehicie is ,_eeing during ascent, which we have done for these load indicator routines
during a}] our flights, and in this particular flight our highest
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indicator, which happened to be a wing indicator in this case, was 87 percent. And the SRB indi-
cators, which are really the indicators that we developed back where the tank is tied to the vehi-
cle, we were down in the 30 percent of their limit load capability as measured against their load
capability.
MR. RUMMEL: Again, Are the limit loads the maximum computed applied loads? Is that
correct? As opposed to design loads, which would then have the load factor applied? Can you just
clarify what the 30 percent is of here?
MR. KOHRS: It is 30 percent of a factor of safety of 1.4. That's the way I would say it.
MR. RUMMEL: Are those factors applied to what we would normally call the design loads?
That is, the actual load plus a load factor? I notice there is a load factor of 3 someplace.
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MR.KOHRS:In somecases--and.George.youcouldhelpmeonthe SRBon the loadfactor.
MR.HARDY:I'm notsure[ understandthequestion.
MR.RUMMEL: Well. I'm trying te understand what these percentages are. Is it the design
load, the maximum load? Or, is it what is called the applied load'? Or is it a limit load? What is
it'.'
S40
MR. HARDY: As best I recall, it is the design load.
MR. RUMMEL" So you say it is of the computed maximum load to which is applied the load
factor, to which then is applied the safety thctor which is 1.4. Is that correct?
MR. HARDY: I believe that is correct.
MR. RUMMEL: Thapk you.
GEN. KUTYNA: Jess, 87 percent shouldn't give you any problems or concern. You've been
there before.
MR. KOHRS: That is well within our base.
MR. MOORE: We've been above 87 percent many times,
MR. KOHRS: This actual trajectory {'or that day was what we call a benign trajectory in a
load sense.
Mr. Chairman, that's all the charts I had.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS" You were mentioning you would have some of this data completed
in two weeks. Is that abort what you are estimating?
MR. KOHRS: Well, here again what we call our ascent trajectory reconstruction, and part of
that takes you back to the liftoff loads and gets you all the way through the completion of the
events, we should have a pretty good, what I call a preliminary cut, in the next
couple of weeks. The final cu, is probably in a month's timeframe to reconstruct all of this.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Does that include everything? In other words, will all of the collec-
tion of material and data and photographs be completed within a month?
MR. KOHRS: I can't answer to photographic. I'm talking about the flight telemetry data
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I'm not trying to hold you to it,
MR. MOORE: We're going to show you tomorrow, Mr. Chairman, what we think the analyti-
cal and testing process associated with our task force is going to take in terms of time, I think
from a trajectory reconstruction and so forth, we hope to be able te, get everybody agreed and in
sync on the details of what happened sometime within the next couple of weeks.
I think with respect to the photography data, it depends upon what we find in that data. I
mean, it may take us several additional weeks once we have identified an area to go back and
get the best expert_ in this country to go and take a look at those photographs, enb"nce them
and do digital analysis on the photographs. So that is kind of a to-be-determined wit respect to
the photographic data.
With respect to the data of the testing and
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trying to re-create the set of circumstances on this thing, that will take a fairly long time.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I wasn't asking about that. I was asking about the analysis of the
telemetry.
MR. MOORE: I think we are in what I would say, and anybody on our team can comment
on it, I think we are in reasonable agreement about the major sequence of events. We are prob-
ably still off in terms of the precise times by a few-tenths of a second, or milliseconds, and so
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[brth,whichwehavenotexactlypinneddownyet.Andbased,apon Dick's assessment, a couple
of weeks is probably a reasonable time to expect us to be in fairly good agreement in terms of" a
timeline.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: As you may know, I am going to have to testifv Tuesday belbre the
S__'nate Committee, and it would be helpful if" I could make some genera[ comments about it. t,,-
say that our review with y_;u.--
MR MOORE: I'm _oing to be there, as well.
GEN. KUTYNA: Jess, I asked the question about liftoff loads because I've gotter, through
the back channel that there were some. You're not going to have that data tot a few weeks, but
do you have _ny preliminary that there might have been some lif'toff loads that were unusual'?
_43
MR. MOORE: I will ask my Cape friends or Marshall friends, and so forth. I have not seen
any done at this point in time.
MR HARDY: We don't have the liftoff loads totally reconstructed. We're very interested in
those loads, and we are working with Dick and his people to reconstruct those. I believe that
that is somewhere in the neighborhood of a week or so away.
GEN. KUTYNA: But how about first-look?
MR. KOHRS: We have not seen anything. There are a few things that the guys are double-
tracking to make sure that they've got the right timing, and the liftoff loads are a function of
the liftoff time. As the vehicle bends over and is coming back, essentially we are minimizing the
loads at liftoff, and there is some disagreement on the actual liftoff time. I showed on my chart
6.6 seconds SSME start T-06.6 seconds later. The guys that have looked at the strain guage data
to date, and have just started looking at this, are about .08 to maybe a tenth of a second in
disagreement that they are still trying to resolve. And to say we've got a problem today would
just be conjecture until we get that detailed analysis. But I've had that same input and guys are
working on it with all the priority that can be put on it.
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MR. MOORE: Where is that work going on? At JSC?
MR. KOHRS: At JSC in conjunction with Marshall.
MR. MOORE: We would be happy to provide the status of what we have right now, Don.
GEN. KUTYNA: Well, Jess, what I'm saying, I don't want the Commission to be surprised
that, oh, you didn't tell us something. Because there's word going around that, hey, there was
something squirrely about the liftoff loads. So, for the record, you are looking at it. Maybe there
was, maybe there wasn't?
MR. MOORE: I had not even heard that. So I think you are using words I haven't heard yet.
MR. KOHRS: I personally did not get that until last night, but we are working on it.
DR, COVERT: Could I ask Dr. Williams a question, please? Walt, if I recall correctly, one
way to get an increase on the turbine temperature on the high pressure fuel turbopump would
be to reduce oxygen flow. Is that right?
MR. WILLIAMS: No. You reduce hydrogen, if you go with more oxygen and less fi,c|.
MR. CRIPPEN: Which is what we were showing.
DR. COVERT: I just want to be sure my memory of
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that was correct.
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MR ACttESON:l don't needa longp -,_ntationon this. but just a clarification.What is
destroyedin this destructcasethat is not !_, Joyedin the normal flight terminationof the
boosters?
MR. MOORF:Are you familiar enoughwith the rangesa(ety,Dick'?Maybewecouldget
GeorgeHardyuphereto claril}"whatwethirlk isdestructedwhena rangesafetydevice[sfired.
George,whydon't you go illustrate.
MR. ACHESON: But it did come down on the chute? Is that correct'?
MR. MOORE: No. The drogue chute did come out. but it did not come down on the chute.
Following that. the range safety destruct sent commands up to destruct the vehicle. So it did not
come down on the chute.
MR. HARDY: Well, as you well know, the booster is built in what are referred to as the four
field segments, and then we have a forward skirt, and then the frustum, which houses the recov-
ery system. And if I could, I would take just a few seconds to tell you how the normal recovery
works. In a normal recovery after separation the recovery system is armed, and then, after it
times out during the fallback phase, the pyrotechnics would jettison the nose. That pulls the
pilot chute out,
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which employs a drogue chute. That is at roughly 16,000 feet. And at about 6,000 feet, we pyro-
technically jettison the frustum which allows then the drogue chute to pull out the main chutes
and the booster falls back into the water impact. It stabilizes very quickly under the three clus-
tered main chutes, and it falls back in tail-first.
The range safety destruct obviously for a norraai flyback is not actuated at all. The range
safety destruct system is a linear-shaped charge. It is configured to concentrate the jet of the
explosion, and it covers a portion of this forward segment, and then the forward center section,
we call it, and most of the aft center segment. It terminates, as I recall, about 18 to 20 inches
above the field joint here, and it is not on the aft segment at all. It is designed such that under
pressure it will simply open up the case. It opens up the case, and the pressure will drop, and
you lose all propulsive capability.
MR. RUMMEL: Is there a notch in tke case. or a seam of any kind?
MR. HARDY: No, sir. It has been qualified that it will fire through the full case thickness.
MR. CRIPPEN: George, excuse me. I think maybe there's one other point. Someone correct
me if
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I'm wrong. I think some people thought that if we had not destructed on the range safety
system, that we perhaps would have gotten a normal separation sequence which would put the
chutes out, and it would have deployed the SRBs in the water.
These SRBs tore off of the system, and consequently they never received the normal set se-
quence that they would need to activate the system. So in fact by shutting clown the thrust, it
may have kept them from going higher and falling further.
MR. ACHESON: Parts of the booster that are valuable for evidence examination after the
fact would have been lost in the destruct mode?
MR. MOORE: Well, all of--the key element that we are after in this thing is the apparent
leakage in the field joint down there, and we do not think that is destructed. We think that field
joint was not impacted by range safety, and we have got some sonar data that says that we have
located the righthand solid rocket booster, and so forth, which will be extremely valuable evi-
dence to us in terms of going back and fitting some _f these failure scenarios.
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We plan to talk to the Commission this afternoon about what we have located on the
r,,ttom, but we do think we have the righthand aft case segment
_48
intact enough to allow us to get some physical evidence back from the recovery, which is ,of para-
mount importance.
CtIAIRMAN ROGERS: On that point, in the NBC report we heard just as we got on the
plane that there was an official of NASA that said that you were 95 percent certain of what the
cause was. Was that just a leak from somewhere'? Was that a newspaper rumor?
MR. MOORE: I would certainly categorize that as a newspaper rumor.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: You heard it, I assume?
MR. MOORE: I did not hear it.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: It was the lead story on NBC that said a high official of NASA--now
I think I'm an expert on leaks.
(Laughter.)
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I'm just asking, as far as you know it was not a high official?
MR. MOORE: No, sir. We stand on the statements we made the other day. We do not have
any cause pinned dow at this point in time.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I'm not talking about these kinds of leoks. I'm talking about newspa-
per leaks.
tLaughter•
COLONEL LINDSAY: Let me add one thought on
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the destruct mechanism on the solid rocket boosters. The linear-shaped charge merely opens the
case. It is designed to penetrate the steel case, and then it opens like a clamshell to instantly
vent and go to zero thrust, so there is no further propulsi _e ;;ower. And that last segment did
not have, by design, the linear-shaped charge.
MR. SILVEIRA: By stopping the burning at that time, you probably stopped the hot gases if
you had any leak there, so you probably preserved the damage in the state we would like to look
at it, rather than damaging it any further. The range destruct was probably a help rather than
a hindrance.
DR. COVERT: Well, it has a potential, but it may well, when it hits the water, break apart.
I agree that it has that potential.
DR. FEYNMAN: How are these things made? If you wanted to put out a chute, do you have
to have the signals received by a radio that is located somewhere else, and it is wired across?
But if you wan Lo destroy it, it has its own receiver? How does it work?
MR. SILVEiRA: The normal chute functioning--
MR. HARDY: Well, I will talk to the chute functioning, and you might talk to the range
safety. But as Bob Crippen mentioned, as an interlock to make
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sure that w, zlon't get any separation during the boost phase, which would not be healthy, we
require two signals from the crbitar, two independent signals, what we call fire one and fire two,
and those are the signals to separate the booster. And until that has happened, we have an
interlock such that there is no power on the recovery system. The recovery system has its own
battery power, and there is no power on the recovery system a! all. When separation signal is
received, those two separate signals, the power is--the bus is powered up by the battery; the
switch is closed, so that you've got bus power; and then it is a combination of timing, timing
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circuits,and altitude detection from the barrel switch that's sequenced, in the remaining things
that I just described in the recovery system.
The range safety system does have its own receiver
DR. FEYNMAN: Located on?
MR. HARDY: It's located on the booster. There is one on this booster. There is one on this
booster. But ::;ey are redundant. Let me take that back. They are redundant on this booster, and
they're redundant on this booster, and they are also on the external tank. And they are cross-
strapped, so that if you had any occasion for destruct with the vehicle
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intact, a signal received from either one of two receivers here, or either one of two receivers
here, or the one receiver here would effect destruct.
After the booster is away, it has its own battery-powered redundant receivers.
DR. FEYNMAN: Thank you.
MR. SILVEIRA: Don't forget the separation motor sequence two.
MR. HARDY: In a normal separation, when the solids--when the separation signal is re-
ceived, it is received to fire an explosive bolt here findicating), and an explosive bolt in each of
the three struts here. Those are redundant signals. Each end of the bolt has a pyrotechnic device
to set it off, and that also signals ignition of the separation motors. There are four down here on
the bottom, and there are four up here on this frustum.
So all of that, timewise, is essentially simultaneous.
COLONEL LINDSAY: The destruct commands, the commands you pray you never have to
send, in the case of the shuttle are through an encoding device that is built and provided to us
by the National Security Agency. And each mission has a different code, and it is completely
independent of the shuttle system. It is separately
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transmitted and received.
MR. SMITH: As host, could I suggest we break for a few minutes? Lunch is outside.
MR. MOORE: Before we do, let me discuss with the Chairman his druthers this t_ fternoon.
We've obviously spend a lot of time on this part, and there are also going to be a h : of very
interesting things this afternoon. Is your cutoff time somewhere around the 5:00 p.m. time-
frame? Is that something we should target for?
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, I think, myself, and any other members of the Commission
could speak for themselves, but I think we should do as much as possible today, and I think we
ought to cut down the social activities, although it is nice, but it is so vital that we know about
all of this as quickly as possible. I mean we are here to work and not to enjoy ourselves.
MR. MOORE: You are getting the latest data information that we have from all our teams.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: That is vitally important, and that is what we are here for. I would
like to work as late as we can stand it.
MR. MOORE: We will proceed with the agenda as we have it right now.
MR. SMITH: Lunch is self-service outside for
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everyone. And, please, ea_ off your tray so we can just take the trays back out and pick it up in
a hurry.
(Whereupon, at 1:05 p.m., a luncheon recess was taken, to reconvene at 1:45 p.m., this same
day. )
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12/22
L_,TRANSFER/MATE PAD B
12/24 ...... 1/3
A HOLIDAYS
i HELD ON JANUARy lP IFLIGHT READINESS REVIEW
115
A IUSITDRS INSTALLATION
118
A TCDT
1116
HYPER LOAD
1117
HPU HOTFIRE
1123
A T-43 HOURS
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STS 51-L
TERMINAL COUN[
1123 (10 /V4EST)
A T-41 HOURS
1/25 (11 AM EST)
_, L-I NIT - QUESTIONABLE_ATHER FOR LAUNCH ON 2GTH
1/25 (930 PM EST)
MMT - WX SCRUB
1/26 MMT (2 PM EST)
_MMT - GO FOR TANKING/LAUNCH ATTEMPT FOR 9;31 AM, 1/27
1127 (I AM EST)
A START ET TANKING
1/27 (5 AMEST)
CE TEAM GO FOR LAUNCH FOR 9:37
:18 AM EST - HOLD FOR HATCH ANOMALY
0:51 AM - IMU REALIGNMENT
12:36 PM SCRUB DUE TO RTLS X-WIND EXCEEDANCE-_'15KTS
A12:ql PM - START ET DETANKING
1/27 (2 PM EST)
MMT - GO FOR TANKING/LAUNCHATTEMPT FOR 9:38 AM, 1/28
1/28 (1:18 AM EST)
A TANKING DELAYED - LPS ANOMALY
A3:55 AM - START TANKING - LAUNCH DELAY TO 10:38 AM
A 1:30 _ 7:00 A11:00 ICE IELM ASSESSMENT
1/28 (9 AM EST)
MMT - TEMPERATURE REVIEW
/k11:38 AM - SI-L LAUNCH
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STS 51-L
WEATHER SUMMARY
L-1 MRT AT 11 AM EST 1/25
MAJOR FEAF!JRE WAS APPROACHING COLD FRONT
FORECAST MULTI-LAYER CLOUD DECKS, RAIN SHOWERS (NO GO)
TEMPERATURE FORECAST - MID 60's
RAINFALL SINCE ROLLOUT TO PAD - APPROXIMATELY 7 INCHES vs 2.5 NORMAL
QUESTIONABLE WEATHER-RECONVENE AT 9:30 PM EST TO STATUS COLD FRONT PROGRESS
0 9:30 PM RRT ON I125 FOR 1/26 LAUNCH
0
COLD FRGNT HAD PROGRESSED THROUGH MOBILE (]0 KTS MOVEMENT)
FORECAST UNCHANGED
I)£CISION TO SCRUB
2:00 PM EST RRT ON 1/26 FOR 1/27 LAUNCH
0 COLD FRONT HAD ROVED INTO AREA, WEATHER HAD NOT DETEORIATED AS
QUICKLY AS PRnJECTED
o FORECAST CLEARING BEHIND FRONTAL PASSA6E
o CONCERN ON SURFACE WINDS AND UPPER AIR WINDS
o AT NOMINAL T-O SURFACE WINOS AND UPPER WINDS ACCEPTABLE
o 12:37 PM EST - SCRUB DUE TO EXCESSIVE RTLS CROSSWINDS (15 KTS)
2:00 PM EST RMT ON 1/27 FOR 1/28 LAUNCH
FORECASTED CONTINUED CLEARING, DECREASING NORTH_STERLY WINDS
TEMPERATURE EXPECTED TO BE BELOW FREEZING (INTO LOW 20's) FOR
APPROXIMATELY 11 HOURS
CONCERN EXPRESSED ON ICE, CAPABILITY OF FACILITY
TEMPERATURE AT BEGINNING OF WINDOW (0938) EXPECTED NEAR ]OOF
(ACTUAL 0900 - 290F, 1000 - 32o_)
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L-6.6 SECs
- 0.0 (11:38:00.010 EST)
+ 0.0587
0.445
1.606
2.147
7.724
,,,_-12-13
20.084
21.124
36.084
40.0
52.084
58.774
SIS 51-L
ASCENT rIMELINE
SSME START CMD
SRB iGNITION CMD
FIRST MOVEMENT
FIRST EVIDENCE OF BLACK SMOKE
RH SRB NEAR FIELD JOINT
BLACK SMOKE DARKEST
BLACK SMOKE EXTENDS HALFWAY ACROSS RH SRB
ROLL MANEUVER INITIATION
LAST VISUAL INDICATION OF BLACK SMOKE
START SSME THROTTLE DOWN TO 94%
ROLL MANEUVER COMPLETED
START SSME THROTTLE DOWN TO 65%
VEHICLE RESPONDS TO WIND
START SSME THROTTLE UP TO 104%
FIRST IND!CATiON OF SMOKE FROM -Z SIDE
OF RH SRB FORWARD OF AFT ET ATTACH RING
(As OF 2/12/86)
NOMINAL
NOMINAL
NOMINAL
CAMERA 6O
CAMERA 60
CAMERA 60
NOMINAL
CAMERA 217
NOMINAL
NOMINAL
NOMINAL
NOMINAL
NOMINAL
CAMERA 207
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(as oF 2/12/86)
ASCENT Til4ELINE (CONt'D)
60.164
60.600
62.484
63.924
64.604
64.937
65.404
65.524
66.174
66.484
66.625
6T.650
MAXIMUM DYNAMIC PRESSURE
WELL DEFINED INTENSE PLUME ON SIDE OF RH SRB
-7 DIRECTION
SRB CHAMBER PRESSURE DIVERGENCE
(RH FROM LH)
EVIDENCE OF FLA&4E FROM RH SRB IN -Z DIRECTION
RIGHT HAND OUTBOARD ELEVON HINGE MOVEMENT SPIKE
RIGHT HAND OUTBOARD ACTUATOR Ap CHANGE
START 0£ VEHICLE PITCH RATE CHANGE
START SSME PITCH V_IATIONS
END OF VEHICLE PITCH RATE CHANGE
LEFT HAND OUTBOAR_ ACTUMOR A p CHANGE
BRIGHT SPOT ON RH SRB IN PLUG IN -Z DIRECTION
START OF mIGHT SPOTS ON +Z SIDE
ET LH 2 ULLAGE PRESSURE DEVIATION
BRIGHT SUSTAINED GLOW ON +Z SIDE OF RH SRB
APPARENT MERGING OF PLUME
NOMINAL
CAMERA 207
TELEMETRY DATA
CAMERA 206
TELEMETRY DATA
TELEMETRY DATA
TELEMETRY DATA
TELEMETRY DATA
TELEMETRY DATA
TELEMETRY DATA
CAMERA 207
TELEMETRY DATA
CAMERA 207
CAMERA 207
JRel'. 2 I:l-tl :_o1"I_
(As OF 2/12/861
ASCENT TIMELINE (CONt'D)
67.684
72.141
72.201
72.281
72.40
77.661
77.88q
73.0q4
73.175
73.200
73.201
73.22G
73.326
MPS LO2 INLET PRESSURE RISE RATE DECREASED
VEHICLE LATERAL +Y ACCELERATION 0.227G
START OF DIVERGENT -YAW RAIES RH vs LH SRB
START OF DIVERGENT + PITCH RATES RH vs LH SRB
LAST TDRSS DATA
VEHICLE LATERAL -Y ACCELERATION 0.254G
START MPS LO2 AND LH 2 INLET PRESSURE DROPS TELEMETRY
RH SRB CHAMBER PRESSURE 24 PSl LOWER THAN LH (5 SIGMA) TELEMETRY
SUDDEN CLOUD ALONG SIDE OF ET
FLASH FROM REGION BETWEEN ORBITER
AND ET LH2 TANK
E_oLOSION NEAR SRB FORWARD ATTACH
INCREASED INTENSITY OF WHITE FLASH IN
REGION OF ET LOX TANK
TELEMETRY DATA
TELEMETRY DATA
TELEMETRY DATA
TELEMETRY DATA
TELENETRY DATA
TELEMETRY DATA
DATA
DATA
CAMERA 207
CAMERA 207
CAMERA 206
CAMERA 206
CAMERA 206
|
ASCENT TIMELIHE (CONT'D)
73.399
73.q73
73.53_
73,605
73.621
76._25
109.604
110.266
SSMEs APPROACHING ;-IPFT REDLINE LIMITS
ORBITER P CHAMBER PRESS MEAS FLUCTUATIONS
SSME NUMBER 1 SHUTDOWNDUE TO HPFT D[SCHARGE
TEMPERATURE EXCEEDANCE
LAST VALIDATED DATA - ORB RCS PRESSURE
LAST DATA FRAME
RH SRB NOSE CAP SEP/DROGUE CHUTE DEPLOY
RH SRB RSS DESTRUCT
LH SRB RSS DESTRUCT
(As OF 2/12/86)
REMARKS
TELEMETRY DATA
TELEMETRY DATA
TELEMETRY DATA
TELEMETRY DATA
TELEMETRY STOPS
CAMERA 206
CAMERA 230
CAMERA 201
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Systems Integration
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Johnson Space Center
Systems Integration
Observations
• ASCENT TRAJECTORY AND LOADS ANALYSIS INDICATE SYSTEM
OPERATIO*_IS WELL WITHIN SYSTEM CAPABILITY
• MAX G _ 716 AT 60 SEC
• ANGLE OF ATTACK PROFILE PREDICTS DEVIATION AT 62 TO 65
SECONDS CONSISTENT WITH VEHICLE RESPONSE TO EXTERNAL
WINDS IN THIS TIMEFRAME
• SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION TO OBSERVED VEHICLE DYNAMICS
• LOAD INDICATORS WELL WITHIN SYSTEM CAPABILITIES
• LEADING INDICATOR 87%
• SRB INDICATORS LESS THAN 30%
IRef. '2 1:3 '22]
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AFTERNOON SESSION
,115 p.m.i
MR. :MOORE: Mr Chairman, tb.s is Char!ie Stevensor,. af the Kennedy Space Center here,
and he is ;q charge or' our photogra:_hic team analysis, and we are going to try to give you a
_'air[y comprehensive rundown of a 1_): _'_fthe photographic data thet we've got from Flight 5l-[,.
Charlie?
855
,e/
STATEMENT OF CHARLIE STEVENSON. PHOTOGRAPHIC TEAM ANAI,YSIS. KENNEDY
SPACE CENTER
MR STEVENSON: I guess what I'm going to try to do is give you a quick rundown of where
we are, o.nd show you some of the things we have come up with. We have a variety Gf visual aids
here we are going to try to run.
iHereafter, a film was shown.; IN,,_ I)ubli',hedl
First we are going to _..how you the film from our 70 millimeter cameras. We have picked
the ones that _how you the best views. Of course we don't have a 70 millimeter projection here,
and so the rnacbine we have will be this one, which is older than I am. As a matter of fact, it
was going out when I was young. But we're going to try with this one. It is an analysis type
machine, and it is not there for projection, but we're going to try it anyway. So let's go on, Gary,
and we will slow it down when we need to.
What I will do, as we run along I will stop, and as we get into the other film, the things I
am pointing out will become more and more obvious as you see more of them.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: !s this 70 millimeter?
856
MR. STEVENSON: This is 70 millimeter. Now this camera is lo,,'ated at Pad A. and it looks
north at the orbiter _art of the vehicle. And the reason we have it is it shows a good example
here of the smoke cloud. And we show it ir_ this camera because it is all the way around the
_ehic!e lookir_g through the vehicle, more or less, at where the cloud is here.
MR. SMITH: The Commission members may want to get up closer, because some of this is
hard to see. I'm sorry.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Now it appears to me that theft could be geometrically
located very close to that. Am I wrong about that?
MR. STEVENSON: Yes, sir. As I go along, I will show you some viewgraphs later that will
more or less show you where that is coming from.
DR. WALKER: Is there a blemish on the screen?
MR, STEVENSON: Yes. This is a very old machine, and we cleaned it as good as we could
last night. You are actually looking at a view like this, side to side, from Pad A.
(Pause. 1
On the TV system, which we will show you later, we can start and stop and really show you
exactly what we have This is the ET attach ring right here.
857
DR. FEYNMAN: I r_otice it is higher now.
MR. STEVENSON: We're going to walk around the vehicle this way with our projection
until we get around the back, and so several additional films will be available.
4(_8
MR SMITH:This is DickSmtthspeaking.If I could point out, it appears on a_l the tilms
that the smoke was projected upwards initially', and you kind ¢9f tlv tap through it, and so you do
see the change in elevation, and it does appear to be above the joint, the large cloud
MR. STEVENSON: It comes up and touches :_0 feet or so, and then we fly on ou_
MR. SMITH: We apologize for this pro.jector It was tlown in from Houston [_:_t nigh_, We
werv, trying to _ind a projection machine we had out in the other area. We had one we couldn't
move This is an antique machine, and as you can tell it does not work very welt.
MR. STEVENSON: We usually look at 16 millimeter, and if we see something we're inter-
ested in, then we go ,.o the 70 millimeter
CtIAIRMAN ROGERS: Do you think that is smoke, or som,_thin_ else'.'
MR. STEVENSON: That is definiteiy smoke.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: It almost looks as if it is
858
continuing to come out.
DR. FEYNMAN: It is flying up.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I guess what I was wondering about was whether there waa a leak.
{Pause.
MR. STEVENSON: Okay, you can see it as we reach about this level, the 20iMbot level. The
cloud has actually disappeared, and from many camera angles. We only have really one camera
that really show's the puff good down at the bottom. So we can see at a later time when the
cloud of smoke begins to appear again.
{Pause.
With this camera, we are able to--we ran out of form betbre we got to the critical point of
where we saw the plume in question. This camera eventually looks right up at the bottom as we
gain altitude. Now the little dark spot you see on the aft dome :_.re normal. That is just charring.
There's nothing abnormal about that. Occasionally yoa'll see a little white puff come by.
DR. FEYNMAN: Is that normal, too, the white puf&
MR. STEVENSON: We do see that.
DR. COVERT: The boundary of the righthand plume is considerably furrier than the other
one,
S59
DR. FEYNMAN: But you're looking at a different part. One is below: the other is above.
MR. STEVENSON: Okay. As we continue to rise in altitude, you'll notice we are looking
more and more into the dome. And on the lefthand rocket, the area we are concerned with, you
can see very clearly on the lefthand---l'm talking the lefthand, not righthand--you can see the
ET ring here {indicating). This little ring (indicatingl, the structural ring that we attach, the ET,
to the external tank, and this is also the area that we attach the orbiter to the external tank. So
that the SRB ET ring right here is on the other side in this area lindicating). This is where we
see the plume.
We won't see it on this film, but we will see it on the next one. Go ahead.
{Pause.}
DR. FEYNMAN: Can you stop it there? Is this the plume?
MR. STEXTENSON: What you see here is the IEA, which is the same as this lindicating/.
,MR. HOTZ: What is that red area there?
MR. STEVENSON: This is the bottom of the aft dome of the external tank.
IPause.
469
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NIP,. STEVENSON: In the area of the ri_hthand booster, you now begin to see more smoke
in :his area than we were seeing be{','re. Some of it is attributed to the flame being this way
toward the camera, rather than just let's say smoke cqmin{z off the righthand booster.
DR Fla:YNMAN: Do w_,_ know what time it is now?
MR WAITE: Aren't you looking through the exhaust of the main engines, as well?
MR. STEVENSON: Some. Now this, the second film, is from camera site 10, which is north
o{' Pad B, _ever_:l miles north of Pad B. and I apologize tbr the orientation, but the image goes
into the camera, and we need one more lens in it to turn it around correctly. But let's run it.
, Pause }
Here you can see your righthand SR_ here iindicatingl, with the plume here {indieatingl.
and the smoke. The aft dome is in this area. This is just a reflection.
DR. FEYNMAN: From the beginning of the plume until now is about how long?
MR. STEVENSON: The first flame was visible at about 59 seconds.
DR. FEYNMAN: And when is this, now?
MR. STEVENSON: You're probably talking about 65
861
seconds or so, in that timeframe.
DR. COVERT: Now there is, it looks like some strings coming out, or some little things
being thrown out. Has it exploded already?
MR. STEVENSON: No.
DR. COVERT: Do you see right below the plume'? To the left it looks like there are hot par-
tic!es being ejected.
MR. S'I'EVENSON: What is happeniag here is that the plume is beginning to wrap around
the rocket case, so it is just expanding. The rocket case is that way tindicatingl, up.
IJR. COVERT: So that is just the reflectlon along the line of the cylinder'?
MR. STEVENSON: Yes. It actually wraps around this way, between the orbiter and the
SRB. It ,,rill come around the other way, and then actually they will meet here in the middle.
As we gc along, we will show you a better one of this that you will be able to orient yourself.
You see the tail is up here instead of down. The film was just taken the wrong way. So here
iindicatit:g) is the tail of the orbiter, the righthand wing, the external tank, the righthand
rocket.
MR. SMITH: Why don't you stop it right there,
862
Charlie, and explain what you've got. It's wrapped all the way around just about now.
MR. STEVENSON: Now you can see the flame coming between the lower surface of the
orbiter, the righthand SRB, and around the backside, what I call the backside, the minus-Z side
of the SRB.
MR. WAITE: Why would&t that just melt the case and cause a separation?
DR. LUCAS: That analysis is under way to respond to that very point, and you will hear
some of' it this afternoon.
MR. STEVENSON: This is just a reflection off the smooth part of the external tank inner
tank area.
DR. FEYNMAN: Which way is that moving through the air?
MR. STEVENSON: The orbiter normally flies down towar._ :he ground.
MR. SMITH: What is the angle of attack it typically flies, Dick'?
471)
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MR SMI'IH: Stop _here _l second
.MR. STEVENSON: Thi,_ is the r_gh_ rocket.. :tnd you carl see _he chute con,,i_g ou_ here. the
drogue, and
the nose cone is Ion_ _one And here _s somewhere, if[ remember correc_ly---'.,ve!I,we missed
that, This is th plume we were re['erriniz tO. :\nd of course the nozzle here, the aft _k}.rT:, :rod the
aft booster. "['he chute blooms, and then is immediately consumed.
Okay, this thir,_,i one, again, is-- there is your plume. This time it is aligned correctly. This
again is the lefthand rocket this time. The righthand rocket on the other side. The plume is
coming toward you. The orbiter is here, and the external tank.
DR. RIDE: Are we seeing the plume wrap around?
MR. STEVENSON: Yes.
Pause. )
864
MR. STEVENSON: You can see here. it has now spread to where it is around between the
orbiter and the external tank, and in this case the lefth_,:,,d rocket.
tPause. )
DR. FEYNMAN: The last time we saw the plume it was coming out and down, and now it's
supposed to be com;ng out and around and between?
MR. STEVENSON: The plume over here is coming under this way and out here and in be-
tween.
MR. SMITH: Speak up a little louder, C ,'_rlie, ,_o everybody can hear you.
DR, FEYNMAN: This must be later, the_: _'rom when you had the other picture.
MR. STEVENSON: Yes. And what we ha', _ound, what we are doing in all (_t these, we are
going back and making S x 10s of these, and we are putting the exact time reference on each
frame so we can giggle them where they should be, and that way we will get the three men-
sional analysis.
(Pause. *
We can slow this down fbr you when we go 1:_othe TV Capes, and we will show you this in
more detail than we can show you on this machine. This was the loss of the LOX tank, and we
can see on fiIm that it actually lifted right up and we can see sky completely under the
8_5
forward top of the LOX tank. It blew ':.he top right out.
DR. COVERT: Is that a vaporiz_:tion pressurized, a heat boiloff, heat. boiled off oxygen?
MR. SMITH: Yes, from the engine.
{Pause.}
MR. STEVENSON: Again, we're really not dwelling on these type objects here, but this is
the orbiter. And once again, the rightband rocket that you can see here, the extra plume that
we have that we normally would not have.
MR. HOTZ: What is that on the lower left?
MR. STEVENSON: That's part of the orbiter. We have passed the part where you can see
the cabin and the lower portion, but there is some question about the RC_'V. We think it is an
explosion following behind. Again, you cm,, see the chute and the obvious two plumes here.
cPause.)
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This is the win_,bythewa',.Thewingjust came,wrossherr.[)[4.COVERT:Arethese"all manuallyaimed "_
MR S_'EVENS()N: Some _o with r-_dar. They are remotely tracked, and they are corrected
as _e r.eed them during t]iRht.
, P,iPJSe.
S_;6
Again. this is the right SRB. and the le(t one is here _indicating_.
Pause.
This film was underexposed in order to study the plumes, to get an idea of what the plumes
look like, which fell right in line with what happened. In this case you'll be able to see the extra
plume we have.
MR. ACHESON: What angle are we !ooking at here?
MR. STEVENSON: We're looking right up the bottom.
GEN. KUTYNA: What would you call that?
MR. STEVENSON: I would call that inboard toward the minus Y from the struts. And I will
show you by viewgraph.
DR. FEYNMAN: You were going around the tire!e, weren't you, with the zero angle?
GEN. KUTYNA: It's not on the bottom of the solids?
MR. STEVENSON: It's in between the rocket and the external tank, and I will point that
out on the view:;raph.
iPause. !
You see now you appear to have what is three plumes instead of two. This one here, the top
plume.
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you normally don't have that.
_Pause.
OR. FEYNMAN: Did you hax ' a special camera set at a lower sensitivity'?
MR, STEVENSON: We had a _3mera just to look at the SRB plume. Okay, this again is the
righthand rocket. You can tell by t,_e extra plume we have off to the side. You can see it rotate
around. Hold it just a second. This is when the range safety system destructed the vehicle. A
typ;cal type range safety system destruct. Okay.
'Pause. 1
Here's the frustum right here. The tbrward part, this part here of the SRB actually under
magnification is in extremely good condition. A little bit of smudge marks, but it generally is in
good condition, at this point anyway. Now that's the end of that one. Let's turn the lights on
again, and let me orient the guys as to wl'.ere we w,,re.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Is there anyth:ng about that that you can tell us that is significant
to you, more than what we observed? Can 3ou d_aw any tentative conclusions from that? What
I've learned is that you have a little smoke early on in the first seconds, and Jt disappears, and
then the plume, and more smoke about
8(;8
that same time. Is there anything else of significance that you can draw from that?
MR. STEVENSON: Well, I think--can I show you the TV version, and that will be able to
answer your questions a lot better. Let me have the three viewgraphs on the smoke, please.
(Viewgraphs, I [_,',,I : I_ 2:_l
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3IR. STEVENSON:Okay, let't _oright timewise Theoneon the [eft on this side under
screen A is typical. The photo was taken out of' a long stream, l just went and pulled one out
just bet\_re the smoke started, and the smoke again is in this area here _indicatin_! And I will
show you viewgraphs in a minute that _.?ll describe this entire area here.
GEN K_.rTYNA: Where is the tield joint?
MR STEVENSON: This is the ET attach ring and the field joint is roughiy a fl)ot above
that. I will show you that in detail in just a few seconds here.
MR. HOTZ: Where is the smoke coming from in that first picture'.'
MR. STEVENSON: Over here in the first two frames, we have no visible smoke. In the
middle frame on the B, we have the smoke here. It actually goes up to right about here It goes
25 or so feet up the vehicle.
DR. FEYNMAN: You mean it starts low and goes
up?
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MR. STEVENSON: Yes. It starts here, goes up, and we fly out of it.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: What is the length of that smoke?
MR. STEVENSON: It's about 25 feet tall.
GEN. KUTYNA: Is the dark area on the bottom of the ET, is that smoke--that dark
shadow?
MR. STEVENSON: Yes, sir. You see, we're already flying out of it. This is about the sixth or
seventh frame where there is smoke. I'm just going downstream a little way so it is obvious to
everyone that it is there.
MR. RUMMEL: Does the solid motor burn out up to that joint at that point?
GEN. KUTYNA: No, it burns the whole thing.
MR. RUMMEL: The entire length?
MR. STEVENSON: Right. You burn from here down internally.
MR. RUMMEL: It's ignited at the upper end up there?
MR. STEVENSON: Yes.
DR. WALKER: When it's ignited, how long does it take for a fire to start'? Does it start very
quickly, I imagine'? It ignites at the top'?
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MR. HARDY: It is microseconds. Just a very short time.
MR. STEVENSON: The smoke is real small in here and going up.
MR. WAITE: Do you think those are combustion gases'?
MR. STEVENSON: I think these are cerbon particles in the materials that make up the
joint, is my opinion.
MR. WAITE: So it is just pressure leaking out? What is it that's leaking out?
MR. STEVENSON: Black smoke is what we see.
DR. WALKER: How long after the ignition is the first frame?
MR. STEVENSON: Rough time showed this to be about 610 milliseconds.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Going back to the qu,,stion before that, what do we think is leaking
out? What do we see as smoke'? Do we have a guess?
MR. STEVENSON: I'm guessing, but to me it is the SRB exhaust coming through the field
joint, and you are seeing the hydrocarbon particles that make up the joint is what makes the
bl_ek _m_ko.
DR. COVERT: Could that be O-ring material?
MR. STEVENSON: It could be O-ring material. It could be
4_'3
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_.:reasearxdputty.
DR.COVERT.Puttyiszincchromate.That probabiydoesn'tburn black.
MR.SMITtt: Nit H;:rdyisgoing;.ozry_ocoverthat wh_nhegets_p.
DR.WALKER:One")thorquesHohIn thefirst frame-
MR.SUTTER:Colid i aska qHestion'.'Can'tyou run a testandfind outwhat the hell it is'.'
¢'an'tyou,setoneof thesethingsup.anJbuiMa leak,andblastit. andseewhat the hell it l,_oks
like?
MR HARDY:Weknowt_at the productcombustionof"the greasein the joint that blows
theO-ringwou!d5eblack,dark in color.Theinsulationontheexternaltank wouldbeblackif it
wereburning--the{barninsulation.Sothereareat leasttwothingsthat I just mentionedthat
couldbeblack.
MR,SU'IY/'ER:But it seemsto methat maybethis isnot thecauseof the accident,but this
is certainly one thing that might be. And it seems to me you guys would be going hell bent fbr
election running tests.
MR. HARDY: We are, and I pian to talk about that.
DR. LUCAS: If we could look at this as
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background, George Hardv pl,ms to take these step by step right along and describe wha_ we
know'.
MR. SUTTER: I know, but I think the Chairman was reflecting a little bit of the frustration.
We're not trying to solve the accident. We want to do it in an orderly manner.
DR. FEYNMAN. I'he orderly manner is first to get the facts and see what we see. and then
hear an interpretat!on, because the interpretation might be wrong. Bur what we see, we see, and
might be right. So the orderly way I think would be to look closely at it and see what we see,
and thel: hear what they think they see.
MR. SUTTER: But this is not something that has been leaked to the press yet.
DR. FEYNMAN: We don't care about the press.
MR. SUTTER: Well, this is going to get out to the press, and I don't think it would do any-
body, the Commission or NASA or anybody, any good to say we really don't know what the hell
chat is.
DR. WALKER: Could I ask one question? In the first frame,, h,;w well localized is the smoke,
and exactly where is it on the 5rst picture c,f the smoke thin vo_ saw? You say this is the fifth
one?
MR. STEVENSON: There are Ibur or fi_e in
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front ,,f' this, and we actually first see it here.
DR. WALKER: It's realb pretty close to the seanf?
MR. STEVENSON: It's really big when you fir,_t see it.
DR. WALKER: It overlaps the seam'?
MR. STEVENSON. We can't quite see the seam, and I will show you where we, can see it in
just a minute.
CHAIRMAN ROGEFS: But .just for our pu, ;_oses, now you sound as if you think it m most
likely coming from the seam.
MR STEVENSON: The field joint.
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CHAIRMANROGERS:Is _hereanybodyof theopinionthat thinks it's actuallycomingfrom
theexternaltank?I realizeyoucan'texcludeit asapossibility.
MR.}lARDY:Wehavenotexcludedit asa possibi!i'cy.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But the more likely possibility is the one he says7
MR. HARDY: That certainly is a possibihty.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: The more likely possibility'? l'm .just trying to figure out your {hink-
i_,g. It' it should leak out, I gather that is one that seems more likely"
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MR. ACHESON: Not to anticipate, but what is there in that vicinity in the external tank,
structurally, tha'_ would permit leakage of some material'?
MR. ttARDY: Well, the external tank is covered.
MR. ACHESON: Is there a seam there, :_r any valve?
MR. HARDY: There's a number of longitudinal weicis, circumtorential welds around the
tank in the general region between the boostv _ and the tank.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: So it is possible that something migh* have happened to the external
tank that would cause this black smoke'?
MR. HARDY: Yes, and I do plan to discuss that.
MR. RUMMEL: I would like to return, if I may, to Joe Sutter's point. Do you plan a test to
examine the design of the rings once more and what the nature of the smoke is, and that sort of
thing'? It seems to me that should be something that should be of interest.
DR. LUCAS: Yes. W_,'re going to discuss the test program.
MR. RUMMEL: When? Oh, you (_oing to discuss that'? Oh, all right.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Why don't you move along?
d_aughter, t
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DR. COVERT: What is the framing rate of this camera7
MR. STEVENSON: I'm sorry. I don'_ have that wiih me. There's a big thick book of all
those things.
DR. COVERT: l'm curious what the time is for this plume to go 25 feet up in the air in tbur
or five frames, and I wonder what the drift velocity is of that plume.
MR. STEVENSON: We haven't worked on that yet.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Why don't you go ahead'?
MR. STEVENSON: We just picked a third series of photos here that show that when we are
roughly at 200 feet in elevation, the black smoke has clisappeared, and it is some time again
before we can positively iden_ :fy it as a matter of fact completely out of the frame.
MR. SUTTER: Could I make a point'? Maybe I've got the cart before the horse, but if you
look at this sequence of shots over here, the main motors are just about up to power, right?
MR. STEVENSON: Yes.
MR. SUTTER: And when they do, they bend the whole machine and it is held to the ground,
and you've got a structural joint where that bending, really a lot of that load is going right into
that joint. Isn't that right'? And that might be changing the seating of those
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seals. And I'm just throwing out a theory, and I would like to get a comment on it. I will te!l you
the whole damn thee-v, and you can tell me how crazy I am.
As soon as that happens, then you put the solid rocket booster motors on, which reorients
the whole load, That might be changing the seating of those seals again. And just about when
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that loadchanges again, then you see the smoke. And when you get around to this testing, it
seew:4 to me you ought to run a test where you put those great big hellish loads in, in the direc-
tion they are here You've, got the right pressures, and you build a Leaky seal, and you see what
the hell happens.
This is why I sort of get antsy. Are you going to do a test? And how real is it? I think these
_r:.;und-holding loads, and the changing of' loads, and maybe a slightly worn eroded seal, could be
the whole damn trigger. And I'm going to pursue that test And if it's a few million dollars, or it
takes a month, what the hell. ! think there ought to be a hellishly good test of that.
DR. LUCAS: Well, certainly, sir, we do plan to do some testing. Let me .just mention two
things, though, that fhll in line with your theory. One is, when the Space Shuttle main engines
ignite, as you
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suggested, the whole stack leans over away from that application of tbrce, and the thing is calcu-
lated such that just as the tip of the tank comes back to the vertical, then the solids ignite.
Now that is one of the things we are looking at. In case that was a little bit off, it would put
a different load pattern h:to the stack. The maximum bending moment, however, on the SRB is
not at this joint, but at the joint above this one. The maximum bending moment is, at that joint,
however, at max Q. And so we are looking at those things.
And as you have already observed, this first light flame occurs at about max Q. And that
happens to be the position of the maximum bending loads on the SRB at that time. So we are
Hooking at those things, and I'm sure some test programs will ultimately be required.
DR, COVERT: And that's also the point where there is the maximum windshear.
DR. LUCAS: That's right. All those things are fact.
DR, COVERT: I'm not speculating al this point. I just want to see if i'm right.
MR. MOORE: Those are the factors that we're looking at.
DR. FOVEP.,T: Thank you.
:7_
MR. MOORE: The other thing in this thing Js it may turn out that a test like that is going
to be required, and so tbrth. You know, we do flight -eadiness firing in preparing and checking
out the new orbiters where you just simply keep the system bolted to the mobile launch plat-
form and bring the engines up to their rated thrust. So that may be a test that we're going to
have to go back and do.
DR. WALKER: But you don't fire the solids.
MR. MOORE: No, we do not fire the solids, but you can get a feel tbr what the loads are on
the solids prior to liftoff.
DR. WALKER: But the launch pad couldn't withstand a full firing of the solids'?
MR. MOORE: No. No, sir. So those are the kinds of things we're going to be looking at in
terms of laying out a test program, and additional test programs may be required for the solids
themselves.
DR. WALKER: When you test the solids, of course, on their test stands, they don't have
these kinds of moments.
MR. MOORE: You normally test them on the horizontal.
DR. WALKER: We could impose those bending moments on it.
DR. COVERT: It would be hard to put the
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dynamic moment on it. The static ones you probably could do.
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DR,LUCAS:That'sright. Andwedid,of course,in thetestprogram.
MR.MOORE: There could be dynamics fbr the mobile launch pk:tfbrm, as wee as the base
mount and pad itself'
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Okay. Out of a matter of o,aliteness, let's let _he briefbr finish his
briefing, and then we will ask the questions.
MR. STEVENSON: Let's have the next series of" :slides on the ET ring.
_Viewgraphs. i _;..',,_ _' I;::Sl
I'm going to present several slides here ti_at will show you roughly what toe ET ring looks
like. starting with the orbiter here, the main structure, attach structure between the external
tank and the orbiter. The large pieces .....
DR, WALKER: Is this 5[-L?
MR. STEVENSON: This is the vehicle, righ'.. As a matter of fact. you see the frost here.
This was taken at T minus 3 hours. The cable tray that goes between the SRB, across the ET
and to the orbits,< The upper strut, which is well protected v'ith what we call a milk can. It is a
stainless steel th_ring that goes, which has cork on tt to protect the cabling between the
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external tank and the rocket.
The IEA un t .....
DR. COVERT: What's tha_?
MR. HARDY: The integrated electronic assembly.
DR. COVERT: Thank you.
MR. STEVENSON: In a lot of' our films, you wiil see this reflection because it is white. You
also will be able to see the strut. This is the ET attach ring where we attach the rocket to the
external tank. The cable tray is on the Y axis outboard of' the vehicle and runs the entire len_4-th
of the rocket.
DR. LUCAS: Would you point out the pressure checkport up there'?
MR. STEVENSON: I'm going to go all the way around it I'll get to the back in .just a
minute. We stopped at the cable trav here. Here is the cable tray again. This is the IEA, the end
of the lEA assembly, the ET attach ring, back around to the Z. These are stiffener rings which
we put foam on to protect from water impact. We do get a little gassing on these during the
ascent, which does attribute _'o some of the smoke you see under the bottom side of' the engine.
The next two.
I¥iewgraphs._ I_""_ " I_ _'-,!
SSl
We are moving now from here. which is this point. This is the backside which is in question
as to the plume. Our analysis says the plume is in here. The leak checkport, which you wi]l
hear, or have heard, or will hear much about today, is here.
DR. COVERT: So that is minus-Z'.:
MR. STEVENSON: Minus-Z on the rig ' and booster is right there {indicatingL Well. Im
saying it's there. It is supposed to be along in there, I believe. But I'm assuming that is what
that is.
DR. WALKER: That i_ frost on that backet.
MR. STEVENSON: Yes. The external tank. This is what we call the EV fitting, and this is
the lower strut,, the lower righthand strut. Thi:s fitting is flown bare. This way. as a matter of
fact you can see the green paint here. It is isolated from the hydrogen tank.
DR. WALKER: This is where the glass fi_sulators are.
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MR STEVENSON:Yes,therearephenoli,?insu!_,'_-_sri_.htunderhere.Therearesix bohs
on the bottom,andsix on the top.Theydohaveaiayer of insulationon themto protectthem
GEN.KUTYNA:Dr Luc_sthe di."ributl,mof stressaroundthat circumferer,ce,is it equal
or aretherepointswh:,reit isgreateror lesser"
DR.LU('AS: 1 think there are points where it is greater.
MR. HARDY: Yes. Are you talking about on the b,soster, or on the tank'?
GEN, KUTYNA: On that solid, on that joint, as it bends through all these moments, is there
a point where the stress is greater? And might it be at that point where it is connected to the
ET7
MR. HARDY: It would be higher up above.
MR. STEVENSON It would be higher in this area {indicating<
GEN. KUTYNA: Where the general higher stress is on SRB?
MR. HARDY: In that black area.
MR. STEVENSON: Again, I didn't point out the diagonal strut, which is on the other side.
You couldn't see it in the first series of pictures we showed.
DR. WALKER: There are actually three struts, and there are only two on the model.
MR. STEVENSON: There is another one on the backside here. The lower strut is flown
bare, with the exception of under the bottom here is where we have the ordinates, the cable
comes across here and goes into here fbr the separation. So we do protect the ordinates
gS:{
wire, and this also has a layer of insulation on it.
DR. COVERT: Is that an optical illusion on that dark-colored covet" there, that it doesn't
stick up, that it just projects forward?
MR. STEVENSON: h does come out here. This is for this .joint to move. So it isn't just a flat
surface circumferential type cover. It does have a leg in it like that,
DR. {_'OVERT: Go ahead
MR. STEVENSON: It is to make that square with the strut. As a matter of fact, you can see
it better over here.
DR. COVERT: Has it always been that way7
MR. STFVENSON: This desigp,, yes, sir. You can see the joint here. You can see the _rease
here.
MR. RUMMEL: Is any degree of relative motion possible between the tank and the SRB
with all that insulation'?
MR. STEVENSON: Back and forth this way, practically none. The tank does rise about .l
inches when we tank it, and the strut becvmes horizontal. The tank shrinks as we go to cryo
temperatures and the tank goes up to the forward attachments, so this part of the tank moves
up to the beam here during cryo loading, and this strut becomes horizontal.
Normally, if you looked at it untanked, it would
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have as much as I believe S degrees cant down. Let's go to the next lhree slides.
{Viewgraphs.) {m.I -' I_,,I lm'_..._ I_ev f
I included these this morning _o show about some of zhe lines of' sight of the cameras, and
the particular ones I'm showing you. we have camera fiats around the pad as we!l as up on the
pad and out on the beach, and as thr north as Ponce de Leon, and as far soulh as Melbourne.
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The camera, like one of the cameras I'm showing you, happens to be located here and looks
at this tinkle. And what we're doing, what ['re done here, when we finish camer';.i E.-{1 sits over
in this northeast corner of the pad, and the field of view o!' camera 6_) shows that I definitely can
see the Z axis where the leak check plug is. I very piainly can see this part of the vehicle, and
should be able to see the strut. I,ookin_ from this way, the camera on the other side of the pad
on the northwest side of the pad. I can nearly see the same thin K.
So by doing a comparison of all of our charts, we will be able to sa_ exactly how far m this
way between the crack we will be able to see.
Okay. what I would like to do next is just go through about ten minutes of this or so. We
have a TV.
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We can start and stop that. The TV shows some things that ace much more detailed than you
were able to see on this one. So I guess if' we could cut the lights again,
(A film was shown.t
Again, this camera is from Pad A looking north at Pad B. Why don't we just run this one
through'? This is one series. Let's just run it through and we will come back and pick this one up
a little later,
We are going back and reviewing all of our data from previous flights. Part. of this smoke is
not unusual. As we go higher in altitude, the amount of smoke w/u see here does become unusu-
al, and it will actuai'_ engulf part of the wing before we finish. We probably edited this one too
much.
DR. COVERT: What was that bright spot up near the bow of the righthand booster?
MR. STEVENSON: We have a shockwave in here.
DR. COVERT: No, earlier.
MR. STEVENSON: It's condensation.
tPause. t
This is the same camera, and here's the spot here (indicaring_. The next one--we haven't
seen this one betbre, but you will see the smoke right here. This is a TV. black and white TV,
camera located on the top of tl'e pad.
(Paus-. i
Again. you can see the plume.
IPause. )
GEN KUTYNA: There appears to be a rotation in that one on liftoff. Is there any oscilla-
tion, or is that my imagination?
MR. STEVENSON: I think the o:,cillation you saw right at liftoff was in our transposing the
camera. This came off a 35 millimeter, transposing to a videotape. It actually came off a 1_ milli-
meter.
Pause. b
Okay, in this one we're _oing to slow it down Ibr you. but you see the plume here _indicat-
ing_. Again, this is actually the lefthand SRB. The righthand was behind, and the flame is
coming towards you. You will see it increase around to this side. and you can see it flash in here.
which is actually coming all the way under the dome. and it is actually on the lefthand SRB.
DR. WALKER: It is just surrounding the tank.
DR. COVERT: The flame on the tank is attributed to the oxidizin_ nature of the exhaust.
and the combustion products?
4-9
MR.STEVENSONWell, I think the flameyou seehereis actuallycomi.q_from whereI
_hinkit _asactuallycomin_ from the righthand SRB
DIR. ('OVERF: So there is no combustion'?
MR. STEVENSON: Ti_e heating, the charring of the foam can have a combustible out-gas,
but it chars.
DR. ('OVERT: You're saying it's later, in other words '_
MR. STEVENSON: Yes.
( Pa u_e. }
This a;_ain is the one we !:artiaily underexposed for the dame.
(Pause.
In this sequence, we were showing what we feel is our scenario, anyway, of how we are
losing the tbr_'ard part of the hydrogen tank and the LOX lank. As the tlame increases from
here ove_' to here (indicatingt we will see it propagate around the ring frame here. You will also
al the same time we see it--do you want to stop it, Pete; back up for just a second--okay, we feel
that at this timeirame we have lost the weld joint, or the barrel section jast about the weld
joint, between the weld joint and the 2_:5S ring frame, which is where the aft dome attaches, and
the h>drogen we feel is coming out here.
DR. FEYNMAN: That is the .joint that usually carries the hydrogen? No, it has nothing to
do with that?
DR, WALKER: So ,vou think you lost the
'_SS
hydroge> feed. too '_
MR. STEVENSON: No. sir. The hydrogen %ed is over here. I believe we lost the weld, just
the weld joint. It just unzipped,
MR RUMMEL: So you've got a hole in the main *ank now'.'
MR. STEVENSON: Yes, where the barrel section joints the main ring frame here to the aft
dome. But once again, we %el this is coming from the righthand SRB toward u.¢,
I)R FFYNMAN: You see. it t]ashes up there. Is th;tt hydrogen coming from somewhere
else'?
MR, STEVENSON: We believe t_lso ,: _,,:a* ttais ,;ame timeframe, due to what we feel. and
based upon the vx'ro ,._ata we have. that a'e a,,l_,.lllv lost ehis strut on _he lower end here, and
thai this rocket had :reed_,m_ of motion to cause :_ !:robh'm in the inner tallk, And what you see
here is the hydrogen coming from the inner tank ,rod this now again we are looking at the side
',hat has the minimam amount of activity.
There is considerably more leakage on r'i--, other side, and this flash from here we feel went
around the back si(h of the vehicle, and ym, _,ee ',* here again. And then it propagates up.
C|IAIRMAN ROGERS: When you say ,:'_hwle," what
is that?
MR STEVENSON: The exlernal tank and the _n'biter.
DR. COVERT: But the negalive angle--but t}',is is _it a negative angle of attack, and so that
is the windward side, and so you were at some ma<,h number like i or so?
MR. AI,I)RI('H: Mach 2.
I)R, COVERT: Okay. lm not going to quib},f,, about a factor of 2. Then. unless _here is some
separation there, I don't bciieve the propagatio_ ,.)f a hydrogen t] ,me will go upstream against a
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roach 2, because l think the hydrogen t]ame propagations are around at 150 meters a second. So
what is happening, causing it to move forward that way? As i say, if there is some separation
there, then you could have the separation as a dead zone. and you could propagate ibrward, but
you are at a negative angle of attack, and it should be relatively cl_,an in there.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: How well do you think we can identit}" the time o_' these
TV frames?
MR. STEVENSON: Pretty well, within two or three frames, two or three thousandths. We
|'eel that about 73.1 seconds we lose the aft barrel section on the hydrogen tank.
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MR. HOTZ: How many seconds?
MR. STEVENSON: About 73.1, and approximately 71) milliseconds after that is when the
inner tank and hydrogen tank fails, along with, followed immediately by the LOX tank mainly
on the righthand side, but you can see here. we do have other photographs that show a lot of
activity on the other side that you can't see in this frame.
We calculate this area to have been 73.2 seconds, roughly a tenth of a second difference.
Pause. I
You can see more action on this one than you did in the hast one.
DR. COVERT: Could we go back and start that one all over again, please? And could we go
a frame at a time?
Pause.
Thank you.
MR. STEVENSON: We have already had the mixing of the LOX and hydrogen in this area,
about three frames.
DR. COVERT: In fact, that may even be a detonation.
MR. RUMMEL: What evidence is there that the strut failed'.'
MR. STEVENSON: We have in the TM data we have
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a rate change, The gyro rate.
IPause.i
Again, the righthand SRB, and we believe we actually ha,e part of the external tank we
feel still attached to it, and it is actually burning out around it.
DR. COVERT: So you think that external tank held and the external tank failed, and you
took a piece with it'?
MR. STEVENSON: Yes, sir.
(Pause. I
Again, your righthand rocket and lefthand.
_Pause.I
This is the righthand rocket again, and actually this stage appears to be in excel.lent shape,
except for this area. And of course the front shows a little more burning than we normally
would see, or a little more charring.
(Pause.)
This is the righthand rocket which is going to destruct in this one. You've got two plumes.
{Pause. t
There's the destruct. And again, the righthand rocket actually showed very little. It was still
intact the last time we saw it. And we feel that
C_, -
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at [east in our frames it was still intact, except for the forward assembly. The lefthand SRB, the
destruct on it was wh:it we would call normal, in that the pieces, the actual segments separated
and we are only left with the aft booster portion.
l
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MR. MOORE: That is some of the photographic data we have. We are working on the en-
hancement of this with some of the oest experts in the country. In fact, we got some people [rom
Los Alamos working on this to try to blow up certain segments of this thing and see if' we can
duplicate this. But that is kind of what we thought was relevant to let the Commission set,. and
the kind of data that we do have in hand.
And we are going through, as [ said, additional analysis.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: It seems to me, from looking at it, very convincing. Why don't your
photographs exclude the external tank'?
DR. LUCAS: We're going to talk about that, and that may be the way it turns out. But I'm
not prepared to say. I think there's a strong probability thaL a leak from the tank ,vas then
triggered. The thing that gives me the most trouble is how does one explain a leak through a
joint in that rocket nozzle that lasts as long as it does. You see it's running for 100 seconds.
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I think we will show some calculations that say if that hot gas is going through that period of
time, you would have a large hole in there. And I believe the analysis will say, although they
have not yet been done, that the tank would come apart before you would get that far.
It may be, and I don't think there's any question that ultimately that joint gets hot and
leaks hot gas. That is very evident here. But I am not certain that it did not come from a heat-
ing source somewhere else. If you have an external source heating that joint, it would have the
same effect, ultimately.
This is speculation.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: How about the first black smoke? Did that come from--could that
have come from the external tank?
DR. LUCAS: Well, here's the thing. You see, if one postulates hydrogen is leaking, it burns
with a nonluminous flame, and you wouldn't see it until it hit something. So if if hits that bead
of grease going around that joint, for example, that would give you a puff of black smoke. If it
hit the cork that overlays that band over the pins, it would give you black smoke. If it happened
to hit some of the insulation on the tank itself, it would give you a puff of black smoke.
Now I don't know whether any of those things
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happened, but until we can exclude that, I think we ought to continue looking at it.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: That explains why you haven't _,x, imh,(I it. And so it is possible
that one theory would be a leak from the external tank, which wasn't apparent, and it might
cause the puff of black smoke, and it wouldn't then be more apparent until the plur,_e--how did
you get the plume on the right booster that comes from the external tank?
DR. LUCAS: I think ultimately there's no question that ultimately that joint up there
allows the leakage of hot gas on the solid rocket motor. My only question is: Is the flame, the
penetration of the flame, through that joint? Did it originate from heating that came from inside
the solid rocket booster and deteriorated the joint from the inside? Or did it happen by a flame
from the outside of the solid rocket booster that deteriorated that joint? It could be done either
way.
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Now the thing that got my attention was that I had asked some of my people to look at how
much leakage of liquid hydrogen could I have at liftot't" and not detect that in any of the sys-
tems'? It is about tbur pounds per second. That's a lot of hydrogen.
Now l want to emphasize--
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I think it is clear.
DR. LUCAS:--that my speculation has to include that one could have had a leak in the
tank, and that it could have come from various sources. Maybe it is some defect. We are looking
back at the tank to make sure that is not the case. It could be some piece of ice or something
blew up, or something that penetrated, perforated the tank, or maybe it is a leak in a joint
somewhere.
MR. RUMMEL: Could it have come from the filler valve, somehow?
DR. LUCAS: We'.I, that is disconnected. You mean at the disconnect?
MR. RUMMEL: Yes.
DR. LUCAS: Well, I couldn't exclude that as a possibility. It is supposed to be disconnected,
and it shouldn't leak, and I don't think it was leaking before we lifted off, because we have hy-
drogen gas detectors all around, and so far as I know, no detection of a leak was observed.
DR. COVERT: There once was, long ago, some leaking, if I recall correctly, in an early pre-
flight readiness fire.
MR. CRIPPEN: That was STS-6, and inside.
DR. COVERT: Right. But it never was
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satisfied to me that anybody knew where it was coming from.
DR. LUCAS: Oh, yes. We pinpointed that one.
MR. WAITE: Can the crystal be extruded through the crack by the pressure inside the
tank?
DR. LUCAS: I beg your pardon':
MR. WAITE: Is this a rubbery material that can be extruded through the crack by the pres-
sure inside the O-ring.'
DR. LUCAS: The O-ring? It is rubber elastomeric material.
MR. WAITE: No. I mean the propellant itself, so it's actually burning on the outside of the
tank.
DR. LUCAS: It is a rubbery material, but I wouldn't think that it would extrude out the
tank. It is still, I believe, too viscous to flow through that joint.
MR. WAITE: What is it? 600 psi?
DR. LUCAS: It originally starts about 900 psi, and it is about 600 psi at the time one ob-
serves the flame coming out of the joint.
MR. WAITE: When you do your test, you can have a crack that's open on one end, then one
typical of this, and see if you can get that.
DR. LUCAS: That's an idea. We ought to
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consider that.
DR. COVERT: I think the propellant, and I don't remember correctly, I think it's got some
aluminum trichlorate in it, some solid crystal, so it's not only got a rubbery-like material, but
it's sort of like a rubbery material with sand in it. And so it will extrude with greater difficulty
than if it were merely a rubbery material--at least I believe that to be the case.
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MR. WAITE: Like you, I can't understand how you could have that much flow tI.'_rough a
crack without eroding everything around it.
DR. LUCAS: Well, you will see some preliminary analysis this afternoon that supports that,
and we also early on looked at the possibility of a separation of the insulation from the wall of
the tank in such a way that because of the ther, nal gradient, that tbe flame could get down to
the membrane of the solid rocket motor, and the calculations are that when you get a hole on
the order of one inch--and I'm speaking from memory now--on the order of one inch or so in
the membrane section of the case, it would become unstable and come apart.
MR. ACHESON: Is there anything on these pictures that i_ inconsistent with a leaky test
port?
DR. LUCAS: No, sir. That is why I wanted to make sure we understand where the port is. It
is in that area.
MR. ACHESON: But either way, it would look about the same from the photographs?
DR. LUCAS: Yes, sir.
MR. CRIPPEN: I guess you can clearly see _vhere the test port is on the bottom side of that
tank, and Chariie showed you the smoke, and it appeared to be
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coming from further around the tank than where the port is. But again, it is hard to tell.
MR. MOORE: I would only oualify what Bob said in that I saw the black dot up there, too,
and that was the first time 1 saw it. That is alleged to be the test port. I am not convinced that
is the test port. I mean, that is where we think it is. That is where it should be, but it is a real
dot, and if anybody can see the test port on that photo, they have got a lot better eyes than I do.
DR. COVERT: I would be prepared to guess that that is grease because it looks furry.
MR. ACHESON: Did the segments have to be put together in a way that makes the test port
appear at that point?
MR. MOORE: Yes. You are going to hear about how they are stacked in what comes up. We
will give you that whole sequence, but the way they are stacked is that all test ports on the
right-hand booster should !ine up on one side of the axis, and on the left-hand booster they line
up on the other side. So they all should be down a vertical line drawn down the solid rocket
booster roughly 90 degrees from the way we measured the clock angle on these drawings.
DR. COVERT: When you did the wind tunnel
9OO
test, were there vapor screen pictures taken to show the shock wave conditions?
MR. SILVEIRA: Yes, we did that in oil flows.
DR. COVERT: So if it becomes a problem to trace why this flame acted like it did, there is a
great body of data to refer back to?
MI_. SII,VEII_'.\: "l'ht' tl,_\_, l_,_,lx\,t',_ql tlt(' t+ttIl., _tll_l the' (wl)it_t,r i_ \('r_+. \<'r\ lnilti_vt_h'. ;itt(l il
MR. HARDY: Excuse me. If I could mention, we are looking at setting up some tests in
Huntsville where we can actually evaluate the interaction of the flow with the plumes.
DR. COVERT: And you will put smoke probes in there and so forth, and how are you going
to maintain the same sensitivity constant with smo],e and air as opposed to hydrogen and air?
MR. HARDY: We are just looking at how we are going to put together the tests now.
(Laughter.)
MR. MOORE: Maybe you can help us design the tests.
(Laughter.)
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DR.COVERT:I amsup:osedto be independent,andif I helpedyoudesignit, then I would
havea strongprejudiceto believewhatI saw.
9OI
(Laughter.!
MR. SLITTER: On that very first film where there was a very isolated plume t0r a while and
then it seemed to spread around the circumference, and then it got much bigger, but couldn't
there be that you would say have that hole, tbr instance, the test hole, allowing whatever was
coming out and starting the thing to still be heating it, but it would be working on just the seals
so you wouldn't be having the total burnthrough to make it go slower'?
MR. HARDY: That could be correct, and as I say, in another 15 minutes we are going to
cover this.
DR. LUCAS: That is one of the scenarios we have. I think that's right. You see, if you
assume this puff of black smoke comes from the solid rocket motor, then you have got to explain
how it can stop.
Well, if it turned out that it came from the test port, which is a threaded lsert with an O-
ring around it, and if that leaked, then you could imagine that it would stay in there for a while,
but there would be a slight little bleed of hot gas coming through, and I think it possibly could
show with the aluminum oxide that you produce from the burning of the propellant, could choke
those threads, but ultimately it is going to get hot enough to blow out, and then it quickly goes
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around.
MR. FEYNMAN: There is another possibility for a transient; the O-rings don't have good
resilience when they are cold, and the first bit of gas that comes in gets through and makes the
black smoke. And then it becomes warmer, it takes time, but it goes through where the metal is
cold, and it has to warm up the metal.
I am not sure myself, and I don't kno,v how long it should take, but warm up the piece of
rubber, and then the rubber expands, fills the hole. But in the meantime, putty and junk has
gotten in, and it is not really a perfect seal. It just seems to work for a while, but it gradually
leaks and finally breaks down.
DR. LUCAS: I think that is a plausible scenario.
MR. FEYNMAN: I don't think it is fair to make up those things now. We should wait and
hear what you say.
I'm sorry, I apologize.
DR. COVERT: It is a lot of fun, though.
ILaughter.)
DR. LUCAS: It is encouraging though that you are coming up with similar ones as we have.
MR. FEYNMAN: But in your scenario, I have a question with the hydrogen coming out of
the ET tank, is
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it obvious that it immediately flames, that it burns? Is that automatic?
DR. COVERT: Well, there is enough oxygen in the air that it would burn out the interface.
MR. FEYNMAN: It starts itself automatically?
DR. COVERT: The combustion ratio is 5 percent to 95 percent, or something like that, and
so that it is hard to not burn in the air.
DR. LUCAS: Its flammability, its ignition temperature is very low, and its flammability
range runs from 4 percent to 96
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DR.COVERT:i'm sorryaboutthat.
DR.WALKER:Thehydrogentank iswelded?
DR.LUCAS:Yes.
DR.WALKER:It is aluminum7
DR.LUCAS:Yes,and it is a verygoodlow temperaturematerial,obviously,becauseit is
containinghydrogenat minus423degrees.
DR.WALKER:I d_dn'thearthe answerto thequestionthat someoneaskedit' youeverhad
anyleaksin thosetanks'?
DR.LUCAS:No,sir.
DR.WALKER:But they do,of course,haveto goovera pretty largetemperaturerange.
DR.LUCAS:That'sright,but that is--aluminumgetsstrongerat lowtemperature,andthe
9O4
environmentaltemperatureis insignificantascomparedto the minus423degreesof liquid hy-
drogenontheinside.
DR.COVERT:Arethoseautomaticwelds?
DR.LUCAS:Thoseareautomaticwelds.And the tanksareall x-rayedasyoumayremem-
ber.All of themarex-rayed.Eachone of them is x-rayed, and then they are proof tested subse-
quent to the x-ray.
DR. COVERT: At what temperature are they proof tested?
DR. LUCAS: I think it is ambient but I will have to check.
DR. COVERT: That is just a leak test?
DR. LUCAS: I am sure it is ambient, because if they are proofed at ambient, the strength
increases by about 30 percent.
,_ R. COVERT: Except it gets more brittle?
Di-_. LUCAS: No, it gets tougher, as a matter of fact; the aluminum alloy, this particular
alloy gets tougher at low temperature than it is at room temperature. That is not true of steel,
and I think Dr. Walker this morning was raising some questions there. The D-6A, which is the
material in the case, would not respond the same way as aluminum, but it does have a fairly
high toughness even at the temperatures, at these temperatures.
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DR. WALKER: The proof test is a pressurization, of the tank?
DR. LUCAS: Yes.
MR. RUMMEL: It seemed to me the plume was almost instantaneous, a small t,,_ction of a
second. If that is the result of heating from the hydrogen, wouldn't the hydrogen leak have had
to occur almost prior to ignition?
DR. LUCAS: Are you talking about for the luminous flame that appears from the SRB?
MR. RUMMEL: No, the puff of smoke. I thought you were implying that might have been
the result of heating from the hydrogen flow, which could well be the case, but in any event, the
leak would have to have occurred almost prior to launch, wouldn't it?
DR. LUCAS: Or coincident with.
MR. RUMMEI,: And my question is, is there any way to go back over ground instrumenta-
tion or photography or in some manner to find that out? It is awfully early.
DR. LUCAS: You may be missing that the SSMEs have been burning, first one has been
burning about 6 seconds before we gel. to the point of ignition of the SRM, You see, you ignite
the SSME at intervals and the time line is when you ignite the solids, you have ignited
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the SSMEs some six seconds earlier, and that is what bends the stack over, and then when it
comes back, you launch with the solids.
MR. MOORE: I think the question that Mr. Rummel is asking is is there instrumentation on
the tank that will allow you to detect a leak that was small enough or lmge enough, as the case
may be, to cause this, or on the ground, and I think the answer to that is no.
MR. LAMBERTH: That's right. The leak detection we have looked at the 17 inch disconnect
area. We looked at that with fire detectors, and we also know that enough of the purge could
come from that area, comes in from the aft. We had no indication of leaks on that. We have leak
detection up at the vent, but we do not have any leak detection that would cover maybe some-
place in that area on the tank in the same area of the right hand SRB. If you had a leak and it
did not ignite, the instrumentation and the pressure and things like that didn't see it, you would
not see it.
MR. RUMMEL: If it did ignite--
MR. LAMBERTH: I think we have enough fire detection around that if it ignited, we would
pick it up prelaunch.
DR. WALKER: I think you said, Dr. Lucas, that
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four pounds could be leaking without being detected? How big a hole would that be?
DR. LUCAS: Four pounds per second is eight-tenths of an inch in diameter. I want to em-
phasize again, I don't have any evidence at al! that we have a leak in the hydrogen tank.
MR. MOORE: But just as we have been saying, I mean, we have been focusing on the solid
rocket booster as maybe being a prime, and we have not resolved the external tank and so forth.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: What about the main engines?
MR. MOORE: The main engines in my book have not been exonerated, but they look pretty
clean.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: What possible data do you have from these photos that the main
engines might be involved?
MR. MOORE: We don't have any working theories at this point in time, sir, that would tell
us the main engines are a contributor.
DR. COVERT: The sequence is wrong. If you threw a turbine blade into the hydrogen tank,
you could have something, but then you would have engine shutdown preceding the event, and
there would be a lateral acceleration and lateral feed.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: For our purposes, it seems
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to me that you always can say everything might have caused it, but with the picture and teleme-
try, it seems to narrow the focus somewhat, and it seems--it looks now as if it is the right boost-
er, or the external tank tank.
MR, MOORE: I would say there are three major areas we are looking at still. Although we
in my task force have not exonerated the orbiter or the main engines, they look pretty clean
based upon our preliminary data, and they are likely to be exonera._od. We are still looking at
the SRB, at the external tank, and also the launch pad system.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: How could that come into play?
MR. MOORE: There may have been different loads and so forth transmitted to _he vehicle.
That could have been the cause of this whole thing. And so we have got to go back and clearly
understand what loads the system saw from the time of ignition and so forth. And so we are not
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exonerating the launch facility at this point in time until we have done our loads anaIysia. So
those are the three main thrusts we are working on at this point in time.
MR. FEYNMAN: Suppose that we do seem to all agree and that we have establi_.ed s_me-
thiag, which is
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that the black smoke appears to come from a region which is the same region as the flame li_ter
comes from the rocket. Nobody is proposing that that is a mere coincidence.
So if I have understood our situation, to take a very elementary view without _i¥inlJ t_
many problems at once, axiom one, you have got to explain the black smoke. After that, t4b_
of the problems will be less important.
How long does it take before the other thing comes out and so on are clues perhaps to _Jae
mechanism of the black smoke, but are not as essential. I mean, they are just helpers.
Is that true? Is that the viewpoint we are taking, that it can't be a coincidence that these
things are in the same place?
DR. COVERT: I don't rule that out yet.
MR. FEYNMAN: Good, I am glad to hear there is somebody still thinking because I have
ruled it out.
(Laughter.)
MR. SUTTER: I didn't appreciate it when I was lying home in bed sick, and after the last
God damned airplane left for the east coast, I was asked to be at a meeting at 2:00 o'clock on
Monday, and I couldn't make it because I doe't have my executive jet. But I am glad
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I wasn't there because that was nothing more than to reply to a leak, and there are going to be
leaks. I am not complaining r:bout leaks, but I think it was important that we discuss these theo-
ries, and we discuss every damned thing you know, and you tell us what the hell you are going
to do so that when the press hears about the black smoke, which they will, the Commission will
say, hell, they've told us everything they l,*low about it, they have told us what the hell they are
going to test for, and we will let NASA Cell you about it. We have already told them what the
hell we expect out of them.
I would rather help you guys investigate this rather than have the_,,.,I damned New York
Times or Washington Post do it.
MR. MOORE: We are with you 1000 percent on that, and if we can stay ahead of the press,
we are a lot better off.
MR. SUTTER: I don't want to tell you guys how to run your test program. I know you will
run a very thorough one.
911
MR. SUTTER: It would have been nice for us to know last Friday that this letter was out.
You _zuys must have known that letter was out.
MR. MOORE: We sure did not know about it.
MR. HARRINGTON: We read it in the Sunday Times like you did.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Ttaat was our first reaction.
MR. MOORE: But I told the Chairman about the black smoke.
DR. COVERT: We knew about the black smoke I believe it was last week, but I've lost con-
tact with reality.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Joe, I want to be sure to get you an executive jet so you can catch
up with us.
493
J t
d¢L_ughter. )
MR. SUTTER: I just want to make one more comment When one of those dumb guys ._sks
what the hell do you think migh; be the black smoke, we know you guys have got to do a lot of
investigation, and the black smoke may be some cigar left in the pipe, but [ mean, you
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fellows said it may have been the damned rubber tubes. We don't have to worry about the press
anymore.
MR. MOORE: Well. we are delighted to have this entire group down here so you can hear
firsthand from all of' the task three people that have been working this, and you can all see the
data that we have seen. This is the latest data that we have seen here, and you are seeing it
right now.
So you should be ahead of the world.
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DR. WALKER: Jesse, maybe you and a couple of other guys could just have a press confer-
ence and present all of this,
MR. MOORE: One suggestion is we were planning to put out some additional data after we
had had a chance to brief the Commission here on some of this photography and some other
zinds of things, but I wanted to make sure that the Commissioners saw it first hand before we
released it.
DR. WALKER: You could have one of these things with a few select people.
MR. MOORE: We also had yesterday Dr. Lucas and Larry Mulloy on a press conference for
an hour and a halt" to try to answer questions.
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: When should you say something about that? I mean, I certaimy
would be guided by what you think would be best.
MR. MOORE: I think we ought to say something right away about the black smoke.
MR. HARRINGTON: I think the black smoke was
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mentioned in the press conference yesterday by the press.
MR. MOORE: I think we ought to release the photos on the black smoke.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Why?
MR. MOORE: We don't have any problem with that. I think that is the way we ought to do
it. In fact, I believe we ought to put together a press kit with these photos in it, talking about
the black smoke and explaining it, and release it to the press.
MR. FEYNMAN: Could I add suggestion that when you present it you simply say that you
have known about this for how m _y days but you preferred to show it to the Commission com-
pletely betbre you presented it, and that was the only reason for the delay?
DR. WALKER: Or that you wanted to document it proI_erly.
MR. MOORE: My task force has not even seen all of this data.
916
I think that is what we would like to do.
DR. LUCAS: We admitted yesterday there is black smoke. I had to say truthfully that I had
not seen it, because I had not, but we did say that the black smoke had been reported.
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CHAIRMANROGERS:But it didn't getar_yattention
DR.WALKER:I think I sawyoumakethat comvaent,andtheydidn't pickupon it.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Why don't we do this tonight'?
DR. WALKER: Mr. Chairman, [ wonder now, from the theories and models that you have,
how should they deal with that.' One way is just to say we have several theories. _ild they n:_ght
want to know what they are.
MR. SUTTER: Well. I would say that they have got _everal theories, and they expose the
theories to the Commission. they are telling the Commission about the tests they are planning,
the Commission reviewed their test plans and maybe even augmented them, and they
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are getting on with the testing.
DR. WALKER: The press s going to want to know the theories.
MR. MOORE: Mr. Chairman, I think we ought to put together a draft press package on this
thing, and then I think we ought to get on with our presentation here because you are going to
hear some theories associated with O-rings and tank leakage and s,J forth.
MR. FEYNMAN: Good. Let's go on.
MR. RUMMEL: I might suggest that it would be useful for the Commission and the mem-
bers to see the press releases of this type so we know what's going to come out.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: He's been giving it to us. We've bad trouble transmitting it to all
Commissioners, but we have been getting the documents.
MR. M()ORE: We will go off and work something ibr possible release tonight on these
photos I* will not make the _wning news. It will be tbr the morning type of thing.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Let's tell them we don't have anything ibr the evening news.
MR. MOORE: It might make the t1:00 o'clock
91S
news but not the national news because I think we want to get the right photos in there and we
want to have the right explanation to go with it.
I would like to introduce Jack Lee who is Deputy Director of the Marshall Space Flight
Center.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Why don't we take about a five minute recess first?
(A brief recess was taken.)
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Let's come back to order, okay?
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TESTIMONY OF JACK LEE, DEPUTY DIRECTOR. MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER,
AND HEAD, MARSHALL CONTINGENCY INVESTIGATIVE TEAM
MR. LEE: I am Jack Lee. I am Deputy Director of the Marshall Space Flight Center, Bill
Lucas" deputy, and the day of the incident I was assigned by him to head the Marshall contin-
gency investigative team for the elements for which the Marshall Space Flight Center is respon-
sible.
(Viewgraph.) I_,'1 -' I:_ _l
MR. LEE: We want to cover two subjects today. I would like to give you a briet' summary of
our contingency team activities, and more specifically, what you have been waiting for is a
status report on our failure analysis.
Could I have the next chart, please?
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MR. LEE: We are operating under a cont_'_gency plan which _'as approved prior to the 5I-L
flight b v Bill Lucas. It consists of working groups for the inertial upper stage, the external tank,
the Shuttle main engine, the solid rocket booster, the solid rocket motor, and tbr this particular
activity we established a systems team because a number of these elements come together. Our
team is comprised of' both NASA and the contractor personnel. We located these people in the
Huntsville
99i_
Operations Support Center at Marshall Space Flight Center, and we have impounded the data as
directed by Jesse Moore, and we have maintained the impoundment of _bis data with the possi-
ble exception of in some areas we have to take film out for special analysis or some data for
special analysis, but it is under our control, and we have a secure area at HOSC.
The areas we chose to review, as they were directed by the contingency plan, is the entire
manufacturing process, manufacturing and processing for each of these elements, the acceptance
test packages. That is, in the case of a Shuttle main engine, that would be not only the static
testing but the factory checkout from the time it leaves the factory until it goes through the
prelaunch processing here at the Cape.
In the case of the solid rocket boosters and the used cases of the solid rocket motor, that
would include the refurbishment and reprocessing of each of those, and that is acceptance and
transportation. We include the transportation from the manufacturing site to the test site and [o
KSC. Specifically what we are looking for here is any unusual environments which the hard-
ware goes through, usually humidity environmental, accelerations and so forth.
We have reviewed the data packages for the
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prelaunch activities here at the Cape and the actual tlight data. Now, within those reviews, the
status of those reviews, we vary from 75 to 100 percent of that activity. Thus far we have looked
at all of' that data. That does not mean we have completed the analysis and stopped looking at
that data. That means that one of our teams has looked at that from at least 75 to 100 percent of
them.
Could I have the next viewgrapn, please?
(Viewgraph.) I_,.I -' I:_ :l_,j
MR. LEE: This is a graphical time line.
MR. SUTTER: Excuse me. "Zou are doing this test and analysis?
MR, LEE: No, no, no, this a review of past history of this hardware. Now, what we are doing
in relationship to the failure analysis, we have another presentation to go into detail on that,
but this is a category review, if you will. We have looked back to see if there were any configura-
tion changes or anomalies or problem reports in the history of this hardware that have been
identified which could contribute in any way, either directly or indirectly, to this.
DR. COVERT: Does this also include the catalogue of waivers?
MR. LEE: Everything.
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MR. SUT']?ER: There have been a lot of design changes.
MR. LEE: No, there haven't been a lot of design changes.
MR. SI3"UrER: In my opinion there have been.
MR. LEE: Not on this vehicle.
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3IR.SUTTER:Therehavebeena lot of design_hanCesfrom the first one to this ,one. and
this one is the last one that had all o1"them.
[tow do you go back and look at that as you progressively put them in. and one of them may
have tripped an incident
MR. LEE: Let me claril_v. I did not explain properly. This is the deviations trom the previ-
ous, from previous vehicles. In other words, we are looking at changes specilically o this vehicle
and anomalies against this vehicle from previous flights, and we did not go back at this time to
the first Shuttle flight. [ misrepresented that it" that is what you understood.
MR. SUTTER: Well. maybe you are going to taik about this. but one of the things I think is
necessary is to look at all of these changes, and yes. the last flight was successful and this one
wasn't, but just looking at what happened between this one and this one, maybe it was one of'
these other changes that because
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something wasn't critical on this flight you got by with it, but when you add them all together
on this flight, one of those other things may have tripped it over the edge.
MR. LEE: And we intend to progress progressively further back into the review. When we
get to--this is our first blush at all of those elements. As we hone in on a particular like the
solid rocket motor, like the external tank that we talked about, we will in Nct do that, and we
are doing that part of it. If _n "he case of--
MR. SUTTER: Including waivers and including things that were suggested as waivers and
didn't get up to design review board, and including changes that were suggested and were passed
over'. _
MR. LEE: That's right. We will do that for sure on the suspect elements, and the thing I
have reported here is we have only gone to the deltas from the last flight. We will progress back
into that, yes, sir.
Does that answer that'?
MR. SUTTER: Well, I think at least some members of' the Commission, I think, would like
to somehow review that whole history and review the actions you have taken on waivers, and
how it was concluded
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that, for instance, taking the loads on the main tank went down, why was it concluded that the
initial design was one way and then somebody thought that he could change the design criteria'?
Those are some of the things that I think some of us, to do a thorough analysis of everything
that has happened, some of us would like to go right back to that.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Could I just say that we are looking for a way of setting up subcom-
mittees, and it just occurred to me how to establish one. You are the chairman of that subcom-
mittee.
Who else would you like to have working with you on this aspect? I mean. it should prob-
ably be only two people.
MR. SUTTER: Anybody that wants to volunteer. I have got some ideas of guys that could
help. Maybe we ought to have a separate meeting on that.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Anyway, well, you chair the subcommittee, and 1 think that is a per-
fect thing for you to do.
MR. LEE: Our configuration, control, identification, and our problem reporting system will
allow us to track that, but we will probably have that in our files.
What I would like to do here is show
497
925
graphicallya time line that we talked aboutthat at least two of the other presentershave
talkedabout,andthe reasontbr tile underliningin red--andthis is a preliminarytime line, it
wasasof--when[ madethechart it wasonMonday.Therehavebeenslightadjustments.There
is only, I believethere is lessthan arounda tenth of a secondoff. Thesequenceis right, but
thosetimesneedto beadjusted.
Andfor mypresentationpurposes,that tenthofa secondis notcriticalat this time.
Let mestart with we ignitedthe SMSEsat T minus6._;seconds,asplanned.T zerois _'_e
SRBignitionand lift-off Thefirst instantwe report--andby the way,I am reportingwhat ts
predictedand wasplannedin somecases,andsomenot necessarilyanomaliesbut somethings
that mightbeslightlyoff nominal,andsomeitemsthat areactuallyanomalousbyour interpre-
tation,andl will distinguishthosefor you.
Thefamousblacksmokethat wejust discussed,weseethat first indicationabouta half a
second,andwe think weseeit up until about 12,a little over 12,between12and 13seconds.
I wouldlike to addoneotherpieceof intbrmationthat didn't comeout in the previous
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analysisof that smoke.It is not all black.Thereis somewhitesmokein it, too.Just for clarity
and for information about this particular column of smoke, it is very essential to us that we
understand the location and the time of that smoke, and the camera angles that you have seen
are not adequate to be able to produce that tor us yet. We are going through some gas dynamics
calculations to be able to try to relate that to the vehicle motion so that we can pin that time
down exactly.
At about 5 to 9 seconds, we did see a slightly high performance on the right hand solid
rocket motor This was well within our experience base, and we don't indicate that as an anoma-
ly, but because t =hanged, shifted our Shuttle main engine thrust bucket, where we go from 100
to 104 percent down to 65 percent and back up to 104 percent again, it shifted it slightly, so we
went from 104 to 94 because of this higher perlbrmance here, which is still well within our expe-
rience base.
DR. COVERT: What does that say, 26 or 2 Gs or what?
MR. LEE: This is 2 sigma high perlbrmance. That is equivalent to about 18 psi, 17 to 18 psi.
DR. COVERT: 2 sigma is five times in 100?
MR. LEE: It is about three percent off of 100.
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DR. COVERT: I'm talking about statistically 2 sigma being about five times in 100?
MR. LEE: Yes.
GENERAL KUTYNA: What could cause something like that?
MR. LEE: That is just the way the sample that we--the test fire sample of the actual grain,
the five inch motor, and its performance is comparable to this. It will be a slight, not a defect, a
flaw or a crack in the propellant would give you an increased irregular grain rate for a longer
period of time. It is just an irregular shaping of the grain maybe, nothing--I mean, not anything
abnormal about that at all from our experience base. The only reason I put it up there is to
explain the Shuttle main engine throttling and because we were looking for everything that
could be slightly unusual.
At 40 seconds we see a 2 degree gimbal angle on the--on both the solid rocket boosters. This
is well within our experience base, and we explain that because of winds, it is directly related to
some winds. We don't see anything unusual, so we don't worry about that.
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Thefirst incidencetha_weseeof an intermittent hotgasemanatingfrom the right hand
solid
92S
rocketmotoris abou*,a little over5Sseconds.Whenweseeit continuous,it is about100milli-
secondsafter that. Sofrom intermittent to continuous,andcontinuousis throughouthe flight,
this correspondsverycloselyto the reconstructedMaxQtime.
MR.FEYNMAN:Thisobservationis thephotographs?
MR.LEE:Thesewereobservationsof the photographs.TheseareMaxQreconstructed.
DR.COVERT:I want to gobackto that earlier point, please.Yousort of gavemea nice
warmfeelingaboutthis2 sigmabusiness.Youhavefired50of these things in flight, 25 flights, l
believe, and you probably have fired another dozen or so at Thiokol and in the qualification test-
ing and so forth, so that 5 percent is 5 out of 100. So we are talking about a possibility of one
thilure, having one rocket having this degree of exceedance from normal, and I guess that
wouldn't give me a warm feeling under the circumstances.
MR. LEE: This is 2 sigma of performance around the main performance for that time.
DR. COVERT: I understand exactly what that means, and what I am saying is if I take 2
sigma as being a variance that occurs at some degree of
.92._)
confidence, five times out of 100, or which is one time in 20, you take the total firings you have
faced, you haven't had very many exceedances of 2 sigma.
MR. FEYNMAN: Well, he has presented the data. He has told you what it is. It is 2 sigma,
and it is up to you to interpret whether you think the 2 sigma is significant or not.
DR. COVERT: Okay, fine. Press on.
MR. LEE: It is in our experience. That's all I can say. It is within our experience base.
Now, the next event we see is the right hand--and this is just after we see the continuous
flow from the right hand solid rocket motor, we see a divergence of the chamber pressure from
the mean, from the mean of previous flights and also from the left hand solid rocket motor, and
so you kind of expect that with the flow, the hot gas flow coming out of the side of the SRB.
The next event we see is the evidence of impingement of that hot gas on the I.II . Ih(, li(l_i,I
hydrogen tank.
MR. FEYNMAN: Evident through pictures?
MR. LEE: Yes. That is still photographs. In this period of time we have a 2 degree per
second body motion or body rate on the SRBs that we don't totally
930
understand. We have some wind sheers and some loading that we can get from what we antici-
pate this thrust to be. We don't have that completely reconstructed, and so I will have to say
that we see this on our instrumentation, but we don't totally explain that.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Jack, let's go back to Max Q. At Max Q we have the max stress on
this particular joint that we think failed.
I_iR. LEE: We have the maximum stress of any field joint in flight, on this particular aft
joint at Max Q.
GENERAL KUTYNA: So it happens on that joint at Max Q.
Now, how sharp do we come to Max Q? Does it just happen at 58.83 or does it build up?
MR. LEE: It builds up. It could be two or three seconds.
GENERAL KUTYNA: So, at Max Q, the effect on that joint could have happened before the
hot gas flows out?
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MR. LEE:[ wouldsayyes.and theguyswhoreconstructedth;s wouldprobablyagreewith
file.
MR. RUMMEL: How does the stress on the load on the joint at Max Q compare to the so-
called tang load in the second joints"
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MR. LEE: The bending load at lift-off, at the tang load, is high• I think it is--I believe--do
you know, George, exactly?
MR. HARDY: [ don't know the numbers.
MR. LEE: We will get that for you. It is higher. I know that. It is higher at lift-off.
The next event that we see is the first evidence of the liquid hydrogen tank leaking, and you
would expect that from the impingement of the hot gas from the solid rocket motor.
MR. FEYNMAN: That evidence was not photo, that was pressure gauge?
MR. LEE: No, that is still photo evidence.
Now. the next one is pressure gauge evidence. The pressure transducers in the liquid hydro-
gen tank--there are three of these--at 67 seconds we see a decrease, a decrease in the rate of
increase, which does not say that we are decreasing the LH pressure; we are decreasing the rate
of increase.
DR. WALKER: And that is anomalous?
MR. LEE: That's anomalous.
MR. HOTZ: Could you just go back one event on the first evidence of the hydrogen tank
MR. LEE: It is in the same vicinity that you saw the plume come out here.
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All right, the next thing we see is another measured event on the liquid hydrogen pressure
at about 72 seconds, and we differ a few milliseconds. That has to be adjusted, but at this time
we see a decrease in the hydrogen tank, in the ullage of the hydrogen tank, and we are trying to
make that up with the pressure, but we are not able to. So we know that the two flow control
valves that feed the pressure into the hydrogen tank are in fact full open, and they are trying to
make up that ullage.
MR. FEYNMAN: It is leaking out faster than the gas is going in?
MR. LEE: That's right. It's leaking out faster than the gas is going in. At the same time
period we see an unusual occurrence of the right hand, what appears to be the right hand solid
rocket booster, the base, what appears to be at the base coming out, okay. So like it is pivoting
about the top, and it is in fact rotating relative, at an angle relative to the rest of the stack. And
we compare that data with what is happening in the orbiter and the other SRB.
MR. FEYNMAN: And you have gyros in each instrument that are different from each
other?
MR. LEE: That's right, and the way we would explain that would be that base rotating out.
In the
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same time period we get a lot of high rate actuator commands between, say, a little after 72
seconds up to about 72 1/2 seconds, and those are not all tied together and explained.
We think we have come detached at the base, and then--
MR. FEYNMAN: The actuators are the gadgets that turn the elevons, is that correct?
MR. LEE: The actuators are the hydraulic pistons, if you will, that gimbal the engine.
MR. FEYNrMAN: Okay.
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MR. LEE: At about 73 seconds we then see a very distinct anomaly in the right hand solid
rocket motor chrmber pressure, and we are seeing about a 20 psi loss in chamber pressure there
at around about 600 psi, and so we are seeing a definite anomaly in the right l_and solid rocket
motor.
So then the terminal events are a little suspect still. We are using some film data, as you
have seen, and some instrumentation, and we put just for reference purposes a time out where
we saw the right hand solid rocket booster nose cap separate.
Could I have the next viewgraph, please'?
DR. WALKER: Could I ask a question, please'? Do you have _parate measurements of the
ullage in each
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of the Shuttle main engines, or is that a single measurement of total feed'?
MR. LEE: We have tied to each engine an ullage pressure measurements which allows what
we call a flow control valve to divert in this case gaseous hydrogen to go back into the hydrogen
tank to pressurize it, if you will, and each of these engines has two flow control valves. In other
words, two of these become flow cont _'ol valves.
DR. WALKER: So all three of them are shown?
MR. LEE: Yes.
(Viewgraph.) Im't. 2 I:_ :_t I
MR. LEE: The way we proceeded at Marshall for investigation is we start with the end item
as we see it and work back to build a fault tree, and our end item was the explosion, and we tied
that to a rupture or a breakup of both the liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen tank. We built a
fault tree, and this is just the overall major fault tree. There are probably 200 or 300 different
elements. If I spread the whole thing out. it would be 200 or 300 elements that make this up.
Just to identify how we construct this, one area would be, to break up the external tank,
would be the external tank and the solid rocket booster attach fittings fail. One would be over-
load of the tank or
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load exceedance, and that could come from a number of things, control, winds, thrust imbalance.
The Shuttle main engine structural failure could cause an external tank rupture. Overheating of
the external tank could cause it. The external tank flaw, that would be a manufacturing flaw, or
some external damage, some flaw in the manufacturing. A premature detonation of the linear
shaped charge would give you a rupture of the external tank. A premature ignition of the iner-
tial upper stage that is in the payload bay--
DR. WALKER: Where is the linear shaped charge?
MR. LEE: That is on the external tank, as well as the solid rocket booster, here and here
and comes down to about here on each of these, and then down the inside.
DR. WALKER: That is the destruct?
MR. LEE: Yes.
MR. ACHESON: Which one do you mean in that box?
MR. LEE: I mean all of them. Another would be, say, an explosion or a fire in the payload
bay. Another would be damage at lift-off or l:remature separation of the solid rocket booster.
Now, what we have still all of these open,
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there are two that we have close to exonerated, but we are not yet able to we are not allowed to,
from the flight data that we have reviewed would be the Shuttle main engine, and we have good
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evidencethat theShuttlemainenginepertbrmedjust asprescribed.Weactuallyhavedataafter
whatyouseeasthe explosion,becausewearegettingout'dataat--our 60kilobit datathat we
got longerthan wedid the 128kilobit in|brmation,plus the photographythat wesaw.And so
actually,theenginewasactuallystill runningat the timeof the explosionbecausethe feedline
propellantandthefact that wegotdatalonger,wewentto the pointof actually,becauseof the
overheatingor the high temperatureindicationon oneof the turbopumps,which is a red line
that wouldcauseyou to cut that engineoff,andwethink wecanseethat in thedata.Weactu-
ally wentthroughtheprocessof hitting a redline andcutting theengineonafter, pretty much
after.
Sobaseduponeverythingwehaveseenfrom flight dataandphotography,wedonotseeany
connection,anyconnectionwhatsoeverbetweenthe Shuttlemainengineandthis incident.
We believewecanalmostexoneratethe inertial upperstagealso,Wedo not haveilight
instrumentationof that duringthe ascentphasebecause
937
wedon'tneedit, I guess,but it is in thebay,andwedon'thaveinstrumentationon it. We have
enough orbiter instrumentation and enough payload instrumentation to be able to see in detail
what is happening to that structure. We are able to look at temperature measurements. So we
are reasonably sure the solids didn't fire. Everything we have looked at compares very favorably
or exactly almost with the previous flight we had with the IUS, so we believe we can--we know
that we can't tie the information we see today to that.
GENERAL KUTYNA: For the record, I would like to say that's the first nice thing NASA
has said about the IUS in the last four years.
tLaughter, t
MR. LEE: Now, what we are leaving open with all of this--and there is a lot of it--is what
happened, what could have happened with the solid rocket booster and the external tank. So we
haven't tried to close out any of the external tank or solid rocket booster items. Where we will
be taking off from today and in the next presentation will be the solid rocket motor failure and
then some of the things associated with all aspects of the external tank.
For this. I would like to now go into the
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presentation that we have been trying to--the group here has been trying to discuss, and I am
not criticizing you for that, but we have discussed a lot of items already that we are going to tell
you about now. But this is the way we see at least two very probable failure scenarios, how we
went about arriving at the scenarios, the processes that we go through for identifying the trails,
if you will, how we go about doing the analysis and tests, and we are going to provide to you
today what we have completed and the results of what we have completed and the analysis and
tests and give you an indication of the type of tests that we presently have planned.
With that I would like to introduce George Hardy who acts as my alternate for the investi-
gating effort at the Marshall Space Flight Center.
MR. CRIPPEN: Jack, while George is getting up, just a little bit further on the IUS.
So we have recovered portions of the IUS, and that includes chunks of solid fuel that show
no signs of ignition.
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TESTIMONY OF 31R. (;EORGE tlARi)Y
MR. HARDY: Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission, I would like to discuss with you
some of' the fhilure analysis work that we are doing under the purview of the task force.
Could I have the first chart, please?
_Viewgraph.) IJ:,'_ 2 I:_ :_eI
MR. HARDY: I will discuss some of the failure scenarios, potential failure mechanisms or
causes *hat set those scenarios, and then work i, progress, which work in progress is a continu-
ation of the development of the scenarios, particularly that has to do with the analysis and test
work.
Could I have the next viewgraph, please?
(Viewgraph.) Im'l. 2 I:_ :L_I
MR. HARDY: Just as a summary, the approach that we have taken is I think somewhat
classical. It is not unique, develop failure scenario assessment matrix with that. That means to
establish event one, event two, event three, etc., and with data that is in hand, the observaticns,
film data, telemetry data from 51-L, special analyses that are run as well as tests, and our expe-
rience base. This matrix approach, then, takes each one of those events and attempts to either
support it or refute it.
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Now, in many cases, as I mentioned, that does take a special analysis and test, and in some
cases we have run some of those tests and analyses, and in many cases we are still in the proc-
ess, and I will try to describe that to you as we go through. But successfully completing that first
step, one comes to the most probable failure scenario.
I am not prepared today to tell you which that is. I am just describing the process.
The next step, of course, is define failure mechanisms and causes. If you can make the sce-
nario fit, something still has to cause that, and there we look at again the 51-L hardware pedi-
gree, anything in the manufacturin_ of the hardware, the handling of the hardware, any design
changes that might have been made. We look at our experience base, if there are any clues
there, the actual design itself, all the way back to the initial qualification of that design, and
then experience base, by the way, that would look at previous loads that we have exposed to
various elements, compare that with our design qualification load base.
We look at launch processing, launch flight, and again, in most cases have to generate spe-
cial analysis or special tests to either verify or refute a particular cause. And then, of course, if
one has done
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that successfully, you get to the most probable failure mechanism.
Now, I am going to talk to you about this and some of the work that is going on right here.
Could I have the next viewgraph, please?
(Viewgraph.) Im'r. 2 l:_-I I I
MR. HARt, V: Before I get into the details of the failure scenarios, with respect to the pro-
pulsion elements of the booster, we have identified three failure scenarios, defined as first event.
The first one is an external tank hydrogen leak. The second one is a solid rocket booster joint
leak, and an unanticipated vehicle loads and dynamics.
5O6
Tb.erehasbeena lot of discussion here today about lift-off loads, the effect of lift-off loads on
the attached s_ructure, the effect of' loads at Max Q, and [ can assure you that we are vitally
interested in t_'at. And at this point in time. since much of that has to be reconstructed, I have
not developed a detailed scenario that uses these vehicle loads and dynamics as the first event or
the fSrst offender. But we plan to do that as that data becomes available.
Now, I would also hasten to say that one can get into permutations and combinations of
these failure scenarios. We are quite aware of the fact that there
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comes a point in time, about 60 seconds in flight, where indeed the aft joint of the solid rocket
motor is leaking. I think that is undeniable. The question is is that the cause or the effect.
Could I have the next viewgraph, please?
(Viewgraph.) Im'l. -' I:_ :_1
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Does D include on that chart the third one, the unanticipated vehi-
cle loads, does that include the launch problems, or is that a separate category?
MR. HARDY: No, sir, that would include, even include ?relaanch activitie.,,
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I see.
MR. HARDY: If there was some procedural error in making the attached struts or tempera-
ture conditions, the temperature around this motor case, as I will show you later, is about a 22
degree profile from the inside to the outside, and so it would include temperature conditions. It
would include the effect of ice on the launch pad, if tbat had any significance.
(HAIRMAN ROGERS: I see. That clarifies it, thank you.
MR. }lARDY: And just one other thing I would mention, too, that goes significantly into the
clynamlcs at lift-off. We ha,;e heard n:ention about the bending
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over of the booster, but it is also cantilever dynamics of the lift-off, with the simultaneity of
release of the booster from the launch pad, I don't know if that has been explained to you or not,
but on each booster there are what we call four hold-down posts, a total of eight, and those are
released about a three and a half inch explosive bolt, or rather it has an explos;ve nut on it, but
it has a three and a half inch bolt with an explosive nut on each one, and they are released
simultaeeously, they are fired simultaneous witb the ignition of the solid rocket motors, and so
we will he looking at the timing, for instance of the release ,v..echanisms themselves, anything
that can put unanticipated, unexpected dynamics into the vehicle.
But as I mentioned, the detailed development of this scenario has to follow the generation of
that data, and it has to be reconstructed. So I am going to be talking in more detail about these
two. But we certainly will be working this one. And again, this scenario can interplay with
either one of those.
What I would like first to do is to discuss just the overall scenario, the events associated
with Scenario A, which is external tank leak, and then I am going to take each one of these
events and tell you what we have in 51-L observed data, or what we have in
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analysis to date, what we have in test to date, that either supports or refutes any of these steps,
and I will also tell you what we have yet to do.
In the process, if you faiI to refute any of these blocks, then that chain has to stay open. At
any point in time you can deny one of these things happening and then you block that scenario
right there, and that part of the scenario is ended. If, of course, you block it back here. then the
entire scenario is ended, but this scenario has again, let me emphasize, and I am talking events
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that occur at this point, not necessarily causes, not necessarily why they happened, but it has an
external tank leaking at or near lift-off.
Let me go now if I could to the next block, and so I can talk in more dc.aai )n each one,
could I have the next viewgraph, please?
_Viewgraph._ Imq. _ I:_ m,!
MR. HARDY: I am going to address now the external tank hydrogen leaks and this hydro-
gen burns. When this hydrogen burns, it overheats the aft joint on the solid rocket motor, and
the O.-ring seals become heated to the point that they can no longer hold the pressure. They fail.
And then we go to the next step which is impingement on the aft struts and the external
tank and that starts a major event.
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Now, I am not carrying on beyond the major event. I am just trying to get to that point, and I
will go through each one in detail, but I thought it would be better just to talk about them one
at a time first. An alternative to the hydrogen leaking and burning is if the hydrogen leaks, it
doesn't burn but it cools the joint to the point that the O-rings get so cold that the struetural
integrity of the O-rings is affected, and they break loose, they can't hold the pressure anymore,
at which time the joint starts leaking, and I get on to this next step.
MR. RUMMEL: Excuse me. Why wouldn't it burn?
MR. HARDY: Well, I think some of it will burn, but it may not all be consumed?
MR. RUMMEL: In other words, it ,fight burn but not impinge?
MR. HARDY: That is correct, or the flame front may bemthe flame propagation may not be
through all the hydrogen. It may be concentrated to the point that there's not enough oxygen
there for it to burn.
DR. WALKER: Could we just return to these infrared images from which temperatures are
derived, and the possibly anomalously low temperature on the right hand solid motor? Are you
going to talk about that?
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MR. HARDY: I will touch on that, yes.
Just again, let me just show you the general timeframe I am talking about these events
happening. I am not really trying to tie them all down, but this first, as I say, it happens at or
near lift-off. This is occurring from lift-off to about 58 seconds. This occurs at around 58.3 sec-
onds, and ttmt is an observation from the film. And then this also is an observation from the
film.
Okay, looking at Event A-! there, it overheats the right hand half of the field joint. The
observation is that we have this anomalous smoke, we have at or near lift-off, and this could
I_'. [¢111i I1_I sit','il_ i' i'< bill il _',_t_ld I_¢' _,x1¢wnal lank TPS Imrnin_, S_ a! lhis lilllt ....
DR. COVERT: That TPS is the insulation?
MR. HARDY: Yes. At this point in time that observation would not deny this scenario. I am
not _aying that is what happened, but it wouldn't allow us to block this scenario.
So the analysis, some of the analysis we have done Dr. Lucas already mentioned. We asked
ourselves, well, how much hydrogen could I be leaking and not detect it in the flight instrumen-
tation of the tank, and the analysis says we coulct be _eaking 4 pounds per
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second out of a hole of eigbt-tenths an inch, and it would not be detected with instrumentation.
The next step was to, can I structurally survive an eight-tenth inch hole, and the answer to
that was yes, it was consicierably greater in the area of interest than eight-tenths inch. So I can
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leak hydrogen and not detect it with instrumentation, l con have a hole of the size that would be
undetectable in instrumentation, and it is structurally sound, the vehicle still is structurally
sound, the tank is.
Now, one of the things that we are trying to do--and I am not an expert in this area, but is
through film enhancement, to attempt to see if there is evidence of hydrogen, either fr_:e hyd.,-o-
gen or burning hydrogen in the area of interest any time from lift-off through the major event.
DR. COVERT: George, what kind of pressure difference would there be between the hydro-
gen tank and the outside from the insulation?
MR. HARDY: I don't know the answer to that.
DR. COVERT: Have you guys done any experiments with that pressure difference, "hat the
hydrogen would work its way through the insulation?
MR. HARDY: I don't have the answer to that. I feel confident it would because the head of
hydrogen
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you have got there, I think that is right.
Now. at this point in time we can't block this scenario because we have found nothing in
tests or analysis to date that says that at this point in time that that can't happen. So we go to
the next step, and we say, well, okay. so what if it is happening, can you overheat the joint?
Could I have the next viewgraph, please?
(Viewgraph.) [r,.t z n:_:_7I
MR. HARDY: This is event A-3, assuming that everything in front of it can happen and
maybe did happen, and this addresses the fact or makes the statement in the scenario that the
joint is overheated to the point that the O-rings fail.
Well, certainly the observation of the fact that we have a blowing leak at the right hand
field joint in the timeframe of interest here that of course would not deny it. The fact that we
have chamber pressure diverging would not deny that. And the fact that we have some excur-
sion in the control system would not deny it.
The analysis that we have under way--and we have some preliminary results from these
analyses, hut we are refining them at this time--the question is can you get a heating rate to
get the temperature of that
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joint high enough in the 58 seconds that you have available, that is, from near lift-off to the time
you see the joint leaking, can you have a heating rate high enough to overheat the O-rings to
the point that they would fail? We have not concluded that analysis. A preliminary assessment
of that indicated that we would heat that joint to--can you give me the number on that, Rick?
MR. REINARTZ: About 450 degrees.
DR. WALKER: Fahrenheit?
MR. HARDY: We would heat that joint to about 450 degress fahrenheit. Now, that is assum-
ing a perfect mixture of hydrogen with the oxygen available, that is burning, and that heat is
flowing over to this joint and is being added to the aerodynamic heating that is already there.
Our preliminary assessment is that the O-rings, heated externally, would have to be heated
to somewhere in the neighborhood of 500 to 600 degrees before they lost structural integrity.
Now, we haven't made a fit of that element of the scenario yet, but it is close enough that
we have to continue to analy:;e it.
MR. RUMMEL: Can I ask over what period of time would they have to be heated to that
temperature?
MR. HARDY: The analysis is taking it frem
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essentiahy hft-off or very nearlv lift-off, that burning hydregen is--the heat from the burning
hydrogen is coming into that joint, to 5;q seconds where we know the joint leaks. We know that
without question.
There is work to be done, both in the analysis area, and we are in fact going to set up a test
to pressurize a joint with O-rings and heat it from the outside and see what temperature we
have to get those O-rings up to so that they would fail. 3o at this point in time this event is not
blocked• So that scenario is still open.
DR. COVERT: When you make this experiment, obviously it is going to be on a small scale,
so you are going to maintain the gap size and the compression ratio in the O-ring and those
geometric factors which means it is going to be at least big enough around so the other curva-
ture is important, is that correct'?
MR HARDY: Yes, and we are considering putting transverse loads on it, too, the kind of
loads you would have at a Max Q.
GENERAL KUTYNA: How do you simulate the air flow varying anywhere from zero to
Mach 2'?
MR. HARDY: Well, what we plan to do is, as best we can, is to calculate the heat rate and
t hen we
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are just going to apply that heat rate directly to the joint.
DR. COVERT: And there will be no insulation on the inside and no putty or aoything like
that, it would just be a clean metal gap on the inside?
MR. HARDY: Well, we will make the inside of the joint without propellant, but otherwise
we will make it very similar to the flight vehicle.
MR. WAITE: Wouldn't the cooling effect of the propellant change the results?
MR. HARDY: No, I don't think so.
DR. COVERT: I would be more concerned about the chemical activity of the combustion
products.
DR. WALKER: Ordinarily you bake O-rings at 2,50 C, so they ought to be able to take this
tern perat u re.
MR. HARDY: That is true. We estimate now that they would hold structural integrity to
6{}0, maybe less than that.
MR. SUT'rER: In a test like that you will probably run a variation of seals and variations
on that to find out how much slack you've got?
MR. HARDY: Yes, we would plan to do that. We will not run a test like this, one sample
test set up one way and say that's the results.
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MR. FEYNMAN: How about if you take a clamp and you tighten it up in a glass of ice
water?
(laughter.)
DR. COVERT: The other thing, George, you might consider is seals tha_ have been eroded.
MR. HARDY: Let me say tbat in these scenarios--well, let me wait until I get to that point.
DR. COVERT: I'm sorry, I didn't mean to get ahead of you.
MR. HARDY: Could I have the next viewgraph, please?
(Viewgraph.) [R4.r 2 13 :_sI
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MR [lARDY Now we come down to the bottom let of this scenario, the hydrogen is still
leaking from the tank. but now we are looking for cooling effect on the joir, t Event A-2 says this
hydrogen cools the right hand field joint The pr()blem we've _ot with that is that does not :up
port the observations, that doesn't cause the black smoke So the anomalous black smoke tha'
you saw early on would have to be assigned to some other cause, b- " we are proceeding, recog
nizing the fact that the instrumentation would allow us to have a leak. and recognizing, ano not
be detectable and recognizing structural integrity would allow that. We are
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proceeding with the analysis to determine how' cold we can get the joint. Preliminary analysis of
that would indicate that we cannot get the joint in 58 seconds cold enough that it would :erious-
ly degrade the structural integrity of the O-rings.
So we have a temporary block on this leg of this scenario, and we haven't quit work on it,
but it is not a prime candidate.
Could [ have the next viewgraph?
(Viewgraph.l Ira., 2 I_ ;,_!
MR. HARDY: I think I have already covered this. Although we think we have blocked that
leg of the scenario, we are still going to do the cooling rate analysis to see how cold it could get
in 58 seconds.
Could I have the next viewgraph, please?
(Viewgraph._ Im,I z I:_ m I
MR. HARDY: Now, failing to block either one or both legs of this scenario, we come to the
point that approximately at about 5g seconds there is clearly hot gas leakage around this aft
field joint, and that is observed both from the film data. It is also evidenced in the tank pressur-
ization instrumentation, and it is also evidenced by the fact that that tank is calling for more
pressure to keep that pressure up. And so I think there is no disagreement on any of these sce-
narios that
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we are working that eventually we get to the point where the SRM joint is leaking.
DR. WALKER: There is another sort of combined scenario in which the leak could be there
before ignition and it could have cooled the Oring and then at ignition the leak, the hyd agen
leak, ignites, but now the O-ring is pretty cool, and so it may be more likely to get damaged or
eroded, meaning that you have also got in addition to burning hydrogen, you have also got a
weak O-ring. So you could actually combine those two scenarios in some sense.
MR. HARDY: Yes. That is one of the main reasons we haven't closed that scenario out. And
you notice this scenario was built to start with the hydrogen leak at lift-off, but we need to back
that up and see what happened before that.
MR. WAITE: Your hydrogen detectors don't or wouldn't be sufficient tc detect this sort of a
leak?
MR. HARDY: I believe Horace said the hydrogen detectors are at specific locations, discon-
nects in other areas where we might have some suspect tbr leaks, but general acreage of the
tank, a survey is not covered for hydrogen leaks.
DR. WALKER: So these are near valves?
MR. HARDY: Near valves and disconnects and
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things of that sort.
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Okay, 1 would like _o go now to the next scenario which addresses the t_rst offender being
the SRM joint.
Could I have the next view_raph, please"
_View_raph._ !m.i - i: iII
MR. HARDY: This scenario says--and I'm _oin_ to talk to each one of these in some detail.
too--that l have primary O-ring blow-by. That is, l have gas past the primary O-,ing. The sec-
ondary ()-ring does not seal. which means now I've got gas to the outside or the secondary O-ring
does seal and I have leaked past the leak check port. In either case--and I will discuss this in
detail--in either case, the scenario says that the joint is either--has either leaked aad stopped
or it has continued to leak tbr this period of ime |¥9m lift-off to this time here. and then we see
a major hot gas leak out of that joint whict_ goes on to the same point that the other scenario
was going to tMx- all the scenarios and with this. all the scenarios have that in it because that is
well established in observation.
Could I have the next viewgraph, please':
_Viewgraph,) lt_,.I : I:_ Iz I
MR. HARDY: Now, let me say at this point, and
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Dr. Lucas has already mentioned this, and I will elaborate on it a little bit more, but we have
great difficulty analytically starting a leak or having a leak past both O-rings at or near igni-
tion, and have that leak remain relatively well behaved, and I say that because I don't know just
exactly how well behaved it stays, but to have it relatively well behaved in terms of the expan-
sion of that leak and the leak area through that joint up to 58 seconds. But I am going to talk
about that a little bit more.
But as has been mentioned here. we are looking at scenarios that--it leaks, then it seals,
then it leaks again. That is not easy _o come by either. This material, the O-ring material, sub-
jected to the gas temperatures for any period of time, seconds, doesn't tolerate 'hat very well,
DR. COVERT: You are going to talk, I assume, about combinations of these so you might
have one of these that seals and then !ater the high load and vibration?
MR. HARDY: Yes.
DR. COVERT: Okay. Press on.
MR HARDY: Well, let me just say now. in the scenario of the leak-seal-leak- -
DR. COVERT: Let's stick with this one. I
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didn't mean to get you off. I just wanted to know if you were goil;g to that.
MR. HARDY: But if I don't cover that, remind me.
Looking at event B-I, which says primary O-ring blow-by, now we have that in our experi-
ence base. Our experience shows that the joint seal design can result in what we refer to as
blow-by, which is during a transient build-up of pressure. While that primary O-ring is pressure
actuated--could I have the next viewgraph on the right hand screen?
(Viewgraph.) t'_'"-z ,:: t:_I
MR. HARDY: I think you have probably seen this a few times, but the primary O-ring is
located here, and the secondary O-ring is located here. The leak test port is located in such a
way that we pressurize the annulus, or the volume in between here, and you have heard the
description as to how that is done, I believe. It is pressurized up to 200 psi_ and it :_,_L^,._,,_,_for ten
minutes, is that right--no, 15, and then that is for two reasons. One is to seat the O-rings .....
the O-rings in a position where they can seal, and the other is to ensure that we don't mask a
leak in the primary O-ring by the putty holding the pressure.
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DR.COVERT:George,in Larry Mulloy'sslideswherethat zincchromate putty comes down
and seats against the tang. his were always very carefully had a gap there, which is the real
_'on figu rat ion.
MR. HARDY: This is not correct. That putty is terminated about haifwav back up here.
DR. COVERT: Thank you.
MR. HARDY: I might say this dime_sion is exaggerated, too. That gap probably shows there
about twice as wide as it is configured.
MR. RUMMEL: May I ask when these units are assembled. I guess they are ass(>mbled verti-
cally and one unit goes down on top of the other and that tang goes in the clevis. Do they always
go in and go home the first time, or is it necessary to pull them out or twist them or somehow
displace that putty'?
Do you know, in the process of assembly?
MR. HARDY: I believe that Mr. Lamberth is planning to discuss that in quite some detail, is
that correct, Norm?
MR. LAMBERTH: That is correct, George. Our briefing will go into that. but to answer your
question, no, we do make the measurements that ensures ourselves that we have the proper
turns before we mate the ;oint, and we have never had to come back out unless we had a
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leak or something like that where we had to change the O-ring.
DR. COVERT: Let me ask again, is that gap really that big between the propellant in one
segment and the propellant in the next?
MR. HARDY: That is generally representative, is several inches. I can get that number.
DR. COVERT: I don't need the number. It just sort of looks like a big crack in a way.
MR. HARDY: I think you could probably put your hand in there.
MR. SUTTER: That sketch is correct in that the test port and O-rings are tied together so
that you could have a combination failure of O-rings and test ports all being involved in the
failure?
MR. HARDY: Yes. In fact, that is one of the scenarios I will talk about. But what I wanted
to make here, talking about the incident of the blow-by, I guess what I'm trying to say is that we
have experience, event No. 1, we have experienced it several times. So I don't have to prove that
can happen because in fact it has happened. I was just explaining the primary reason for it to
happen is when we do pressure check here, this graph doesn't show it too web', and I've got one
later that shows it a lot better, but this O-ring, the primary
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O-ring can move back and does move back against this edge of the groove, and the gap between
the other side of the O-ring and this other side of the groove, of course, depends upon several
things, not the least of which is the diameter of the O-ring. But it also can be because of the
allowable dimension on "_his groove here, it can be anywhere from 15 to 30 mills.
So when the motor is pressurized and the pressure first hits this O-ring, this is what we
refer to as pressure actuating. It has to move back to the side.
Now, I am going to go into more detail about that with some better diagrams in just a few
minutes, but I only wanted to point out that we believe that that is where we occasion what we
call blow-by. But we do know from experience that you can establish for a transient period of
time some blow-by of the primary O-ring. In every case it has been limited. It has been limited
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bv the sealing,first of all, by th- t21cthat the secondaryO-ring is sealed,the leak port has
seal,.'d,sotherehasbeennowaytbr thegasto continueflowing.
Could I have the next ;,iewgraph, please'?
DR. WALKER: Betbre you do, I .just want to ask a couple of questions on that.
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How many threads are engaged in that plug, in the leak check port'?
MR EtARDY: I will have to get the answer to that.
DR. WALKER: i don't see the steel band. It is not shown.
MR HARDY: The steel band is right here underneath the cork. What is represented here is
a shim, and I will talk about that a little bit later.
DR. COVERT: George, Larry Mulloy again said there were two O-rings on that leak check
port, and your diagram only shows one.
MR. HARDY: There are two O-rings on that, and I will get this diagram corrected before I
show it again.
DR. COVERT: I don't mean to be a nitpicker but as you know, I get confused easily.
MR. HARDY: I think that is a good point. We should represent truly what it looks like.
Could I go to the next viewgraph, please?
(Viewgraph.) Imq 2 i:i i i I
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: That is threaded, too, isn't it?
MR. HARDY: Yes, it is.
Now, this is the incident of blow-by that we
962
have seen on the primary O-ring, and I think most of you heard a good bit about this in Wash-
ington. But I just wanted to show that we have had four instances of blow-by, and I distinguish
blow-by from O-ring erosion because those can occur together, they don't have to occur together,
and in fact, there is a slightly different mechanism that causes each one of them to happen.
There does, for just a matter of interest, seem to be focused around this leak check port area
here. Now, we have at this point in time assigned--haven't assigned any great significance to
that. It may well have to do that this is where the gas enters to do the leak check, and there
may be some more disturbance of that primary O-ring pushing it back in that area versus in the
other area.
GENERAL KUTYNA: That's a contradiction of what we heard in Washington because we
asked Mr. Mulloy at least twice, was there any area in which this was localized, and he said rm,
it was pretty well distributed, and you are now saying that it is at that bottom of the Z axis.
MR. HARDY: Well, Larry may have been referring to the fact that it is not total. We do
have one over here, but I will check my facts on this, but
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I'm pretty sure I'm correct.
DR. WALKER: Maybe he was talking about the erosion rather than the blow-by.
MR. HARDY: Now, that is true on the erosion. In fact, the open circles is where we've had
erosion, and the half-opened, half-closed is erosion and blow-by. So on erosion you can see that
there doesn't seem to be any pattern where you've got erosion on the O-rings.
GENERAL KUTYNA: And yet he did say that given the choice between the two, the blow-
by was the more serious.
MR. HARDY: Yes, and I agree with that because the blow-by can in fact get us through the
first event in this failure scenario.
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CouldI goto the nextview_zraph,please'?
MR.FEYNMAN:I hopeit's not improperto bringupsomethingslightlydifferent.Thequ.:'s-
tion is whetherthereis a correlationbetweentheblow-byandtheaccuracywith whichtheg_ps
andsoforth were fitting, the mechanical fit of the particular joints when they were put togt,'_h _
er. There must be. of course, all kinds of' records, and you must have heard that a million times.
does it turn out the blow-by occurred when the gaps- -
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MR. HARDY: There's a number of things that we are attempting to correlate blow-by _ith,
environmental conditions, specific configuration of that joint, material vendors, whether there
were more than one material vendor, was there one material that performed a little bit better
than the other, and as you correctly state, the dimensions, specific dimension of each joint, and
we are correlating all of that, and we see some correlation in certain areas.
I am really not prepared to talk about it right now because I can't remember all of" the de-
tails.
/Viewgraph.) ll_," " I:: ':'t
MR. HARDY: The second event I would like to go to first is to take this trail down here and
look at event B-2. This says if I get blow-by of the primary O-ring and this leak check port is
leaking, the first question we ask ourselves, could this anomalous smoke starting at or near lift-
off, could that be from the leak check port, and I guess there is some difference of opinion
among the film analysts at this time. and I am not going _o try to pick sides, but I am going to
work to find out which one is right, that there is film that says that we can see the leak check
port, you heard that discussion earlier, whether we really know whether we are looking at the
right place, that say you can see the
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leak check port, and the leak check port is not leaking. At this point in time we have not put a
block on that. It may get blocked if in fact we can verify from observed data that that port is not
leaking.
DR. COVERT: George, what is the diameter of that leak check port?
MR. HARDY: Three-eighths is the number I remember.
DR. LUCAS: But it's a one-eighth inch hole.
MR. HARDY: Yes. You saw from the drawing that the hole that went directly into the
cavity is one-eighth inch. But as long as we can block this--as long as we can't block this, then
we look at the analysis to see what are the thermal flow characteristics of this leak check port.
If the leak check port is leaking, it cou!d be several things, theoretically, that could cause it. One
would be missing O-rings. The other would be not missing O-rings but damaged O-rings. The
other potential could be lack of proper torque.
Now we set up a series of tests. That is shown right here.
DR. WALKER: Do you know that the plug was there?
DR. COVERT: I think if the plug wasn't there,
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DR. WALKER: Do you have some photographic evidence?
DR. COVERT: We looked at it. Didn't we look at the closeout pictures of the ring?
MR. HARDY: I don't know if we have close-out pictures on the photos or not.
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MR.LAMBERTH:Yes,George,thereare--a close-out photo is not required, but in the area
you can see the hole there, and you can argue about the plug being there or not. It looks like it
is there, and all of our paper and everything shows normal, buy-off and everything normal.
DR. COVERT: On that Eastern airliner that lost those O-rings in the oil, they had all the
right paperwork, too.
MR. LAMBERTH: George. just to kind o( correct the record, the drawings and everything,
in our architecture there is one O-ring on the leak check plug.
MR. ACHESON: In real life there is one?
MR. LAMBERTH: Yes, and this is a plug and an O-ring.
MR. HARDY: So this chart is correct. I had
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heard that two different ways.
But in any case, what we want to do is characterize the leak. What would be the leak rate
for various conditions of anomalies of that plug? And that is important in order to determine--
to do the flow analysis and the thermal analysis. And we have done the thermal analysis and
determined that for any leak rate we just about we want to pick out of that plug, whether we
want to consider the plug is gone, the O-ring is gone, or neither are gone, but there is a very low
leak rate out of that plug, we have determined that the secondary O-ring will degrade and erode
to the point of failure before the threads are heated to lose structural integrity and blow the
plug out.
So as I said, very key in this scenario is coming to some grips with whether or not that
might be the source of the black smoke because this scenario would fit the incident of a small
leak early on. and then the joint failing at 58 seconds.
MR. FEYNMAN: This way the idea is that it starts to leak through the leak check port,
through the primary, and that perpetual gas going through there ultimately destroys the second-
ary O-ring?
MR. HARDY: That is correct, The thermal damage and strength loss in the threads would
not be
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sufficient for it to go 58 seconds, but the secondary O-ring erosion wou!d.
Now, i_l cnaracterizing this leak, we are going to do cold flow and hot flow tests because I
believe, as Dr. Lucas also mentioned, we believe that it would be possible to get let me say, a
relatively high leak rate out initially, but as the aluminum oxide and other products of combus-
tion flow through those threads, it would tend to slow that leak rate down
So we are using a variable leak rate in these analyses. But in every case we see a secondary
O-ring failure before we see the leak check port.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Why is that secondary O-ring eroding? There is no flow; there is stag-
nation at that point.
MR. HARDY: Well, if I am flowing through here and I am flowing out here, I am pumping
heat into this gap.
MR. FEYNMAN: It is circumferential.
MR. SUTTER: The first ring is getting cooked fast, but the second one could last a lot longer
because there isn't flow by it.
MR. HARDY: Well, there is flow into this cavity.
MR. SUTTER: But if it is sealed, it isn't
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flowing--
MR.HARDY:But if I am pumping 3,000 degree gas in here, in order to get out right here, [
am severely degrading that O-ring.
MR. SUTTER: But I am just curious, is that plug, what I see here is just a plug screwed in
and some guy torques it, and there's no locking device on it'?
MR. HARDY: You are correct, to my knowledge, tl,_at is correct.
MR. SUTTER: Are there other nuts and bolts like that, too? It doesn't seem like a standard
design practice. I am just curious.
MR. HARDY: Well, it is a standard design process for a lot of electrical connectors and
many of the structural fasteners.
DR. WALKER: Did you say it is locked tight?
MR. HARDY: It is standard practice to lock wire or lock tight electrical connectors.
DR. COVERT: This is aluminum tightened into a steel. Is there some sort of a frictional
seizing, like if you put brass into steel and tighten it down, why, then there would be a sticking
there.
MR. HARDY: This plug is steel.
DR. COVERT: Where did I get the idea it was aluminum'?
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MR. HARDY: I'm not sure.
(Laughter.)
MR. SUTTER: The only safety of that system, then, is quality control?
MR. HARDY: That is correct.
MR. SUTTER: And it is a single item.
MR. FEYNMAN: Well, it is supposed by itself not to be a problem because the primary ring
is supposed to hold. That is why it isn't at the same level as we are now thinking abou: it, and
we now are thinking about primary rings failing, and that hasn't been communicated that the
check valve therefore becomes a critical item.
MR. WAITE: Would you say if the plug were left out that you would have O-ring failure?
MR. HARDY: No, I would not say that. I would not like to have the plug left out because, as
I experienced for occasions of blow-by, if it was in one of these eases, then I think I would be in
for trouble.
MR. WAITE: Then you would have flow that would cause the secondary seal to degrade'?
MR. HARDY: That's right.
MR. ACHESON: In cases of blow-by past the primary ring, what is your experience on the
condition of the plug and the check port?
MR. HARDY: In every case that we have seen
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blow-by, we have post-recovery, in examination of the article, has shown that that blow-by is
limited to soot ,'eposit back here, and on no occasion have we seen any violation of the second-
ary O-ring or any violation of the leak check port here.
MR. ACHESON: I see.
MR. HARDY: If I might go on to the next one and mention that this track stays open for
the time being, and now I wou!d like to look at the B-1 event.
Could I have the next viewgraph, please?
(Viewgraph.) II_,q-' la i_q
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MR. tIARDY: Now, the B-i event [bllows the blow-by on the primary O-ring, and it says
_hat--and these ar_ {'or the secondary O-ring seals, and thereibre I establish flow past both O-
rings, the anomalous smoke starting at or near lift-off could be from that field joint, and it could
be from gas passing through both O-rings. And I think it has already been mentioned the grease
in this joint. From that grease we would see black smoke. We have identified in the investiga-
tion a suspect secondary' O-ring which is indicated in the close-out photos, and let me hasten to
mention be[bre we show you this that we are still collectively trying to interpret these photos.
It is not immediately obvious what we are
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seeing, and that is the reason I classified it as a suspect close-out photo. I have some viewgr¢=phs,
and Bob looks like he has got a big blow-up, and so let's put the viewgraphs on, please.
The next viewgraph,
(Viewgraph.) It,','t z t:_ ts I
MR. HARDY: No, I'm sorry. They are out of order.
Do you have the picture viewgraphs?
Take down the viewgraph on the right hand screen.
Jack, could you help me back there get the picture up?
(Viewgraph.) ii_,'l-2 13 17 I
MR. HARDY: You can probably see better on what you have there, but what you are look-
ing at, maybe I can locate you the features and then you can look at the blow-by that you have.
What you are looking at is a clevis. This clevis has been prepared, this is the upper side of
it, and this is the inner leg that you are looking at. The primary O-ring is here. This is a land in
between the primary and secondary. This is m_taL and this is the secondary O-ring right here.
And these are close-out photos that are taken as a part of the process.
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I might mention to you this joint. The metal, before the O-rings are put on, the metal is
greased. We put a heavy coating of Conoco grease, which is a stiff grease that is put on this
joint, and it is put on there for two reasons. One is, the primary reason is to provide corrosion
protection for that joint, and the other is +o provide ease in assembly of the installation of the O-
rings. The O-rings are delivered prelubricated f¥om Thiokol to Kennedy, certified ready to in-
stall, and the secondary O-ring is put on, and I am not going to go into great detail about this
because you are going to hear a lot about it and mayl:e even see it tomorrow, but the secondary
O-ring is put on around the vehicle, over this joint, and then the primary O-ring is put on.
And what we view, the area right here in the secondary O-ring, that gives some appearance
of depression and raised area, and it also gives some appearance, and you can probably see it a
lot better in what you've got, of the reduction in cross-sectional area of the O-ring.
Now, if I could have the next viewgraph.
(Viewgraph.) IR,'f. 2:1:_ _s]
MR. HARDY: We have a picture of one here that has been somewhat enhanced, and again,
not too clear up here is the primary O-ring, and this is the land between
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the two grooves, and this is the secondary O-ring, and this is the area of imerest, and here is the
area which concerns me, indicating some reduction in cross-sectional area.
DR. WALKER: it looks like a gouge almost.
MR. HARDY: Possibly.
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MR. FEYNMAN: What is _hat slightly white area? Do you mean that slightly white or
black area in there':
MR. HARDY: In here.
Let me explain what we do know. What we do know is that there is, as l mentioned, this
joint is greased rather heavily, and we are quite confident that this is grease that is smeared
across here either at the time of application or installation of" the O-ring. Again, without getting
into too much of what you are going to hear tomorrow, after the O-ring is put in place, the oper-
ators with surgical gloves, with greased fingertips, do by procedure go around and push this O-
ring into the groove, make sure it is fitting in the groove before they mate the joint.
So there is a question as to whether this represents grease smears also or whether it is some
form of a distressed O-ring, and I use that term because I wm.:d not describe it as a twist; I
would not describe
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it as, at this point in time, as a deformation. I will only say that without being able to totally
interpret it at this time, it is a piece of data we are working with. We have some photo enhance-
ment activities going on with expertise that we believe can give us more insight into whether or
not that is grease smeared across the O-ring or whether that is in fact some {brm of defect in the
O-ring.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Is this the flight motor or is this just a sample?
MR. HARDY: This is the flight motor
GENERAL KUTYNA: Is this the flight joint?
MR. HARDY: This is the flight joint.
DR. WALKER: That particular one down there?
MR. HARDY: It is in the correct hemisphere. It is on the inside, and it is not in the same
quadrant as the point where we see the blowing leak. All ; can say at this time. it is in the right
half of the motor. It is in 'he half of the motor adjacent to ihe external tank.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Can you tell us how this picture was taken? I assume--when? When
was it taken?
MR. HARDY: It was taken as a matter of procedure when this joint was being made.
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: What is the purpose of the picture?
MR. HARDY: It is what we refer to as closeout photos, and there are a number of oper-
ations here at Kennedy that require that closeout photographs be made. These closeout photo-
graphs can be used for many purposes. In some cases they can be used as a quality assurance
validation, and in some cases they can be used in anomaly investigations.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: What about this case?
MR. HARDY: In this particular case, Horace, I will let you explain it.
MR. LAMBERTH: These were closeout photos sir. We had photos that covered the entire
360 degrees of the putty lay-up and so on.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Somebody looked at this akead of time but didn't notice it?
MR. LAMBERTH: That's right.
DR. COVERT: The inspector did not call attention to this change in the gap?
MR. LAMBERTH: No, Sir.
DR. COVERT: Well, how much could you see on that without having to call it? What is the
spec on that?
MR. LAMBERTH: We did not have a spec.
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MR.RUMMEL:Thereappearsto my eyesto bea ridge,a smallridgearoundthe secondary
O-ring.Isthat....
MR HARDY:We believethat is the greasethat it pickedup whenit wasrolledover the
edgeof thegroove.Thatisourbestguess.
MR.LAMBERTH:George.all of the engineersandall of the techsandtheQCandadvisors
lookedat this photostill feel that this is a result of the greasestreaksandshadows,but noth-
ingwaswrittenonanynotesor anythingwhenweactuallymadetheclose-outphotosandmade
thejoint.
CHAIRMANROGERS: Do we know who it was that signed off on th_s?
MR. LAMBERTH: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Is that person--does he say he didn't notice this?
MR. LAMBERTH: We ha':en't interviewed that particular person formally yet. On all of the
notes, they make notes of anything that they notice or anything, and none of the notes--ali of
the notes have been reviewed, and no notes specify anything.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Is there more than one person who does this?
MR. LAMBERTH: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: In other words, is there
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somebody who looks at this and signs off on this, and then somebody checks him?
MR. LAMBERTH: It is about four or five techs that put the O-ring in, and then they go
around with gloves like George said, and QC goes around and makes a circle and looks.
CHAIRMAN ROGEPS: But I am talking about the picture afterwards. You take the picture,
and the picture is taken n order to see if--
MR LAMBERTH: The picture is not part of the logoff records. Sometimes the picture does
not get looked at.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Why is that?
MR. LAMBERTH: Well, there is a requirement to make these photos and document that
they have been made and log them. The buy-off is the actual visual inspection at real time. The
photos are for records.
MR. FEYNMAN: You talk about the streaks on the metal. For the moment I am not con-
cerned with that on the O-ring, but the streaks like that--are streaks like that on the metal
very common?
MR. LAMBERTH: Yes, sir.
MR. HARDY: The grease streaks would be, yes, sir.
MR. FEYNMAN: They look more or less like
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that.
MR. HARDY: Yes, I believe that is the case.
MR. FEYNMAN: Thank you.
DR. WALKER: Could I raise a question?
Shouldn't you expand your scenario backward, b_cause suppose there's a low point in the
putty and the putty doesn't seal properly? That could be a problem as well.
MR. HARDY: We do have the putty in _.he failure scenario. One particular aspect is the
putty is cold, and how does cold putty affect the performance of the seal?
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DR.WALKER:But supposethere is a low point in the putty herewhich leavesa gap'?Is
theresomeinspectionof theputty?Doessomebodymeasuretheuniformityofthe putty?
MR. [lARDY: Yes, it is, and I need to point out to you, I don't know the exact dimensions.
but as you see that putty there, it is up I'm going to say three-fourths of an inch or so, or in the
neighborhood of three-fourths of an inch, and that is compressed into I would say a third or less
of that dimension.
DR. WALKER: But there could be a gap in there.
MR. HARDY: We do believe, however, that the
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primary O-ring erosion occurs when we have what we refer to as a blow hole through the putty.
So we can concentrate hot gas on the primary O-ring. So weak places in the putty, weak relative
to other places in the putty where the gas would go through first could be a contributor to pri-
mary O-ring erosion, the primary O-ring erosion that you heard about yesterday or the day
before, I have forgotten which now, in Washington, which we believe is a limiting failure mode.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I would like to go ahead with this.
When was the picture taken prior to launch?
MR. LAMBERTH: We stacked ira December the 7th, so it was right about that timeframe.
GENERAL KUTYNA: On the back of the picture it says 12/7/85.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Now, you said sometimes these were looked at for safety purposes
and sometimes they weren't.
How do you make that decision?
MR. LAMBERTH: Well, usually these are placed on record, and many times they are looked
at by a group of people just looking at closeout photos, and review might occur a week or several
week afterwards. The procedure does not require a review and a verification
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of the closeout photos. It requires a verification from the staff that the closeout photos are
taken.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Was that practice changed? Did you used to do that'? In other words,
did you use to take the picture and then look at it before you signed off?.
MR. LAMBERTH: No, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Ithas always been that way?
MR. L3MBERTH: Yes, sir_
MR. HARRINGTON: The corresponding requirement for this isfor postflightanalysis of an
anomaly.
Nil,' l..\MIll';l(l'll:'l'lli_ i, t,,,,ll,_.,li,,jl- I1_1 t_li_lll _,,t,,,' ,_t_ I:tl,'l ill vl_. i';'l"" ,_t :,I,,,I,L;_Ii,,-
MR. RUMMEL: A picture is taken at the time of the visual inspection, prior to the accident
MR. LAMBERTH: Yes, sir. We have a requirement, that after we put the joint in the config-
uration that you see it here, from the time we start this joint to the time we mate is 24 hours, so
the picture and the work all gets done within that period of time. We actually did this one in
about ten hours.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Just because you are going to be asked eventually a lot of questions
about it, what is the purpose of keeping the picture if you are not
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goin_ to look at it before launch?
MR. LAMBERTH: .Just like we are doing here now, sir, so that if some question comes up on
the paper later that some anomaly or some q,ae.stion .....
521
md*
B_
--m .
MR HARRINGTON: A record of the condition that gets closed up by the flight configura-
tion that you can look at later to examine it in the ca=_e of an anomaly, which we are doing.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But it seems i'logicai it' yoa are going to save it fbr a record to show
the failure.
MR, HARRINGTON: Well, you see, if we didn't know today there were two O-rings in ther,,.
and we didn't have a picture, we would have a difticult time ascertaining that somebody did put
two in. We would have to take the word of the paperwork trail and the inspector. In this case we
have a picture that says they definitely were there,
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I just dont ibllow that• Why is it better after the fact to look at it
than betbre the fact'?
MR. LAMBERTH: Well, let me clarify that. Real time we have a buyoff by the technician
that does the work, by a contractor inspector and a NASA inspector that this job was done prop-
erly and all the inspections
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were made, that is, by visual and buyoff procedure.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Let me press that point just tbr a moment.
So you have two humans or three humans that look at it.
MR. LAMBERTtt: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And then you have a record, which is even better, because it shows
it.
Now, if you don't compare the record ahead of time with what the humans have done, and
now you have a record that the humans failed because they didn't see this. and assume that's a
fact, now, what is the point of having the picture?
I mean, it would seem to me that this may explain the failure after the catastrophe?
MR. FEYNMAN: Might I make a suggestion? Just as a suggestion as to what. it might be a
very logical reason for doing this, whatever procedure :,,'ou use, no matter how many inspections
you use with people and whatever, then you have to decide sometime to close it up. It would be
very handy to have a record to look at later in case there is some kind of a thing that you didn't
know was important because you find some kind of a flaw, let's say blow-by. Later on you want
to discover what did you do. You discover that every time
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there is a blow-by, there is a little extra grease mark that you hadn't realized was of any impor-
tance, and therefore the record would be very useful when looking at the thing later to discover
whether something that you are not considering as important, which you are allowing to pass.
That is, let us suppose that the usual rule is that when an ordinary human being looks at this
picture he doesn't think there's anything wrong with it, which as a matter of fact, I do think
there is nothing wrong with it. So it would pass everything, but the real thing is you would like
to get a record of v,hat it looks like so that in ease later on you discover there is some other
condition that t_o much of this grease or something like that, or a special color grease that you
never knew or that you changed or something like that becomes of importance, but you hadn't
realized that when you were putting it together.
And I see therefore some logical reason to have such records.
MR. CRIPPEN: Mr. Chairman, I guess that is our standard practice for keeping records, not
for inspection, and in fact, I would submit that probably somebody--if somebody had inspected
this picture while it was being put together, at a later point, and we had not had a problem, that
it would have probably gone
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through and been looked at because it is stil! not obvious t,_ even all of the experts looking :-_t it
today that that is really a problem area. It is just something that we--since we know we ha'i a
problem in this area, that looks a little bit different arLd people are ou_ exploring.
DR. (.'O_,ERT: In fact, Mr Chairman, the fact that there is no specification calling f,,_r more
than a minimum acceptable _ap or a maximum acceptable _ap suggests what Mr. Crippen is
saying is so. If there is no spec to measure it against
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, I guess l understand. I am not convinced. I think it is going to
be difficult to explain if you have--maybe the answer is that you didn't think you could find
anything by looking at your pictures, maybe that is a better answer.
MR. RUMMEL: I think there might be some validity to that because the human eye looking
at that object in three dimensions I think usually is far more accurate than photographs because
of the perspective.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: That is a better answer to me. It seems to me the human inspection
is better than a visual inspection, a photographic inspection, but I'm not sure people are going to
be convinced by that.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: May I ask, the
yellow, is that the putty or is that the insulation, the yellow material'?
MR. LAMBERTH: That is the putty.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: In this case, do we know who the ones were who looked at it visually
and signed otI' on it?
MR. LAMBERTH: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: How many were inw_lved?
MR. LAMBERTH: It is tbur people who usu:lllv };_u_dle the O-rings, and then we have a
NASA QC and a contractor QC, and the technicians.
DR. COVERT: Cou!d 1 ask a different question that has to be asked at this point, not direct-
ly relevant. In this organization, does QC report directly to the Director independent of the man-
ager?
MR. LAMBERTH: Yes, that is correct.
MR. SMITH: Let me clarify the point. There is a quality organization within the Shuttle
Directorate, the Shuttle Operations, under Bob Sleek, that does report to him. I have a center
quality organization that is a procedures and holding function. That does not do the detailed
inspections. The detailed government inspectors in this ease do report to Mr. Sleek.
DR. COVERT: Is there the possibility--and I only raise this as a devil's advocate viewpoint,
but is
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there a possibility that there may be a mild conflict of interest here because the guy on the one
hand who is responsible for quality control and safety of the Space Transportation System re-
ports to you, and you are also the man who is responsible for maintaining schedule and all of
these sorts of things'? And I don't mean to imply you are putting any pressure on your safety
people or anything like that.
DR. SIECK: Well, that is a tough one to answer.
DR. COVERT: I did not mean to say when did you stop beating your wife?
MR. SMITH: Gene, I have gone through that process several times since I have been here. I
have asked that question, I have talked with people. I have in my own mind been absolutely
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convinced that we do not have a conflict of interest, primarily because the first charge is a safe
launch and not schedule. And I kno'_' ?,_. i .,s ._,m ,; ............. _ut_n.e. .t .... ..... , I ,,_-,,_ "_..... ' and made sure to my
personal satisfaction that that was not a conflict because [ recognized the apparent conflict
DR. ('OVERT: You understand
MR SMITH: Absolutely, I understand the questior..
DR. COVERT: Thank >_,u. Mr. Chairman. for that.
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CHAIRMAN KCRSERS: Going back to the picture for a moment, do you have pictures of. a
lot of previous pictures of the O-rings from previous launches'?
MR. LAMBERTH: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And do you now, looking back at it, find other suspected areas?
MR. LAMBERTH: I am not prepared to answer that, sir. I don't know how many we have
looked at. I am not aware of that. I need to check how .many we have gone back and looked at.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: How did you find this one?
MR. LAMBERTH: This was the inspection. We tbrmed a special team to go back and re-
review all of the procedures in_olved in this specific launch and review the closeout photos and
all documentation, and it was rf.viewing these closeout photos where we picked up this.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But that was just 51-L that you reviewed'?
MR. LAMBERTH: Yes. sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you.
GENER,XL KUTYNA: The .earn that stacked--II,t- was a restack of this particular seg-
ment. ;s that correct? Didn't you stack it once and take it down and restack it?
MR. HARDY: No. I think that was it.correct
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information. There was another segment that was initially designated to be stacked here. and
there was a redesignation of segments.
MR. LAMBERTH: George, we are going to cover that in our briefing, and we will go
through that specifically, but the answer is no. sir.
MR. HARDY: Let me just say this about the picture. I cannot interpret the picture. [ do
want you to know, however, that we have engaged and are in the process of engaging what we
believe to be the best photographic enhancement and photographic interpretation assistance
that is available, and that should be going on. if not in fact today, within the next day or two.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Could I iust make this one comment'?
I appreciate, as Chairman of the Commission, that you showed us this photograph and en-
hanced it and made it available to us. I mean, it is the kind of cooperation that I think is very
important, and you are to be commended for it.
MR. HARDY: Let me just mention one other thing that we are also going to do in the task
6f trying to interpret this picture is that we have set up on the full scale segment to try to simu-
late as nearly as possible what we see here, and prepare the joint, put
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the secondary O-ring on, the primary O-ring. and we will do at least three things that we can
think of and anything else that we can think of around that O-ring, that we will twist it, we will
smear grease on it, trying to match that pattern of grease as nearly as we can. We wili indent it.
deform it. We will do the things that we think might simulate that.
524
Thenweplanto takephotographsasbestwecanmatchingthecameraan_les,t_e lighting
conditions, the distances and so forth, to see if we can make any reference photographs which
would lend any support to interpretin_ what we see there.
DR. ('OVERT: George. just one other thin_, and [ hate to always _o back to what Larry
Mullox said. but he led me to belies_e on Tuesday that in fact people did measure the diameter of
the O-ring at the time that the O-rlmg was taken from its envelope, that there was essentmllv a
receiving in._pection procedure.'
MR. HAROY: l am sure Larry knows
DR. WALKER: That was only every two feet.
DR. COVERT: But it" there was a ding in it ......
MR. HARDY: I know Larry knows how this is done. and maybe we have a miscommunica-
tion here. but the O-ring is measured at Thiokol. It is lubricated at Thiokol. It is placed in a
sealed bag, and it is
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delivered here certified flightworthy, and the inspection here is to ensure that the bag has not
been opened, to make sure there has been no tampering with it.
But there is no requirement on KSC to verify the O-ring diameter. In tact. with the grease
on it, it would be difficult for them to do.
DR. WALKER: So Thiokol measures the O-rings.
MR HARDY: Yes.
DR. RIDE: Has that always been the case. that KSC hasn't verified the diameter?
MR. [lARDY: It has not always been the case that KSC received it unlubricated, and I don't
know whether you verified diameter or not, Itorace.
MR. LAMBERTH: There was a time that we did do inspection of the O-ring. and I am going
from recollection. I think part of the diameter checks, the interval was part of that.
DR. RIDE: When you used to do that, did you always find that they were within spec as
measured by Thiokol?
MR. LAMBERTH: l asked for that record, Sally, and I know we had some questions about
the O-rings. and there had been some that were, say. not usable, but I'm not for sure what was
the reason. But what George says,
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today, we receive them in the bag, we inspect the bag, the bag is intact and sealed, and unless
we see something very obvious when we take the O-ring out of the second bag. it is a plastic bag
inside of a paper bag, and unless we see something obvious, we just install the O-ring.
MR. MOORE: Our task force is going back to ask for those records Sally.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Assuming this is some kind of an anomaly and not just a distortion
of grease on the photograph, that there is some kind of a defect here, is it possible that the
defect would be on the part of the manufacturer or the contractor, or would it be always in
connection with the installation?
MR. HARDY: I think it could be either one.
DR. LUCAS: fhe same contractor does both.
MR. RUMMEL: Could it have occurred during the shipment or storage, where the O-ring is
wound up and compressed? That sort of thing.
MR. HARDY: I think that is possible.
MR. RUMMEL: I think it would be normally expected if. in fact, that is the way it is stored.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thiokol is responsible for that, too?
MR. HARDY: Yes. sir.
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MR SUTTER: Is there a h)t or'equipment that
is inspected by whoever makes it. "rod then it is just put on the vehicle without a receiving in-
spect ion here"
MR HARDY: Fm not a',_:-_re of a lot of that equipment, but I could defer to Mr l,amber*h at
KS('
MR I,AMBERTH: I think the answer is no. there is not as lot. I think the purpose---it is my
understanding when this decision was made. it was a time consideration, that the process we go
through in putting up the putt>" and everything, you know. you do have a requirement to try to
lay the putty up and put the O-rings in and make the joint in 24 hours, and I think that the
time to try to inspect the O-ring to that depth and lubricate it and everything was why the deci-
sion was made to go ahead and lube it and ship it in that way.
MR. SUTTER It seems to me the guy who is lubricating the O-rings shouldn't be fooling
around with the joint.
Was this considered to be a noncritical item. or it just seems to be a false economy.
MR HARDY: It has always been a critical item. and one of the reasons, too, was to have it
lubricated at Thiokol. the manufacturer, the motor manufacturer's plant, was because the lubri-
cation of the O-ring is a critical operation.
MR. SUTTER: Doesn't Thiokol join this thing?
'._._
MR. HARDY: Yes, sir, the same contractor
DR. WALKER: I thought Parker manufactured this.
MR HARDY" The rubber is from DuPot_t or aM. [t is molded by Parker-Hannafin, and then
it is joined together and made O-rings out of it by a company called Hydropack, which delivers it
to Thiokol.
Just one other thing that did have to do with the decision to have it packaged at Thiokol
was that there was some experience--and Horace. you. may rememb¢ : this--that this O-ring is a
very large O-ring with a large diameter, and there was experience here at Kennedy of getting it
contaminated when putting grease on it, getting contaminatmn on the grease. This was having
to be done in the Vertical Assembly Building where it was not contamination controlled, and so
it was judged that it could be processed at Thiokol, we could ensure that we got the right grease
on It. and we could deliver it without any contamination in that grease.
DR. COVERT: Is it inspected by a NASA inspector at Thiokol prior to bagging and ship-
ment?
MR. HARDY: Yes. :Jr. There are mandatory inspection points requiring government inspec-
tor buyoff,
Now. if I can leave the O-ring, that suspect
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O-ring for a moment, the other observation that is of great interest to us regarding the part of
th scenario that says the secondary O-ring leaked is the launch environment and the tempe, ra-
t u res.
Could I have the next viewgraph, please?
(Viewgraph.) I'_'"-' I:; '"1
MR. HARDY: This shows the temperatures at the various nodes indicated here around the
SRB, the right hand SRB, and this goes _,ack roughly 70 hours, I believe it is, from the time to
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launch, and the arrow here is at or very near the time of the launch, and this shows what the
temperatures did through the night and where we were at the time or' the launch
MR. F_TyNMAN: Is this calculated because there is a delay in cooling the steel'? Otherwise
you would have no way of predictiag where it was going tc be--the delay of the arrow is the
inertia, the thermal inertia or' the steel"
MR HARDY: The model is just set up to run it for this period of" time. and we just picked
the actual launch time up here, but you can see. I believe, that the coldest temperature was in
this area here. At the time of launch it was around 2.5 degrees. The other side of the booster was
at near 47 degrees.
DR. COVERT: Does the sun shine on that side?
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MR. HARDY: I believe this side here is exposed to the sun, right in this area.
GENERAL KUTYNA: And where do we postulate the leak?
MR. tlARDY: In this area here, this general area, well, first of all, somewhere on this side
of the booster, and the very evident leak at t!,e point in time, about the 58 seconds, is in this
general area here.
Could I have the next viewgraph, please?
(Viewgraph.) Im'l e I: -"'l
MR. HARDY: The question was asked this morning about the gradient in the propellant.
This is 3i-L's curves. This shows the propellant next to the case, the insulation, and then the
outer propellant, the outermost propellant and the inner propellant, and I believe that is about
19 degrees.
Of course, the mean bulk. which is the average temperature you see here. and you can tell
that over the temperature excursions of this type, the temperature changes practically not at
all.
The next viewgraph will show you that.
DR. COVERT: Could I have a copy of that, George?
MR. HARDY: Sure.
The next viewgraph, please.
997
_Viewgraph.) Im '_ -' t:;-,I I
MR. HARDY: Just for inlbrmation, I have shown on a previous flight, this was flight 51-C,
the outer propellant temperature and inner propellant temperature on that particular flight was
about the same. about 18, 19 degrees difference. The mean bulk temperature on this flight was a
little bit lower than on the previous flight, a little bit lower or, 51-L.
Could I have the next viewgraph, please?
DR. COVERT: What caused that cycling of the temperature?
MR. HARDY: It is the hourly cycling of the ambient temperature.
DR. COVERT: The time scale I didn't read carefully.
MR. HARDY: If these viewgraphs are not in your handout, I will make them available.
GENERAL KUTYNA: They are not.
MR. HARDY: Then I will make those available.
(Viewgraph,) Im.r 2 I:_ -,_1
MR. HARDY: In summary, fro_ _ what you have seen off of the curves, just putting it on a
table here with the model, using the coldest ambient temperature and the relative humidity, the
wind direction you can see there, and the cold sky for radiation, this is the
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cold case, the nominal case using the more nominal sky temperature tbr radiation, the aft seg-
ment in the coldest case. We predict the case temperatures at launch would be around 25 de-
grees at one location, and around the other side, about 17 degrees,
A more nominal prediction you see wouldn't be a vast change in that. There wouldn't be a
vast change in that, and tbr the tbrward joint, the fbrward segments, the joint temperature on
the right hand booster would be about the same.
Now, we are going to talk about these temperatures. ! just wanted to show you that the
forward segment on that .dde and the aft segment temperatures were essentially the same.
Could l have the next viewgraph, please?
MR. ACHESON: And we can assume the Ooring temperatures would have been the tempera-
tures corresponding wi,_n those numbers?
MR. HARDY: Yes, very, very close.
MR. FEYNMAN: What did you mean by forward?
MR. HARDY: The {brward field joint, these are these two joints here, and these aft field
joints on the right hand booster at approximately the same clock orientation, or about the same
place.
_Viewgraph.) lr,q " I:_ -'_1
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MR. HARDY: Now, this is a busy chart, and I have it in your handout, and there was some
interest expressed in this, I believe, on what are the dimensions of the joint, and I will not try to
go through all of these, but I will point out some of the more significant ones having to do with
the establishment of squeeze on the O-ring.
This is--well, first of all, this is a sealing surface on the tang, and this is the orient loca-
tions, and this is a picture that shows this just a little bit bigger, these radial dimensions on this
sealing surface, and this interclevis leg sealing surface, dimension C and dimension D on 51-L
were as shown here, I44.574 inches, and 144.56;6 inches.
DR. COVERT: That is an average of a bunch of readings around the ring?
MR. HARDY: Yes. This is done on the lathe.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Is this at a specific temperature?
MR. HARDY: At ambient. This is done at the case manufacturer, which is Rohr, Incorporat-
ed. in San Diego. and it is done on the lathe, and it is done, Nell, at just an ambient tempera-
ture.
DR. WALKER: It is not done after they are flown and recovered?
1000
MR. HARDY: No, it is not.
DR. COVERT: So this is as delivered to Thiokol for loading?
MR. HARDY: That's correct, the first time. Yes, specifically dimensions C and D.
Now, I am going to talk about some other dimensions that are made after every use, but
this is the dimensions, the regular dimension on these sealing surfaces, and that is done the first
time on a lathe at delivery, and in fact, that could only be done on a lathe. These steel, relative-
ly thin-walled steel cases with the large diameters they have, there is no way you could actually
make those--you could make some pie tape checks on it, but it is just not round. It never sits
round, perfectly round. There are, however, requirements on the contractor Thiokol that if they
have any occasion to repair any of the sealing surfaces--and there are repair procedures--that
in the event there is any salt water effect--and I mentioned where you have the grease on it to
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prevent any corrosion--but if _here is anv pitting corrosion, there are specifications that allow
repair to remove that pitting corrosion. There are specifications, and I don't have the numbers.
that tell what the allowable depth of the pit is that could be repaired, which can't be repaired,
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but in any case, where the sealing surfaces are repaired, the contractual requirement on Thiokol
is that they still have to remain _ithin the specification limits.
Now, this is the spec limit for this dimension, 144.37:_ plus or minus .004. You can see where
51-L was. You can see that if tbr any reason that segment had to be repaired, it could be re-
paired, but it could never violate that dimenuion, even after repair.
The other dimensions of interest are dimension A, which is specified as a minimum, al-
though there is a maximum, too. That is the tang width of 51-L dimension was .789. The spec
allowable is--this should be reversed--is .7,92 to .777. The other dimensions of interest is the gap
of the clevis on 51-L that was .841. The spec allowable--and this should be reversed, too, is .842
to .827, You can see that this was on the high side within spec, and this, of course, was just
about, I guess, close to the middle of spec.
Some other dimet,*ions of importance is the O-ring groove width, and that is .310 to .a05,
max. The other is this ,r)--ing groove depth, and that is ,21_4 to .209. 51-L was .211. And when l
say 51-L, I am talking about 51-L aft field joints specifically,
The other dimension which was specified was--
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is this gap here between the outer leg--that is, the gap between the outer leg of" the clevis and
the tang, and that is specified at .032, and that is controlled by the thickness of the shim.
Remember, we said in every case after the pin is put in, around each pin is put a shim. So
that is a well controlled dimension.
So then in the use o!" these dimensions, one calculates a maximum gap, and in the case of
51-L, that static gap was .()20.
Now, let me just make one other point, and then if anyone cares to pursue the details of
this, there is an actual formula that is used to calculate that. Let me just mention one other
thing, that unpressurized, the calculations are made ;or a gap size, a minimum sealing gap size
and a maximum sealing gap size. The calculations are made assuming that the tang portion is
not concentric. In other words, it assumes that on one edge I am up against this leg here, and
the only thing I have got separating me is .032, and then all the rest of the dimension can
gather such as the other side, is the maximum opening.
So that assumes that that piece is eggshelled to the maximum extent possible to give you
the maximum gap possible with the dimension that you have here.
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The 51-L O-ring squeeze--and this assumed a minimum O-ring diameter--the O-ring is spec-
ified .280 minus .003/plus .005, and we assumed in all of our analysis and calculations on 51-L
that it was minimum O-ring size, ,277, but the static squeeze at room temperature for the O-
rings for 51-L was .0395, and that is 14.7 percent, and calculated at 26 degrees Fahrenheit, which
accounts for shrinkage of the O-ring, it was .0356, or 13.4 percent squeeze.
Now, the minimum spec squeeze allowed is 7.54 percent. I would only point out that 51-L, in
terms of actual dimensions, aft field joint, would be somewhere I would say in the average di-
mensions that we could stack up on these things or slightly better than average.
Could I have the next viewgraph, please?
DR. COVERT: Wait a minute. Stop, please.
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MR. SCTTER: l-lave you ever measured tnese dimensions when you put, say, the flight loads
on it or put torsion and bending on it'.'
MR HARDY: Yes. Go back to that viewgraph, please. It is not shown here, but remember
the leak chock port that goes through here? In the structural, static structural load test that we
ran, and also in the hydroproof test, each one of these segments is hydroproofed to about i0
percent or 5 perc_,nt, I believe, it is at maximum expected operating
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pressure, we have on a number of those units taken that plug out because it didn't enter ieto
the test that we were running, and put a dial plunger, a little device that has got a spring-loaded
plunger that rests up against this leg here, and we zeroed that condition in, the static condition,
and then as we brought pressure up to the ignition transient, up to max pressure, we measured
the increase in that gap. We plan to do some more of that. We want to--well, first of all, let me
say that what that does is measure the deflection of this joint as a result of the pressure load,
and that is essentially a line load that. is pulling through the bulkhead ,.n that end, and it is
pulling through the bulkhead on that end because the joint is tending to, or this clevis is tending
to rotate around where the pin wou!d be here, and that puts forces this way and this way to
tend to spread it.
We have also done testing in the static '.::ruc:ural test program where we had the two seg-
ments joined together in the test thcility, ;-rod .he pressurized those segments, and then we ap-
plied at this point here the bending load _.:,r.d i,he l,:,ads at the back side here, the design loads,
and then we measured the deflections ot" the joint the same way, and we also, of course, meas-
ured and sealed any leak if we had any, and I might say that
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in that test program, which went over a number of months, the joint was pressurized, I can't
remember how many times, but I'm going to say in the tens if not in fact a hundred cycles, and
we never changed the O-rings. We left the O-rings in there.
So that is not, of course, the way we fly. We change the O-rings after every flight, but the O-
rings are rather tenacious to cyclic loading
Now, we are not satisfied totally today with the data that we have in hand, so in the pursuit
of this failure analysis, we are continuing to measure this deflection or have a test program to
measure this deflection where we are going to go around at eight different locations and we are
going to drill seven more holes to correspond with the one hole where we have the pressure port,
and put eight gauges in there, and measure it circumferentially.
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DR. FEYNMAN: I believe we have seen som'e pictures that were shown to us of the gap
changing from .042 to something like .061. Is that what we were talking about?
MR. HARDY: .042 to .061, yes.
DR. FEYNMAN: Is that a result of those experiments you're going to try to repeat?
MR. HARDY: Yes.
DR. FEYNMAN: What does that mean? When I look at these numbe _ here, what would
that mean when the pressure is put on the gap increased by what--excu,e me, decreased by
what, et cetera? How do I use those numbers?
DR. HARDY: I will show you that on the next viewgraph.
DR. COVERT: Before we do that. George, I was going to ask: How much does the change in
the inner radius, when you take the temp, rature of this thing and drop it from say 70 degrees
down to 25 degrees?
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MR. [lARDY: That c, lculatiot_ has been made, but I don't remember it, Gene. I don't have a
recollection. You're talking about the basic shrinkage from temperature'?
DR. ()OVERT: Right.
MR. HARDY: Of" course both sides are going to
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shrink some. There may be a differential there.
DR. COVERT: One side goes into compression, the other side gets stretched.
MR. ACHESON: Can we assume that when you stack the two segments, that it is really
impossible to push the O-rings out of the groove by some accident'? And even if you did, it would
probably just produce a tighter seal?
MR. HARDY: Yes. Could you go back to the viewgraph on the right, please'? I have to have
that viewgraph to show that.
(Viewgraph.)
If you notice, and I don't know if this would show too well or not here, but the O-rings are
in the groove here, and you will notice that the tang is designed so that this portion of the tang
can pass the O-ring without any engagement, and in fact this tapered surface here will contact
here (indicating) before anything gets to the sealing surfaces. And it's designed such that as this
taper here rides in on this taper to avoid any scrape across the O-ring, now I wouldn't say that
couldn't ha,)pen, because if in fact you had an O-ring that was not pushed back in the groove,
that could possibly happen to you. You could in fact engage the O-ring and damage it.
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MR. RUMMEL: Doesn't that assume perfectly concentric mating'? Why can't that be a little
bit off center so that in fact you, through the holes, take the pins? Why wouldn't you have a
possibility of shearing part of' the O-rings? And as it slides in, if it slides in metal to metal, if it
isn't exactly concentric--
MR. HARDY: I see what you're saying. You're saying it is not concentric, and this does
come into where it comes in right here.
MR. RUMMEL: It would be a masterful job to hold anything this big perfectly concentric.
MR. HARDY: If I could, I would like to defer the answer to that question to the presenta-
tion that is planned for you on the mating of this joint. That is in fact the primary reason that it
is necessary, when mating, when I've got this segment, if you rotate that 90 degrees and I've got
this segment on a crane, and I'm lowering it into position where I can go into this crevice here,
the procedure requires that that be halted at some point there, and reference dimensions be
made to ensure that it is round enough that that is not going to occur. But the details of that
will be explained to you tomorrow, and I would like to defer that, if I could.
If I can answer another question, I would be
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happy to do it, but I think you are going to actually see a demonstration.
MR. RUMMEL: The only question would be that if indeed there was a metal-to-metal slide,
then theoretically you could in fact pare the O-ring at that point. Is that correct?
MR. HARDY: That is correct. Could I have the next viewgraph, please?
(Viewgraph.) Im'c "-' I:_ ",ll
MR. WAITE: Have you ever done any pressure checks, and then pulled them apart and had
an O-ring cut as a result of this?
MR. HARDY: I believe there has been some experience of what's referred to as nibbling, or
damage, and I'm not speaking here at Kennedy. I don't know that they have disassembled--well,
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they havedisassembledsome,too.But at Thiokol in the test programstherehavebeensome
occasions where they have taken them apart after they've been assembled, and they see some
nibbling, or damage, on the O-rings.
Now that has been--and then there's a big question: Did that happen when l put them to-
getheff.' Did that happen when I took them ap,rt?
MR. WA1TI_2: But they did pass pressure checks?
MR. HARDY: They did pass pressure checks,
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yes. If I could. I would just like to explain a little bit of the dynamics of this seal, and I will
relate it first of all to the generic type description of how the seal operates, and then I will give
you some information, albeit preliminary, because we are still trying to refine the analysis on
51-L.
This picture here represents step one, and that is at time zero, pressure zero, and that is a
static condition. The primary O-ring is somewhat exaggerated here, but it is back against this
side of the groove. Im'v. 2 J:_ ;5 I
The second area O-ring is against this side of the groove, and that is because of the pressure
test that I mentioned earlier. We put 2,00 psi in there.
DR. FEYNMAN: When you put the 200 psi, do you often have some ]cakage temporarily, at
least, through the primary? De you make bubbles in the putty?
MR. HARDY: I can't recall any cases recently. There may be some in the early test program
when we assembled these horizontally. VCe had a few more problems with them. as you can
imagine, and we have had to rake some segments apart. When they were assembled or the test
stand, they are tested horizcntaliy, and we have been unable to pass a leak test, and had to take
them apart and put them back to_;ether.
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But in any case, the flow starts across here. The first step is that this O-ring starts what we
call pressure actuating, or moving toward the other rode. Now the distance, you recall, that I
told you that it could be depending upon dimensions could be 15/ to :_0/I000, roughly. I'm going
to talk about the gap here in a few minutes.
As flow continues, this O-ring moves completely to this side. And then, as the pressure
builds up, it actually forms what we reter to as an extrusion seal. Now this is an exaggeration
here a little bit. I don't think it goes to a square in that corner, but we do believe that there is a
slight dimpling, if you will, of this O-ring into that gap.
Now that makes the gap very important.
DR. COVERT: George, is that edge of the O-ring groove broken? Or is that a fairly sharp--
MR. HARDY: It has a radius on it, and I don't remember the dimensions.
DR. COVERT: The important thing is it is not square.
MR. HARDY: We ran some tests, for instance I thipk it might be of interest here, on wheth-
er or not we stretch, rupture the O-ring, and we run tests pressurizing these O-rings up to 3000
psi, and we use
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them in the neighborhood of 900 and 950 psi. And also we have done that at various tempera-
tures. And we also have, as I mentioned in the structural test article, recycled the O-rings
around 1000 psi for 50, 60, 70, 80 times.
DR. FEYNMAN: Again, when the ring is moving because of the flow and hasn't finally set
in, is there some chance of a little bit of leak? The reason I ask this is because Mr. Weeks no-
532
ticedthat themotionin thenozzle ring is 110, and not just 15/1000ths of an inch, which is much
more. And he was trying to account for the [hot that the nozzle has more blow-by, almost 10
times, as the field joints, and I wondered what your opinion was, whether the actual fhct that
you have to move it further would weaken possibly the seal and account for the difference be-
tween the nozzle and the field joints'?
MR. HARDY: The nozzle joint is differ-'i,t, as you know, than other joints. It's a great deal
stiffer. But I do believe that the fact that the nozzle j_int primary seal groove is wider by several
thousandths and the fhct that when you pressure actuate the seal and have to move it over a
greater distance does account for the somewhat higher occasion of blow-by in the nozzle joint.
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But in any case, these are the steps Now the design is such that if for some reason this fails
to seal, then the secondary O-ring should take the pressure and essentially form the same type
of O-ring or the same type of seal.
Now critical in this process is the rate of application of pressure, the squeeze on the O-ring
and the change in the gap here. I would like to point out the fact that I believe the squeeze on
the O-ring is important. To maintain pressure behind the O-ring while it is pressure-actuating,
the gap dimension is important in the ability to form the extrusion seal and maintain that.
Now the dynamics of this seal is very important to us in the failure investigation, and we
have a number of tests structured fbr t, is, and I will talk about them in just a few minutes. But
a preliminary analysis as to what's happening in the squeeze on the O-ring and what is happen-
ing to the gap on 51-L dimensions, that is from the time we started at static zero pressure, static
zero time, which is down here in this corner (indicating), until we build up in pressure with
time, what is this gap doing'? And also, what would be the effect of temperature on that sealing,
little sealing dynamics'?
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Well, the effect of temperature is still in analysis and will be subject to tests. We believe we
have to actually run the dynamic tests. But just to look at some of the things that are not affect-
ed, as is for instance the O-ring by temperature, as the pressure goes up--and I've plotted here
10 milliseconds. In fact, the pressure is about 25 psi.
At 80 milliseconds, it's around 60 psi. And then at 150 milliseconds, it essentially hasn't
gone up. What happens there is that the igniter in the head end of the motor provides the first
initialization or pressure vise, and then as the crane ignites and the pressure starts going up,
then the pressure starts going up very fast. But the deflection, if you will, and the gap change is
represented by this curve.
So at 200 milliseconds, I'm at 250 psi and the gap is changing approximately 4/1000ths. Now
what's important to understand is the seal performance under those dynamic conditions, and in
the temperature area of interest.
So we have a number of tests designed to evaluate the performance of the O-ring under tem-
perature-pressure dynamic conditions. These tests, some of them will be scale tests. Some of
them will be portions or representative of full-scale tests. We will
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be taking the joint down to ensure that we have the O-rings at the temperatures predicted that
51-L would be. We will set up the initial conditions like we had on 51-L, and we will apply the
pressure to the appropriate pressure profile.
Our objective is to see do we get blow by the primary O-ring, and if we do, will the second-
ary O-ring seal under those conditions?
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MR.SUTTER:Onthat curve,1don'tknowwhetheryoucarriedit out to,what,800seconds?
MR.HARDY:To600milliseconds.
MR.SUTTER:Whatis600milliseconds?
MR.HARDY:6 10thsot'asecond
MR.SUTTER:That saysthat thesqueezegoesfrom O:_S and drops down to .0187 Am I read-
ing the chart right?
MR HARDY: That would say at 600 milliseconds the gap, the delta, the gap is 20/1000ths.
And if I started with a 36/1000ths squeeze, and I had immediate response of the O-ring to fill
the gap as it opens up, I still have a 16 mil squeeze.
But what is of interest to us is how will the O-ring respond at reduced temperatures.
MR. SUTTER: So the O-ring could be sitting there with very, very little squeeze on it and its
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performance has got to be a lot lower.
MR. HARDY: I would just change your words a little bit. The O-ring is going to be sitting
there with the gap opened, and its response to the gap opening, its resiliency could be hampered
by temperature.
GEN. KUTYNA: If you had zero resiliency, it wouldn't spring back at all. You could have a
gap as much as 20/1000ths.
MR. HARDY: At this time, that is correct. Now unless something else has happened, unless
something else has happened, I am long overdue for actuating the seal. Now this happens here
at about 25 psi, 25 to 50 psi. This happens at 100 to 150 psi. And so at 600 milliseconds, I am at
700 psi plus. So the seal should actuate. Nominally the seal should actuate in this timeframe
down here.
GEN. KUTYNA: Let me ask you, do you start time at the time that you light the solids, 7
seconds prior to that? Or is it 7 seconds when you light the liquids'?
MR. HARDY: Right.
GEN. KUTYNA: And you go through an excursion of the _mnding moments on that chart,
even though it is not very bad, what happens to that gap as a /unction of those bending mo-
ments in those 7 seconds?
MR HARDY: I cannot quantif_¢ that. I can
!(}17
tell you that the dynamic model shows--the gap opening characteristics shqws that the vast ma-
jori@ of the load that causes that gap to open is the pressure load. Now the bending load does
have an effect on it.
GEN. KUTYNA: Are you going to run a test?
MR. HARDY: Yes. We're going to run a test, and we're also including in our model the ef-
fects of bending, and we will in fact incorporate that in the gap opening at these various times.
DR. FEYNMAN: So a preliminary estimate or kind of a guess when thinking about it,
which way the gap goes at the initial bending, whether it's on the back there, does it close down
first and then open on account of the pressure? Or does it open on account of the bending and
then open still further?
MR. HARDY: It would tend to close, compress in this area, and open over here. Now again,
our area of interest is maybe somewhere in between the compression and the tension. It is closer
to the compressive load than it is the tensile load.
MR. ACHESON: What does the gap curve look like in other flights?
MR. HARDY: This would be--and I can be more specific with the data--but this would be
near nominal, or I would say a little better than average.
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MR.ACHESON-Whydoesit dropbackthereat 80?
MR.HARDY:Well.of coursethegapprimary responseis to the pressure. The highest pres-
sure we see here is really the igniter. The igniter in this motor is about the size of the third
stage of a Minuteman. So it is a big igniter. And that pressure causes the initial rise right here,
and then the main grain ignites, and then it catches about here, and then it shoots it straight
up.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Did I understand correctly the pressure measurements
on that graph come from the transducer, and that the gap comes from calculations'?
MR. HARDY: That is correct. The gap measurements come from actual measurements made
.;n the pressure test that I referred to, and they also in that analysis we used strain measure-
ments that we put on. In static firings, we put strain measurements around these various joints.
So we know the strain that is going in juat from the pressure around each one of these joints.
But the gap is calculated based upon actual dimensions, and the model which has been vaEdated
by actual tests that we ran.
MR. RUMMEL: Did those calculations assume
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perfectly concentric mating of the components?
MR. HARDY: Ne. They assume the worst case that you could get, nonconcentric worst case
that you could get. And let me explain that one more time.
That says that I've got two circles here, or I've got a circle nonconcentric, and then I've got
another circle nonconcentric, and I put--at one point I put those just as close as I can possibly
get them so that at another point I've got them as far away as I can have them, and that is what
is referred to as the max gap.
MR. SUTTER: Could I ask one more quick question? A vendor cai_ change these O-rings, or
change materials? Has there been any change in the manufacturing process'? Has anybody
checked those records?
MR. }lARDY: The primary vendor, as I mentioned, Parker-Hannafin, molds them and Hy-
dropack that cuts them measures them, dimensionalizes them, and /'uses them together, has nm
been changed to my knowledge. We have not changed the vendor tot the rubber, although there
are two sources, and we are in the process right now--and some way along on this--tracking
back to the ore in the mine. We're tracking back to the rubber, the batch of rubber that was
1020
manufactured for these very O-rings that went into 51-L, what the chemical analysis and con-
stituency of that rubber is. We are comparing. We're looking to see where else in the program it
was used, if it has ever been used betbre.
We're doing the same thing by O-ring lots. So we are going back to the origin of the rubber
to make that distinction.
MR. SUTTER: These O-rings that are checked out at Thiokol and put in bags, are they seri-
alized so a given O-ring goes into a given segment? Or are they just in a store and you take out
so many of them out of storage?
MR. HARDY: I'm not positive of that. Horace, do you know?
MR. LAMBERTH: I'm not positive of that, George. I will cheek.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: George, just in consideration of our reporter, maybe you ought to
pause a little bit. It's pretty rough for him. It's been a long se,_sion. Why don't we take just a few
minutes break.
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(Recess.
MR. HARDY: Mr. Chairman, if I might proceed, I think I have maybe one more chart here
and I will be
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finished my presentation. I would like to just mention one thing to make sure that I gave a
c:J,iectanswer, or you have a correct understanding regarding the inspection and certificationof
the O-rings that isdone at Thiokol and delivered here certified.
It is,however, at Thiokol that government inspection is mandatory on the insrection of
those O-rings, so itisdone by Thiokol m_d government inspection.I just wanted to make sure. I
thought I made that clear,but I wanted to make sure.
The only other thing I want to make clear before I go to the last chart, and then I will
conclude, iswith respect to the launch environment, cold temperatures. In addition to the effects
of temperatures on the O-rings and the O-ring response and sealing performance capability,we
are also running some testsand some analysis to see ifit is possible that water in the joint
creasing could in any way upset or effectthissecondary sealant capability.
Ifyou go around the jointhere in the crevice,the water wou]d be in this area here (indicat-
ing},and we are doing the analysis and teststo determine ifthere would be any effectof ice in
the joint affectingthe sealing capability.If I could go to the next chart, which I believe ismy
lastone.
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(Viewgraph.) im't. _ i:_ :,"l
This is proceeding on with the scenario that said that after primary O-ring blow-by, either
the secondary seal leaked or because it was defective, or because it was affected by the tempera-
ture, or because it had ice in the joint, or whatexer reason, v, the leak checkport leaked, then
the next event that occurs is at 58 seconds, approximately, where we know we have leakage out
of the aft field joint.
These two events show up in every scenario because they in fact happened. So in every case
we have to get back to this event. Now as mentioned before, and I won't belabor it anymore, we
are experiencing analytically a great deal of difficulty sustaining a leak from at liftoff, or near
liftoff, through the joint, the primary and secondary O-ring, and havinj it wait until 58 seconds
before it shows itself as a blowing leak.
In fact, if we do the simplistic analysis and just simply assume that the entire joint by di-
mension has the complete ability to vent--that is, there is no choke points, no flow blockage or
anything like that, it would indicate that we would be leaking profusely all the way around that
joint in about 12 to 15 seconds.
Now we do know that there would be flow
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blockage in certain areas. It could be upstream, it could be downstream. So we are refining that
analysis. But there is difficulty in maintaining the picture that we see and that is, let me say, a
limited leak at best for 58 seconds, which grows into a bigger leak for that period of time, to the
thermal flow analysis. But we are continuing to analyze that.
The next question would be the structural capability of that joint, and the structural capa-
bility of the joint assuming maximum flow conditions through there would also be degraded to
the point that we would question the ability for the continuous leak. Emphasize again, those
analyses have to be refined.
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Wehaveto run someteststo moreproperlycharacterizethe flowconditionsandcomplete
those.That does not of course attack a scenario like this, because a small leak through this port
could wait until about 5_ seconds to manifest itself in the secondary O-ring. nor does it attack
the scenario that says I've got limited leakage for some number of seconds, and I won't try to
quantify that right now.
I did damage to the primary and secondary O-ring. but it sealed. And then when 1 came to
max Q and got the maximum deflections on the joint, the degraded seal could not hold the seal
And so we are
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studying all of those scenarios.
I just wanted to tell you at this point at least, in a scenario that said that we started a leak
through the primary and second O-ring at ignition, and that leak continued for 58 seconds is
difficult to control it the way the photograph tells us it must have been controlled up to that
time. But that doesn't rule out all of the possible scenarios for that event.
And I think that just about brings me to the end, except to say that in many of these sce-
narios that I've talked about here, particularly those that have to do with the joint dynamics,
the sealing characteristics, the dynamic effect of transverse loads, et cetera, is a fairly compre-
hensive test program that we have got set up and in process.
Some of these tests will be conducted in Huntsville. Some will be conducted in Utah. and
some will utilize test fixtures that have been in place. Some are requiring special test fixtures
that are in fabrication now. We will be starting tests, and in fact are scheduled to start some of
those tests at the end of tbis week, or just about in the now timeframe, and I expect they will be
going on for the next two weeks, two or three weeks. And most of these tests are subscale tests,
or component level tests. And as we learn from
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those test_, a need to get to a higher fidelity, and maybe even a full scale, we will define those
tests as we proceed.
But the objective of those tests is to test these scenarios for any event they're in, and either
credit it or discredit it, prove it or refute it. One other thing, as we continue and particularly in
the area of dynamics and loads, we will develop any appropriate new scenarios. We will change
the scenarios as they may have to be changed, and we will interconnect them, if that is indicat-
ed.
That concludes what I had prepared.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you very much. May we go off the record for a moment?
Discussion off the record.}
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Let's go back on the record.
DR. WALKER: I had one question on the last presentation. Could someone say something
more about the infrared picture evidence?
MR. HARDY: If I could, I would like to call on our thermal analyst who is with us from
Marshall, and he has been working with the PSC people over the last several days to try to get
some understanding or resoh-tion of the difference between this and the metals at issue.
¢ /
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MR. BACHTOL: Rick Bachtol from Marshall. As George presented the minimum tempera-
ture we predicted on the SRB was on the order of 21 degrees, and that was a cold case. That is
where we assumed the coldest sky, a minimum wind, et cetera, to try to see if we could get down
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to the measurements that were being made on the pad. Now what was made on the pad was 9
degrees on the righthand SRB.
We estimated there was a 4 or 5 degree error in that.
DR. FEYNMAN: Which way?
MR. BACHTOL: Well, I mean the measurement was too low by 4 or 5 degrees. And the
problem there is, as the gentleman was shooting up at the SRB, the night sky was reflecting off
of the SRB. The SRB is about .85 incidents, and we went out this morning and made some tests,
and it looks like that error may be as much as 6 to 9 deg,'ees, and the reason being it is a little
more is because the instrument is only sensitive in the 8 to 12 micron region by design. That is
also a window in the atmosphere as far as water vapor is concerned, so the night sky looks a lot
colder to the instrument than it really is.
So we estimate there's about a 6 to 9 degree error on the low side, and a 9 degree heat
measurement
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which gets it up to 15 to 18 degrees. And so we still have a small discrepancy between the 18
that he measured, and we put that 9 degree error on it in the 3 degrees that we calculated, and
we're still looking at that to _ee if we can resolve that. But that is where we stand right now.
DR. COVERT: Why is there a difference between the right and the left side?
MR. BACHTOL: Well, the righthand side has a good view of the night sky, so we would
predict it is colder. The lefthand side, when he is shooting up at it, he is reflecting the--
DR. COVERT: It is because of where he is standing?
MR. BACHTOL: Right. And he is reflecting the fixed surface structure, and we have proved
that this morning when we were out there.
DR. COVERT: I am touched by your faith in your model, and I guess my experience with
these things are such that--well, in what way have you calibrated this thing down at these kind
of temperatures.
MR. BACHTOL: Let me say the model probably has, as far as surface temperature is con-
cerned, plus or minus 4 or 5 degree error, but what I have done is biased down so that I feel like
I've got pretty much
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minus zero. So I have oriented everything toward the low end to try to see how cold I can really
get. For example, I assume the sky in my model was minus 30 degrees, which is a lot colder than
a lot of people would think.
DR. COVERT: But still and all, have you ever really honest to God validated your model at
temperatures at say below 30?
MR. BACHTOL: Well, for example, the day before we were within 2 degrees.
DR. COVERT: What was the temperature the day before?
MR. BACHTOL: The SRB temperatures were in the 30s.
DR. COVERT: So you're in a sense trying to validate the model and use it at the same time?
Good luck.
(Laughter.)
MR. CRIPPIN: I guess ! would like to make one point. Even though we're still trying to
understand those measurements, this was the first time that we had ever seen that kind of a
difference between the left and righthand SRB.
MR. BACHTOL: That's true. We've never seen that before.
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DR. COVERT: In the future,will you have him walk around and look at it'?
DR. WALKER: So these measurements usually agree fairly well with the model?
MR. BACHTOL: They usually agree with the model in the right and lefthand SRB. They
usually agree with each other unless one of them happens to be in the sun.
DR. FEYNMAN: Of course the primary question is not whether it agrees with the model or
not. The primary question is whether what the temperature is that you measured, that is to say,
what is wrong with the instrument, if I may put it that way, or how much specular reflection
from the sky is going to produce, you mentioned 6 degrees. Is that figure also pushed for some
reason, assuming the night sky is colder than you would have ordinarily thought?
MR. BACHTOL: No.
DR. FEYNMAN: To the normal night sky and normal reflection, not trying to push that?
MR. BACHTOL: This morning we demonstrated a 6 to 9 degree error, and you are right. We
were interested, we are interested in the measurement. Because if I can only predict 21, and we
actually had 9 degrees on the pad, then there is something else that is
1030
causing it that we have to look for.
DR. FEYN MAN: When you're pushing, you should push on your model, but you shouldn't
push on the inst:_lment.
MR. BACHTOL: That is why we went out and ran the test.
_'II.\II,'M.\N lq_q;l:l'.g: _k;_\. it \x_' m_l\ Ii,,xx _,,1,, \ll \h_-_'_
MR. MOORE: He will talk about some work he has been doing on the failure scenario team.
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STATEMENT OF T. MOSER, HEAD, FAILURE SCENARIO TEAM. JOHNSON SPACE
CENTER
MR. MOSER: I am going to talk to you this evening primarily about the failure scenario
teamwork that we have had going on at Johnson Space Center.
(Viewgraph.) Im''. 2 m:_:,7I
There is a bit of other work that I want to review with you briefly. It is, and you can think
of this entire report as a status report, and in light of what you just discussed about releasing
information, I think it is true of everything I will show you here. We have tried to show you in a
status everything that we know to date, and a lot of it is very preliminary, but it is our best shot
today of the way we see things, and it can change.
So I will point that out now, and I will point that out as we go through some of the analyses
that are being refined, and we will continue to do that. So I think the entire system needs to
recognize that. If I could have the next charts, please.
(Viewgraphs.) IRcf. z t3-ss I
A little bit of background. What we did at the Johnson Space Center from the day, the
morning of the incident, we formed a team that was consistent with
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our contingency plan at Johnson Space Center, signed by the Director also. It was comprised
primarily of program and project office personnel in addition to discipline experts throughout
the center, and in addition to a staff It was formed as you see here.
The purpose of this organization was to, number one, ensure that we captured all the data.
We are controlling that. We established a focus for this team, shown up here as a MER. That is
our Mission Evaluation Room, which is an engineering focus for all of our activities in support of
shuttle missions. All of our technical information flows through this in support o/Mission Con-
trol Center. That was our focus for this activity.
We had developed an investigation plan for each one of the teams. We had established a
time line, which you have seen, by Mr. Kohrs today. That is a dynamic time line that is chang-
ing as we interpret the data, I might add. And then we have daily tankups to exchange informa-
tion between us.
The failure scenario team, which I am currently heading, was formed several days after-
wards, once we began to get the data. To date, here is a one-page summary of what all of those
other team efforts are, other than the failure scenario team. We have gone
1033
through all of the orbiter systems. We have gone through the main propulsion system--and by
the main propulsion system, I mean 'he engines, the lines in the orbiter up to the interface be-
tween the orbiter and the external tank.
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We have looked at the cargo, and the environments associated with the flights, both the
natural and the self induced environments; the dynamic loads; the thermal effects during ascent.
We did not--we have let Marshall do primarily the work on the temperatures on the pad.
We do not see any indications at this time of any one of these systems contributing to this
incident. We have not concluded our work there, howe,zer. We are spending most of our team
efforts right now on an ascent reconstruction of the l.)ads in those environments, and that is
quite an extensive effort.
For that, the Johnson Space Center is responsible to the total system to define the loads, the
vibration, the thermal effects on this entire steck configuration of all the elements. If I might
take a moment, what we do for this particular configuration, we are going back and looking at
the predicted thrust as measured from the solid rocket boosters, the mass properties of the
system.
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We are doing a complete dynamic multiple response of the systems so we get the dynamic
loads, we get the static loads, and we combine all of those so that we will provide to Marshall for
their detailed structural analysis of this joint, or anything else that they want to analyze, an
overall complete compatible set of dynamic loads. That is a significant amount of the work.
It will be using as best predicted winds at the time of the event. We have talked about max
Q alpha, the dynamic pressure versus the angle of attack of the vehicle as measured as predict-
ed. We will be filtering all of---or factoring all of that into these loads.
GEN. KUTYNA: Without extending the evening, much of the team has not seen the twang
the Shuttle does on liftoff. Could we get a quick movie of that tomorrow? It takes about 15, 20
seconds. Have you got a good illustrat:ve one?
MR MOSER: I would say yes, but I can't spe_k for Kennedy. I know it is on every flight. All
we've got to do is find the right camera. Looking primarily from this angle, you can really get
the response. We are continuing with the major focus of our effort to the failure scenario team,
and I'm going to spend most of
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this afternoon in my discussion with you on that.
The visual team has an effort and tried to enhance photos. We're doing a lot of work in that
area. We're looking at the spectral analysis of the photographs, trying to understand what is
causing different things that we see. We are looking at temperatures, trying to use calibrated
pyrometers to look at photographs to see if we can get temperatures from that, in addition to
the analysis that we're doing.
DR. FEYNMAN: How can you look at a pyrometer with a photograph?
MR. MOSER: We're going to try some schemes we have in our minds to see if we can cali-
brate.
DR. FEYNMAN: Do you have color photos? Do you have many different filters?
MR. MOSER: Yes. We have _ look at it. I don't know if it's possible, but we're going to give
it a shot. We're trying to do everything we can.
DR. FEYNMAN: I just wanted to make sure it wasn't utterly impossible.
MR. MOSER: Okay. The next charts, please.
(Viewgraphs.) lu,'l. -' I:_ ",_q
Now let me spend some time with you on this bullet here of the failure scenario team. The
team is
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comprisedof"a groupof senior,a,id I will underline"senior",expertsin the areasthat yousee
in that viewgraph.We usethat teamto focusandguidethe activitiesfor the failure scenario
team,which is probablyseveralhundredengineersthat aredoingsomeof the analysesthat I
will sharewith youtoday.
Our processthroughthis organizationis we havetaken the output from the orbiter, the
main propulsionsystem,and thosethings, lookedat that, at evidenceof what appearsto be
anomalous,or what conditionscouldexist whichwouldcontributeto a failure scenariomuch
like GeorgeHardyexplainedto you. And in addition to that data which is being documented at
this time--and I might add that we do have--we have provided to Jess Moore and to Arnie Al-
drich about a one-inch thick status documentation of the activities of the other teams.
We are using that as our findings. We are using visual data, mt_zh the type that you've seen
today. In addition to that, we have spent a lot of time looking at other missions, corresponding
times of what is occurring during the ascent phase of the mission, comparing apples a,_d apples
for those two to help give us clues.
The physical evidence we're just beginning to
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factor into our scenarios, and we are using the timeline bits. From that we have constructed
failure scenarios. We have four primary failure scenarios that we are working now. I am going
to touch in quite some depth on the one, and just tell you briefly about the other three.
The major part of our effort now is verifying each one of the steps in the failure scenarios,
much as Marshall is doing.
DR. FEYNMAN: Is this an independent effort from what they're doing here?
MR. MOSER: Yes. I was just getting ready to say that. We have done this totally independ-
ent of Marshall. We met with them last _,'eek to begin to exchange information and ideas. We
have been passing information back and forth about our failure scenarios, and those activities
are independent. We are considering now joining efforts, however, to make sure that we get to
the right depth.
I think once we establish some baselines, that would perhaps be prudent in our use of re-
sources in order to try to get more depth, but we haven't done that yet. So everything to date
has been independent. So then we close the loop. If we have something here we need back from
that team, or more photographic data,
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then we close the loop through that process. And i don't want to belabor the process a whole lot.
I'm going to leave this chart up, because this is a failure scenario for an SRB leak, a solid
rocket booster leak. We have other failure scenarios where the hydrogen leak has been the igni-
tion source, and oxygen leak being the initiating force, but let me talk to this one to give you
some feel for the status of our analysis.
This one, compatible with the timeline event Mr. Kohrs showed you this morning with an
SRB leak being observed, had about a little bit less than half a second. The plume from the SRB
expands in this theoretical model up to the time about 59 seconds. There is heating in the aft
end of the solid rocket booster, and the external tank. There is a hydrogen leak detected, and I
will substantiate all of this with more fact momentarily.
The righthand SRB moves with respect to the stack at about 72 seconds mission elapse time.
We think then there is an overload at the forward end of the external tank spilling liquid hydro-
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genandliquidoxygeneitherby anoverloadhereor somerupturesof the lines,andthenwesee
theexplosion.
! amgoingto walkyouthroughthis pathand
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not spenda lot of time on theseother things.Wehaveclosed,we think, someof theseareclos-
ing out, like the large 17-inchdisconnectfor the hydrogenor oxygenline. Wehadthat in ot_r
model,andweseedatanowwhichis notsupportingthat disconnecting.
Thenextcharts,please.(Viewgraphs.)It_,'n_ I::_mI
This is the waywehavetrackedthroughon our system. We establish a time, an observa-
tion, what we are seeing, what the data source is for which the observation is made, a premise
which goes with that, and then a task which we identify and track, and then for each one of
these tasks we have a detailed task description, a set of products, and a schedule which supports
that.
I want to start here with the noticeable drop in the pressure of the righthand solid rocket
booster on this screen, and I depicted that. You may not be able to see this because of the equip-
ment here, but mission elapse time is just in excess of 60 seconds. We see the divergence. This is
the righthand chamber pressure of the righthand SRB, and for the lefthand SRB up through
that flight they had been tracking fairly closely.
DR. FEYNMAN: Just one moment, because you've got _he same time of the divergence as
they did. Is
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that done independently? Because it doesn't look like you could determine that time. How do
you know you shouldn't go further op flint?
MR. MOSER: Well, what we have done is we have compared our time lines, and we have
tried to merge those. To the extent that---
DR. FEYNMAN: It's not the absolute time that I'm worried about. It is the fact that you
picked that point to say those two curves are diverging. How do you know they don't diverge
until later?
MR. MOSER: Pardon me.
DR. FEYNMAN: Let's say they do not diverge until later. You still have some time in which
the things are the same distance apart as they were earlier.
MR. MOSER: If I'm interpreting you, there should be a tolerance on the start of the diver-
gence, and that is correct.
DR. FEYNMAN: Well, it's remarkable that you come so close to each other.
MR. MOSER: No, I don't want to mislead you or give you any indication that we have not
compared time lines. We did that probably about a week ago, trying to get a normalized and
compatible set of time lines where we could reach agreement. And so for the purpose of exchang-
ing data ....
DR. FEYNMAN: Carry on.
MR. MOSER,d}vi,m_l.v ._,m _an h._k at
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this. That could be interpreted to be several milliseconds, or hundreds of milliseconds probably
on either side of that. And to further refine that, we are doing more analysis in this region to
see if we can pin it down. On the other hand, I don't know that it is really that critical that we
be that accurate for that particular one.
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We looked at that pressure drop. We have estimated the leak associated with that decaying
pressure, assuming that the right hand should be tracking exactly with the left.
The next chart, please.
DR. COVERT: Tom, have you calculated what the thrust would be due to a leak of that size?
Does that give you a torque that is compatible?
MR. MOSER: I'm going to touch on that in just a moment, but tht:t is a good question, and
the answer to your question is yes, okay.
DR. COVERT: Good.
(Viewgraph.) I_,', . 2 i:_ '_'1
As George Hardy indicated, it is difficult to expand a leak from v,here we think we see a
leak at less than half a second after the SRB ignition up until the time of about 60 seconds,
where we can see a visual indication of a leak in that solid rocket booster. We're predicting that
that l_akage in the solid rocket booster is growing at a very fast rate from 6[D seconds and
beyond, based upon our analysis and trying to extrapolate back down to the time of ignition.
And when we look at a one-dimensional growth like an O-ring moving circumferentially
around a solid rocket booster--and let me call that a one-dimensional increase, in area--you get
an increasing area about
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like the lower sloped curve I show you up here. If it is an area increase from the square of the
dimension, then it's a characteristic slope like you see here.
We're still not meeting that type of increase in area. To us that is telling us that we're not
only getting--we're getting more than an ablation increase or melting of the steel, that we are
literally losing part of the steel case to meet that type of model.
The next chart, please.
(Viewgraph.) IJ_," e ,:_ ,z I
That is an effort we are spending an awful lot of time on trying to construct that failure to
get some bound of what is happening in this joint, and this would be an upper bound. We have
modeled thermally, two-dimensional thermal analysis of this joint, letting the 5700 degree gas go
from inside the solid rocket, out the labyrinth path, through the clevis and the tang, to see what
temperatures are doing out there with the O-rings removed and with the nominal caps.
DR. COVERT: Where do you get the material properties for this combustion? Is that from
the JANAF tables?
MR. MOSER: I'm sorry? Repeat that, please?
DR. COVERT: The combustion products from the chamber that's going out.
1044
._ll_. M( )SEh': \Vhal _t,'l'(' (hfiR/g h(*r(, i_ .ill'd II%illg lh(' ga_ I_'llll)l'l'i|llll'('. _(, ill'(' I1_1 II'_illg
DR. COVERT: You have to know something like CP and CK and all kinds of grubby things
like that.
MR. MOSER: I don't know specifically where our thermal analysts got that. I can find that
out.
DR. COVERT: And you have to know what the constituentsare.
MR. MOSER: Yes, yes, we have that, and I don't know what the source is,but I w_ll find
that out for you. I don't know maybe Jack Lee or George Hardy could answer that. I think we
probably reliedupon Marshall to provide that to us.
DR. COVERT: Fine.
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MR. MOSER: We will find that out for you.
Anyway, after one second of flow-through a path like this, we're seeing isotherms as depict-
ed here: 2,000 degrees, 1,000 degrees. As shown after two secords of flow--and this is what Dr.
Lucas was talking about--we're beginning to see melting, as shown in the cross-hatched regions.
The next chart, please.
(Viewgraph.) [IwJ. z I:_'_:_l
So our flow area is increasing after 3 seconds, and 12 seconds. After 12 seconds, we would
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show a complete violation of that region, again in a two-dimensional thermal analysis. And this
is with the O-rings completely gone.
MR. WALKER: And this is all around the circumference?
MR. MOSER: Well, this is just two dimensional, okay. So just taking that heat o-,_¢_• that
section, we are doing the three-dimensional analysis right now. So this is the type of thing that
we are using to help build our model, how this leak rate is changing versus time.
The next chart, please.
(Viewgraph.) I I_el". '- l:_-,_q
Another event that we saw in the time line was an unusual pitch motion of the entire vehi-
cle at about 64 seconds. We looked at several things. One was wind response and, just to get to
the bottom line, that appears based upon the reconstruction of the trajectory to be the best ex-
planation of that diameter response.
Everything appears to be normal. You will see some wind activity at that altitude, and the
vehicle responded to it, and we think that is in fact what caused that.
We also looked at the plume effect from the SRB to see if that could be a contributor to this.
It
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is not very significant in the overall aerodynamic forces on the vehicle. Nor do we see that it is
changing the aerodynamic flow across the vehicle significantly.
We also looked at the possibility that one of the separation motors or all four of the separa-
tion motors on the aft end had fired, and if that would result in the motion of the vehicle. It
does not, based upon our preliminary analysis to date.
The next chart, please.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Excuse me. On that previous one, you said something
about the simulate with SSFS?
MR. MOSER: The space shuttle flight simulator.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: It would seem the time to gather such things as wind
shear, thrust degradation, and nozzle motions, and various dynamics, it would be appropriate.
MR. MOSER: That is all in that model, Nell. It is all included.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: All of the elements you can reascnably include, with the
mechanisms you have available?
MR. MOSER: That is correct, and I can't think
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of anything off the top of my head that it doesn't have in it. It is quite detailed.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: And at what point would you expect to get preliminary
results out of that?
MR. MOSER: Well, our preliminary results have been completed. It does not show the vehi-
cle responding according to that.
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I wouldsaywithin the nextcoupleof weekswewill havethe final resultsfrom that. I can
lookat a detailedtaskandgiveyou that specifically.Let'ssee.Could you put the last--okay, all
right, go ahead.
(Viewgraph.) Ira')._ t;_(,_I
The next thing in the ascent that we see is the change in the ullage pressure of the hydro-
gen tank from measurements. We then tried to determine what the cause of that was. We have
looked at thermal analysis of the tank, but before I say that let me show you specifically what
I'm talking about again. Again, interpretation of the exact time line, probably measured to the
nearest thousandth of a second.
But we see what the characteristics and the repressurization is relative to what it had been
up to that point. It is not normal. We're not keeping up with the pressurization of the tank.
GENERAL KUTYNA: But that is after the
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appearance of the flame?
MR. MOSER: That is correct, that is after the appearance of the flame.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Eight seconds or so?
MR. MOSER: About six seconds.
So we looked at that and said, what are the potential causes of that. We've got plume im-
pingement on the external tank itself and on the repressurization lines.
The next chart.
(Viewgraph.) Im'l. z I:)-*_.I
DR. KEEL: Do we not have these charts?
MR. MOSER: You do have those charts. What I've done is, any ones you see back up there
in the back, and I will mesh them together to let the information flow as easily as I could.
DR. KEEL: Would it be. possible, for the benefit of the reporter and the record, to indicate
what page number, so that we know what we're referring to in the record.
MR. MOSER: Yes, I believe that I can do that. Let me check my system here. It is marked
down here. I am now looking at charts 14, BU-14, and on the right screen or C screen, chart 7.
Okay, I'll try and do that. On screen A we have taken the plume fron the SRB
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and imping_ed it directly cn the external tank to see if that could have penetrated the wall of the
external tank with different boiling heat transfer coefficients of the liquid hydrogen inside and
adjacent to the aluminum wall. We have taken, theoretically taken the insulation, the spray-on
foam insulation on the tank, off.
We're looking at a thickness of about four-tenths of an inch in thickness, and with a heat
transfer coefficient very high. We are showing peak temperatures of about minus 100 degrees
with that plume impinging directly on it.
At a lower heat transfer coefficient from the hydrogen to the skin of the tank, we are show-
ing a peak of about 200 degrees, still well below--
DR. COVERT: So this raises liquid hydrogen to the inside skin temperature?
MR. MOSER: That is correct.
DR. COVERT: What temperature does nuclear boiling take place in hydrogen?
MR. BACHTOL: Well, we usually plot it versus heat plus.
DR. COVERT: I know that. I want to get to that.
MR. BACHTOL: Well, I can tell you the burnout heat flux in about 10 Btu's per foot
squared second.
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DR. COVERT: But this age of 10,000 then corresponds to what?
MR. BACHTOL: I'm not sure. I suspect that is BTU's _)er hour. I'm not familiar with this
analysis.
DR. COVERT: You say 10 BTU's per square foot per second?
MR. BACHTOL: That's right, burnout heat flux.
,MR MOSER: This assumes boiling. With that analysis---and again, we were trying to bound
it. We did not show a penetration of the tank. But we also have analysis proceeding which not
only takes the heat, but takes the energy from the aluminum particles which are in the solid
propellant and impinges it, to see if we can erode the tank away. VVe do not have the results of
that as of yet. The other thing that we are doing--
_r T TTI_ .MR. _;vA_,,_R. There'_ enough thermal mass in the hydrogen to keep the tank pretty cold?
MR. MOSER: That's right. We've even looked at what it would be doing to change the pres-
sure of the gas which is dissolved back into the liquid, and we do not ever show a pressure in-
crease of significant magnitude there.
Again, this is about one week's worth of analysis, which we began on this scenario. The
other
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thing that we're going is trying to look at this decrease in pressure by a structural failure which
would be manifested in the form of a buckle in the tank. Even though we are not melting the
tank and penetrating that way, there are some fairly high thermal gradients set up and fairly
high thermal stresses which could cause local buckling, with the local buckling and a crack
forming in the tank and then letting that leak.
The thing that flies in the face _f that, though, to see those types of pressure decreases we
have to be leaking liquid at about 13; pounds per second, which is about equivalent to what is
flowing through the engine'. And so we don't think that that model is really going to hold up. Or
in a gaseous sense, about a little bit less than one pound per second of gaseous hydrogen, which
better fits.
The next chart, please.
(Viewgraph.) {m,f. 2'1:_4mi
We looked at the gaseous hydrogen repressurization line with a low heat flux, and we're
seeing that wall temperature getting out to about less than 150 degrees. For a higher heat flux--
the next chart, please.
ffViewgraph.) II_,'J. 2 I:_ _i7I
We're getting high enough temperatures to fail.
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But again, we're trying now to model the plume coming out of the SRB and get a better charac-
terization of what heat flux we're really seeing there. In addition to heat, we're also having to
look at erosion of that line. That looks like a very high possibility of the thing that is causing
the increase in the pressure of the tank.
The next chart, please.
DR. KEEL: Again, could ! make a plea with you, please ask you to give some reference title,
or figure number to your charts.
(Viewgraph.) Im.I 2 I:_ "'N
MR. MOSER: I'm sorry. I'm now looking at chart BU-16 on screen A, and on screen B BU-
15, and chart 7 on screen C.
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MR.SUTTER:Is all of this work to try to find out why it finally went, after the SRB leak
started?
MR. MOSER: Yes, sir, seeing if we can fit all of the data to this scenario, that the SRB truly
had started there. Some of this analysis is applicable. However, even if' the ET started, if every-
thing doesn't fit the physical evidence that we have, we don't think we have concluded or will
have a legitimate understanding of' what caused this fhilure.
MR. SUTTER: It would seem to me if that SRB
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ever leaked, like it could have with what we know, after that it's too late.
MR. MOSER: Yes, sir. I agree with you but today we can't say the SRB leaked for sure.
MR. SUTI'ER: But this is all a lot of work assuming the SRB leaked.
MR. MOSER: Yes, sir. 1 don't know any other way to build all of the facts into and to put
the pieces of the puzzle together and have a clear picture. If I had a one-piece puzzle I wouldn't
have a problem, but I don't,
MR. WAITE: Could you consider some of the structural loads at the bottom attachment, like
loss- -
MR. MOSER: I'm going to get to that in just a moment.
DR. FEYNMAN: There's no way to make aluminum hydride or something when it gets hot,
chemical reactions between the hydrogen and the aluminum?
MR. MOSER: We haven't looked at that. That is on the list to do. We have not considered--
gotten any depth in that.
On chart A--now, I'm coming up to your question now. Later into the program, into the
flight, we see a divergence in the right-hand solid rocket booster
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compared to the rest of the stack, Tha; is the orbiter on the left hand, and that is depicted on
screen A. What's shown here is the pitch rate of the right and the left, and you can see slightly
beyond 72 seconds, you see a deviation. The same way with yaw.
The potential explanations for that is the plume effects and also the heating on the aft
structural attachments of the external tank to the solid rocket booster down here.
The next chart, please.
Wiewgraphs 17 and 18,11R,'I'. " I:_-t_,q
This is a picture--on screen A I have chart 17, and B is 18, and chart 19 is on screen C.
On screen A, the lower attachment strut is shown in the upper part of this view. The center
screen shows a cross-section of it. Pyrotechnic is included in that attachment. We looked at the
possibility of that pyrotechnic getting to sufficient temperature to detonate it.
Based upon the thermal analysis that we have conducted so far, we show that pyrotechnic
being slightly over 100 degrees. I think that that has been shown to be able to get up to about
420 degrees from 60 seconds before the pyrotechnic would be detonated. And so we went one step
further.
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Next chart, please.
(Viewgraphs.) IR,". 2 I:_ 7o I ,,I :,1 I_,'_. 2 13-7o 2 ,,l' 5 I
And so we looked at the load on that link. And on screen C, I now have chart 20, and on
screen B, I have chart BU-15.
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JThe load in that tank is about 80,000 pounds at the time of the event. It is designed for
compression of about 290,000 pounds and tension of about 390,000 pounds. So it is well within
the capability.
Next chart, please.
(Viewgraphs 22 and 29.) [l_,.i z I:_ 7o :_,,t :,} tm.t. 2 ::_7o i ,,t _1 Im.I -' I:_ 7o 5 ,,t _1
However, ,,'hen we consider the temperature, and on screen A I have chart 23, on B I have
chart 22, and C, I have chart 21, for the record. Looking at a thinner section of that same lower
link, which has less thermal mass, predicting what the temperature is there and the surfaces
are ,¢or an exposure of a plume like we are seeing at the solid rocket booster, you can see that we
are easily getting up in excess of 2,000 degrees.
Looking at the material properties on screen A of a typical Inconel, somewhere around 1200
degrees the ultimate strength of that material just plummets. So that looks like a feasible fail-
ure scenario of what has happened.
Next chart, please.
1056
(Viewgraph B-15.) IRet'. 2 1:_-7o 2 ,,f 5 I
To further substantiate that, we looked at if that link fails. So now the right-hand SRB is
attached at a forward point and it is allowed to hinge about the aft point. It now has a new
hinge line which is skewed to the axis of the solid rocket booster. If that rotates up toward the
orbiter, then the ratio of the pitch rates and the yaw rates about an axis of that rotation corre-
spond to exactly what we measured. So that fits the model pretty well.
Next chart, please.
(Viewgraphs 24, 25, 26.) tx_'_. 2 J:_-TI _ ,,J 31 I_,.J. "- t:_ 2 ,,_ :_J Ix,'_. 2 J:_7t :_ ,, :_l
I have charts 24, 25, and 26 on A, B, and C. With that, with the loads that are on that, on
the solid rocket booster at that time, at about 72-1/2 seconds we would be predicting a rotational
rate about that hinge line of 40 degrees per second.
Screen B shows pictorially what that view would be, and screen C shows how the SRB
moves over and begins to contact the inner tank region on the solid rocket.
DR. COVERT: What was the roll rate that would indicate that?
MR. MOSER: I would have to go back and look at that. Those are yaw rates, the pitch rates
that a_'e
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in the handout there, and I can't remember which of those_what that magnitude was. Shall I
go back there?
DR. COVERT: Well, this says relative roll rate.
MR. MOSER: That is the roll rate about the new hinge.
DR. COVERT: I understand that. I wondered what the data indicate. I can't put this back
into a single thing in my head.
Lets go on, Tom.
MR. MOSER: It is shown on chart BU-16, that shows the right hand has a pitch rate at that
time of about minus point--I mean, about .5 degrees positive. And it has a corresponding yaw
rate--this is about the body axis now for the right-hand SRB--which changes drastically and
goes up, goes from minus about .15 or 1-1/2 up to about 3-1/2 degrees per second, iI_ef. 2 i:_-_s l
Next chart, please.
(Viewgraph 28.) Ira',. z I:_ 721
I want to show you what I think is happening up in the forward end, and again just to put
the other pieces of the puzzle together.
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(Viewgraph27.)[R,a. z I:_ 7:_I
Now, on screen B I have 28 and on screen C I have 27.
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With a 12 degree rotation about that new hinge line, we bottom out the forward SRB attach-
ment to that on the external tank. So now we're beginning to induce a bending moment in that
carry-through structure between the SRB's, which is a load direction for which it was not de-
signed for a very high magnitude, and I don't know that number right off the top of my head.
Next chart, please.
(Viewgraphs 29 and 30.)[R,.f. "'- i:_-71] II{,q. 2 1:_-75]
What that is doing, it is inducing loads into the inner tank region, which is dumping them
into the blocks, wall, and the bulkhead of that, and the same way with the hydrogen tank.
As the SRB continues to rotate--and on screen B, I have 29 and on screen C chart 30--the
aft attachment does not encounter an interference until it has rotated through about 52 degrees.
However, by the time it rotates through that angle, the forward end of the solid rocket booster
has impinged into the inner tank region a significant amount, as seen in the crosshatch on chart
C. And we are completing the analysis now to show what that would do as far as loading up the
external tank, both LOX and hydrogen.
Next chart, please.
(Viewgraph.) [_,'J. 2 1:_-7, I ,,_ :_l Im't. z 1:_-7, 2 ,,t :_l Im'_. " 1:_7, :_ ,,t :_]
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From a CAD, the way it would appear to be, in screens A, B, and C, charts 31, 32, and 33.
The back end of the solid rocket, right hand solid rocket, has moved up toward the elevons, and
from the physical evidence that meets the model also, looking at the damage, in talking to the
National Transportation Safety Board members today and looking at it myself.
The head-on view of that, you can see with that type of rotation how that right-hand solid
rocket booster has gone up and probably contacted the wing for sure plus failed the tank.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Is this compatible essentially with what the Aviation Week story
said?
MR. MOSER: I did not read that all the way through.
MR. HOTZ: It's pretty accurate, sure.
MR. RUMMEL: Isn't the impact point on the tank between--
MR. HOTZ: I don't think they had any contact with the wing in their story, but they had
the rotation.
MR. MOSER: I saw it is USA Today and they referenced the Aviation Week article, and I
believe that they did have it--show it going into the inner tank. It is probably the same thing.
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MR. RUMMEL: Could I ask, the impact point of the SRB with the tank is between the
oxygen tank and the other tank?
MR. MOSER: Correct.
MR. RUMMEL: Is there any evidence of those tanks in fact failing?
MR. MOSER: Just the visual evidence, yes, sir.
MR. RUMMEL: There is?
MR. MOSER: In the visual evidence, there is a cloud of vapor at this corresponding time
coming out on the tank.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: If we recover the right booster, will the damage to it likely confirm
this theory?
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MR.MOSER:Yes,sir, I wouldthink so.It shouldshowsomedamage.
MR. WAITE:How long hasthis beenavailableto yousincethe Sth of February,is that
right'?
MR.MOSER:Yes,sir, this has.
DR.RIDE:DothephotosshowtheSRBcontactingthetank'?
MR.MOSER:Pardonme?
DR.RIDE:Dothe photosshowtheSRBcontactingthetank'?
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MR.MOSER:Thephotos,no,notsofar. Wecan't tell that,Sally.Weare trying to enhance
it to seeif wecan,but to dateyoucannotseethat it does,at leastnot in theobservationsthat I
havemade.
MR.SMITH:But I guess,eventhoughyoucan't seethat, that wouldagreewith the leakage
that you'reseeingin thetoppingoff of theforwardoxygentank.I think that fits the story.
MR.MOSER:It fitsa lot ofthe physicalevidencethe visualevidence.
MR WILLIAMS:Plusyou'vegota lot of burningin that area,too.
MR.MOSER:Thenextcharts,please.
(Viewgraph. I llwt. 2 1:_ 771
MR. MOSER: I'm not going to walk you through the same detail on this, but it is a scenario
not too unlike George Hardy showed you. Assuming a hydrogen leak initially, on screen A,
which is chart BU-5, (_, and 7, respectively, A, B, and C; which on screen B is an oxygen leak.
following through that tailure scenario tree; and then a structural failure on BU-7.
And I do not think that I have sutt_cient information to really show you the status of that
today, but we are working that and we will continue to work it until we have closed out what we
think is tile most
10(i2
probable.
And that's it, Mr. Chairman.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you very m.uch.
Are there any questions?
(No response. I
Well, I guess we should adjourn for the day if there are no further questions.
MR. WALKER: Mr. Chairman, in the morning are we going to pick up with these other two
presentations?
MR. KEEL: The intent, Mr. Chairman, is to start with the Thiokol temperature discussion,
but then try to constrain that to an hour and 30 minutes, and then go directly Dora there to the
assembly demonstration prior to the tour. And then we will couple the wreckage reconstruction
into the visit to the logistics facility, where we actually will look at the wreckage.
MR. SMITH: Excuse me. Are we going to have the discussion on the field joint assembly
prior to the tour? It probably would be beneficial.
MR. KEEL: Yes, I just said that. That will be at ,q:30, We are redoing the agenda right now.
IWhereupon, at 7::35 p.m., the meeting was adjourned.}
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PRESIDENTIAl. COMMISSION ON TIlE SPACE SHUTTLE CttAI,LENGER
ACCIDENT--FRIDAY. FEBRUARY 11. 1986
Kennedy Space ('enter
Cape Canaveral, Florida
The Commission met. pursuant to recess, at _:0.5 a,m.
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NEIL A. ARMSTRONG, Vice Chairman
DR. SALLY RIDE
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DR. ARTHUR WALKER
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DR. RICHARD FEYNMAN
MAJOR GENERAL DONAI,D KUTYNA
RORERT HOTX
DR. EUGENE COVERT
ALSO PRESENT:
AL KEEL. Commission Executive Director
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PROCEEDINGS
1O65
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: This morning, the first item on the agenda is the Thiokol discussion.
and I thought that in order to lay a foundation for the discussion, I might have Dr. Keel, who is
our Executive Director, refer to comments that were made in our executive session, whenever it
was--I've lost track of the date, I guess last week--by Mr. McDonald.
DR. KEEL: Yes.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I think this will give you a good starting point. We didn't ask the
questions at that time. We thought we should have the principals here so we could ask them. So
with your permission, we will do that. and you can summarize it, A1.
1066
DR. KEEL: Yes. I will just, Mr. Chairman. at your direction just--we have selected excerpts
t¥om this, and let the record show that this is excerpts from the closed session of Monday, Feb-
599
ruarv 1!)th.bet_rethe Commission.I will be_in--this_sai'terMr McDonald_rst roseandex-
plainedthe fact that therewasa discu,._ionprior to launche×pressin_concernaboutthe tern-
peeatureat thesea[andthepertbrmanceo["theO-cin_sat that temperature
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: You really said "discussions," so dnere were more than one
DR. KEEL: That is correct.
"'Chairman Rogers: Am I hearing you say that yot_ recammended against !aunch and you
never changed >'our mind':
"'Mr. McDonald: No, [ did not say that. We did change our mind afterwards.
•'Chairman Rogers: What brought you to that decision':
"Mr. McDonald: Well, the data that was reviewed. NASA concluded the temperatu[e data
we had was inconclusive, and indeed a lot of the data was inconclusive, because the next worst
blow-by we had ever seen in a primary seal, in a case to case seal joint, was about the highest
temperature we had launched at.
1067
and that was true."
And I'm skipping ahead now in the testimony:
"Chairman Rogers: Did you change your mind'?
"Mr. McDonald: Yes. The assessment of the data was that the data was not totally conclu-
sive that the temperature could affect everything relative to the seal, but there was data that
indicated that there were things going in the wrong direction, and this was far from our experi-
ence base, the conclusion being that Thiokol was directed to reassess all the data because the
recommendation was not considered acceptable at the time, at the 53 degrees.
"NASA asked us tor a reassessment ana some more data to show the temperature in itself
could cause this to be a more serious concern than we had said it would be, At that time, Thio-
kot in Utah said that they would like to go off-line and caucus for about five minutes and reas-
sess what data they had there or any other additional data.
"That caucus lasted tor I think a half hour before they were ready to go back on, and when
they came back on they said they had reassessed all the data. They had come to the conclusion
that the temperature influence, based on the data they had available to them, was inconclusive,
and thereibre they recommended a
1068
launch.
"Chairman Rogers: When you say 'inconclusive,' what does that mean?
"Mr. McDonald' Well, the fact is--
"Chairman Rogers: You told them the day before not to do it, and then now you've got some
more data and you say it is inconclusive and you changed your mind?
"Mr. McDonald: I was not back at Wasatch when that discussion was being held. I was at
Kennedy, and I do not know what other data they were looking at, other than the charts that I
had in front of me and others that they had in front of them at both KSC and Marshall. 1 do not
know.
"I do know they came back on and said they had reassessed it and concluded that it was
okay to launch, and at that point in time Thiokol was requested to put that in writing.
"Chairman Rogers: We!l, I think in view of the very serious nature of this and the fact that
it will be scrutinized for years, that we should have precisely what the data was before we
present it."
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, this meeting today is in the natare of an investigation and not
really a hearing, so it is not necessary to swear anybody in.
600
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When we have our regular formal meetings, we swear all our witnesses, but this realty is for us
to assess the facts and to see how tbey will be presented later on.
So, although it is going to be recorded, it is not going to be sworn testimony That doesn't
mean we don't want the truth, but it means that this is not formal, this is informal and in the
nature of' an investigation, and we want to have you feel free to have a discussion about the
facts.
And what I have in mind particularly, and l think the rest of the Commission does. is to be
sure that we know precisely what the thcts were, who was involved, and as much as you can
remember what was said, and if there were any documents relating to those discussions we
would like to take a look at the documents.
And if there was any impounding of documents, critical documents, we would like to know
that, when ;t happened, who has them if there are documents of that kind--all of the facts that
relate to tbJs very critical period in the launch.
MR. R_INARTZ: Mr. Chairman, I'm Stun Reinartz from the Marshall Space F_ight Center.
I'm the pr(,ject manager for our propulsion elements.
What _-e would p_opose, subject to your
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concurrence, is that Mr, Mulloy, our SRB project manager from Marshal!, give you the back-
ground that led up to the discussion that we had with Morton Thiokol, list the participants, in-
cluding myself, in that telecon, and run through what we had, a very brief summary, and then
we would provide Morton Thiokol the opportunity to then discuss on their side of the situation
how they viewed it, if that is ac,reptable.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Sure.
MR. REINARTZ: All right, Sir, Larry Mulloy.
I07I
STATEMENT OF lARRY MULLOY
MR. MULLOY: Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission:
Good morning.
(Viewgraph.) IJ_,'I e J_ J I,,_ l]
The decision to scrub the 51-L mission on January the 27th was made at approximately 1:00
p.m. by my recollection. Now, I had put approximate symbols in front of these times but I don't
have the precise times.
But of course during the launch process, the project managers at Marshall and Dr. Lucas
are on a communication net with personnel back at our Huntsville operations support center
and also personnel that we have in the backup firing room here at Kennedy. We communicate
with those people--they are technical specialists--relative to any problems or during the launch
count any anomalies that come up, any potential launch commit criteria violations that come up
during the course of the count.
And then subsequent to the launch or subsequent to a launch scrub, we stay on the net and
communicate with those people relative to our ability _o turn around within 24 or 48 hours on
any concerns that might be related to that.
So what happened on the 27th, after the
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decision to scrub, w_, polled our support personnel who ,a<-'_.• on the net, :rod t!tnt includes USB|.
_,_.,_:,, - Prod'.action c,'omp:in). _md '3,lort_m Thiok_ per_onrwl, re_ardm_ :my constr:tint_ t _ :t ';"_-,
h,_ur "_'c',c[e. :n othe'_" _or,._s _;[' Z_otug at _ _> o_. _.he 2_kth o{' J.mui._ry.
This '_as nbcat ;',0 min:_tes _fter the launch scrub ..*,'ome input did con;<, back. ar',d vvhnt the>
had Ioc, ked at was till eiements of :_e system. Our request the_l went in_.o the system, which
M,.,)'tc, n Thiokoi will discuss as to how they re_cted t > th_,t request. ::my com_t<-_ip.ts for a :.{_-hour
t t_lrn-around,
The input that [ got back about :_i) minutes after launch scrub on the net was that the con-
cerns that had been worked were related to the recovery battery temperatures on the solid
rocket boosters We have a launch commit criteria red lined I_,_ those, and the f_te[ service
module, hydrozene modules in the aft skirt that work the thrust cector control system on the
solid rocket booster.
At that time, at abeu_ I _tt. there was no concern or no input back relative to any concerns
tbr the solid rocket motor, considering the predicted temperatures.
qr_l_ ,
,,,e n_.,._t event that l am nware of is about 5:[7_ theft afternoon. In response to that request
to
'l',_ork. A[ had--welL I will let him cower what he did. but he cai.ed our MSSE resident office,
Cecil Houston, to inform him that Thiokol engineering did have some concerns regarding the
function of the ()-rings at the pred;cted temperatures.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Could I interrupt. Was there a discussion about the weather prior to
the scrub?
MR. MULLOY: No, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: In ot_:er words, the first discussion, s you remember about the weath-
er occurred at 7):157
MR MUI,LOY: Yes. sir. It was in the assessment of, do we have any problems with going at
!_:;{8 on the 2Sth of January. And then it was pointed out that the temperatures were predicted
to get below freezing, and there were a lot of aspects of that consideration for the work. Of
course, there was water on the pad and potential burstin_ of pipes, ice on the external rank, et
cetera.
MR ALDRICH: Excuse me, Larry. To be consistent with the discussion we had yesterday,
between the I:00 p.m. meeting and the 5:15 p.m. meeting there was a mission management team
that met, too, which Jess Moore and myself conducted in the launch control center, where we
met with all of the projects and discussed whether we should pick up for launch the next day.
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And at that meeting, we elected to pick uu, and we were most concerned about the temps on
the facillty. But we asked the facility and the other elements to review the temperatures and
call if we developed any complications downstream which would make that decision.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: So at 2:00 o'clock--
MR. ALDRICIt: So at 2:00 o'clock we called the level two and the level one of the projects,
which fits between these two times.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Excuse me. I think I've changed my mind. If you don't mind. I think
all the people from Thiokol that are going to talk today let's swear them all in at one time,
because it' we don't _'md we have sworn the other witnesses it may in retrospect look a little odd.
So if you will all stand up and be sworn.
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_'['he flq[,_win_ witnesses _ere ,w_'orn: Jerry Mason, Cat Wi_,_ins, Joe Kilrnins_er. Rober't
[.und, Don Ketner, R,_er Boi_ioiy, :-\cnie '|'h_,;,rnp_on, :k! .Mcl)ouald. aP_J Bovd [_rir_torl ,
MR. MUI,LOY: Sh', I wil! show on the chart tile po,rticipants who are here
CHAIRMAN RO(;ERS When >,)lL 're asked _o c,m_mem, it' v_nl _ould identity vour_elt _o
the reporter will be able to record this.
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MR. MULLOY: And fi_llowin_ up on Arnie's comment--
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Now. as much as possible, when yo, say we called the fi._cility, ff you
rernember who you called or who somebody called, iet's use ramies, so it' we trace what happened
we have peop!e instead of buildings.
MR MULLOY: Yes, sir. will do.
Following up on Arnie's comment, what I just stated relative to our concerns, I stated in
that mission management team meetinK that we had worked those two concerns. And I cannot
reca!l any discussion in that mission management team meeting relative to SRM temperatures,
MR. ALDRICH: I do not recall such discussion.
MR. MUI,LOY: Now, AI called the resident office. He will testify to that. Cecil Houston
about ten minutes later then was able to ,<et in contact with Jud Lovingood, who is here toduy
he's the Deputy Manager of the Shuttle Projects ()trice, of Mr. Reinartz--and re!aying this con-
tern that A] had pointed out to establish a teiecon with Reinartz. myself,, (ieorge Hardy at the
Marshall Space Flight Cente.r, and engineering and program people who were at the Thiokol
Wasatch divibion
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in Utah.
That telecon did occur, I did not participate in that telecon, Ttnev were unable to ,_et in
touch with me at that time, but that telecon occurred between LovinKood, Reinartz. and Thiokol
personnel, and other personnel at Marshall Space Flight Center. And the result of that was to
listen to the concerns as expressed here ,just in oral transmission. They had no data at that time.
"['he result of that was to set up a telecon where we could _et all of the data transmitted to
all of the parties and have more pers',)nnel participating in that.
CHAIRMAN ROGEPS: And we will be able to be told by somebody what tile comments were
at that time'?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir. At the S:15?
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Yes.
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir, and I'm going into that.
DR. WHEELON: Is it your practice to record these telecons on magnetic tape?
MR. MULLOY: No, sir.
DR. WHEELON: There is no record of that---
MR. MULLOY: To my knowledge, this telecon was not recorded,
DR. WHEELON: Are others, and this not'? Or is it your practice not to do so'/
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MR. MULLOY: It is "mr practice not to do so.?
DR, COVERT: Do you vrite up notes?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir.
DR. COVERT: Does everybody write up notes? Or if you don't kno_ .....
MR, MULI,OY: I don't know. sir. that everybody writes up notes, I am aware that 1 wrote
up notes in this case. IR.'t. _ it t _' .,t I I
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DR. WHEELON: May we have copies of those notes?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir
DR. COVERT: W_ might want to collect these different notes and see if" rhev all attended
the same m_ 'ring.
MR. MULLOY: I don't think, when you see the number of' participants--there were some :_0
participants--| cannot say that everyone had notes.
DR. COVERT: I under'stand. Press on, Larry.
CHAIRMAN I£OGERS: Well. we should, if there are notes, we should have them, because
there may be a difference of opinion on what was said, and it would be helpful to us to have
them all. And it there are some that exist and we don't have them, that would be a mi'.:take. We
should get them all.
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir. We v. ill collect those.
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That telecon was a little late starting. It was intended to be set up at 8:15. 2'he 30 minute
delay was due to the transmission of the engineering material from Wasatch in Utah to the
Kennedy Space Center and to the Marshall Space Flight Center. That did arrive, though, in
Huntsville and here at Marshall, and the telecon was begun at 3:45.
And Thiokol will then present to you today the data that they presented to us in that tele-
c,m. I will not do that. The bottom line of that, though, initially was that Thiokol engineering,
Bob Lund., who is the Vice President and Director of Engineering, who is here today, recom-
mended that 5l-L not be launched if the O-ring temperatures predicted at launch time would be
lower than any previous launch, ::nd that was 5',-Idegrees. Yes. sir.
MR. WALKER: May [ ask a question. I wish you would distinguish between the predicted
bulk temperatures and the Oring kemperatures. In fact, as I understand it. you really Oon't
h.a_'e any offic:al O-ring temperature prediction in your models, and it seems that the assump-
tion has been that the O-ring temperature is the same as the bulk temperature, which we know
is not the ca,._e.
MR. MULLOY: You will see, sir. in the Thiokol
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presentation today that that is not the case. This was a specific calculation of what the O-ring
temperature was on the day of the January 19_5 launch. It is not the bulk temperature of the
propellant, nor is it the ambient temperature of the air.
It was Thiokol's calculation of what the lowest temperature an O-ring had seen in previous
flights, and the engineering recommendation was that we should not move outside of that expe-
rience base.
I asked Joe Kilminster, who is the progranl manager for the booster program at Thiokol,
what his recommendation was, because he is the gentleman that I get my recommendations
fl'om in the program office, ite stated that, based on that engineering recommendation, that he
could not recommend launch.
At that point I restated, as I have testified to. the rationale that was essentially documented
in the 1962 critical items list. that stated that the rationale had been that we _ere flying with a
simplex joint seal And wm will see in the Thiokol presentation that the context of their presen-
tation is that the pr!mary ring, with the reduced temperatures and reduced resiliency, may not
function as a primary seal and we would be relying on secondary.
And without getting into their rationale and
6O4
gettir_.g ahead, the point, the bottom tino, is that we were continuing--the assessmer_, '*'as. my
assessment at that tim,> was, that we wculd have an effbctive simplex seal, based up< _ ;. _engi-
neerin_z data that Thiokol had presented, and that none of _hose engineerin_ data ned to
chan_e that basic rationale.
Start Reinartz then asked George Hard}. the Deputy Director of Science and Engineerin_ at
Marshall, what his :)pinion was. George stated that ne agreed that the engineering data did n(_t
seem r,o change this basic rationa!e, but also stated on the telecon that he certain{y would not
recommend launching if Thiokol did not.
At that time Joe Kilminster requested a five minute off-net caucus, and that caucus lasted
approximately 30 minutes.
DR. COVERT: Larry, I'm confused, and could i go back about Ibm" meatballs here. What is a
simpl,'x joint seal?
MR. MULLOY: No redundancy.
DR. COVERT: That's a single O-ring?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir.
DR. COVERT: Is this cmnmon notation, or is it named after Charlie Simplex or something?
MR. MULLOY: Perhaps it is an untbrtunate
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phrase. I gaess I consider "simp!e×" singular and "duplex" duai. and I was using it in that con-
text.
MR. WALKER: So you're talking about the secondary seal.
MR. MULLOY: Yes.
MR. WAI_,KER: In other words, if the first one didn't work the seccmd one would'/
MR. MULLOY: Yes. that is correct. And the engineering rationale you will see fbr accepting
the situation was counting on the _econdar_ seal. and that will be developed Yes, sir.
MR. SUTTER: Is this in _ne witb--I thought the philosophy was at least dual redundancy
on there being critical.
MR. MULLOY: Yes, sir, that -
MR. SUTTER: Where is the rationale that says a single ring is okay and anything single is
okay?
MR MULLOY: The design g_mi is certainly to have redundancy in critical systems, and in
late 1982 it was recognized that this joint design did not provide that redundancy and the criti-
cality on the critical items list, the criticality for this joint was changed t¥om criticality l-R,
which is redundant, to a criticality 1,
And there are numerous systems on the shuttle syste_n that are criticality one. They are not
redundant. They are indeed criticality one.
This was changed into _hat criticality, recognized, and the rationale for the acceptance of
that
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condition based on analysis and comparison to a similar joint design which flies with a single O-
ring, namely the Titan, which at that time had had some T0 successful launches.
So since December of 19_2, we have been operating the system with the recognition that
under worst case conditions, worst case tolerance buildups, and certain other conditions, that
you could indeed not have redundancy in the joint. And what I am stating here is that my con-
6O5
/.'!usi,,n, ba,ed ::_Or_ ,.m/.ineerm_ data _reser:ted. was _h-_t th.._ s'._uatt,m here was aot any differ-
MR HOTZ: But doe-_r,'t _he Ti,.,m use a different joint"
MR .\2[.:I,L()Y It is :_ simi[a: ioinr. _ir lt'¢ a taqa: and cle;-:s with :_ single O-r_:ig that they
d_m't !oak ch:.,_.rk The pr_:_._r->
MR [|OTZ: But isn't _t reversed, that ri_e tang and the clev_.s _o the opposite ,_vay •'
MR. ?dULLOY: Yes. sir. _ !_e_¢,.ve it >, yes. :.ir It is the tan< is down--or, excuse me. the
tane is up Jn fli_zht dir'ec_,,m md the clevis is down
MR. HO':'Z: So xou're n,,t basina it ot_, exactly the s_iille type of a _)oint•
MR MULI,OY: No. -;Jr: :.-'.imik_r
[0>3
MR. WALKER: There's also a quasi-seal of tte insulation, and that may be a very critical
d iflorence.
MR. MULLOY: TherP is an interference fit m the insulation, which is not related to the
physical joint design. But it is related te the insulation layup
C[_.AIRM _,N ROGERS: l,arry, :n criticality one problems in the past. do you remember any
other examples where there was such a [ate decision on a criticality one and whether there were
disaa_reement,., amom; the pattie!pants'.'
MR. MULIA)Y: No, sir. I do not. We are researcb!ng those records now tbr the total shuttle
system, and rrn certainly doing that for the SRM. I am not aware since December or 1982. I took
,wer the pr_iect in November of 19S2
I do not remember any chan_es from a criticality I-R to a criticality I in the solid rocket
booster. What we're looking at now is what are all of the criticality ,)nes and getting a listing of
those fbr the soiid rocket booster. The total system is doing that. I believe, are you not, Arnie?
MIR. AI,DRICt-|: Yes, sir, _!r. Chairman, We are preparing a summary tbr you on the critical
items and the nature of some ot _hem and the total set. and that
l!)b-1
will be available and we can discuss it later today if you wish
MR. SUTTER: Well, I think that that discussion shouldn't be discussed today, because [
think it is a d;scdssion that should take all day some time. This is not exactly the subject we're
discussing now, but I would like to some time have a discussion on the design criteria, and is
_edundancv an objective or a requi:'ement and how do you go from 1 to I-R, how do you decide
these things, and how do you say that at one place you've got redundancy and then yo_- don't'} I
think that is a whole day's discussion.
CttAIRMAN ROGERS: I agree• Dr. Keel, would you make a note, and we will schedule one
as soon as we can. I think you're absolutely right.
DR. RIDE: Larry, in your discussion relative to the CIL or your decision relative to the Cllb.
does that mean that you were assuming what the effec*s of temperature were on a secondary
seal?
MR. MULLOY: No, I don't believe that was considered at that time. I believe the total ra-
tionale ['or retention on the CIL from I-R to 1 is attached there, and all of the considerations are
there, and I do not believe temperature is included in that consideration.
0S5
DR. RIDE: I guess I meant, when you were makieg this decision at the meeting were you
assuming that the effects of the cold weather--
DR. MULLOY: Yes.
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MR .MI.'I,LOY Ye_. and that _ili comeouz, I think, i.a Thlokoi_
MR RI£INARTZ _V.ILt ,.i mlllUr' I':xCuse me. Repeat your qu_,_tL_m, Sa{iv, It" vmi "_'m_l_t.
please, for [.arrv.
DR RID[']: Okay I _zuess l was jtlst looking at the ('11_ and it _av-_ that--.it looks to me like
it save, that the primary ()-rin_ is I heard now a single point tailur-e, because wm can't count or;
the ._econdary O-r|ng. Is that a fair assessment o[' the ('II..'
MR MULI_,OY: That is correct
DR. RIDE: And then I guess my question was, m your discussion the day belbre launch and
the evaluation of the effects of" the cold temperatures o,-. the O-ring, if you were _oing to ba:;e
your decision on the CIL it seems that you would have to assume that the cold temperature
affected the secondary O-rin_, but not the primary O-ring, since the primary ()-ring i'._ the criti-
cality one.
MR. MULLOY: Let me restate. I did not base
1 I)_t;
my decision on the C[L. The CIL states that we have a simplex--the rationale for a simplex seat.
We do not have a redundant seal. My assessment at the time that I made this comment right
here. that it did not seem to change that basic rationale, was related to the engineering data
that Fhiokol will show. that shows that even with the effects of the cold temperature that we
expected to have a simplex seal under the worst case conditions, ,_he basic rationale bein:_ _im-
plex and not redundancy, a single functioning ()-ring.
DR. RIDE: A simplex seal where the one O-ring was the primary ()-ring'.'
MR. MULLOY: No. The rationale, you will see, says we were counting on the secondary O-
ring to be the sealim_ O-ring under _,orst case conditions and the worst case analysis that is
presented here.
DR. RIDE: But doesn't the CIL say you can't count on the secondary ()-ring?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, and you have to see the engineering development for the rationale that
states that if the cold effect on the primary O-ring--and I'm _etting imo Thiokol's engineering
data, but basically, and I guess I should say what mv understanding "_as, the effort of the cold
on the O-ring is it reduces the diameter of the O-ring. It also reduces the resiliency o{' the
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O-ring.
The primary seal under the leak check pressure i_ seated in the wrong direr !on. Therefore,
there is a time required be|bre the primary O-ring" can become effective. The consideration was
that if the primary O-ring under the worst case conditions, which was not predicted, incidental-
ly, as you see the engineering data--it was predicted that the primary O-ring would have suffi-
cient compression and sufficient r-siliency to extrude into the gap and serve as a functioning
seal.
But we went a step further anc said, suppose under worst case conditions the cold effect
caused the primary O-ring to be totally ineffective. If the primary O-ring is ineffective, the sec-
ondary O-ring, which is in a position to seal, will be pressure actuated in the time before the
joint rotates.
DR. FEYNMAN: Excuse me. I'm getting very confused, and I would ,_refer a more logical
description and order. I think your original plan was to explain the order of things quickly and
then we could go back and listen to all of the arguments in the order in which they were pre-
sented. This way things are being pulled out of order and it is hard to follow. Is that okay'?
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('Iq.\I[{M.\N R()t;ERSYes.hut lt'anvb,_dvelsehasque_ttor_thev_houldaskthem
I)R FEYNMAN Yes.but _e havetheopportumtyfor some orderl'me._
t '[tAIRMAN R{)GERS. We hLtven't t";lh}wed the procedure ,_t not inte"-upttn_ so thr. _o iet'_
_o ahead
: I.amzhter i
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: If on-body ha.-, a question he wants to ask. he __houh! ask it.
MR REIX+ARI'Z: Mr. Chairman. let me do one thin_ When we c'msidered the question of
the joint and the simplex, that that was the conclusion of a worst case possibility What we were
looking at from the data pre,;ented was that there was an increased probability tl-at you may
not have a primary seal.
But we did not accept the |'act that the basic starting condition was assume that you had no
primary seal to start with. There was an increased probability of not sealin_ with the primary,
and if that did occur then we had a simplex with a secondary seal, and that was the final point
that Larry was making there.
So there was some increased probability, but it was not a fore_one conclusion, that the pri-
mary seal would not operate, and I think that wi!l come out today.
C|tAIR,MAN ROGERS: It's a little difficult to compare what you just said with what the
document says. though.
I0S9
Let's ,-'o ,Ih_'ad
MR. MUI,I,()Y: Ye,_, sir. This is the list of the total participants, the total number of partici-
pants in the telecon. At Morton Thiokol in Utah were these. We brought the principal technical
disciplines. W._, did not brink all or these peopt- here today, Mr. ('hairman, and of course they
are awdlabie.
But. in Florida there was myself. _;tan Reinartz, Cecil Houston, and Jack Buchanan. Did he
_et in? Okay, ,.lack Buchanan is here also. He's the manager _l' the launch support services here.
and AI McDonald; at Marshall, the {bllowing individuals with the disciplines that the_ represent
indicated. There are some 30 people then involved in that 5:.-15 telecon.
The next chart, please.
<View_4raph.iik,.i :.'ll i ;,,i I I
Moving on, then. That telecon lasted, then, alter ThiokoI reque_,ted their caucus and it took
about :10 minutes, at that point Mr. Kilminster came back on the net on the telecon and read
the rationale for recommending launch. Ant! that was rapid-faxed to me here at Kcanedy about
:15 minutes later, and ' will show you what that says.
I guess it is an assumption on my part, Joe, that you were reading from that. It sounded the
same.
MR. KILMINSTER: ! was reading from some other
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notes.
GENERAL KUTYNA: During that 30 minute off-the-net conference, were there telephone
calls between the centers and Thtokoi to discuss this thing?
MR. MULLOY: No, sir. We were off the net and we were not carrying on any _ oussion on
this. Those of us who were here at Kennedy were discuss;ng among ourselves and remoking at
some of the engineering data, and I'm sure that perhaps George Hardy can testify to the fact of
what they were doing back there. I don't know.
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We did _lot c;_tF_ ,)n A.qv O)r_titltliFl_ didlo_t|e,_|LiriI_, tha; :_i_ _]i_ltlte pt,.v!od
What -Joe Kilmmster then essen[iatlv -_tated at the end ,f th_tr teb':.',m ,_nd '_,,i_',i,_ he -_b,_e
quently f_lxed dowu :;5 ,qlitltlte_, 1 tt_-_r, _,'_hi,ch [ _}l_,'v1 h;Id. w_l_,
"'(',ticul_itbm._ "_h:)_ that the SR.M-2- ()-;'in_ ,, i!i be 2-; (t_'_:'e,,-_-2_ de_,,'ees -,]d,,': t}_,_'.T_"4P,M-
"3" _hich was that one thtlt was ;:t -,;! de_rees.
MR WALKER .;:_ de_rees. [n oth_,r _ords. was the' predicted temper._.ture'
MR M['I_IX)Y: I beiiew,, ve_, _ir
I)R COVERT What':_ the difference between 25 and [5'.)
MR, MI.;I.I.OY: That _hould be 25 de_rees" T) ,t's an error" Well. thi_ is the chart ,'hat I
worked from.
i()9!
MR. KILM[NSTER: That is the way it read. but it should have said 25.
IJR. COVERT: What's the difference between 25 and I57 Is that just a serial, or sequence'?
MR. MULLOY: Yes, these are theSRM numbers It'sten SRM builds later [t happens to be
the difference between -January and .Ianuarv
I)R. COVERT: Okay, fine. Thank you. Press on
DR .MI.rLL()Y: "Temperature data is not conclusive on predictin_ Drimarv O-rin_ blow-b*:
The engineering assessment is that colder ()-rings will have increased eft'ective durometer. They
will be harder The harder O-rin<s will take longer to seat. that more<as may pass the primary
O-fine before the primary seal seats as it translates from its upstream position to its down-
stream position, tha_ the demonstrated sealing threshold, however, is three times _reater in
terms of erosion than we've exper,,enced ,_.p SRM-[5."
And I will iet Thiokol engineering explain more about the analysis that ._oes into that
"If the primary seal does not seat, the secm_darv seal will seat. Pressure will get to the _ec-
ondary seal before the metal parts rotate The ()-ring pressure leak check places the secondary
seal in outboard position, which minimize:, sealin_ time, and MTI recommends 51-L launch pro-
teed on 2S January I!)S_;and
I092
that SRM-25"'--which are the motors that were o,: 5! L "will p.,._t be sitmificantly different
from SRM-IS.'"
And with that, sir. I will turn this over to Thiokol. who will discuss their deliberations
during this period of time, Mr. Jerry Mason is the Vice President and (;eneral Manager ef the
Wasatch Division of Thiokol.
I mi#ht mention, Mr. Chairman. we also have from Thiokol here today Mr. Ed Garrison,
who is the Presi& """ of the Aerospace Group in Chica_o. Mr. Mason's supervisor.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Mason, might I suggest in your discussion with us today that,
piease disclose anything that you know about that may turn up. If you have documents that we
don't know about that would be er.:barrassing to you. tell us about them now.
We don't want to have to pry information out of you. You know what's there. Tell us the
whole story, if you will.
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J#JX_S_RY27, 1986
- _',gg P.M.4..
"5:15 P.M.
._ECISiO_i_.3 SCi_LG. POLL Of SRB L_UNCH SLPPORT PERSOI'_NELREGARDING
CONSTRAINTS TO 24 HOUR RECYCLE.
- _! PERSC_+hEL AT _SC ANI_HUNTSVILLE BIB NOT ',OENTIFY ;_NY
r_ChCERNS.
USB_-BPC _n-_ iEO_L,I,IF CONCERNS REGARBING RECOVERY _,ATTERIES A_D
FUEL SERVICE _DLLE REDLiNES.
M_SSION _I_GE_EI_ TEAM _ETING.
REPORTED NO SRB CONSTRAINTS TO 24 HOUR RECYCLE AND STATED THAT
CONCERNS FOR LOIN TEMPERATURE LCC VIOLATIONS HAD P_#_ENASSESSED
WITH CONCLUSION THAT THERE WERE NO SRB CONSTRAINTS TO A 9:38
A.M. LAUNCH ON 1/28/86.
MTI (AL MCDONALD) CALLED MSFC RESIDENT OFFICE AT KSC (CECIL
HOUSTON) TO INFORM HIM MTI ENGINEERING HAD CONCERNSREGARDING
O-RING TEMPERATURES.
I r e I" I I] I1--1 I O'f 1]
I I I
"5:25 P.M.
-5:45 P.M,
-7:00 P.M.
"8:45 P.M.
CECIL i_USTON CALLED dUD LOVINGOOD TO ESTABLISH A TELECON WITH
REINARTZ, MULLOY, HARDY AND MTI WASATCH DIV!SION.
TELECON BETWEEN LOVINGOOD, REINARfZ, MTI AND OTHERS RESULTED IN
SETTING UP TELCCON FOR 8:15 P.M. EST TO INCLUDE ADDITIONAL
TECHNICAL PERSdNNEL AND DATA.
i
REINARTZ AND MULLOY VISITED BILL LUCAS AND JIM KINGSBURY IN THEIR
MOTEL ROOM TO !NFORM THEM OF CONCERN AND PLANED TELECON,
CHARTS CONTAINING MTI ENGINEERING RECOMMENDATIONS RAPIDFAXED FROM
WASATCH TO HUNTSVILLE AND KSC. TELECON BETWEEN MTI WASATCH, MSFC
HUNTSVILLE, AN_ MSFC/MTI PERSONNEL AT KSC STARTED.
MTI ENGINEERING (B(IBLUND) REC_NDED 51-L NOT BE LAUNCHED IF
O-RING TEMPERATpRES PREDICTED AT LAUNCH TIME WOULD BE LOWER THAN
ANY PREVIOUS LAUNCH (LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 53 DEGREES F.).
CONCERN WAS FO_ POTENTIAL OF INCREASED PRIMARY O-RING BLOWBY
BECAUSE OF REDULED RESILIENCY.
JOE KILMINSTER,! VP, SPACE BOOSTER PROGRAMS AT MTI, STATED THAT
BASED ON ENGINEERING RECOMMENDATION, HE COULD NOT RECOMMEND
LAUNCH.
IRef. "2 14-1 "2 of Il
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"11:0_ P.M.
-II:35 P.M,
MULLOY RESTATED RATIONALE FOR FLYING ;3 DA]E iN LIGHT OF
PREVIOUSLY O_SER_ED PRIMARY O-RiNG EROSICN &NO BLOWBY (INCLUCINQ
RECOGNITION IN I_83 _L WAI_ER THAT UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS ONLY
ONE O-RING t,V_YDE EFFECTIVE) AND STATED TMAT DATA PRESENTED _Y MTJ
E_G!_EER;_G DiD _:Or SEEM IO CHAliCE TF_T BASIC RATIONALE.
STAN _EiNARTZ ASKED GEORGE ,HARDY TO COM_'£hT ON >!IjLLOY'S
,,_A_!_,N?_.E, _E_!I.'I]_ STATE3 T_AT L,E 3AS'.CALLY AGREED BUT WOULD NOT
RE£CI_'_END __f'>,G F MT! 310 NOT.
JOE 'K'.LM;NS[ER 2EC!iESTED FiVE M!NurEs OFF-_;ET CAt.;US.
__ MCDONALD ASKED _CE F!_MINSTER TO _E SURE TO CONSIDER IN TF_E.IR
CAUCUS THAT TF#EI CChCERN CREATED BY THE COLD TEMPERATURE WAS
PRIM_Rf O-RING BLC_Bf. HE STATED T_AT IF TH!S OCCURRED, IT _Ob_O
OCCUR AT IGNITION -- BEFORE THE JOINT GAP BEG_N TO OPEN -- AND
THAT THE SEOQNDARY O-R!hG ,,;OULD[HEN BE PRESSURE ACTUATED AND
WOULD SEAL.
CAUCUS LASTED APPROXIMATELY THIRTY MINUTES. DURING CAUCUS, KSC
AND HUNTSVILLE k_RE ON MU_E AND _ DISCUSSIONS OCCURRED BETWEEN
THOSE _0 SITES.
JOE KILMINSTER CA_ BACK. ON NET AIND READ RA[10NALE FOR
RECOMN£NDING LAUNCH.
MTI RECC)_DA[IION TO FLY _,-_-'' RAPiCFAXED TO MULLOY AT 'KSC.
, ii I L
fKt.|' I ".i_) | | | :] lit' |I
-5:00 A,M. DISCUSSED MTI QONCERNS, TELECON RESULTS A_D FINAL RESOLUTION WITH
DR. LUCAS, MSFC DIREcToR, AND JIM KINGSBURY, MSFC DIRECTOR OF
ENGINEERING.
IRet',2 II-I I _f Il
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MR. CHAIRMAN, MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION, I HAVE PREVIOUSLY
TESTIFIED TO THE STS-51L FLIGHT READINESS REVIEW PROCESS
LEADING UP TO THE LAUNCH MINUS C;_Z DAY REVIEW AT KENNEDY
SPACE CENTER ON JANUARY 26, 1986. I NAVE STATED HOW THE
CONTINUING CONCERN FOR JOINT O-RING EROSION HAD BEEN TREATED
IN THE FLIGHT READINESS REVIEW PROCESS. MY STATEMENT TODAY
WILL BE LIMITED TO MY KNOWLEDGE OF THE SPECIFIC EVENTS OF
JANUARY 27, 1986 LEADING TO THE DECISION TO LAUNCH STS-51L ON
JANUARy 25, I_6.
AT APPROXIMATELY 1:00 P.M. ON JANUARY 27, THE DECISION WAS
_ADE TO SCRUB THE LAUNCH FOR THAT DAY. ALL PROJECT ELEMENTS
WERE ASKED TO ASSESS tHE ABILITY TO BE PREPARED TO LAUNCH AT
9:_8 A.M. EASTERN STANDARD TIME ('N JANUARY 2_. MR. STAR
REZNARTZ, SHUTTLE PROJECTS MAN#GER FOR MSFC, ASKED OVER '?HE
LAUNCH COMMUNICATIONS NET FOR INPUT gROM THE MSFC PROJECT
ELEMENTS MANNING THE BACKUP CONSOLES IN FIRING ROOM 2 AT KSC
AND AT THE HUNTSVILLE OPERATIONS SUPPORT CENTER AT MSFU.
PRIME CONTRACTOR SUPPORT PERSONNEL, INCLUDING MR. ALLEN
MCDONALD, WHO WAS THE SENIOR _HIOKOL REPRESENTiVE AT KSC TO
SUPPORT THE LAUNCH AND MR. 90YD BR_NTON, THE SENIOR THIOKOL
REPRESENTATIVE AT MSFC, HAVE ACCESS TO THIS COMMUNICATION
NET. (IT HAS BEEN REPORTED TO ME THAT P_. BRINTON WAS ASKED
BY MR. LARRY WEAR, MY SRM ELEMENT MANAg:R, IF T_IOKOL HAD ANY
CONCERNS FOR A LAUNCH ON JANUARY 28. MR. BRINTON CALLED
THIOKCL ENGINEERING TO HAVE THEM ASSESS THAT QUESTION).
AT APPROXIMATELY 1:30 P.M,, THE MSFC ELEMENTS REPORTED TO MR.
REINARTZ THAT THERE WERE NO CONSTRAINTS. THE SRB SUPPORT
PERSONNEL AT THE HUNTSVILLE OPERATIONS SUPPORT CENTER DID
STATE THAT THEY WERE STILL LOOKING AT THE RECOVERY _ATTERY
AND FUEL SERVICE MODULE LAUNCH COMMIT CRITERIA TEMPERATURE
REDLINES BUT SAID THEY DID NOT THINK AT THAT TIME THAT IT
WOULD BE A PROBLEM. I TOLD THEM TO LET ME KNOW IF THAT
ASSESSMENT CHANGED.
AT APPROXIMATELY 2:00 P.M. I REPORTED TO THE MISSION
MANAGEMENT TEAM THAT THERE WERE NO SRB CONSTRAINTS TO A
LAUNCH AT 9:38 A.M. ON JANUARY 28. I STATED THAT WE WERE
CONTINUING TO ASSESS THE RECOVERY BATTERY AND FUEL SERVICE
MODULE TEMPERATURES BUT THAT OUR ASSESSMENT AT THAT TIME WAS
THAT THEY WOULD NOT BE A CONSTRAINT.
AT APPROXIMATELY 2:30 P.M. I DEPARTED KSC FOR THE MOTEL.
ORIGINAl. -PA_"E': 1_
OF POOR QUALITY
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IT HAS BEEN REPORTED TO ME THAT AT APPROXIMATELY 5:15 P.M.
MR. MCDONALD, AFTER BEING IN COMMUNICATION WITH ENGINEERS AT
THIOKOL. IN UTAH, ATTEMPTED TO CONTACT ME AT MY MOTEL ROOM
AND, BEING UNABLE TO DO SO, CALLED MR. CECIL HOUSTON, THE
MSFC RESIDENT MANAGER AT KSC. HE INFORMED M_. HOUSTON THAT
THIOKOL ENGINEERS WERE CONCERNED ABOUT THE EFFECT OF THE COLD
TEMPERATURES THAT WERE PREDICTED FOR THE NIGHT AND AT LAUNCH
TIM_. MR. HOUSTON THEN ATTEMPTED TO CONTACT ME AND MR.
REINARTZ BUT WAS UNABLE TO DO SO. HE THEN CON_CTED DR. JUD
LOVINGOCD, MR. REINARTZrS DEPUTY AND INFORMED i _ _ OF WHAT MR.
MCDONALD HAD TOLD HIM HE SUGGESTED THAT A TELECONFERENCE BE
SET UP TO DISCUSS THE CONCERNS. THAT TELECONFERENCE DID OCCUR
AT APPROXIMATELY 5:45 P.M. IT DID NOT, HOWEVER, INCLUDE ME
AND OTHER PARTIES NECESSARY TO DISPOSITION THE STATED
CONCERNS NOR WAS IT POSSIBLE TO UNDERSTAND THE CONCERNS
BECAUSE OF THE LACK OF WRITTEN DATA AND POOR COMMUNICATION
WItH PERSONNEL WHO WERE AT THEIR HOMES. IT WAS THEREFORE
DECIDED TO HAVE THIOKOL TRANSMIT THE DATA ON WHICH THEIR
CONCERNS WERE BASED TO KSC AND MSFC AND ESTABLISH A
TELECONFERENCE FOR 8:15 P.M. WHERE ALL NECESSARY PERSONNEL
COULD BE ASSEMBLED IN TELECONFERENCE FACILITIES AND REVIEW
THE DATA.
MR. REINARTZ NOTIFIED ME AT APPOROXIMATELY 7:00 P.M. OF THE
THIOKOL CONCERNS AND OF THE TELECONFERENCE PLANNED FOR 8:]5
P.M. MR. BEINARTZ AND I THEN VISITED DR. BILL LUCAS, MSFC
CENTER DIRECTOR, AND MR. JIM KINGSBURY, MSFC DIRECTOR OF
SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING, IN DR. LUCAS' ROOM AND INFORMED THEM
OF THE CONCERN AND THE PLANNED TELECONFERENCE. MR. REINARTZ
AND I THEN PROCEEDED TO OUR RESIDENT OFFICE AT KSC WHERE WE
WERE JOINED BY MR. HOCSTON, HR. MCDONALD, AND MR..PACK
BUCHANAN, THIOKOL LAUNCH SUPPORT SERVICES MANAGER AT KSC.
THE CHARTS CONTAINING THE THIOKOL ENGINEERING DATA AND THE
CONCLUSION THAT THIOKOL ENGINEERING WAS DRAWING FROM THOSE
DATA ARRIVED AT KSC AND MSFC AT APPROXIMATELY 8:45 P.M. AND
THE CONFERENCE BEGAN. A LIST OF PARTICIPANTS AT EACH SITE
HAVE BEEN PREVIOUSLY SUBMITTED AND IS 7NCLUDED IN THE PACKAGE
PROVIDED TO YOU TODAY.
THE DATA PRESENTED ADDRESSED THE LOW AMBIENT TEMPERATURES
PREDICTED FOR THE NIGHT AND AT LAUNCH TIME, THE RESULTING
TEMPERATURE OF THE SRH FIELD JOINTS, AND THE EFFECT OF THOSE
LOW TEMPERATURES ON THE O-RINGS IN THE JOINTS. ,_.T.J_IOKOL
ENGINEERS STATED THAT THEY BELIEVED THE EFFFCT nF THP
ON THE O-RINGS WOULD BE TO SLOW THE TIME F-OR THE
P_.E]di_ _ RESULTING IN GR_ER RNT GA_TF-A-_E
PRIMARY SEAL AND POSSTBLE EROSION OF THE SECONDARY SEAL.
_ .;;_!4."__ ¸-
THE DATA SHOWED THAT THE PREVIOUS COLDEST L_J_CH, STS 51-C, HAD,
AT LEAST _UALITATIVELY, THE WORST BLO_BY OF A_" OBSERVED.
CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION BETWEEN MSFC AND THIOKOL ON THE
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DATA ENSUED. THE MAJOR FOCUS OF THE
DISCUSSION WAS THE EFFECT "HE LOW TEMPERATURES COULD HAVE ON T_E
DURATION OF BLOWBY OF THE _R!MARY SEAL. ALL PARTICIPANTS WERE IN
GENERAL AGREfMENT THAT EFFECT WOULD BE TO INCREASE THE DURATION
OF BLOWBY. TdE QUESTION WAS, WOULD THE SECONDARY D-RING, WHIC_
WAS IN A POSITION TO SEAL, BE ENERGIZED BY THE BLOWBY PRESSURE
AND FORM A SEAL BEFORE SIGNIFICANT JOINT ROTATION OCCURRED AND
REDUCED RESILIENCY BECOME A MODE SIGNIFICANT FACTOR. AT THE
CONCLUSION OF THE DISCUSSION, MR. BOB LUND, VICE PRESIDENT OF
THIOKOL ENGINEERING, SUMMARIZED THE RECOMMENDATION TH'.T HAD BEEN
PREPARED BEFORE THE DISCUSSION BEGAN AND CONCLUDED THAT THE
SHUTTLE SRM NOT BE LAUNCHED WHEN THE JOINT TEMPERATURE WAS LESS
THAN 530 F. THE LOGIC FOR THIS RECOMMENDATION WAS THAT THE
TEMPERATURE OF THE JOINT ON STS 51-C WAS 530 F. AND FUNCTIONED
SATISFACTORILY.
I ASKED MR. KILMINSTER, VICE PRESIDENT, SPACE BOOSTER PROJECTS,
FOR HIS RECOMMENDATION FOR 51-L. HE STATED THAT BASED ON THE
ENGINEERING RECOMMENDATION HE COULD NOT RECOMMEND LAUNCH. I THE,
STATED THAT MY ASSESSMENT OF THE DATA PRESENTED, WHEN CONSIDERED
IN CONTEXT WITH ALL ENGINEERING DATA PREVIOUSLY DEVELOPED FROM
TES3 AND PREVIOUS OBSERVATIONS OF PRIMARY O-RING BLOWBY AND
EROSION ON FLIGHT MOTORS, DID NOT SEEM TO SUPPORT A CHANGE TO
PREVIOUSLY DEVELOPED ENGINEERING RATIONALE FOR FLIGHT
READINESS. MY ASSESSMENT WAS:
I I
COLD O-RING ASSESSMENT
BLOW-By OF O-RINGS CANNOT BE CORRELATED TO TEMPERATURE
STS 61-A HAD BLOWBY AT 75°F.
SOOT BLOW-BY PRIMARY O-RINGS HAS OCCURRED ON MORE THAN
ONE OCCASSION, INDEPENDENT OF TEMPERATSRE.
PRIMARY EROSION OCCURS DUE TO CONCENTRATED HOT GAS PATH
THRU PUTTY
MAX ALLOWABLE EROSION AND STILL SEAT DEMONSTRATED BY
TEST IS 0.!25"
NO SECONDARY O-RING EROSION OR BLOW-BY TO DATE IN FIELD
JOINTS
COLDER TE_P MAY RESULT IN GREATER PRIMARY O-RING EROSION
AND SOME hEAT EFFECTED SECONDARY BECAUSE OF INCREASED
HARDNESS OF C-RING RESULTING IN SLOW SEATING
EARLY STATIC TESTS (HYDROTEgTS) WIT[i 90 DUROMETER SHOWED
SEATING (0.275" O-RING DIAMETER)
SQUEEZE AT 20°F IS POSITIVE (>0.020")
SECONDARY SEAL IS IN POSITION TO SEAT (200 PSI/5O PSI
LEAK CHECK)
PRIMARY MAY NOT SEAT DUE TO REDUCED RESILIEKCY -
HOWEVER, DURING PERIOD OF FLOW PAST PRIMARY - SECONDARY
WILL BE Sf;ATgD AND SEAL BEFORE SIGNIFICANT JOINT
ROTATION OCCURS.
CONCLUSION
RISK RECOGNIZED AT ILL LEVELS OF NASA MANAGEMENT IS
APPLICABLE TO STS 51-L
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MR. REINARTZ THEN ASKED FOR MR. HARDY TO COMMENT ON MY
ASSESSMENT. MR. HARDY STATED THAT HE BASICALLY AGREED WITH MY
SUMMARY BUT THAT HE WOULD MOST CERTAINLY NOT RECOMMEND LAUNCH
AGAINST THIOKOL'S RECOMMENDATION MR_ KILMINSTER THEN
REQUESTED AN OFF-NET CAUCUS OF THE THIOKOL PERSONNEL IN UTAH.
MR. MCDONALD THEN MADE THE FIRST COMMENT THAT i CAN RECALL
DURING THE ENTIRE TELECONFERENCE. HE STATED TO JOE
KILMINSTER THAT DURING THEIR CAUCUS THAT THEY SHOULD CONSIDER
THE COMMENT MADE BY MR. HARDY DURING T_E cOURSE OF THE
DISCUSSIONS THAT THE CONCERNS EXPRESSE[ WERE FOR PRIMARY
O-RING BLOWSY AND _HAT THE SECONDARY O-_SNC WAS fN A FCS[TICN
TO SEAL DURING THE TIME 3F BLOWSY AND WO_LD D@ SC BEFORE
SICN[FISANT JOINT RCTATf:N HAD OCCURRED. MR. MCDCNAL? STATEU
THAT HE THCUSHT THAT _AS AN IMPORTANT CONSIDERATION. ALL
SITES THEN PUT THE CONFERENCE ON MUTE AND NO FURTHER
DISCJSSION OCCURRED BETWEEN THE SITES UNTIL APPROXIMATEL.'_
TH:RTY _:_:TES LATER WHE_ THE THIOKOL CAUCUS IN UTAH WAS
C3_?LETE.:
AT THE COMPLZ/_ W IF THE CAUCUS, MR. K:L_!NSTER STATED THAT
THEY HAD ASSESSES ALL THE DATA AN_ CONSIDERED THE DISCUSSIONS
THEREON AND PRESENTED THE THISKOL RATIONALE FOR RESOM_ENDINS
LAUNCH 3 c ITS 5?-L. _Ro PEINARTZ ASKED iF _HERE WERE A'_Y
FURTHER COMMENTS AND TO _Y RECOLLECTION THERE WER_ NONE. :
THEN ASKE_ THAT H_. KIL_INSTER SE_D ME A CDP_ OF Eli FLIOHT
_EADINESS R_TIO_ALE AND RECOMMENDATION. THE CONFERENCE WAS
THEN TERMINATED AT APPROXIMATELY _I _5 P.M.
AFTER THE TELECONFERENCE WAS COMPLETED, _ MCDONALD INFORMED
MR. REINARTZ AND ME THAT IF THE HTI ENGINEERING CONCERN FOR
THE EFFECT OF COLD WAS NOT SUFFICIENT CAUSE TO RECOMMEND NOT
LAUNCHING, THERE WERE TWO OTHE_ CONSIDERATIONS - LAUNCH PAD
ICE AND RECOVERY AREA WEATHER. I STATED THAT LAUNCH PAD ICE
HAD BEEN CONSIDERED BY THE MISSION MANAGEMENT TEAM BEFORE
DECIDING TO PROCEED AND THAT A PERIODIC MONITORING OF THAT
CONDITION WAS PLANNED. I FURTHER STATED THAT I HAD BEEN MADE
AWARE OF THE RECOVERY AREA WEATHER AND PLANNED TO PLACE A
CALL TO MR. ALDRICH AND ADVISE HIM WEATHER IN THE RECOVERY
AREA EXCEEDED LAUNCH COMMIT CRITERIA. AT APPROXIMATELY 11:30
P.M. MR. HOUSTON ESTABLISHED A TELECONFERENCE WITH MR,
ALDRICH AND HR. SESTILE OF KSC. I INFORMED MR. ALDRICH inAT
THE WEATHER IN THE RECOVERY AREA WOULD PRECLUDE IMMEDIATE
RECOVERY OF THE ORBS AND THAT THER_ WAS A POSSIBILITY OF LOSS
OF MAIN PARACHUTES, FRUTUMS AND DROGUE PARACHUTES, MR,
ALDRICH DECIDED TO PROCEED WITH LAUNCH.
MR. REINARTZ AND I THEN RETURNED TO OUR MOTEL.
| II I m
AT APPROXIMATELY 5:00 A.M. ON JANUARY 28, I iNFORMED DR.
LUCAS AND MR. KINGSBURY OF THE DAfA THAT LED fO THE THIOKOL
ENGINEERING CONCERNS AND THE FINAL RESOLUTION THEREOF. IT
DID NOT OCCUR TO HE TO INFORM ANYONE ELSE THEN NOR DO I
CONSIDER THAT IT WAS REQUIRED TO DO SO TODAY.
IN CONCLUSION, MY DECISION TO PROCEED WITH THE LAUNCH AS
RECOMMENDED BY THE THIOKOL OFFICIAL RESPONSIBLE FOR MAKING
SUCH RECOMMENDATIONS WAS BASED SOLELY ON THE ENGINEERING DATA
PRESENTED BY THIOKOL ENGINEERING AND THE MSFC ENGINEERING
EVALUATION OF THOSE DATA. I AM CERTAIN THERE WERE NO OTHER
FACTORS SUCH AS SCHEDULE PRESSURES INVOLVED IN MY DECISION,
IR,'I'. !.l 1 _ 6 (_1" T I
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TESTIMI)N__)F.IERR_MASt)N, SENIt)R ",'ICE PRESIDENT. V_'ASATt'll I)PERkTI()NS,
MR MASON: We will do that. l%rst o,% what we had m mind was that [ would give you the
kind of overview that Larw has, except to give you more specifics of what occurred at the Wa-
satch Division in Utah. And _hen after that, our Vice President of Engineerin_ will _o through
the specific technical charts that were reviewed that evening, and then Mr. Kilminster is pre-
pared to provide the additional rationale that led as to the final concluslon_.
But one thing I would like to explain. Larry's introduction was a little bit in error. I am
actually the senior vice president of the Wasatch operations, and I need to explain that. We
have three divisions there, the space division, strategic, and the tactical division. And of course.
the space division is dedicated to the shuttle program, and we have a general manager fi)r each
division.
Mr. Wiggins, who is with us today', is the genera! manager of the space divisior, and report-
ing to him is Mr. Kilminster, who is the program manager over manuthcturing and quality oper-
ations. ArM then Mr. McDonald reports to Mr. Kilminster as the program
I094
manager on space and the solid rocket motor itself.
On the ocher side, also reporting to me, is the vice president of engineering, Mr. Lund So I
hope that clariff.es the relationship a little bit.
The chronology is essentially as Larry had identified there.
MR. SUTTER: Can I ask one question now? Between Kilminster and Lund, who makes the
"technical" or engineering decisi,ms?
MR. MASON: Lund makes the technical recommendation to Mr. Kilminster.
MR SUTTER: He can act on it as he sees fit'?
MR. MASON: The final decision comes from the program manager to the general manager.
and if necessary to me. The engineering, since it is a separate function, does provide a bit of ,an
oversight on the program manager's tunctions. In other words, he doesn't report to him on a
hard line: he reports to him in an advisory role, if you will.
The sequence was essentially a_ Larry had identified it. We were notified both from Mar-
shall and Kennedy that the temperatures were going to be quite low the next morning tbr the
launch if -t were to occur at 9:38.
As a result of that, our engineering people
1095
looked at all of the aspects of the motor, particularly at the propellant mean bulk temperature,
which is normally something we are concerned about, and that was not of any concern in this
case, and identified that the only area of concern was the seal,
And they wanted to get together more data that existed in various places to take a further
look at the seal, which they did. They started gathering that intbrmation, and the preliminary
telecon occurred and arran2ed tot the subsequent formal telecon.
In the formal telecon then, we reviewed the technical data, which Mr. Lund will cover with
you, and the sequence was that we were gathering this data and attempting to reach our firm
recommendation at the same time. So we were in a position that we got the charts togeth,'r and
616
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were trying It) make the final c,_art +an our recommendation::, and at that point had not had any.
I _ _uld say, complete discussions.
There were differing opinions within the _roup, and the only opinion that surv:ved everyone
was to launch at 53 degree O-rint_ temperature or higher.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: What was the nature of the discussions? I mean, you say there were
a lot of different views. What were they, some of them'?
MR. MASON: Welt, they centered around the
1096
effect of the cold on the abiltty of the O-rings to respond, and it was primarily the primary O+
ring because, as has been mentioned, when you pressurize, when you run the leak test, you put
the primary O-ring on the wrong side of the roof. whereas the secondary goes onto the side that
you want it on.
So the question was, will the cold change the response time enough to keep that primary
from sealing'? And we did not have hard data that would give us that answer.
DR. RIDE: What was the lowest temperature that your data went down to'?
MR. MASON: We had--the only meaningful, I guess the only conclusive data was the f_ight
data, which was the 53 degrees, in other words, we had intbrmation on the hardness of the O-
ring and various other things like that, which Bob will cover with you in the chart. But we did
not have anything that said specifically how long does it take for the O-ring to move across.
Now, the reason, of course, that is the primary issue is that it needs to seal before you get a
high enough pressure in the case to open that gap, or the so-called joint rotation. So it needed to
seal in the 160 milliseconds.
GENERAL KUTYNA: If I may, sir, this has been a problem since about 19_0 off and on,
and it was looked at as a criticalit) one thi!ure mode for a few years and it has been continuing.
It seems strange that you had to gather the data on the environments of this thing at this very
moment: that if I had a problem lik_- this m an airplane, I would have been wo;king that envi-
ronment data from the year 19_0 or 1_'81, and not t985 or 1986.
Why was the environment not considered and why hadn't you gone through an exhaustive
review of the environmental effects on the failures prior to this time?
MR. MASON: Well, some of the data that we were gathering is data that was currently
being created at that time as a result of the eflbrt we were making to improve the reliability.
For example, there is a blow-by test in there. That one had been run with argon and we were
going to run it with freon, and we were getting the latest, very latest information we had, be-
cause we were giving consideration to that.
DR,. RIDE: Let me ask Don's question in maybe a sli_tl,tly different way. You had at some
point to sign up for the SRB's working at 31 degrees ambient temperature, because that is the
launch commit criteria on the entire system.
10f_8
What data did you use to certify the boosters to work at 31 degrees before you allowed that
to be taken into account'?
MR. MASON: Well, let's see. ! think the way it is set up is, we signed up to work--to have it
work with the propellant mean bulk temperature from the 40 to 90 degrees. I believe that is the
performance requirement.
MR. WALKER: Why was there no separate requirement on the O-rings? That is the issue.
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DR.RIDE: I mean,surely that requiremen:wasimposedon youby NASA. NASAmust
havesaid:Yoursolidrocketboosterhasto workat ;_[degrees;dotheanalysis(if cdt the ,_arts to
determine that it does.
MR. MASON: Well, t have to say what mv current understanding of the requirements is,
which is that it has to perlbrm, the propellant, at mean bulk temperature from 40 to ,99, and
that says it has to withstand temperatures of 31 to !19. And the attention has all been focused on
getting the performance when the propellant mean bulk temperature was 40 to 9,9.
DR. WHEELON: A question. It is normal to establish specifications on a unit and then to
complete a qualification program tbr a unit, prior to flight. Did you have a
1099
temperatur,_ specificationon the O-ring or the jointassembly, either one? And can you describe
what your qualificationprogram of'testingto verify-that that specificationwas being met?
And ifyou personally don't know the answer to that question, I would like that question
then to revolve to whoever in your organization picks itup. But I 'thinkwe need a clean, crisp,
clear answer to the question.
MR. MASON: Okay. I think it would be better that I not--[ think I know the answer, but I
_ave not enough confidence to try it.
DR. WHEELON: Who are you going to lateral that football to'?
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Who can answer that?
MR. MASON: Joe, can you answer that'?
MR. KILMINSTER: I believe, as Jerry mentioned, the major focus of emphasis was on the
40 to 90 degree requirement for the mean bulk temperature. When it comes to the seal, we have
a procurement spec fbr that material, a Mil R specidcation, that calls out that material being
capable over the temperature range of minus 30 to 500 Fahrenheit. And it was on that basis that
we qualified the use of that material as tar as the seal is concerned.
111}0
GENERAL KUTYNA: Capable of what?
MR. WALKER: Isn't that specification fbr a captured O-ring inside of a groove with a flat
mating surface, not this kind of configuration?
MR. KILMINS'I'ER: I don't believe the specification specifies what type of construction or
what kind of design. It is a material capability.
MR. WALKER: Could we have that information? That information must be in Parker's spec-
ifications.
MR, KILMINSTER: It's in the Mil R specification.
DR. WHEELON: What did you do to assure your material was meeting that specification?
What was the qualification program'?
MR. KILMINSTER: Early in the program, it was determined that we would not have a pro-
gram. a development program, and a test program that would qualify over that full temperature
range.
DR. WHEELON: What range were you going to qualify' over?
MR. KILMINSTER: Again, the emphasis was based on the solid propellant bulk tempera-
ture, and that qualification was done by analysis. We did not condu:t a test.
DR WHEELON: Let's set aside the question of
6IS
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bulk [e,mper:iture (',n the propellant. The qaest_on is what specificvtion did you have on the.io_lt
and the O-rint4, and how did you test to verit_ that in fact you ,,,'ere meeting that specit_cation,
or did you not have a specification and not ,:.est'."
MR KILM[NSTER: The specification we have is a Mil R specification
DR. WHEELON: Which is a generic spec to cover a whole range of military eqmpment,
right'.'
MR. KILf_IINSTER: In this case, it is this specific material.
DR WHEELON: Okay. S- it is minus 30 to plus 50o, is that correct?
MR KILMINSTER: That's correct.
DR. WHEELON: And how did you shade that requirement and how did you test to make
sure that you had met that shaded requirement?
MR. KILMINSTER: We did not test specifically to identi(y that requirement or test against
that requirement.
DR. WHEELON: Don't you find that a little surprising?
DR, KILMINSTER: There are many areas, as I mentioned, based upon the ol,ginal intention
that we would not conduct full-scale firings, full-scale tests, using
iI02
a full range of temperatures.
DR. WHEELON: Did you use any subset of that full range of temperatures in your tests'?
MR. KILMINSTER: Yes, we did.
DR. WHEELON: What range was that?
MR, KILMINSTER: That will be discussed when Bob discusses his charts, I believe we had a
static firing as low as 47 Fahrenheit.
DR. WHEELON: Ambient?
MR, KILMINSTER: No, that was the predicted O-ring temperature, using ambient calcula-
tions lower than that.
CIIAIRMAN ROGERS: Could I make a suggestion about procedure'/ Let's not worry about--
if there is a question that is asked and somebody can answer it, have them answer it. I mean,
you can still continue yo;_r ?,resentation that you have organized, but you are all here now and
it's reasonably informal.
So wl_en Bud asks a _!uestion like that and somebody can answer it, just have them stand up
and answer it.
DR. WHEELON: So you think went down to 47 degrees, in terms of a spec tbr ground test-
ing of the seal'?
MR. KILMINSTER: Yes.
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DR. WHEELON: But no lower than that'?
MR. MASON: That was the seal temperature.
DR. WHEELON: I understand, not the ambient. But you qualified the seal at 4T degrees
Fahrenheit?
MR. KILMINSTER: We verified it in a static test at 47 degrees.
DR. WHEELON: A static ground test?
MR. KILMINSTER: Yes, sir.
DR. RIDE: And you did no tests on the joint below 47 degrees'?
MR. KILMINSTER: That is correct,
619
(;_TN_R.\t. K['TYN.\ B,,. _' ('rappen. I _E,,u<ht _,)mei_cdy 4_,d v_,_terd_,v, m:_,b," iv ,._ls v,,t,.
:!:=._r _:he sht'tti:, ',_.ts ,i_,;lr'<,,._ _o i'!_ vviti_ at shuttie ',ern_)e,'_;ture _t :-_[ de_r_'e-_ or 'h,:,r,.._lbou.*s
VI('E ' v 3, Ntt\,R..,A. .\RM£Fg(_N(; .-krnt..,satd t_a_
_;ENER.\[. k -':'vv.\ No'._. ,_{,,.v ,-_, v,_,.l .."_rr,.i_l,e 'he l_,.'t rb,tt rht. :,hutt!e i_ .'le,,re4 t,) ,:_
A{ :{', ,.'tegT:,es _,!,{ ,.,<,t ',_)u _o.ve .mIv _e._r.e, ! :i*)','."l [i) ]- ":']egt'ees. ,I(ld _1_,' :,naly<s only to 1_ de-
" " ' ._h.lt
_ze_.- }tow do ",_9_; explAl_'l ' "
MR KiL?,IINSTI':R The _._nlv ,'xpht.'_.lt:,,n [ h.tve is their _e l_'i[ ,_h_{ w(-, had ._ mar,,,*tn be-
cause or _he m::_ter{al being capztble down _,_ minus :'_,_ as identified in the specifica_:ions.
[)R W_' 1EEI.()N: (',u)able. , t _ na_."
!li!i
MR. KILMINSTER: (_"_.pab{e o{' !'anctioning.
MR. WALKER: [ rez_lly thi.qk we need ,'.o uuderstand e×actly what that specification implies
in terms o{' the use o{' ()-rings in various kinds of confi<urations We would really like to have
that _ni:)rmation as soon as possible on exactly _ahat that specification implies
DR. WHEEl.ON: Or b¢_ter ,'et, can you _ive us the specification {'rom which you were work-
in_'.'
MR BOlS,J()l/f: The _¢pecit'ication in question is Xlil R ",::2-1'_A
DR. _VIIEEI.()N :\ f'urther question. Dtd you do any further testing of the ()-rin_as or the O-
ring/ material on y<mr own. {ndepe_dent of the motor?
MR KILMINSTER Not tha_ I can ecall
DR. WHEI':[.ON: So you wer,_ :tiNt '., _rktn._ {o the specifi¢'atio_, of the material as provided in
_he Mil Spec?
MR [_:II.MINSTER: Im talkin_ _: "h,, ,,i_-inalqual{t_cation program. We.-mbsequentty have
done testing.
• o
DR. WttEEt.ON: ffo:_ subseq_,{, ntl.V The i_l.-t .'_,_, . :,t d ,v
Mt-l. KII.MINSTER: No. Over the last probably year. year .rod a ha[6
I i05
DR WI![EEI,()N: e\:_d what .:lid those tests over _he last year te_I you?
MR. KILMINSTER: There is one test thai is included in Bob's presentation that gc_es down
to :{_) de_zrees and identifies no blow-bx at that poin, in a sub-scale.joint configuration.
DR. WHEELON: Is this a scale test?
MR KILMINSTER: It is a scale model.
M_R. MASON: It's -_ full scale O-ring and f'_il scale joint. It's just short. *.t small d_ameter.
I)R WHEELON: Ho_a many such te_ts did you run?
MR. KILM1NSTER: I can't recall.
DR. WHEELON: (Pan you get us that data'? I don't mean to tax your memory'•
MR KILMINSTER: Roger, do you recall the number of tests that were run at the cold tem-
peratures?
MR. BOIS,JOLY: No, I don't.
MR. THOMPSON: Arnie Thompson here. There were two tests run at 30 degrees and two
tests run at room temperature with the blow-by device, using argon as a tracer gas. The results
were that we could see no blow-by with the apparatus.
We recog_.ized that we needed to h_-ve a better sensitivity, so we went to freon li, which
shows better
,106
on the mass spectrometer. And those regis are proceeding and we have some data from that.
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DR .V[II']EI.ON In v,t,w ,ff that at)paren_l> -_at_fact,_rv vaIMati,m, why w_,r_, w_.: c(_:lcerm'd
Oil Iht' d_p: bet'or_,idLirlch' It _e_rl;_ t_)m(' _'hes¢'tests -;hotlJdb,iv_,_t'tv_tl .t_ _,'J-_'.,Ilhl_,_",_,,)u
_t're uneasy Wi_'
MR B()I.'4.I()I,Y Ir _h,,uld b*' emph,islzed that that .'.(,st -,IFllkl!.l_l:", [hi' _..,,1!1 i),l ,i -'l_'_'/,¢.'<lit °
b,lst,_, but (to,t,s not 4lrn,l[ ire fl_l,'. (t_,n,lr'dlL'4 ,,t" rh_, ]mnt :,nd ()-ring It 14 r',_t :i joint It i4 .I :g.l[.). :l
physical fixed _ap A,d 1t ',_a,a int_'nded to measure !I' bl,,w-b_ ct,uk| occur pa_t .m ()-riT]_ ,it ,i
very l,_vv temper:tt,lr_. .... r_,_t tht, rel'!lp,'rtlt'lr_L _:t.lt it . w,r_ l¢,w pr<,-_-,..Irt,..K th,_, ,_t*_ll'Ir'llr_ _t' the
{._nit it)n rr_l_Kit_!'t
That test was specifically set tip dt'ter th_ _ ,_RM-!.-, bh)w-b_ '_hwb ,_ccurr_'d .i year a<,., 1.1st
January. because at that presentation we made a point of sayln_ that there is a small, miniscule
portion el" :lit' that will <o past ,my -_eal. any O-rin_ seal, in its :lttempt to ,' ) It._ i[iitial ._ealinK <it
low pressures. And then rapidly, as the pressure increases, the seat is functionin_ better and
better at higher pressur_,s, and that was the purpose of that test That is the el[mate in which
that test was developed
, ltt7
GENERAL KUTYNA: But yesterday we were shown that that joint does in i,lct compress
The _ap moves, opens, closes
MR BOISJOLY: That's correc:
_,I'_\K[_\I. kl I'_\ \ ,ll I_"' i_I_ _n_ ".1:}; ,I,," ....... !,i\ ,"..'I _,,'I,,!,' :',_l_
\_1_,',_ :!,,' <,%\!t:. • it,' i,_ .-tI.! _,,*l t_'.,' :!!,. l_, in_ .'_!,',
And what you're say'ng is v,m did n(,' take that il'lt,o .c m._idecati,m during this r,,._r"
MR BOI_IOLY: On that particular test, that is correct
GENERAl. KI.:TYN.-\: It's a totally ,_tatw joint with no compressmn"
MR BOISJOLY: Yes
DR. COVERT: [ .vould like to ask a procedural question, please I._ that .pec y_:u :_:,IVt' tin arid
that number, i_ th'tt th; _ ,_ :e that was in ti_rce at the time the decision was rr, ade, (_r is that the
one that is in three now'.' Or what's the deal'.'
MR BOISJOLY: Tha, is the mil spec that controls the flight-on" O-rin_ material
DR. COVERT: What is the date of the spec':
MR BOIS.JOLY: I don't think I have that inibrmation
DR. ('OVERT: I think that would be helpful to know.
DR WHEELON: Did these tests figure in your
decision to proceed, or were they not a part of your thinking '*'hen you re-made the decision to
proceed?
MR. BOI%JOL_': To proceed with flying'?
DR. WHEELON: With flying'?
And I'm trying to say, there apparently was a caucus out in Utah at which you were asked
to consider your decision not to go and in effect you wound up going. Were these test results a
part of that reconsideratio,n?
MR. BOISJOLY: Yes, sir.
DR. WHEELON: What _ole did they play?
MR. MASON: Well, sir. if I could, maybe I could pull that, the next steps together, and ex-
plain what things were involved in the reconsideration. We got to the point where we had faxecl
these copies of these chart c, and at that time our best conclusion was to stay within our experi-
ence base.
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We h _d n,,e b,,,m ._t,l_, _,, de_er'mzne _,.he_i_er _, _vas r:_,_l,m_d t,_ extrnp,,iate.._nd ._, a_ that
[)q_lr'i_ _a,_, rt't'olHl'lH'Pi_t_'d (ht' ];', de_,'t't" _r .h.l_ht, P [er'i_pt',,<l('dr_,. i_,-'<ltl_" th,.,,t _a,A.; o'.lF _'_pt, rtellc't,
DR t_7]7][. ][,,- I,'_'i i_rlH.t!l. C,_LI',d _._,t" 7'IA'..'" I.'. Cl,ir'i_],'d _',_f" ';h<' :>.'t_)Ptt t'xac(]_ _,h.l: '_Tt,lt
MR .%I:\.';()N l"h.it loin, _ _<ls tit tht, time when w+, f_ixed _.he charLs t_> _tcirt the fr_r'm.l!
_F()L!p '<eh'clm
I)R KEEL: And in addition, can we have thcise charts" Do vo'a have them with you todav?
.%IR. MASON: Yes. qir .'%Ir I,und is goin_ to review those charts f))r you
('t[AIR.%IAN RO(IERS: When you say "formal telecon" and "'informal." how do you distin-
guish'
MR M:t,qON: Weli. it really was _h_,ther you have the whoh, _roup on or there is an indi-
,'idu:ai telecon. Earlwr there had been a telecon that Larry mentioned with Mr Lovin_ood. in
_hich there was just talk betv,'een Marshall and Morton Thiokol And then there had been the
call from Kennedy to us sayin_ it was goin_ to be cold. _,nd so I call that the informal telecon It
w_ls just commun;ca_in_ _enerally
And then it culminated :n what I call the formal telecon, at which we had evervone on the
net--Marshall. Kennedy. and ot, rself
MR [,()VINGOOD: 1"o clarity that. Kennedy was on. Jerry. durln_ the .1:15 telecon, but we
didn't have all the _,+,._l,le in that I 15 meetina that we bad in the later meeting.
(,I'IAIRMAN ROt,;ERS: I,et'_ discard the idea of "formal" and just c.',lll it telephone conver-
-_atlon. and who was taikin_ and what w;,:, said
.%IR. ,%IAS()N [ chink now I probabb, ought to
filet
address it as the flnal telecon in which we had everyone that Larry had listed to on the line.
And it was interrupted b_ our caucus, and some people would call that two meetings or two
telecons _n one, but in mv mind it wa-_ a continuin_ one, just interrupted bv the caucus
Now. we reviewed the charts in there and drew our conclusion that we ought to [lv at 5:{
de<tees or warmer And at that point _',e received a number of comments on the net. The ones
that [ looked upon as be,ng of consequence were that we were reminded that there really wasn't
good correlation or valid correlation between temperature and blow-by, and that was pointed out
because we had tw,.) cases of blow-by and one had been at 75 degrees and one had been at .-,!)
degrees, and we had a lot of cases at varying temperatures where there had been r.o blow-by,
and so we had very limited basi_, for saying that blow-by correlated with temperature. I_,._ " I, I1
MR. WALKER: Now you're talking about seal temperatures'?
MR. MASON: We're talking about seal temperatures, right.
DR. RIDE: Where was the lowest temperature that you had no blow-by?
MR. MASON: Well, in the static test motors it was 17, I believe was the lowest, but
1111
it's on Bob's charts. We have cases where we had blow-by listed and we have--what we did wa_
pick the coldest static test and the [light test. And of course, the static test didn't have any blow-
by.
The static tests are slightly different and Bob will explain those. We tended to not put a lot
of weight on those.
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(.;I':NF2RAI. KT.'TYNA But the' _vor_t blow-b), y,)u had _:_ at tho l,,_e_t terni>eratLlre, which
was -,I L" dat that p_)t _lve ),ou a .;tr, m,_ :(_rr,.,lat,.,m'
MR M.k.q()N That _a, r.ht exact discussion "hat _e h.ut. _as ,ab,, her the fact that that
_me was ._ome,,_;h:lt ;v,_r,;e th¢ln tho ,me .it 7, dt'_r_'e'< was that a corrt.[.ltl,m with tt'mperolture _,r
'als the t'ac_ t_at they blt._ b_ t[ both the 77, .._nd .;,_ IrMi¢:,tirl,.' that it _.l:_ Ft'l_t[IVt'l_, 'ndepend-
_,tlt :)t tt'ttlpt'r_ltuce
I)R ('()VE'IRT I)M you have ,m_ data ,mth,, ";t,l,2kin._ !,r the cle.lrances _>tl !ht' 77, de_"ee _me
:_.._c,_rnpared to the other"
MR MAS()N Ye',. we did
DR COVI':RT: And _ere those e[ear/.it!ces dfflerent significantly"
MR MASON' The} were relatively nominal, and we have that on the chart also.
MR WAIl'E: Is last year's experience what led
ii12
to this increased l,°vel of testing. In other words, the decision to go back and te.t,
MR MASON: Well. you might say cranked up the _ain in August when we had .qummarized
everything and concluded that we needed to get a more aggressive effort on improving things.
MR. WAITE: So it was your experi,mce on this one occasion that led to this need for more
testing"
MR MASON: [ would say it was collective e._perienct,, sitting down and braking at it totally.
[n any event, with the one comment about the lack of hard evidence that _here was really a
correlation, although instructively we felt that the cold would make it somewhat worse. The
other point that was made was that '_he concern about the primary having to move and mt beimg
colder, it might move slower We siaid, don't overlook the fact that the secondary i._ m position
and thereti_re it doesn t have _o move. so the time element is not as of great z_ consequence on
the secondary ;ts it is on the primary
So with those two comments and others, but those were the ones that we coasidered of con-
sequence, we decided that we ought to have a ,'aucus and assess whether it would be reasonable
to e×trapolate below our experience.
ill:/
DR. (,OVERT: How much more rigid is the grease at ;'_P,degrees than it is at 5!) degrees'.'
MR..MASON: [ can't give you at number. The grea;e is somewhat stiffer, but it is just a film
on the outside ¢;f the ()-ring.
DR. COVERT: At least in principle it is.
MR. MASON: Yes. And we m;:de that observation, that both the grease and the O-ring
would be stiffer. Now. we had durometer readings on the O-rings and we had the general knowl-
edge that the grease gets somewhat stiffer.
DR. FEYNMAN: Could I interrupt, because there's some physical thing that I don't under-
stand quite clearly, and that is why the need to move the O-ring makes it so much less likely to
seal than if it is in the right place.
MR. MASON: Because if it doesn't move fast enough and the joint opens up before it is
seated, then it won't seat.
DR. FEYNMAN: Why?
tMR. _.ASON: Because it doesn't have enough compression of the O-ring to hold the gas that
forces down into the crack.
MR. WALKER: In other words, it has to be defm ned initially belbre the gap opens up'?
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MR MA£1_NIt hasto Initially ._othnt whenthe_ashits it it will tl_wdowninto thecrack
md if _,,t__,,_s_,to,_muc_',,_Ithat compres:<onthen:t will i_._vby insteadof pushin_ it in
£,) that _v,t.4 _ur exact concern, that _.hat _,er,, ,mmll distance that it had to move. if it didn't
nww, that ,_'ithin the Ida milli._ec,mds before the _ap opened.
I/R FI£YNMAN: That _h_,orv of how lr works would account for the very much larger frac-
tion of ,wzzle ioints which failed compared to field joints, in which the nozzle joints have to
mayo about -_even time,; as far as .t if,aid joint, and that is consistent with your view.
MR. MASON: Exactb
So we then had our caucus, in which we revisited all el" the things we had talked about
before. And we recognized two primary things that are covered in Mr. Kilminster's chart, and
that was that the worst experience ,a,e had had in erosion was :1_ thousandths, and we know
from tests that the O-ring would seal with over 12i1 thousandths of erosion.
So our first thought was that if we had more erosion on the primary because it took longer.
it would still seal. even if it were eroded three times as much. So we said we still had a reasona-
ble expectatit,n that
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tb,' primary would seal. but we didn't have absolute data that said how lon_ it would take to
move.
So we then said, what happens if it doesn't? And we took the second point, which was that
the secondary was m position and did not have to move So we felt that the primary probably
w-ould seal, but if it didn't the secondary would because it was already it" position.
DR. FEYNMAN: During this discussion, r,'_,body noticed the possibility. I presume, that even
thoa_h the, secondary is in position, if the thing opens up and the resiliency of the material is
zero because _t is too cold, it won't close, it won't till into the seal? Was that considered or not?
MR MASON: That was considered, and the key issue became that what had to happen is
either the primary or the secondary had to seal in _he l(;0 milliseconds, before resiliency came
rote play. because in both cases if it seated before it opened up then it would extrude down into
the joint.
But as you pointed out, if it started to open. then the resiliency question came into play.
GENERAL KUTYNA: But that's !60 milliseconds after lightoff of the solids. Haw about the
resiliency effects in the seven seconds that the ,qSME's are
ii 16
compressing and bending this particular joint? Is there not an opening and closing of the gap
during that time, that could have compressed the seals.'?
MR. MASON: Well. I can't answer that with certainty. I believe that those effects are rela-
tively nominal on that joint, because the stiffener rings take out the bulk of that load on that
joint.
DR. RIDE: Has that analysis been done'?
MR. MASON: They have been looking at that effect again since the incident, and I can't tell
you what the outcome is right now.
DR. RIDE: Where is that done.'? Is that done at Thiokol?
MR. MASON: Both. We're do'ng it both at Thiokol and at Marshall. We cross-check each
other.
But I know there were some rough numbers done that said that that is quite stiff and it is
not likely to be, but it needed to be done in great detail.
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DR. RIDE: But tt hadn't been done bet\_r'_, 51-L '_
MR MASON Yes, the analysts, the Ioadanalvsis m the joint had been d{me I can't tell ','ou
whetheT we had looked at whether it had any eft)ct on the()-r'in_ I can't answer that questton
DR FEYNMAN: I've ,Zot the timtn_ problem
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m_xed up with the I_;q_ and _:,_ milliseconds and so on. I.et me understand Supposin_ the sec-
ondary seal is in place at some time and the primary seal has failed or something, and so the
secondary seal is supposed to be pushed in by compression.
Now, it opens'? Or is that not the way it works?
MR. MASON: Now it opens
DR. FEYNMAN: How does it .tay against the metal'.'
MR MASON: Because the pressure is high enough. You see, it's now got ,q0(), !-I00 psi. so now
the pressure overrides the lack of resiliency.
DR. COVERT: Have you calculated how far this thing opens during this twanging motion
because of the--it is a two-part system and it is a pin-connected thing, with a clamp there and
the rest of it acts like it's free, in effect.
MR. MASON: We've calculated how fast it opens and how much due to pressurization, and 1
believe that the data will show that that is the primary driver, that that overrides any impact
from the loads.
DR COVERT: From the bending.
MR MASON: But that l can't say has been verified yet.
DR COVERT: But I agree with you that the pressurization deformation may be large com-
pared to the
bending detbrmation. But if we are at a marginal situation, it seems to me you can't throw away
the small part, because that might be the thing that tips it across the edge.
Is tiaat a reasonable way to look at it':
MR. MASON: I think we have to look at every small potential contributor, yes.
MR. HARDY: Mr Chairman, I might make one comment to Sally's question earlier about
ca!cu!atin,d the effect of the :ransverse !a_d_ on the joint. We did in the early part of the pro-
gram run static structural tests and I talked about the dynamics of the joint, but we did run
static structural tests where the test article with a flight representation of the joint under pre_-
sure, under a number of pressure cycles I think it was said yesterday. I don't know how many,
but a large number of pressure cycles, where we did put in the transverse load and the maxi-
mum design transverse loads on the case, both at the aft joint and at the forward joint while we
were pressure cycling.
GENERAL KUTYNA: But did you do it prior to pressure cycling? Because that's when it
happens.
MR. HARDY: We did it in the precise sequence of the pressurization: the twang load, the
pressurization, and then the flight dynamics.
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GENERAL KUTYNA: And how much opening or closing of that gap did you get,'?
MR. HARDY: Well, we measured the opening and closing. We measured it for the total
effect, that is both the pressure effect and--
GENERAL KUTYNA: But now the pressure happens afterwards. How much did you get?
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MR HARDY I can't recallthat. I don't rememberthat. l don't rememberthe precise ffect
ot"thepre-i_nitionload_n thejoint
G[';NFRALKUTYNA:But .vouidthat be.afactorif wehavein t':lcta sealthat haslost its
resiiiency,that you would be concerned_.bouthow much that _zapopened and closed and
squished that seal pr_or to the pressurizntion?
MR HAPDY Depending upon the effect and how much that load might open the gap. tt
could be a t'actor And _'e are aI'ter that answer right now.
MR. SUTTER: On these tests, was it just on one set of O-rings, or did you change your _'aps
and the dimensions of the ()-rings'? Did you run a variation"
MR, ftARDY: I can't remember how many sets of O-rings were involved. I do remember
that repeated pressure cycles were done on the same O-ring. but I can't remember exactly how
many sets of O-rings were
1120
involved,
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: You took part in all of" these conversations yourself,'?
MR. MASON: I took part in the final conversation from the beginning, the whole telecon,
from when we thxed the harts down until we drew the final conclusion. I was there.
CtIAIRMAN ROGE?S Mr. McDonald testified, at least I thought he did, that the recom-
mendation was not to launch. Thiokoi's recommendation was not to launch. Who--at one point.
Who was involved in that discussion leading up to the decision not to launch'?
MR. MASON: All of us that were in the meeting, we were gathered and we were reviewing
the data and attempting to reach our recommendation simultaneously.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Now, could you give us, without being too precise, the nature of' the
arguments against launch'? "Fell us what was being said. There must have been a consensus
against launch if" that is what you conveyed to NASA.
MR. MASON: Well, at that point we were trying to meet the deadline of getting the data
together and getting the recommendation in, and so the engineering people were generating that
and put together the
1121
charts.
CHA,'RMAN ROGERS: What were they saying, though'?
MR. M-_.SON: They were saying, we're going to be outside of our data base to go colder tl':::n
53 degrees, and we're concerned about whether the O-ring will move fast enough to seat and seal
before the joint opens up. And that was the thrust of the issue, is not knowing exactly how long
it would take for the O-ring to move into position.
DR, COVERT: Jerry, if the O-ring has been eroded a little bit or ablated or chart ,d or what-
ever the damn thing does, it is now oval rather than round, and the action--is this going to tend
to rotate vertically? Is that the stable motion, or does it tend to, say, slide in, skinny in the
vertical direction as opposed to rotating like this?
MR. MASON: ! don't know. Perhaps. There is probably some theory there, and Roger is
probably the best one to answer that. I'm not sure we know exactly.
MR. BOIS,JOLY: That was one of my major concerns, and I addressed that as a timing time-
tion to seal. And I believed and I still believe and I believed that night that there isn't anybody
on the face of this earth that can tell you exactly the mechanism that happened in that joint.
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And ever- betore the fact, you don't understand if it's _oing to rotate and walk up and delay
or either slide because of kts _tiffness and delay. But the timin_ function that I .spoke of that
night had to do with the thct that I was afraid that that timing function could throw u_; in from
an i_nition transien t at the start to somewhere after that start time, and that is what my major
concern was about
DR. COVFRT: l think Roger and I are :hinking along the same line. If it rolls in. then it is
not a problem because you have the full exposure. But if it slides in and it is not skinny', it may
in tact continue to blow by.
MR. BOISdOLY: But my concern even went beyond that point, because as it is perlbrming
this function at the beginning of the transient cycle, it still is being attacked by hot gas,
DR. COVERT: Precisely.
MR. BOISJOLY: And it is eroding at the same time it is trying to sea!, and it is a race
between, will it erode more than the time allowed to have it seal.
And that was my major concern, because SRM-15 showed erosion and hot gas blow-by at a
low temperature, and that was the r ,ajvr iss "'_ _,n the table at that time.
DR. COVERT: Thank you very :',_m.h.
CHAIRMAN ROGERg: Did yea change yo, - ,_:,:d?
l I:_ _,
MR. BOISJOLY: No, sir. never.
MR. SU'PTER: Can 1 ask a qu_,stion, Mr. Chairman?
In the_e conversations, this discussion abot, t thi, s_,nplex seal right there, was that dis-
cussed with you?
MR. MASON: Well, on the telecon Mr. Mulloy did go through his rationale and talked about
the simplex seal.
MR. SUTTER: Did Thiok.:! agree with the; fact that you could work with the simplex seal'?
Did that influence your decision'? What if there was no statement that the criteria said the sim-
plex seal is okay? Would you have still made the decision you did?
MR, MASON: I'm not sure I understand that question.
MR, SUTTER: Well, I g_less my question is, were you designing the same criteria that
NASA was designing, and who established the criteria, and what were your ground rules for
design?
MR. MASON: Well, let's see. If we g::t back to that fundamental design criteria, I really
can't answer that. I'm not sure whether doe or Bob can.
I know what we were endeavoring to r,o was to be confident that it was safe to fly, and we
weren't
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going back to that kind of a fundamental issue.
MR. WAITE: I have the same question in regards to the initial conversation .bout the single
seal versus the two seals. You didn't really address the simplex seal until the latest conversa-
tion.
MR. MASON: Our thought has always been that _t is essential to have a seal in that first
100 and--well, 160, 180, 200 milliseconds, before t'.,e joint opens up. If we get a seal at that point,
then it doesn't really make any difference whether it's the primary or secondary. Once it is
sealed, then it is reliable.
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And so from a practical standpoint, we have been addressing o_ettin_ the high confidence or"
getting that seal at ignition, and in that sense .....
MR SUTTER: But you're saying that when that seal--when one seals, then there's no as-
sumption tha _ any other failure might wipe out that seal'.'
MR. MA::,ON: Well. everything we have known and everything demonstrated that once you
had that seal, that there wasn't another cause that we could identify that would cause it to [hil.
because once it's sealed there is no more gas flow and then it is simply a benign environment
DR. COVERT: But if it seals on the secondary flow before the joint enlarges or rotates.
whatever you
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call it, and now it is a benign environment because there is no gas flow, and if the primary seal
is not yet seated and now you get joint rotation and you feel the pressure, is what you said
before, the pressure is sufficient to deform the secondary seal so that the primary will never be
called into play again, is that right?
MR. MASON: That is correct. And there is--on that point, there is a unanimous position.
There isn't any difference in that. that once it is pressurized it will handle the Joint rotation.
The issue is wbether it gets pressurized rapidly enough.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: I am unclear as to why you considered 53 degrees was
the limit of your experience base, rather than the ,17 'hat you had had in the static test.
MR, MASON: Okay', I will explain that. In the static test, we static test it in a horizontal
position, and in the process of' mating the segments the putty is exposed differently. _t flows
differently than it does in the vertical mode.
You don't have to touch it in the vertical mode, but in the horizontal mode we have to go
inside the motor and tamp the putty to get it in the right position. So our feeling was that that
probably made--
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well, it made a putty job that could be classed as better than the flight condition, and so it may
have masked something.
And so we were hesitant to use it absolutely as evidence that it was okay.
MR. WALKER: Why didn't you ask for inspection of the putty seals in the flight, or didn't
you think that was important, the vertical mating?
MR. MASON: Welt, we had finally reached the conclusion that you can have--you can trap
air in the mating operation. You can cause an air void when you leak test, when it blows back
into the putty, and you can't be sure. You can go look and if it hasn't erupted through the putty
you may have a path that is there but it hasn't exposed itself.
So even if you inspect it, you have the possibility of that path. So we felt that inspection
wouldn't eliminate that possibility, and so we had to have a design approach that would tolerate
that. That was our thought.
MR. WALKER: Can you respond to the question as to why the shuttle SRB design is differ-
ent than the Titan design in terms of these seals? Were both of these designs done by your com-
pany?
MR. MASON: No, no, United Technologies.
1127
MR. WALKER: That is probably the answer.
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MR MASON: And I think maybe there are some diit'erence in burnin.; surt'ace require-
ments I'm not sure But anyway, [ know the Titan was cc,nsidered at the time the joint design
was done. but [ think there were reasons•
But the point I would like to get to. however, is that we had the caucus avd had these dis-
cussions, and it was clear that we were not going to reach a _nanimous position there, ar:d so we
were then t)_ced with the issue: Shall we stay with 52 degrees or is i_ reasonable to extrapolate'?
And we had the reasons that I've already identified that made us feel that it was reasonable
to extrapolate. S,_ our final conclusion was reached by me having a review with the vice presi-
dent of engineering, the program manager Lund, Kiiminster. and the general manager Wiggins.
and my own opinion.
We collectively agreed that it was reasonable to extrapolate, with the rationale that was
listed on Kilminster's chart that said that we had a substantial margin, that we could erode
more in the primary by a factor of three than what we had seen before; and that even if that
didn't happen, that didn't seal, we had the secondary in a position where it did not have to move
in
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order to seat. and therefore it would seal.
And that was the basis for our conclusion. And we have brought with us today the people
that had objections. In fact, Roger, as you just noted, is one who says he didn't change his mind.
But it was one of those where it becomes the responsibility of management to make we think a
rational decision, and that is what we did.
MR. WALKER: How many people in the meeting were considered seal experts? That is,
their primary interest or their knowledge would qualify them as particularly knowledgeable on
seals?
MR. MASON: Well, to varying degree_ i guess there's a half a dozen people there, Bob. you
would be best to respond to tbat.
MR. LUND: It is n matter of degree. It's a judgment factor. Certainly Roger Boisjoly is a
seal expert, and A_nie Thompson.
MR. WALKER: Did you seal experts agree, or is it kind of a confusing issue?
MR LUND: There was much data, and I wil! present that data to you in a iittle bit. that is
both ways. Some say it's okay, some say it's not. So each engineer that was there reached his
o-,n conclusion from the data that was presented, and so there is a diversity
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at opinion.
MR. MASON: Mr. Chairman, I did make one point while you were gone that was consistent
with your earlier request, and that is that when we came down here we did review--and first, I
made the point that we did not have a unanimous opinion, and t_ecause of the fact--we had a
unanim,_us opinion among the key people reporting to me, but because of that we did identify
and talk to the people who had e_,ncerns, and we brought the people that had concerns, so that if
you wanted to yo,,a could talk to them, or if they wanted to they would have an opportunity to
speak.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Very goc_.. Thank you,
MR, MASON: Now, that is as far as I was intending to proceed, i thought Mr. Lund could go
through the charts that we looked at that _ight,
CHAIP.MAN ROGERS: Any other questions?
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M_ WAITE: [ have one more. I still haven't _ot the sequence or" events m terms of _h,,s
sir_le versus dual sea! concept Did the dual seat discussion c_me up after you had been contact-
ed ,)r at'ter your caucus, o;" bet'ore the caucus7
MR MAS()N: Well. l thl_k that _t became a thought, a pctmary thought, after we had said
tha' ,_e ought to r_v _o .'_:_,and we hau that ens.._ie, g
I[:,a)
cc'nversation. And it was pointed out at that point that the secondary seal was in position. And
we had been focused so much on the primary seal that _,e said: Wait a minute, let's take a look
at that, because we really hadn't --
MR. WAITE: Who pointed it out'?
MR. MASON: Mr. McDonald. He said, don't overlook that. His comments were that the cold
is in the direction of badness, but that--and that is the concern with the primary. The second-
ary, boy;ever, is in a t)etter position. Don't overlook thau
And we said, well ....
DR. (.,OVERT: Could I ask you one more.
MR. MASON: We!l. I guess we ought to have AI say just exactly what he said.
MR. McDONALD: I commented that lower temperature zs in the direction of badness for
both O-rings because it slows down the timing function, but that the effect was much worse ._br
the primary O-ring compared to the secondary O-ring because the leak check port puts the pri-
mary O-ring on the wrong side of the groove, while the secondary O-ring is in the right direc-
tion, and that this condition should be evaluated in making the final decision tbr recommending"
the lowest acceptable launch temperature.
ll:_1
Based on the data presented in chart 2-I, I considered this very important because, depend-
ing upon how much delay one has with getting a good, reliable primary seal affects the capabil-
ity for the secondary O-ring t,: seal.
MR. CRIPPEN: Excuse me. And we made that in light of even though we had a ClL saying
the secondary might not be there during separation?
MR. McDONALD: Well. the charts that were presented that night, one of the charts, and I
had presented that chart earlier in August in a meeting at NASA headquarters, and it ,was pre-
sented that night and we looked at that and it showed the ....
DR. KEEL: Do we have that chart, so all the Commissioners can see it'? .-
MR. McDONALD: Yes, in Mr. Lund's presentation.
DR. KEEL: Can you pull it up now if you're going to talk about it, though'. ) Can you put
char*, 3 up and let Mr. McDonald make his point.
(Viewgraph.i lmq. z m_ :q
MR. MASON: Do you want to do it right now?
DR. KEEL: Yes, it is up there.
MR. McDONALD: That was one of the charts, and _'hat I was looking at was that we could
conclude that this lower temperature doesn't affect the timing functions,
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which I said I really feel it does--so that we really don't change the time for the primary seal to
really seal, what is being eroded, up to the 170 milliseconds. That is, we haven't changed this
launch from any other.
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Ho,,vever,it' the coldertemperaturetakeslongerto not only movethe seat,but alsoto ex-
trudeit m thegapbecauseit's harder,then that mightthrowus into thoselongertimeswhere,
asyoucansee,it reducestheprobabilityof thereliablesecondaryseal.
That wasmvconcern,andif you_othroughit far enoughit saysthat wehadalreadystated
that wehavea highprobabilityof"nosecondarysealbecauseof the rotationproblem,andI said
that _sa veryimportantconsideration.
MR MASON:LetmeaddressthentheCILquestion,becausethebasisfbr---
DR.COVERTWhat_:_a '_CIL'".'
MR.MASON:Critical ItemsList.
Thereasonthat that waschangedfromthe 1-Rto 1wasthis veryrationalehere,whichsaid
that alter earlyon,aRerthe 171)or ;1;10milliseconds,youdidn't havea redundantseal,andsoit
waschangedbecauseit wasnotredundanta!! thetime.
But it didn't really removetheredundancyat ignition.
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CHAIRMANROGERS:Could 1 put the case and oversimplify it just a bit, because this is a
good opportunity to be argumentative, if you will, on why you changed your mind. First, it was
criticality item one, so that meant that if it was a failure, the mission was a catastrophe, and
there had been discussion about that, a lot of it.
Fhen you made a decision, you and Thiokol made a decision, to recommend against launch
R_r this very reason, that you were concerned, And then Mr. McDonald, in describing what hap-
pened, said that Thiokol had notified NASA thai they should in effect not launch or conditions
were ,not appropriate for launch, however you want to say it.
And then there was a pilone call and he said, the conclusion being that Thiokol was directed
to reassess all the data because the recommendation was not considered acceptable, in that--he
was a little unclear about what he said, but ar,'yway the recommendation was not considered
occeptab!e.
And then you were supposed to have a five minute phone call caucus, which lasted ;_0 min-
utes, and you _hanged your mind.
Now that, you know, it is hard to explain it to an average ovtsider. Yea ,'ould think that
that was
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one of the most critical things you can imagine in this program, and it had been so considered
by "_ASA for a long time, and you obviously knew it.
What caused you to change your mind? Try to explain it. The impression is that you were
directed to do it, that there was so much pressure to get this launch off that you were directed to
j: ido it, and you -ua it.
Now, if that is not the case. try to explain it in language that the public wi?l understand:
Why you changed your mind and how you did it so quickly?
MR. MASON: Well, I think I woula start by saying that when we picked the 5:_ degree tem-
perature it was clearly the most conservative approach, and it was done because we had only
gotten to a position in time to get to the telecon discussion. We had not established it as an
unequivocal position, but rather one that was conservative, that stayed within our experience
base.
That ',;'as what we were thinking at that time.
When we had the telecon, then the other factors that I mentioned came out, and I would not
characterize that NASA said, directed us to reassess. What NASA said was: Here is our feeling
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andour rationale,andwewonderwhetheryoufeelstronglythat that 5;5degreesis as lowasit
is rationalto fly.
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And I think weall recognizedthat it certainlywasgoodat 50degreesand 45,and so the ques-
tion wasn't one of do you go below 53 degrees.
It was a question of how much below 58 can you go.
DR. RIDE: What data did you have to make that extrapolation'? Did you have any data at
all'?
MR. MASON: Well, we had the effect of the temperature on the durometer of the O-ring.
We had the one blow-by test that showed that it didn't blow by at 30 degrees. And other things
that don't come to my mind that are in Mr. Lund's charts.
We had the higher margin of erosion. I mean, we had the ability to tolerate considerably
more erosion than we had ever had and _till seal.
But the reason tbr the debate was the fact that we didn't have hard evidence of how quickly
that O-ring would move. And it became a matter of judgment rather than a matter of data, and
that is the reason we couldn't reach a unanimous opinion.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: What was the split? How many people were against it, even at the
last moment?
MR. MASON: We didn't poll everyone.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, roughly.
MR. MASON: 'well, I really couldn't guess. There
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were so many people--people were shuffling their positions within their own minds during the
conversation,
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But I mean, was there a substantial number or just one or two?
MR. MASON: There were i would say probably half a dozen, five or six in engineering, that
at that point would have said it is not as conservative to go to that temperature and we don't
know. The issue was we don't know for sure that it will work.
DR. RIDE: Roughly how many in engineering said they felt it was okay?
MR. MASON: Bob, do you want to guess?
MR. LUND: ,lust from an informal poll I would guess there were five or six, the same way.
CttAIRMAN ROGERS: So it's about evenly divided among the engineers'?
MR. LUND: That's a very estimated number.
MR. MASON: Remember, of course, it's a lot easier to say just stay conservative.
MR. CRIPPEN: Mr. Chairman, if I may make an observation. Since the earliest days of the
manned space flight program that I've been associated with and Mr. Armstrong has been associ-
ated with, our basic philosophy is: Prove to me we're ready to fly. And somehow it seems in this
pa_vticular instance we have
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switched around to: Prove to me we are not able to fly.
I think that was a serious mistake on NASA's part. if that was the case.
DR. WHEELON: May I make an observati(m while this chart is up, Mr. Chairman. You
notice that it says from :l:{0 milliseconds to 600 milliseconds there i,_ a high probability of no
secondary seal capability. I just point out that at 445 milliseconds was when the black smoke
was starting to rome out. I presume they are correlated. That's no big deal, but .just before the
chart gets away from us.
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CtIAIRMAN ROGERS: Just one more question. In the final telecon, did you or anybody
from Thiokol let NASA know that the engineers were reasonably evenly split on whether to
launch or not launch?
MR. MASON: No, we did not. We did--it was on the telecon when it was asked individually'
of the three gentlemen down there, Mr. Land, Wiggins, and Kilmins*er, whether they agreed to
fly. But there was no discussion about the overall vote or poll.
Now, it was clear, I believe, tha_ it: was not unanimous because of the lengthy discussion and
the caucus and so tbrth. But we did not say in detail
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that.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: In other words, I'm not speaking about a Foil now, an exact count.
But I wondered whether you told NASA, we've got a pretty good split here among our engineers
and yoa sh_ 'lld know that, and we've decided to recommend it, but we have got some engineers
that are pretty welt split.
I mean, did you say something like that?
MR. MASON: No, sir, I did not. But during the telecon I think most of the people know
most of the people by voice, and the pros and cons as discussed by the telecon I think would
have conveyed the general statement.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: So those engineers that opposed i_ were on the telecon, too?
MR. MASON: Oh, yes.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And they expressed their opinion at that time?
MR. MASON: Yes.
DR. WHEELON: To NASA or to you?
MR. MASON: To the group on the telecon.
DR, WHEELON: So NASA heard their reservations on the telecon'?
MR. MASON: Yes, sir, I believe so.
MR. SUTTER: Can I ask a question. Why wasn't Houston in on mat phone call'7 ' Aren't they
responsible for the design of the machine?
DR. COVERT: Marshall is.
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MR. REINARTZ: Mr. Chairman, I might answer that directly. The item that ,, _s being con-
sidered was an SRB item, a level three item, and that was treated as a level three item, as are
many items by all of the elements, either orbiter, SRB, or ET. And we considered that, and de-
pending upon the outcome of that telecon, an unfavorable recommendation by Thiokol to not
launch or by the level three group, we would have then gone to JSC and said: Here is the situa-
tion as we see it and why we would not recommend launch at this time. In the conditions.
We treated it as a level three matter. It did not violate any of our--it did not require any
waivers for our hardware and did not violate any launch commit criteria that we were made
aware of by Thiokol. And on that basis, we di:l not bring in the level two organization into that
discussion.
MR. SUTTER: Do you mean the decision to not have a redundant seal situation was not a
waiver?
MR. REINARTZ: No, sir, it was not a decision to not have a redundant seal, as we indicated
that the worst case condition that you could get into would be a single seal, which is the same
situation as is now in the critical items list, ",hat you could have a single
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seal,:_ndthat wouldbe:l 'a'orstcasesttuationthat vouwou!dget in_e
We indicated durin_ the discussion there may be some increased probability of e,"o_mn on
the primary, but it was not concluded that you would have -_s :_tfore_one conclusion
MR, ,gUTTER: You don't understand n',y question At one point in time. somebody t,ud down
the desl_,;n criteria that this would be ;a re_,_undant seal. Somewhere along the line it go_
changed, and all l would like to know is who made that decision, and then would he ,.,*9alon_
with this decision
MR. ALDRICH: Could I speak for Houston and for the level two orgamzation, which is re-
sponsible for the integration of this total shuttle system'? The critical items hst is prepared and
managed by the level two across all the projects, and they contribute to it, either with compli-
ance through the two and three tolerance requirements that were described, I think yesterday or
earlier last week.
And that process is tbrmai, and the document that Sally has here in front of her is a docu-
ment which in fact existed as l-F, early in the program for this case. It was changed in 198;L and
it was reviewed and signed off at all levels of NASA, not only the level
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three project, but also in Houston by the level two project management and in Washington bv
the level one management, as the final concurrence in that.
So the situation of agreeing to accept this joint as a single seal during the timing period
described here when only one of the seals came into pIay was reviewed and accepted for the
program at all levels tormally and understood.
This meeting that we're d:scussing here, however, where that was discussed as it pertains to
the cold or the performance of the seal on the actual tlight day of 51-L, is a meeting that was
held only at level three, as Stan just discussed. And not only the synopsis of the points consid-
ered in that meeting, but the fact that the meeting was held. was not known to myself or to the
level one o,'ganization, Jesse Moore, above it until subsequent to the event of _he launch day.
MR. CRIPPEN: Sir, if [ might point out, I guess maybe it's a matter of interpretation of the
ClL. I don't think the CIL was written to say it's okay to fly with one seal. I thought the CIL
was written to say that it is okay to accept that after the thing separates the secondary may not
be sealed.
DR. KEEL: Mr. Chairman, I think that is just
1142
the point I was going to make. If you look, there is some ambiguity here or the danger of ambi-
guity, The criticality items list says specifically that the primary seal, the primary seal, not a
single seal, is considered criticality one, which means that therefore the primary seal presum-
ably has to be viewed as working and cannot fail,
DR. FEYNMAN: Could I ask a question? Could you tell me, sir, the names of your four best
seal experts, in order of their ability?
MR. MASON: I would ask Mr. Lund to respond to that. Bob, did you hear the question?
MR. LUND: Yes. Roger Boisjoly I thint¢ is number one, with Arnie Thompson--I'm not sure
who the best is. It's one and two.
DR. FEYNMAN: Approximately--what was that?
MR. LUND: Roger Boisjoly and Arnie Thompson, and Jack Kapp, K-a-p-p.
DR. FEYNMAN: And some other guy. And if you don't have any further, that'll be all right.
MR. LUND: Jerry Burns.
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FEYN.MAN: Now. Mr. Th_m_psor. were v,_u in a<reement, and s,> forth'
TttOMPSON I wa_ n,)t ira a_reeln+,nt
FEYNMAN: Mr Kapp"
LUND: fie is not here.
WHEELON: Does anyone know what his position was.'
MR. LUND: Yes. I talked to him and he said--after the meeting, because there had been so
much discussion--I asked him, I said. how did you really feel. Jack. and he said: I would have
made that decision, given the information we had that :'vening.
CHAIRMAN RCKIERS: Would or would not'?
MR. LUND: Would have made the same decision.
DR. FE_t NMAN: So it may be that he would be in agreement '
MR. LUND: Yes. he was in agreement. That is as close as I can put it
DR FEYNMAN: And the tburth man's name'
MR. LUND: Jerry Burns. I don't know.
DR. FEYNMAN: So of the four. we have one don't know. one maybe yes or very likely yes,
and two who were {qrst mentioned without doubt as being the seal
fill
experts, they both :;aid no. That is the information I wanted, that's all. Thank you.
MR. ACHESON: Could I ask a question. This Mil Spec A32.1SA that was referred to earlier
is described as meeting the requirement that this material be capable. I think was the word. of
between minus :In and 51)I) degrees Fahre.-.heit. Capable of what wasn't clear to me
CapablP relating to the function as seals, or capable only in the sense that the raw material
would not disintegrate or break up or something?
MR. KILMINSTER: I can't recall the specitic working in the back of that specification.
MR. ACHESON: What I'm trying to find out is how much reliance was placed by MTI when
it acquiesced to fly in this stack and that they wjre confident of the material in that respect
MR. LUND: We didn't discuss that specificati,m at all. We depended upon our data. I don't
think we discussed the specification at all.
MR. WALKER: Is that a materials specification or an operations specification'?
MR. LUND: Its a material specification for tb,_ Viton.
MR. WALKER So it doesn't speak to the use,
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configuration, or operation?
MR. BOIS,/OLY: dust in the form of an O-ring, but it does not spoak to the form of how that
O-ring--
MR. WALKER: That wouldn't seem to be an appropriate specification tbr this particular
question, would it?' Wouldn't you need a functional specification to say that under a certain con-
figuration the O-ring would operate2 Wouldn't that be what you would want, rather than just a
specification on the material?
DR. COVERT: Let the record show that Mr. Lund nodded yes.
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MR I.I'NI_ 'G's
('HAIR.V,.\N RIR',["_RS Mr :\]drich. _,;_ back to v_ur _a_ernen_. ,qe!_her v_u n,_r *|r
MR AI.DR!('I't Ye-< -_r I ,' _,n c_m'_m,ent tl'_at ',t :s :'p,_, t_nder_t ,_nd_r,,d th.,,_ Mr .M,,,,r,, d,.H. n_t
kq,,w ,,t _t, b,,cau.;_, J did r_ ,t kr_,,,,v ,," ,t..u_d I have ,mt_ t,)Lmd ._ut abou_ th;_ ,m_,ett_:.g _tr, c_, r'_e
l,lc'derlt
_'f!:\IRM.\N Ri)t;l<R.'4 And vtere t}_er'_, ,)lher.; }ikt' '¢<v_lr,_elf, that ;re would ,have -'xp*'cted
'.v,,u'_d _'_,lve, k.',,v>wn abou! it that didn't kno_,, aN,u{ ,t' D,) ",m_ understand my qu_ st on
II ld
MR AI,I)R|CH The t,*'o important people m terms of responsibility in the chain of con>
mand are .less and myself And I should comment that the {'ollowin_ day we met early before
the launch in the firing room. myself and Mr. Reinartz from Marshall and Mr Moore and Mr
Lucas--Dr. Lucas from Marshall. all of us in the same area. physically adjacent as w_, are in this
meeting.
And we discussed concerns and progress in the countdown continually durin_ that time. and
we also called for fli_zh" readiness--that is a specific _oal of each project tbr myself and Jess--at
minus 2_ minutes in th,, countdown and at minus 9 minutes in the countdown.
And through _hat morning, because of the launch delay there was probably a five or six
hour ?erred when we were ,..,*athered there, with a break which I took to review the _ce situation
outside of the area. Durin_ that period of time. we did not discuss the concern _,'ith respect to
the SRB and the temperatures, or particularly wtth respect to this joint or the seals
('HAIR}IAN ROGERS: And you did not kno,*' that there was a split among the engineers in
Thmkol about whether the launch should occur"
MR. AId'_RI('I-[: I did n{}t kn,w t.har there was a
I I17
concern about the solid rocket booster.joints, her that there had been discussions relating to the
possibility of concern.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And you think that is true about Mr. Moore, too"
MR. ALDRICH: Yes. sir. [ would be certain of that.
DR RID_]: Do you think that is appropriate?
MR. ALDRICH: Let's see. I would be more pleased if we would have had a full discussion
As you saw earlier, we had a series of meetings and a series of requests from each element of
our program to review their concerns and put them forward.
CHAIRMAN ROGF, RS: How is the final decision made? Is it made between you and Mr.
.Moore. or is there a committee?
MR AI,DRICH: We have a process of a lot of [brmal documentation, and yotl have had some
extensive questions about wanting to understand it. and it is a complex system. But the formal
process of documentation specifies the criteria to conduct a launch, such as the 31 degrees for
the system launch failure is one criteria.
And the managem_nt is not in ae in-line role of allowing the launch to proceed. We have a
launch
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team in Houston with a flight director. We have a launch team here at Kennedy with an oper-
ations director, and they conduct the entire launch from prior to the countdown through the 43
hour countdown period and through the launch, based upon the rules, regulations, and data
with respect to those rules that their people are looking at.
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._laila_IneFlt m,mltor< th.it pr_'i,.-_ _,_d _lves ccqlcurrence Jl "itl" _'_._lflt.s wt, !_,1_,_ + _'_llked
.tbout the tli_h _. readtm'-_ review, mavb,, ,, -+k "_o tx,_a_ _veek..4 _'_fgre. 'ht' I. rl_I,'_'.;- on@ day. _):!e
d<l_ bet'_re, and tit th_,..e c,m_mltmerlt p_,rto_!, ai+,.ed :lb,)Ll[
[{tit {h_lt {._ I ,.'t_llt'l.lf't't'[l__'_' that _%e know ti( tied .%'tI." Itl :10¶ [_1 _)[q'c't't'(l, ,t[t(t_ II" ',_' ',It'(',.' t'_tl[
E['I_.'P"2 tO fll,i:l,l_e I{ ,_!'lt" -_'FLlC_tlre ,Q" _h_" tioC_dFllerlE,l_.h):l c[_ ;ilt' f_';tlll 14 _,t.l,'h {h<lt '.h_", ,',)LI'(] t,)
_,_,r)tl_h ,ill ,)l 'he _lrderlv el]i,_lne_,rl!_ .'h_,t'k..i ir_d Dr_ettut<,:_ .ln,t pf',u.'e_s '.,> ,lli<_'. _, t[_,_, !,ltlp, Ji'l (,i
, _c'7 tl r
MR S{'TTEIR: Bu[ <irent the,, 41,_,+i1 Iq_tructlon,_ that. v_:4. the', .ire ,qippcsed t,> ,'h'nr tt,,,.
vehicle for launch, but within the ,ipproved docum.'tltatio_, '
MR. AI,DRI{'H. Yes. sir
MR SI;'I*rER- Well. _a_n t this out_ide l)l' the approved documentatl_m"
l !-I _+
MR ALDRIt'H: No, sir. There is no requirement in any I_ve; in ,,ur !brma! documentation
that violates an)' of the criteria that had been reviewed m,-er the year,_ and documented and was
in place.
VICE UItAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: This is <m,, I was going _o ask _,arlier. unce we got past
Thiokot. But we're in this dJ.-,:?ussian and I would like _<l bring it up nov,' It seem.-, that tf ever',-
thing is falling within the mission rules, the launch rules. :ll degrees and _ on, then tbr con-
terns '_hat people have--and let's talk _pecifically. as an example, about zhat temperature, the
buik mean temperature or the seal temperature c)r other temperatures--your process depends
on people at one or another of thc-_e commit meeting.,; bringing their concerns to you. even
though you are _'ithin the launch range rules, brinmng thmr concerns in
And then you make a decision at that point tnat, even though we are in the launch rules.
because there are certain concerns, this type of thin_, you depend upon '_hese contacts, personal
contacts, is that right, coming in to tell yell about thin_s that would prevent you from going'.'
MR. ALDRICH: Yes In fact, at our 2:00 o'clock meeting, the afternnon meetin_that didn_
appear on today's list. but did appear on yesterday's--
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it v.'a.+ 3 level that had Je_s Moore and myself also and our peop[e there. We concluded that
meeting, where there had been a discussion of concern about whether the facility would make it
successfully through all of the parameters because of temperature, that it' any concerns for tem-
perature did occur, would we please be called and we would discuss them.
And it was highlighted with respect 1o the facility, but it was a general request to the team
that was there, that represented each of these
DR. WHEELON: Arnie, had you known of this divergence among the technical people at
Morton Thiokol, would you have proceeded to _aunch?
MR. ALDRICH: I would have proceeded to review it in detail at the next higher level, which
is my level, and I can't say what decision we would have made. But we would have pursued the
same things that are being pursued here today and were pursued in the discussion that was held
by the people on that night.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I think Mr. Armstrong's question goes to the heart of the matter.
Let's talk a little more about it. I mean. if you just have a checklist and you say everybody is
checked off. and then you have no assurance that the human factors are going to come into play,
so that if there is real concern on
I151
the part of people that you're not going to notify, it seems to me that that is --
p r
VIt'E t'I'IA[RMAN ARMS'FR()NI; la't me just charactemz,, the questton is a little ditTerent
w,lv Yi)ur rtlle s.i',s that _,,u _hould be abo_e :{[ degrees, and aeyond that there is no detailed
qpt'ct[_c,ltl,m _t pdst hlst_)r'_ ._,',_one could .tsstlme th,it, withl[l votlr mission rules :it least, it
c,mld ha_e sat there t,)r tw,, m,mths at ;',1 de_rees and t,verythin_ could be _tt :_l do_rees, seals
A!ld the .mean bulk tevnper;_ture
MR ALI)RI('[I: N,,. there is a rul.-,,r_ the, bulk tecnp__,rature and .'.hat would have been vio-
lated
VR['; ('[tAIR.MAN ARMSTRONG: I _uess I am questmning whether you believed that the
kind of appr,_ach. _hi., approach of deviatmns being required to be reported to you and discussed
at commit meetings, is satisfactory7
MR ALDRICH: Well. l'm certain _e will discu_ downstream today and as we go fbrward
the formality of our pr,:cess, the types of" meetings we had. and what might be more appropriate
_r more adequate now.
[ believed up until this point that the process we were u.,,ing was thorough and adequate. In
['act. could I characterize the meeting'? [ might have
talked too long, but if I could characterize the meeting.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: No, why don't you talk more.
MR. ALDRICH: This meeting came out of a day where we held, because the hatch handle
had a problem and that delayed us, anO durin_ that deiay this weather front progressed into the
Flomda area The winds became too high to support a return to launch, and so we scrubbed.
There were no other problems known with the laue, ch system or the flight system at that
time. We had this meeting to decide it" it was reasonable to proceed the next day, and the pri-
mary point of discussion was whether, if the winds had been high, to scrub on the 27th.
It was projected to be cold on the 2Sth, and so the focus of the meeting--the way we do that
is we have a weatherman come in from the Kennedy weather station° that supports us in great
detail, and he made a full presentation of the wea":her [brecast, which we had at the prior meet-
ings also, because that was the point of involvement.
All parties there in this meeting heard the weather tbrecast and heard the report that the
night
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before the temperatures had dipped to 22 to 24 degrees and the predicted range was 24 to 27. but
perhaps as low as 22 to 24, that for the preceding, but it was going to be above freezing by
launch because that was going to be at 11:00 or 11:30.
So that was a well-known fact of the condition we expected. Now, one year previously we
had the STS-51-C !aunch, in ,January of the year before, and we came up on a very cold night
with a similar set of discussions at that time, and we had management meetings.
And this is all, by the way, my recollection, and I'm not reading this from a formal review,
but this is my recollection..
We had a meeting that day. The forecast was it would be very cold that night, and should
we tank the external tank and should we proceed with the launch? And we said we don't know,
et's meet again later in the evening and see how" we are proceeding with the filling of the tank.
We met late in the evening, and the concern we expressed, that the cold might be difficult
for us, was in fact true, because the facility was already experiencing ice and problems with
their equipment. And at that tir.m we elected not to go because it was clear
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the faci!itv needed a better procedure for protectin_ ',t from coki ,_e:,.r.her that ,,va_ not in pllLe
_to',_ever, also at that tm_e a year a_o, we had no di_cusston about other elemems or" the
]a,.mch and tqi_ht :_vstem b_,in_ concerned or proceedin_ with that cald and proo:,edin_ ._m the
launch day
In other w_)rd_, it was a __m_ilar ,qtuation. }towever. we did m_t proceed because of spectl]c
problems with the ._round equipme",t -_,nd I think in :_om, • of our minds, in my mind--and bv
the way. I was not m this job at that time I wa6 in a job where I was nt the meeting, where I
was involved directly with the orbiter at that time.
But I _ot a _ood impression out of that meeting that there was. beyond the facility, not a
concern with launching at cold temperature in the range of 3!) degrees, and my impression was
we were proceeding to launch.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: You're speaking about a year ago'.'
MR. ALDRICH: A year ago.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But did you go through them on that launch? Wasn't there a blow-
MR ALDRICH: There was an item that was worked
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later,
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Now. why wouldn't that ca!! everybody's attention that weather
might have been re_,a.ted to 'Lhat blow-by, and why a year later, when you had even colder condi-
tions, wouldn't anybody in the loop have said. my God, even the Thiokot people are split on
whether this will work or not.
MR. ALDRICH: Well. that had been reviewed in a series of meetings over the course of that
year, and in fact there was more blow-by and more erosion. And [ would have to yield to these
people that worked this problem better than myself', that the correlation of that to cold was
never made totally clear in the discussions that I am aware of or the documentation that I kno_
about.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: In other words, no one related the fact that that happene ;, to be the
coldest launch and that launch was the only one that had the blow-by?
MR. ALDRICH: I couldn't say no one related that. That was not raised as an issue at the
level in the program th._t I'm speaking from.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Just going back for a moment to the procedure, just speaking per-
sonally now, Ym really surprised that you and Jess Moore were not made
1156
--that you weren't given the knowledge that there was such a considerable question and even a
split among the engineers at Thiokol.
Didn't you know that at one point that evening they had recommended against launch and
changed their mind?
MR. ALDRICH: I did not know that they had this series of' telepnone calls.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But did you know they had recommended against launch the night
before?
MR. ALDRICH: No, sir.
MR. ACHESON: Who is the senior NASA official who knew of the split of opinion at MTI?
MR. REINARTZ: I was at Marshall. The discussion that we had, and as Jerry Mason indi-
cated, that the evidence of the informal poll that was mentioned here today, was not provided as
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_lmatterat'c,,;urseor_thete!ecoarh,_:wehadthat evenm_Therewasthe initial discussion,as
Jerry hadi,,_d:.,'ated,Mr Masor:had,ndicated.that the initial recommendationandquestionas
Mr. ,Mullovwent througha _et of rationale and asked for commeat t then also asked Mr
I-tardy, who was :me "enlor technical representative that was on the line in tIuntsville, to corn-
men: ,." Md :h,:, _'echnical posltior: :'ron_ Huntsville. And he stated that he had in essence
a,_reed ,aith :h_ rationale ,)t" Mr. Mulloy. but however he did not wart MTI to be recommending
or to indicate that they would not--excuse me. let me start again
MR. ACttESON: I wa_ asking for a name, the name first, and then the description
MR. REINARTZ: 4.11 right. I was the individual. The Marshall projects, including the SRB,
report :o me. the Marshall projects, shuttle projects manager, and in that sense I was the senior
prcu_ram official that was on the line on the telecon.
And we had the discussion. We were not made aware, as was indicated--your other question
was the poll. We were not made aware of that situation. We knew that the initial discussion had
}_een the 5:1 degree,s. We were certainly aware of that.
And after we went through and Mr. Hardy had said--and maybe it would be best to let him
directly sa:,. :hat he made a comment asking Thiokot fbr their further views, because he was
surprised a: _hei_" cecommendation on the basis ot the data they had with that for the 53 de-
grees.
And he asked t'aem to--he said: Does that confirm that'? He did not want to put them in the
position of saying, hey, we are trying to tbrce anybody to launch. He wanted the MTI opinion
and their
technicai opinion of that. He asked _hem it' they had any additional data supporting their opin-
ion
It was at that time that Thiokol then went off the line to have their caucus.
And in regard, _,might address the other one. Mr. Chairman, that, as I believe that Arnie
,aid and as far as was made available to me at that time, that we were within the ground rules
_nd had no violations of ground rules regarding any of the written requirements.
And as Mr. Armstrong said, in discussing any concerns that would prevent you from going,
_hat after we had our discussion and then we came to our final conclusion, we did not have a
concern that would prevent us from going at that time.
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DR. RIDE: Why d'_'d you not at least bring up the meeting the concern, the original concern,
and the discussions, and Level 2'?
MR. REINARTZ: I guess, Sally, at that point it was because there was not any violation of
the activities. There are a number of activities at all of the projects, both at Marshall and JSC.
There are Level 3 considerations or items involving their hardware, and they are discussed, and
_he concerns are discussed and then resolved. And if they do not have an impact or waiver of the
requirements, it is not a fbregone thing that each one of those is then brought to Level 2, if they
are successfully resolved within the framework of the criteria.
DR. RIDE: Did you at Marshall have any data or any models for simulations that you con-
sidere_i reliable to indicate that you could launch at 38 degrees, or 31 degrees?
MR. REINARTZ: George, I would have to ask you, on tbat question.
MR. HARDY: Let me just go back a little bit and cover the consideration of the discussions
and my own position regarding the meeting.
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Hold on just a minute, before you teli us, because [ think we have
an idea what
I I_;0
the general argument is and the position is. what you knew about Thiokol and the engineers
aad their attitude, l mean, specifically now.
These things are tough, and we're not trying to make it tougher tot you, but we might as
well know. Were there two or three engineers in Thiokol who expressed a view that the launch
_houldn't take place, and did you know that'7'
MR. HARDY: I did not know, specific, by name, at Thiokol, who was making firm recom-
mendations as to launch or not launch.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But did you know there was a division'_
MR. HARDY: I did not know the degree of division. ! was well aware of the concerns that
Mr. Boisjoly had and that he did express during the conversation, and the points that he
brought out about the concern of the performance of the seal under cold tempmatures.
I would say that, of all the people involved in the teleconference, my ability to detect levels
of concern during the course of that discussion would be that he appeared to be the individual
that expressed the greatest concern.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And you didn't convey that
i161
to Mr. Aldrich and Mr. Moore?
MR. HARDY: No, sir. That would not be in my reporting channel to do that.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Mr. Chairman, I think I kind of understand all the de-
tails of this, but the gap that appears in my mind is the fact that we seem to have a situation
where we are intended to have an operational vehicle that is going to fly on winter mornings for
twenty years, and it should be able to handle conditions that are down around freezing, certain-
ly if it is going to be operational in that category; and we have the mission rules, a launch rule
that says it ought to lye able to launch at 31 degrees or above; and yet we have seals that have
constraints that are substantially away from what I would think would be a normal operating
environment.
They have had to work very carefully to make sure that, in fact, this critical system was
going to operate well within what I would think would be an operating envelope.
If I don't understand that right, I would like to have somebody tell me why that doesn't
characterize the system.
DR. WALKER: In fact, there weren't any specific constraints on the O-ring temperature,
specific
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to the O-ring.
DR. RIDE: Well, that is one of the things I don't understand, because I guess I agree with
Crip, that the NASA philosophy is it is supposed to be proved to me that it works under these
conditions, and, as far as I can see, there is no data and no tests that indicate, that give you any
confidence that the joint would be expected to operate at 31 degrees. I mean, maybe it does, but
there is no data that proves that.
MR. SUTTER: Could I ask one more question, a quick one, I hope?
In this case, there was an inputmdon't fly, and then it was changed to do fly, and over all of
the other Iaunches. Has this happened before many times? And was it settled at Level 3, Level
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2,or Le_ell} Can you _o back m history" [s this a normal occurrence or is thi_ a very unusual
(_CCL1 r re nee')
MR. ALDRICH: I would try to answer that [t ts hard to recreate historv o[ :l l]{'teerl vetlr
program, and all _)t' the critical thinas we have worked But i would personally think that the
proc_,ss that these gentlemen talked about, polling all of the engineers and hearing all of the
opinions and their positions, and findm_ there is disagreement, is probably something that has
occurred often,
11_;3
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I think you ought to consider, though, on criticality one--[ mean, I
could see others, but Joe's question seems to be, in my mind, too directed toward criticality Oner
Everybody knows if there is a failure, all is lost. So it seems to me everybody would be alerted,
and you had the experience the year be{bre, and that was a cold day.
It's hard for me to understand why everybody didn't talk to everybody about it and say my
God, there are some concerns, are we sure that we are going to be protecting, that the astro-
nauts are going to be protected'?
They just assumed, everyone assumed, the temperature of the O-rings would be the same as
the ambient temperature, or would be at the time of launch?
MR. MASON: No.
We ran a calculation based upon the temperature tbrecast and the heat transfer to get the
O-ring temperature, And, again, that is on one of Mr. Lund's charts. We didn't make an assump-
tion. We ran a calculation what the temperatures would be.
GENERAL KUTYNA: And you had IR readings, is that not true, of some sort'?
MR. ALDRICH: The IR readings that were discussed yesterday were taken at various points
on the
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external of the vehicle, and they were taken on the lower portion of the SRB. [t would take a
calculation to extrapolate that also, to get the O-ring temperature.
GENERAL KUTYNA: But what did that calculation reveal as tar as the temperature?
It was down in the twenties, below?
MR. ALDRICH: I wish Horace Lamberth were here to give you exactly what he said yester-
day. But the gist on the discussions of the readings that were taken with the [R was that there
was a requirement to take them on the external tank. and that is taken with the understanding
that we want to understand ice on the external tank for its impact to the launch system when
we lift off. The readings on the SRB were taken by the team because they chose to, and there is
neither a requirement to take them nor a specification tbr what range would be acceptable or
not acceptable.
They were not reported to any point in the chain beca,lse there is not such a requirement.
DR. WALKER: That raises a question as to why there was not a requirement to get a tem-
perature on the SRB near the position of the rings if Morton Thiokol thought that '_as a con-
cern.
I mean, for example, why didn't the Morton Thiokol people ask for a temperature measure-
ment there?
11_;5
DR. KEEL: Mr. Chairman, if it will clarify the record according to my notes, Mr. Lamberth
said yesterday that the IR leadings indicated that the left solid rocket motor had temperatures
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aq low as 25 de_rees, and the ri_ht-hand as low as l_ de_rees, and with ._ome lower temperatvre
:n the neck ,ff the nozzle
('HAIRMAN ROGERS: I sua_est we take a recess I'orten minutes
[)R. WHEEL()N: [ can't let th.t_ _a by You said there, was a reqdirem_,nt t._ take h,,aher
measurements I-[e said there weren't What is thes[orv.'
[)R KEEL: No. [.just stud that there were measuremen,._ taken, and that [5 where he indi-
cated the readings were.
MR. ALDRI(,H: fie Ls reporting on the measurements that were taken as a matter or' cours-,.
on the day before the launch It w-is not :_ requireraent, specifvina SRB const-aints. There was
no requirement to measure that.
DR. WHEELON: But. in thct, measurements were made and they were 25 de_rees.
MR ALDRICH: Measurements ,*'ere made. The,,' are under investigation and test, because
the measurements on the right SRB were lower than expected or can be explained, and that was
part of the discussion
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yesterday. They were "-'4 approximately on the left SRB, and they "*'ere in the seven to nine
range on the right SRB. We think there is a magnitude of error between five to as much as, I
guess, perhaps twelve degrees being worked by the team now.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Okay.
If we may, I would like to have a recess no'*.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: The Commission will come to order.
We have just had a private meeting and decided to eliminate a couple of the items on the
agenda, so that we can complete our work today. Mr, Keel will point that out.
We "*'ant to _o ahead with this discussion, and when you finish your presentation, then we
would like to have
MR. MASON: I think I am finished, unless there are more questions.
Mr. Lund was next up.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: An,t then we wou!d like to have the two engineers that raised sonJe
questions about it.
This gentleman--what's your name'?
MR. BOISJOLY: Boisjoly, Roger Boisjoly.
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MR. THOMPSON: Thompson, Arnold Thompson.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: One other thing that I would like to comment on, and I hope every-
body is listening, is this.
I would like everybody to consider that the Commission has requested from each of you all
of your private notes--not only your official notes and your official files, but any private notes
you have in your own handwriting or any other notes you have, particularly as they relate to
these conversations we have been talking about this morning.
MR. MASON: Would it be appropriate if we gather all of those notes--some of those would
be in Utah and some in Iluntsville--if we gathered those and delivered them on, like, Monday'?
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Yes.
I would like to have you work it out with Mr. Keel, the Executive Director. I mean, there
may be some that we would want to get directly, I don't know. What we want to be sure about
is, because of the nature of these documents, to be sure that we've got them first-hand, and then
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anybody who wants to give ',is documents shouid t'eel free to give them to the Comm,sslon direct-
l v. if they would _ike to.
So [ wi_l leave that up _o Dr. Keel about how
those will be delivered.
The principal pomt is we want to be sure that they are protected and to save them. so that
no claim can be made later or: that they were destroyed, because of their importance.
Okay, Mr. Lund.
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TESTIMONY OF ROBERT LUND. MORTON THIOKOL. INC.
_'iewgraph) IR,'I -' I, 1I
MR. LUND: My intent to the Commission is to review those charts that we reviewed in this
Monday night telecon and to make it very clear I was not the presenter on any of the charts,
except the cunclusions charts. There were other engineering people at the Wasatch Division
making the presentation on the individual charts that they were preparing in real time.
Listed there were our understanding of those people who were involved. I think that Mr.
Malloy's presentation is a more complete list. This would be incomplete as far as those who were
involved.
/_'iewgraph.) IR,'I :: ' I _1
MR. LUND: The thing that we were most concerned about from an engineering standpoint
was reflected in the history of O-ring damage on the SRM field joints.
As noted on this chart, the top five notations here are the joints and the locations in the
joints, in the motors, of Motor 61-A and 51-C: the erosion depth t_at occurred in those motors,
the perimeter around the circumference of the O-ring that was effected by that erosion, and, of
course, the nominal diameter of the
1170
O-ring. And then, if you took the O-ring and looked at at top view, looking down, this would be
the length of that erosion. And then we looked for what we called heat affected zone, where you
see some discoloration of the O-ring.
What brought the concern--
DR. COVERT: Mr. Lund, on the chart I have, there is another column that is not on the
viewgraph.
MR. LUND: Let me tell you what that--
DR. COVERT: I'm just curious, what plus-Z and minus-Z are with respect to 36 degrees or
something like that. I need to tie the two together with what I know.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Three sixty is the bottom on the SRB.
DR. COVERT: Three sixty is the bottom, so that's minus Z. Okay. Thank you, Don.
MR. LUND: Now, of chief concern were these five at the top. Those were the ones that expe-
rienced blow-by. The way we can tell what blow-by is, is we look for discoloration in the area aft
of the primary O-ring. In the two instances, the one that was the most severe was the 51-C.
There was black material between the two O-rings. And in the 61, there was some black materi-
al, but it was not anywhere near the amount =hat we experienced on 51-C. Also listed there for
our
1171
consideration was the fact that on other motors we had had O-ring erosion, but no blow-by.
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Now,whatwasnot listedon the chart that night, but whatwasdiscussedin the meeting,
wasthe thctthat this motorwasabout,well, it wasat 75degrees,fora calculatedO-ring"temper-
atureat thetimeof the launch.
Thismotorwasat 53degreesat thetimeof the launch.
DR.FEYNMAN:That saysnone.Whatwasthe matterwith 617
MR.LUND"It hadblow-by.TherewasblackproductspasttheprimaryO-ring.
l think that's themessageof that chart.
MR CRIPPEN:Excuseme,sir.
Can we look at that chart and see the three cases of--what have you got there? Nine--and
still say that there was no temperature correlation?
MR. LUND: The temperatures on the other motors, on 41. was B4 degrees. I'm sorry. I don't
have. these are the overnight low temperatures. Thut's the data I have. These are the overnight
low temperatures on the night before launch--was 64 on l i [_: 51 on 41-C; 56 on 41-B; 60 on
STS-2.
GENERAL KUTYNA: And 53 on 51-C.
I172
MR. LUND: Let me review that again.
What I have given you is the overnight low temperatures. I don't have at my disposal the
calculated--
GENERAL KUTYNA: What was it on 51-C, the overnight 1o_,?
MR. LUND: 51-C was 34.
DR. COVERT: And how about 61-A?
MR. LUND: Eighty-three.
DR. WHEELON: So the one where you had no erosion was the highest temperature by quite
a bit?
Sixty-one-A had a relatively high temperature and overnight ambient temperature, and yet
it had no erosion?
MR. LUND: But it had blow-by.
DR. WHEELON: The others were all in the forties and fifties?
MR. LUND: The overnight lows were in the fifties and sixties.
MR. KILMINSTER: I would like to correct one statement that was made about the caulking
location on the right hand. For the right hand SRB, that is correct. Zero is in the minus-Z posi-
tion. For the left-hand, it is in the plus-Z position.
MR. CRIPPEN: Unfortunately, some people use Z
1173
in different directions. Could you be a little bit clearer?
MR. KILMINSTER: Minus Z is away from the orbiter. Plus Z is toward the orbiter.
(Viewgraph.) I_,q, :_ ] _ "l
MR. LUND: What I would like to do is, is there anyone in here who is not familiar with
that chart? We have had enough of that chart.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Yes, we have been over it several times.
(Viewgraph.) IJ_,'r. '-' 1_-71
MR. LUND: This chart has been previously reviewed. As was noted, the field joint was our
highest concern. What we were concerned about is the erosion penetration of the primary seal,
and if it penetrates, we want a very reliable secondary seal,
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Wehadtalkedaboutthe Uact that that is a ['unction of how quickly the pressure comes up
in the motor. The radial expansion and tee axial expansion of the steel de|brms the joint. TEat
iS shown over here.
So we are concerned about the timing o|' how those seals seat and the rate of rise of pressure
within the motor.
Now in steady state of' course, if we have erosion penetratin_ this primary Deal, there is a
I171
possibility that this seal would not be there, and we could have blow-by and gas escape.
MR SUTTER: I'm confused with that statement.
I thought the decision was if you had the primary blow, the secondary would hold? That it
was a simplex seal?
MR. LUND: Only if this was in position early in the ignition process,
MR. SUTTER: I thought NASA's position said that a simplex seal is okay, which means that
if the primary is gone, the secondary is holding. That is what I thought NASA was leaning on.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: I think, to clarit) that position a little bit, when we re-
viewed this at the Tuesday meeting, I guess it was, they pointed out that the reason it went
from criticality 1-R to criticality 1 was that during testing--not firing, but testing--of the flex-
ure. here lind[cat[rig), they found that they get this particular situation, and the secondary seal
might not seat, in which case they only had one seal, the primary seal, and that is what caused
the change.
It wasn't a firing test that did this. as I understand it.
MR. LUND: That is correct.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: But it was static
1175
testing that made them to go this criticality 1 as opposed to criticality 1-R, that is, this particu-
lar characteristic right here.
MR. SUTTER: But, during these conversations, with the concern over temperature that sur-
thced, I thought that the chart said it is still okay because you've got the simplex seal, which is a
secondary seal. Am I contused?
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: No. That's true.
MR. LUND: We'll talk a little bit more about that in just a second. All I'm saying is that in
a normal motor operation, you could experience this sort of thing. It could happen. That is a
worst case.
DR. COVERT: Sir, have you ever taken this joint apart and examined the pin for wear or
abrasion or scarfing of any kind, that would indicate that there is a bending of the nature that
has been shown in that sketch?
MR. LUND: Maybe Mr. Boisjoly can talk about that. He's worked hard on that.
MR. BOISJOLY: Yes. I've taken many of them apart at the Cape, when they return from
flight, and there is no indication in the pins at all that they've even been rubbed or even been
used, for that matter. The only time the pins get pushed out of the recycle flow is when they
have slight pitting, due to corrosion
1176
or something on that nature. We would take them out of the flow.
But, as far as wear marks, the only wear marks that have ever been seen on any pins are
those units that were taken purposely as engineering test units to burst, and then you started to
see the shear effect and the rotation effects on the pins.
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DR.COVERT:I'm thinkingaboutfretting.
MR.BOISJOLY:Thereis no indication,on any pins I'd ever seen.
DR. COVERT: Are the pins that loose that it's possible to get a deflection without fretting':
MR. BOISJOLY: No, I don't think so.
MR. LUND: I agree with that.
!Viewgraph.! tic.., z i_ _l
MR. LUND: This next chart then summarized our concerns in the list.
First of all, the temperature lower than the current data base results in changing primary
O-ring sealing-timing function. We were concerned that, the O-ring was going to move at a dif-
ferent rate.
We had some indication of that with 15-A and 15-B, with the black in the area between the
O-rings.
We also know with the temperature that the O-ring does contract, and there is a 2 or 3 mil
1177
coatraction of the rubber itself at the lower temperature.
We know that the O-ring was harder at lower temperature.
We indicated that, of course, the grease is there, and it has a higher viscosity at the lower
temperature.
Our feeling was, then, from all of that, that we would have a higher O-ring pressure actu-
ation time.
Our concern was if the actuation time increased, the threshold of secondary seal pressuriza-
tion capability is approached; and if the threshold is reached, then the secondary seal may not
be capable of being pressurized.
Are there any questions on that chart?
MR. WAITE: So, you're saying you may not have any seals?
MR. LUND: Several things had to happen to cause that to occur.
MR. WAITE: Okay.
I want to get back tc, Mr. Sutter's point, that the primary seal concept was based on the fact
that the secondary seal had been seated by the initial pressure check. You don't show that.
MR. LUND: In the seating process, if you have
1178
the instant blow-by, because you would have a pressure at the secondary O-ring at time zero.
MR. WAITE: No. We're talking about pre-launch, pre-operation procedures which seat the
secondary O-ring.
MR. LUND: Oh, the leak check.
MR. BOISJOLY: That shows in the top chart, the position of the secondary O-ring.
MR. LUND: The secondary is here, as a result of the leak check.
MR. WAITE: But in terms of the discussion we've been going through this morning, if
you're talking about a primary seal, it is the secondary seal that is the primary seal.
MR. LUND: Th-re is a scenario that would draw that conclusion. That is correct.
MR. WAITE: I'm having trouble with your scenario with that second seal, upset like that.
MR. LUND: If the primary O-ring seals, then this could result.
MR. WAITE: Even though it had been seated before'?
MR. LUND: You see, the resiliency and the cold temperature and the rotation would tend to
make you do that.
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Now, the pressure torte,even if"this came through, the pressure force may be sufficientto
push it in. But, in a worst case scenario, it could be up there if the primary seals.
MR. WAITE: Do you agree with that?
MR, SUTTER: I'm slightly contused•
MR. WA[TE: Are you saying this scenario calls tbr a change in the secondary seal from its
previous condition?
MR LUND: This scenario is the one that has drawn all the attention fbr several years, that
the gas comes down, actuates the primary seal. and it seals. As the _-otation occurs, there is a
possibility that the secondary seal would lose squeeze and be capable of having blow-by, if it ever
burned through the primary.
It is not an easy concept.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Okay, Mr. Lund.
Proceed with your presentation.
_Viewgraph.t _J_,',. z I _ "1
MR. LUND: This was a summary chart prepared by the next presenter.
In essence, he's just reiterated the same thing we had seen. that the SRM 15 had the worst
blow-by, must worse visually than SRM 22. Twenty-two had blow-by and we also experienced, of
course--then
1180
also blow-by. And that was also discussed this morning.
(Viewgraph.t Im'J z I I Io I
.... "....... MR. LUND: I would like to show you now the hardness data on the O-ring. This is the Shore
A reading.
The hardness goes from 77 to 96, as you go from 70 down to 10 degrees.
DR. FEYNMAN: What is the hardness data--the amount of force you need to change it?
MR. LUND: Yes. You push or, it and measure the amount of push.
DR. FEYNMAN: It has nothing _o do with time?
MR. LUND: No. It's just hardness.
DR. WHEELON: Is that like a standard Brinell hardness test?
MR. LUND: It's like a Rockwell A on rubber.
(Viewgraph.) Ira.I, z I i _l!
MR. LUND: This is a result of some of the resiliency testing that we're running. During the
initial pressurization rate of the solid rocket motor, pressure comes up relatively slowly for the
first hundred milliseconds or so, and then goes more quickly, and then turns over and goes
slowly again.
If we took a secant across the total time, we would have a rate of movement of the two
metal parts that the O-ring is trying to seal of about 3.2 inches
1181
per minute.
Your time is much shorter, and so are the deflections, so that is the equivalent time.
And so we put into our tensile testing machine a two-inch-per-minute rate. We co mpre:,.':ed
the O-ring in a groove--and let me get those exact--and "squozed" the O-ring. Forty thou-
sandths is very representative of what the squeeze is, as we squash the O-ring between the two
metal parts.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: When you say "we," was this an old test?
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MR. LUND: Yes.
This has been done previously.
And then we moved the head of this tensile machine away from the O-ring at two inches
per minute.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: At what point is it moving two inches per minute?
MR. LUND: The O-ring is in a groove, and we squash it down 40/1,000ths, and then we
moved the head of the tensile machine away from the O-ring at two inches per minute to try to
simulate--
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSrRONG: It doesn't lie within a groove when you're doing this?
This is just a push against the machine'?
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MR. LUND: Yes. The machine forms the other seating surface that would occur in a rocket
motor.
What this said was that at 100 degrees, as that head came back to its original position, I'm
sorry, not to its original position, but to within 5/1,000ths of its original position, still maintain-
ing the squeeze, that at a high temperature, at 100 degrees, the O-ring came right back.
It followed the machine right up. At 75 degrees, it took several seconds to recover. And, as
we went lower in te,_'_perature, it took much longer to recover.
DR. WHEELON: _'hat's pretty nonlinear. How do you account for that?
MR. LUND: It is t, _ modulus of the rubber. Those polymers do that.
DR. FEYNMAN: The rubber--ordinarily in materials, like steel or something when you
squash it, you are compressing the molecules together and they simply expand back. When you
stretch a piece of rubber, the reason that it respc, ads is because of dynamic motion. It is trying
to shake molecules and pull something: like, you take a long chain across a room. which has a
lot of tennis balls bouncing in it. The chain will be "ponged" by the balls and pulled
1183
together. If the balls are slowed up, and low temperature means slowed up, then there is much
less ponging and much less pulling back together, and the same way responding.
I used the expansion. But you can do the same thing with compression. If you compress it
out of shape, it goes back into shape because of thermal notion, really, _ot because of spring.
And when the thermal temperatures change, it goes back very, very much lower.
It is very characteristic of materials of this kind, that have this enormous effect. Tempera-
ture has such enormous effect.
DP. COVERT: Does it follow the sh'_are root?
DR. FEYNMAN: No. It's E to the minus A over T. It is exponentially. ,<o. at 32 degr_.es or,
the scale, you probably wouldn't be able to measure the time. It would be too late to wait ;or the
hour, or whatever.
MR. LUND: Now, keep in mind that resiliency is not the only issue. But you have tho pres-
sure load coming in and the pressurization of the motor kicking that O-ring up and saying g
with me.
So this is one factor.
(Viewgraph.) [_,'l. 2 ] t- 121
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DR, FEYNMAN: But if there is a gap left, is there really any pressure remaining _o push?
Suppose the O-ring did return, and there's a little gulf, and the gas comes. Why wouldn't that
push it?
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DR.(2OVERT:Becausethere'sa lowerpressureat theminimumareapoint.
MR.I,UND:There'sa nozzlingeffect,,-:ndthe pressureisgoingto godown.If the pressure
is halt"thac,it isout in thechamberit s t'eeding, and it would suck it. That is one of the reasons
O-rings work
_Viewgraph._ [tt,t'. z I I lZ 1
MR. LUND: Here are the results of the blow-by test.
This blow-by test fixture is simply a little ten inch rig that has simulated m it the actual
geometry of the seating surfaces, only instead of being 146 inches in diameter, it is 1') inches in
diameter, the O-ring diameters, the grooves. The gap widths are all the same.
What we wanted to do in this test is, first, by the same technique that is used in the motor,
put pressure between the seals, to push them into the position that they actually occur in the
rocket motor. Then, through another channel in the test vehicle, we pressurize, like the motor
does. We loaded the
I1s5
pressurization medium with argon, and ran a couple of testsat each one of these temperatures,
and there was no indicationof leakage that we could tell,with the argon. And we worried about
the sensitivityof that.
We are in the process of using Freon 14, which ismuch easier to detect and categorize at
much lower leakage rates.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I assume thisisone you are doing now?
MR. LUND: Ithas been done now. We were right in the process of doing this at the time of
the {light.And we had thisdone. We were in the process of doing this.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Was there any particular reason why you were doing itat the time
ofthe flight'}'
MR. LUND: Oh, yes.
We have been wo,king on this problem of this whole leakage O-ring _scenarioIbr some time.
MR. ACHESON: How many testsrepresent a reliablebodj of testingdata?
MR. LUND: That isa tough question. I guess I couldn't quantify it.
[ would certain}y think that I would always want more than two.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: When did thistest start,or
llg6
these testsstart?
MR. LUND: Arnie, can you answer that?
MR. THOMPSON: We started about eight weeks ago, I guess, or ten weeks, to build the
apparatus, and we're developing the system and the techniques to measure blow-by.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And in these te]econs that you had prior to launch, did you discuss
the factthat you were then conducting testson this?
MR. THOMPSON: This data here was presented in the telecon.
MR. CRI_'P._'_::Ex, us_ me, sir.Can you tellme whether this test stimulates the flexure of
the " int?
MR. LUND: No, itdoes not.
What we were trying to do was measure the blow-by at the early part of motor operation. At
this point in time, we had not concluded the Freon 14 tests.We have completed them now.
DR. COVERT: What does a quick look say?
MR. LUND: No leakage down to in the area of zero degrees.
When you get down below zero,there issome leakage. So that would tellym',that the engi-
neering thought process iscertainly in the ri:.Jbtdirection.
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MR. LUND: This data was discussed very briefly in the telecon. All of this data was taken
at 75 degrees.
What the intent here was is to indicate, that when O-rings are squashed, "squozed" together,
for long periods of time, that they w;'! not return to their original ibrm. They have a memory.
I might indicate that that scMe is exactly reversed. This is really 70, 168, 500, and 1,000. But
the answer is still the same, that there is some permanent set in all of these O-rings, as you
store them for long periods of time.
That is another thing that was of* concern to us, that there is permanent setting in the O-
rings themselves.
DR. FEYNMAN: How big is the TO minus TS? Do you remember? The distance that you
squoze it in the beginning? How much do you squeeze them when you do this?
MR. THOMPSON: Twenty-five percent.
DR. FEYNMAN: Thank you.
(Viewgraph.) [R,.r. 2 l l-l:q
MR. LUND: We also carefully looked at the geometry on the "as built" dimensions, and
compared the 15-A and B motors, where we had had erosion and
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blow-by with the geometry of the motors that were to be flown. Two conclusions out of here.
You can see the squeeze percent across 15. They range from about 11 to 16. You can also see
that the one that had the highest squeeze had erosion, and the one that had the lowest squeeze
did not have any erosion, which tells me that squeeze is not the only parameter affecting ero-
sion.
We looked carefully at the squeezes here. They are in the same ballpark population, with
the exception of the tbrward here (indicating) on the !eR hand, up front.
(Viewgraph.)[m't z II I II
MR. LUND: These are the results of the thermal calculations that we pe:'fbrmed. We went
through our sequence of motors and picked those motors that we thought would give us the
lowest operating temperature at the time of motor operation.
We then went back and looked at the environment that the motors were exposed to and
picked out those motors that would give us the lowest O-ring temperature.
This is the list. The first four of these are static test motors that were static fired at the
Wasatch Division.
You can see 15, 22, and 25.
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This is the mean bulk temperature of the propellant.
This is the ambient temperature at the time of launch, or suggested launch.
Here are the results of the thermal calculations, indicating the temperatures that we would
predict the O-ring to be at at the time of the launch.
MR. ACHESON: Why is there such an erratic relationship between the ambient and the O-
ring temperature?
MR. LUND: It turns out that the fillum grain is a very nice oven or hand warmer for the
case. The grain, of course, has a lot of rubber and has aluminum powder in it. It has a good heat
capacity. But it is insulated. All those little aluminum particles are separated by polymers, And
so, it is a good heat capacitor.
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But it contains a lot of heat.
Well it transmits it slowly, too.
So, what you have to look at is how hot the grain is, what the temperature is, and you _ill
always find that this is between them, They are being chilled and heated from two different
sources, because we didn't have totally definitive velocities.
MR. ACHESON: Is there putty in between'? I guess there is--at the time of this measure-
ment?
1190
MR. LUND: There is putty in the gap, upstream of the O-rings.
MR. ACHESON: So, wouldn't that prevent the temperature of the bu!k from warming?
MR. LUND: No, just conduction. The grain, the propellant is attached to a rubber insulator
that is attached to the case. So it is just a conduction effect.
We also looked to see what the effect of the convective part of the heat transfer was. We
didn't have definitive winds for each of those launches, and so we just took a look and said well,
what is the effect of varying that wind? And you can see it makes some difference, but not a
tremendous differences in the temperature at the O-ring.
GENERAL KUTYNA: A quick point.
The night before, when we drained the external tank, we did not drain all the hydrogen out
of it, which sometimes happens. You had hydrogen in there, ice cold. Would. that have made that
a little bit cooler because you had that hydrogen?
MR. LUND: Yes, sir.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: One question.
Clearly, you had a concern about temperature, and so on. Did you ever consider or take
thought of controlling the temperature at the seals, or to !ianging
1191
of the material of' the seals to something that had different characteristics?
MR. LUND: Those thoughts have gone through our minds. Tt'ore ha,., been no positive
action along those lines.
cViewgraph._lml _' I, I-, i
MR. LUND: So our engineering opinion, looking at that data, was, first of all, of course, that
temperature of the O-ring is not the only parameter controlling blow-by. That was quite appar-
ent to us. But we did know that SRM-15 with blow-by had :an O-ring temperature that was low.
We thought that was a contributing factor.
We had the four development motors from the previous chart that had no blow-by, that
were tested lower than the SRM-15, in the area of 47 tc 52 degrees. But, as was mentioned
before this morning, because of the assembly problems, we had gone in and packed that putty, so
we felt that it was a more representative case of the flight motors at that point in time. And we
were concerned that we had done the right thing at that point in time, in looking back.
DR. WALKER: Let me understand that.
The motors had putty packing which resulted in better performance, better performance
than the flight
1192
motors'?
MR. LUND: The flight motors.
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DR. WALKER: But I thought this morning, or earlier, rather, Mr. Mason indica, ted that he
didn't think that packing the putty in the flight motors would really improve the performance
because, you couldn't necessarily see. There is evidently a difference of opinion.
MR. LUND: Th_re is one of those that, you knc.w, every engineer would have an opinion on
that.
MR. MASON: Excuse me I think the point was that if you F xcked the putty and you know
there is a hole there, you would have filled it. But it doesn't assure you that you don't create
ode.
One of the primary ways of creating one is in the leak test. So, in the static test vehicle, you
have the opportunity to run the leak test and make sure that if you have created any leaks, that
they are plugged. Whereas, in the flight vehicle, you don't have that opportunity.
So, what we figured was we had a higher probability that we had plugged any leaks in the
static test motor because, when we put it together and we knew we had a chance of creating the
voias, and we knew that we had potentially created them with the leak test, so
1193
we w mt in and plugged those. And so, we just figured that there was a lower probabilityof a
blow-ihrough in the statictestmotor than there would be in a flightmotor.
_o we didn't want to deceive ourselves by assuming that the statictest motor was exactly,
the same _q a flightmotor.
DR. WALKER: I guess the question I had was ifyou thought packing the putty was a good
idea,why didn'tyou suggest packing the putty afterthe leak testfor the flightmotors? Isitjust
too difficult,because the flightmotors were not accessible and you couldn't get inside easily?
MR. MASON: Fundamentally, that is correct.
You would have to take the igniter out and go down into the motor.
DR. WALKEF It just wasn't a practical thing to do?
MR. MASON: That is correct.
MR. LUND: We concluded theft at about 50 degrees Fahrenheit, that blow-by could be expe-
rienced in those case joints.
We looked at the temperature and we were seeing numbers at that point in time of those
kinds of temperatures. We concluded that we really don't have
119:
data that would indicate SRM-25 is different than SRM-15.
MR. SUTTER: Just to show you how confused I am reading what that says and going back
to the point that the secondary seal may not be working, I wou!d conclude that you shouldn't
fly.
MR. LUND: Let's go to the next chart.
MR. SUTTER: Am I confused o
MR. LUND: No, iet's :;o to the next chart.
MR. SUTTER: Am I confused?
(Viewgraph.) [Ref. 2,1.t-16]
MR. LUND: So, our recommendation was that we should maintain the O-ring temperature
at greater than or equal to 53 degrees Fahrenheit at launch. We didn't feel that we had the
data, as Mr. Mason pointed out, to really go down below, based upon the development motor
because of the putty packing problem, and our engineering recommendation was tc. project the
ambient temperatures, or conditions, the wind and the temperature, to determine the launch
time.
DR. COVERT: Mr. Lund, what is the action time on the igniter, as it gets colder?
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MR. BRINTON: About 450 to 500 milIiseconds.
DR. COVERT: Then it is lov_er, as it gets colder?
MR. LUND: No It is longer_
DR. COVERT: That is what I mem',--it spreads out.
MR. I,UND: It is slower, to slightl> longer
1195
pressure.
DR. COVERT: And the primary grain ign _'.es with greater difficulty, I _ppose?
MR. LUND: That is a fair statement.
DR. WALKER: So, could we conclude then that, in addition to the two engineers who
seemed to be the best experts on the O-rings, that you also were recommend_,_g against launch?
MR. LUND: Yes, sir, at that point in time.
DR. FEYNMAN: At this point in time is the caucus, because that's what we're l_oking at?
MR. LUND: That is what we're looking at, the charts that were presented ill the caucus.
MR. SUTTER: Didn't the chart before this say SRM-15 had blow-by?
MR. LUND: Yes.
MR. SUTTER: What does it mean that it worked?
MR. LUND: There was no violation of the primary seal, other than the instantaneous blow-
by and a little bit of gas. 'i'he seal functioned.
MR. SUTTER: I thought, though, that if you're concerned that the secondary seal may have
a chance at not working, you sure wouldn't want to tolerate any blow-by in the primary seal.
'['hen how can you say it worked to meet your criteria?
1196
MR. LUND: I don't have a good answer to that.
MR. WAITE: You see, because when you say that secondary seal potentially can be upset by
deflections, which disturbs the initial pressure check position, then there is no seal, if you have
blow-by on that parameter?
MR. LUND: If you have blow-by. I think Roger said it best--every seal blow's by. There is
probably always some blow-by in the seating process.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: That is at the low pressure?
MR. LUND: As the pressure is just rising.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: If it's rising, you get a little blow-by before it seats?
MR. LUND: Yes_ so "blow-by" is a qualitative thing.
MR. WAITE: The blow-by is excessive?
MR. LUND: If the blow-by is excessive, then you would have erosion and you would blow-by
the O-ring.
DR. COVERT: Ron, I think we'd all better remember that we're talkirg about margins.
There's nothing absolute about this. The real question is, as Roger put it, who's going to win the
race. Is the seal going to seat before it erodes away, or is it not? And the question is how big is
the margin between them?
MR. LUND: That's right_
1197
MR. WAITE: I think I understand th_ m(chanism. I'm just trying to understand what
they're saying.
DR. WALKER: Could I ask a question.
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Doyouknowif thereiserosionand blow-by in the Titan seals, General Kutyna, and can we
get that history?
GENERAL KUTYNA: I do not know. I've asked for that history.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Okay.
If there are no further questions, thank you very much.
Now, Mr. Boisjoly we realize you don't have a prepared statement to give and we will have
other opportunities to talk to you, I'm sure. We just want to get a preliminary statement. You've
already said on the record that you did not favor the launch. Could you tell us a little bit more
about your involvement and the discussions in detail'?
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TESTIMONY OF ROGER BOISJOLY, STRUCTURES SECTION. MORTON THIOKOL. INC.
MR. BOISJOLY: Yes.
l wrote some notes here. I have to confess that right now, my mind is basically like a
sponge, with everything that has been going on after the incident and prior to the incident. So, I
.just had a sequence-down here, and I would just like to hit the highlights, if that's okay. [m.r. ', t
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Yes, that's fine. 17]
We have all baen under a lot of pressure, too, so we understand that you may be tired.
But go ahe_a.
MR. BOIS2OLY: Okay.
I first heard about the cold temperature at 1:00 p.m., the day befo,_ the launch, and we
immediately, including myself--
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Do you want to give your name?
MR. BOISJOLY: My l:an-.e is Roger Boisjoly, and I'm in the Structures Section. I work di-
rectly for Jack Kapp, and I have been involved in these seals and the joints basically since I've
come, to work for Thiokol, which was some five and a half):ears ago.
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CHAIRMAN I_OGERS: Thank you.
MR. BOISJk:/ i': Okay.
I first heard ot the cold temperatures prior to launch at 1:00 o'clock on the day betbre
launch, and from p:_:t experience, namely the SRM-15 launch, of which I was on the inspection
team at the Cape, i', ju:_t concerned me terribly.
And so we started in too,don to question the feasibility of launching at such a low tempera-
ture, especially when it was goin;z to be predicted to be colder than the SRM-15.
So we spent the rest of the t_y' raising these questions.
DR. WALKER: And tho O-ring was your concern:
MR. BOISJOLY: Yes.
I felt we were very successful up until early evening, because it culminated in the recom-
mendation not to fly, and that was the i.nitial conclusion. I was quite pleased with that.
I presented and prepared charts 2-1, 2.z, 2-3, 4-1, and 5-1, and basically those were the charts
where I had that exaggerated view showing the O-1 ng in joint rotation.
There was the summary that put a probabilist c sequence on the timing of the seals, and
then I prepared
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the chart of primary concerns.
I was basically concerned with how temperature, low temperature, affects the timing func-
tion and the ability of the seal to seal. Low temperature--and I stated this tbl' over a year--is
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away from the direction of" goodness. I cannot quantif}' it, but [ know that it is away from the
direction of g,aodness.
I feel very strong, and I always have fblt very strongly, that SRM-15 was telling us a mes-
sage, and at the flight readiness review, we did not have any data to support anything but a
generalized statement that said we feel that temperature was a contributor.
We did not make a major input in that. We did not make a major thing about it. But we
said that we feel that temperature had something to do with that thing.
Subsequent to that, we des,gned a blow-by rig specifically to investigate the questions that
were raised at the SRM-15 data review, subsequent to that data.
That blow-by test, as configured, was strictly configured to measure if we could put approxi-
mately a teaspoon or a tablespoon of cold gas past an O-ring a_. the low pressure regime off say, 1
psi up to 50 psi, and if we
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could get that past, we would have explained the blow-by phenomenon, and then the timing
function would have come out of that and that said it was a function of temperature because it
is a delay. You are seeing hot gas indications pass, which was the visual indication between the
seals in SRM-15. That was the primary crux of the whole situation.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Why did you not improve the dynamics?
MR. BOIS,JOLY: That was coming. But we had not got into that at that point.
On the net that night, alter I presented those feelings very strong--I get very emotional
about these things--and I was quite strong over the net about it, as George Hardy remembers.
Somebody brought up about SRM-22. I was not personally at the Cape, and disassembled,
seeing the hardware in 22. But one of my colleagues was, a younger engineer. And I questioned
him about this,
He told me that the gas blow-by that was observed on that was grey, splotchy-type blow-by,
over a specific arc length, which I don't remember at the moment. I made that point that on
SRM-15 we had over 100 degrees of arc, and the blow-by was absolutely jet black. It was totally
intermixed in a homogeneous
1202
mixture in the grease. I attributed that to the pumping action of the jv:nt as we were towing it
back into the Cape. That is why it was totally homogeneous.
But we analyzed that chemically and found the products of combustion in it, we found the
products of putty in it, we found the products of O-ring in it.
I made that point.
During the course of the evening, I also produced photos of the SRM-15, and my colleague
produced photos of SRM-22. And you could visually see the difference in the amount of soot, as
characterized past the O-ring seal.
I was asked then on the net to support my position with data, and I couldn't support my
position with data. I had been trying to get data since October on O-ring resiliency, and I did not
have it in my hand. We have had tremendous problems in trying to get a function generator and
a machine to actually operate and characterize this particular pressurization function rate.
At that point, the telecon basically continued, and Mr. Lund presented his conclusions and
recommendations.
So the formal part of the presentation was finished.
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Listeners on the other lineseemed not very pleased with the recommendation. In fact,some-
body asked Mr_ Hardy what he thought about it,about our recommendation, and Mr. Hardy said
he _ as appalled at MTI'_ decision.However, he would not go against our recommendation not to
fly.if the contractor recommended not to fly,he would not go against that. He would recom-
mend not to flyalso.
There was a very short discussion that ensued, and we had, we asked for a five minute
caucus. Our people asked for a five minute caucus to discuss the situation.Those opposed to
launching continued to press their case with MTI management, and those opposed to the launch
that pressed thiscase in the caucus were basicallymyself and Mr. Thompson. And we did every-
thing we could to continue to try and press for not launching describing--I took the photograph-
ic position of the evidence and Mr. Thompson was trying to further elaborate on the sealing
characteristics of the seais. When we realized that we basically had stopped in the discussion
and we could go no further because we were getting nowhere, we backed off, both of us. We just
sat back down.
GENERAL KUTYNA: What was the motivation
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driving those who were trying to overturn your opposition?
MR. BOISJOLY: They felt that we had not demonstrated, or I had not demonstrated, be-
cause I was the prime mover in SRM-15, because of my personal observations and involvement
in the flight readiness reviews, they felt that I had not conclusively demonstrated that there was
a tie-in between temperature and blow-by.
My main concern was if the timing function changed and that seal took longer to get there,
then you might not have any seal left because it might be eroded before it seats. And then, if
that timing function is such that it pushes you from the 170 millisecond region into the 330
second region, you might not have a secondary seal to pick up if the primary is gone. That was
my major concern.
I can't quantify it. I just don't know how to quantify that. But I felt that the obser_,ations
made were telling us that there was a message there telling us that temperature was a discrimi-
nator, and I couldn't get that point across.
I basically had no direct input into the final recommendation to launch and I was not
polled.
I think Astronaut Crippin hit :he tone of the
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meeting exactly right on the head when he said that, the opposite was true of the way the meet-
ings were normally conducted. We normally have to absolutely prove beyond a shadow of a
doubt that we have the ability to fly, and it seemed like we were trying to prove, have proved
that we had data to prove that we couldn't fly at this time, instead of the reverse.
That was the tone of the meeting in my opinion.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you very much--any questions?
DR. WALKER: Mr. Boisjoly, wait. I have one question.
We are still grappling with this little puff of smoke. Do you have any opinions about that?
MR. BOISJOLY: Yes, I have an opinion. But it is just an opinion, mind you.
If you get blow-by through both seals and you have erosio_ sufficient to do that, you may be
seeing the products of the culmination of the hot gasses, the putty, the grease, the O-ring materi-
als, blowing out the joint; but you still, because of the overwhelming amount of pressure being
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tbrcedon theseseals,pushthe remainingpart of an erodedsealinto eitherJorthe primaryor
thesecondary.
Basicallyyoucanwork this scenariobothwaysbecauseil"the primaryseals,the secondary
at somepointin time,becauseit wouldhavehadit to beeroded
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too,becauseit wouldhavebeenoff of theseat.wouldhavebeenoff theseat,andthen if you lost
integritylateron in flight of theprimaryseal,youblow-byandfail.
If youusethis scenario,that the primarysealwaserodedscbadly that it neversealedin
the action,but therewasenoughof the secondarysealleft and it did seatin the extrusiongap,
and thensubsequentlylater in flight, dueto loadsor whateverit gotspit out, thenyouwould
havethesameeffect.
Soyoucando it eitherway,with either seal--andthat you can't quanti_', because you're
talking about a hot gas happening with a cold gas test firing.
DR. WALKER: Do you think it is possible, by looking at the volume and duration of that
smoke, to estimate just how much material was eroded?
MR. BOISJOLY: I understand that people at Marshall are trying to do just that thing.
DR. WALKER: Is there any result of that?
Could someone at Marshall comment on that?
MR. HARDY: I don't have the results. That activity is underway, was underway two days
ago, when I came down here. That is being done, and we do think that is quite critical in under-
standing the scenario
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you very much.
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DR. FEYNMAN: I just had one question, to try to understand a little more clearly what Mr.
Lund showed us--maybe he should answer, I don't know--a series of graphs, of pictures that
were supposedly occurring during the half hour caucus.
MR. BOISJOLY: No. That conclusion was the conclusio_ prior to the caucus.
DR. FEYNMAN: These were not the slides shown during the caucus?
MR. BOISJOLY: No, sir.
That whole presentation was a culmination before the caucus occurred.
MR. ACHESON: Is it practical to conduct a test with hot gas?
MR. BOISJOI,Y: Yes. In fact, as a result of the incident, we are going back, and one of the
things we are trying to do is to take a full-scale joint and run a hot, 40 pound charged motor,
and blow gas, hot gas, through it. We are also trying with cold gas to simulate the dynamics in
that subscale test rate that would have the O-ring pressurized as the joint opening is added.
MR. ACHESON: Why wouldn't either or both of those variations in your test program have
been instituted at the beginning of the test program?
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MR. BOISJOLY: I guess, in all honesty, the data that we ran in resiliency showed on that
chart at room temperature showed that in a normal ambient environment, that we did not have
a problem, and we had a very sufficient erosion margin.
Now, one thing that wasn't put up on that chart that we did discuss was there was one test,
because I was concerned and I asked one more test be run in the time frame that those resilien-
cy tests were run, back about eight or nine months ago, I asked that the O-ring be squeezed 40/
1,000ths of an inch, and just back off 10/1,000ths of an inch. The rationale for doing that was to
show what the effect of the secondary seal was at the ignition transient, beginning, namely, the
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zeroto 170millisecondregimeandspilling over into the next regimeof [70 to 330.And that
neverliftedoff.
That wasthe basisof my makingthat chart I madethat chart for theWashingtonpresen-
tationand[ quantifiedthat asbest[ couldon the basisof that information,and[ fi_.!tverycom-
fortablewith the factthat, if we_ere in that positionof a launchthat wasaboveSRM-15,that
wewereokayfor that region.
We hadthat asan experiencebasein our books,andthat is why ! wassoadamantlyop-
posedto go
1209
outside of it.
DR. WALKER: Did you present that argument at this half-hour meeting?
MR. BOI,qJOLY: Yes.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you very much.
Mr. Thompson, Do you want to give your name and position?
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7. The presentatlon continued, then Bob LuDd gave his
COncluSiOnS and reconu_endat_ns. T_,e listeners on the other
lines _ere not pleased and began to question the rationale
_ehind such a set of comcluslons and _eco_mendatlons. Bo_
Lund e_pi_:ned why we s_uld stay within our data bsse _s
recommended.
[ ) brgckets denote co,ants added to aut_*_r:s notes fo_ clarity,
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8. George Hardy was then asked by someone at e:t._er Kennedy
Space Center or Marshall Space Flight Center what he t_u_ht.
_e sSld ha was appalled at Morto_ Thlokol imc.'s
reco_mendation. _e was t be_ asked If he would fly and he
&aid not if the co_tractor is reco_u_endlng r_ot to fly_
9. A s,hort discussion followed by various people. Morto_
Thlckol, Inc. management asked for a short f_ve minute c_c_s
offilne _Dd said they would get _Ig ht back to them. The
caucus lasted approximately 20-25 minutes.
The caucus started by Mr. Mason statlng t_t a management
decision was necessary.
Those of us who opposed the launch were still trying to
convince management that temperature was indeed a very
important parameter.
Arnie Thompson went up and placed a 9ad of paper right in
front of Mr. Mason on the table and attempted once agai_ _c
explain the affect of a lower temperature. Arnie stopped
when it bec_me apparent that he wasn't getting t h/o_gh.
then spoke up agais and this time made a big point about t he
photo evidence betweerl Solid Rocket MOtor-J5 [launc hod on
January 24, 1985, st 1:50 p.m. EST with a 53 e F O-ring
temperature) and Solid Rocket Motor-22 [launched October 31,
1985 st lit00 a.m. EST with 75 a F O-ring temperature]. I
tried to explain that Solid Rocket Motor-15 had a lot
(approximately ii0 degree arc) of black soot while Solid
Rocket Motor-22 had a small (local greyish spots) a_eJnt of
SOOt. I tOO sto_ped when it was apparent to me that no one
wanted to hear what I had tO say.
Sometime during the caucus, Mr. Mason asked if he was the
Only one that was taking the _ositlon to fly. I really t hink
that many people didn't hear him due to all the discussion
that was taking place.
i0.
Ii.
12.
13.
[ ] brackets denote comz_e_ts added to author's notes for claritl,.
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_o_es for Janua_ 2_ and 2B, 1986 _¢ont_d,l
i_nd and asked _A_ tO "are OfF _AS e-gin_e_Lng _at a_ _J_ _'_
h_S managemen_ na_.
I_. Shortly after t his _e _ent bac_ on the _e!ec_n and m_e _:e
reco_e_dat_on to launch 5ol_d Rocket _0to_-25 without _ny
temperature restr_rt_on_
1_ The decision was Das_z_ii_ based on _he items tha_ were
IAs_ed on s ¢h_r_ s_g_ed by Joe _Im_nster. T_S si_e_
s_ee_ was requeste_ by NASA.
i?. I was ,St a part_ to t_e co, tents on _he chart and in f_ct
did _ot see the c_art _ntll _he next day.
I_. I le_t the room _eellng badly de_es_e_ but felt I d_d all :
could s_rt o_ being fired. _ knew that msnagemen_ h_d m_e
a tough decision but I didn't agree with it at s!l.
_9. One of my colleagues put it best to sum it up. "T_S _as a
meeting v_ere _._ dete_nination was to _aunch a_d it was up
to u_ tO prove beyond a ShadOW o_ doubt that xt wa_ not safe
to do so." _ might cor_ent t)_t this is not the usual to_e
o_ pre-fli_ht seetings. We usually hav_ to---___9__ beyond S
shadow Of doubt that It iS Okay to launch.
20. Refer to notebooM @2 pages _ end i0 for reel ti_e entries
about feelieg prior to end after launch.
21. _y feelings ore well doc_ented by memo and internal activity
reports lon 9 before this In_iden_. I couldn't s_ar.d the
thought of a disaster any longer SO I wrote _omo 2870:PY
86:0_3 some time in July Aug_s_ of 1985. A sea_ tss_ team
w_S subsequently fOZ_ed _Or real as a result Of my _emo --
refer re ,otebook |I page I _Or entry note
22. Z hope a_d pray that Z have not _isked my job and family
security for _el_g honest in _y conviction, tO sra_d up f_r
what _S right and honorable.
_Oger M. Bois_oly 2/13,'8_
(signed by) 4:5_ _.m.
_ST
I ] brackets denote com_flents added to author's notes for clarity.
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Typed _er_ion of Handwritten Notes of R. Bois_olyr Seal Task
Force, Structure, Morton Thi_k61, Inc.
J,nul.ry :P?a_. 8;00 a.m. Meetin@
O S5-6A _ented _utty with the double O-ring is _lanned to be
fired today. This is a 402B motor wi_h test section.
o Gave status on fluorocarbon seals.
o LOoked out the wlndow after the meeting and could still SP_
the STA-I segments in the storage yard. The 2 still are not
snipped t3 H-7.
January 2 _ 1986 _nforme_ion
o Recelved a hendwrltten quote end non-dimensioned sketch of
the fluorocarbon seal concept,
o Held a serious meeting concerning the launch of Soi_d
ROCket MOtOr-25 [launch planned for Jar.u©ry 28th] slnce it
is so cold st the cape. After much dlscuss_on from i:00
p.m. to 8:30 p.m. the engineering recor_mendatl_n was to
delay the flig ht untl! t_e seal was st 53 e ? _o stay wlthln
our data base NASA management did not like our
recommendations and our management promptly cauc'*_ed for
further discussion. This resulted in our management (Jerry
Mason) making the decislon that it was a low risk _ased
upon their assumption that temperature was not a
discr_tor since Solid Rucket Motor-22 [launched October
31. 1985 at IS:00 EST[ h_d hot _SS passage at essentially
at room temperature. We (engl;learlng) tried once again to
Impress that the timing of the event due to t_psrsture was
C he problem. My thinking is that tqrmperature is a
discriminator a,d Solid Rocket Motor-15 [launc1_Rd January
st 1:5_ p.'_..¢_-[j ano boiid ROCK_£MOtOr-X2
demonstrate this fact. Solid Rocket Motor-15 _d s large
order of more soot between tPJI O-rings than Solid Rocket
Motor-22 and this tells me that temperature is Important
end that the data does exist to lead us to o_'{ engineering
rscolamendstion. Z sincerely hope th&t this %munch does not
result in a castrophy [catastrophe]. I parentally do not
agree with some of the statements made in Joe _ilminster's
_ritten summary stating that Solid Rocket Motor-25 is okay
to fly.
[e.d of page 9 of ootes_
[ _ brackets denote comments added tO author's notes for clarlty.
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Januar_ 28, 1986, 8:00 a.m. Meetin@ - Meetln_ ended 9:00 a.m.
o The O-ring resiliency testing (or lack of testing) was
discussed. Zt was suggested that we structure all our
testing with an OUtSide vendor (Parker Seal in Salt Lake)
since our lab is not responding to our needs, we have bee_
trying to 4st testing started since last October. I will
investigate this with Arnle [Thompson_.
o Also check to see where Ycm [Gregory] is on the design of
the seal dynamic test fixture. If no progress has been
made then consider having Dave Sparkl_an designing the
system to give us the opening rate speed to simulate t_
field joint parameters.
0 One more co_ent about the Solid Rocket Motor-25 meeting
that took place yesterday: This is the first time that I
am aware of that NASA has taken a position that .s outside
of the program data base. _ have had many lrg_ments
negated by them because they have Insisted that my
suggestions were not withln the data base up to that time.
It seems to me that they only allowed the data bass to grow
as a result of unforeseen conditions. At no time would
they allow the data base to be expanded by predetermination
of a set of conditions. I remember well, the fights I had
at the Solid Rocket-Motor-16 [launched April 29, 1985]
Flight Readiness Review when presenting the Solid Rocket
Motor-15 [launched January 24, 1985] results. I was
ha_ered hard about being outside the previous data base
since Solid Rocket Motor-15 was end still is the worst hot
gas passage indication past the primary O-ring seals.
January 28, 1986 2nfoz*mation ,(51 Launch II:38 a.m.)'
L ......................
o Solid Rocket Motor-25 blew up approximately one minute into
the flight. Presently waiting for information on the cause
of the. disaster. I feel real sick about this but I did
everthing possible to convince them not to fly.
684
[end of page 10 of notesl
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2" AuSust 198_
TO: S, II.. Sttl_,
PTOje¢= t_jineer
CC; J.I, Itaw_ , X.M. $1_T7, J.G. Russe',l, |.V. [b_ilnj, H.H. M¢:_'_o_, _
_OR: &.R, Tlll_ml_soul , 5u_t_'Isoz
Str_ctutes _ s I k"_
S_M'EC7! SIUq tllSbt Sell b¢oqmel_diti©:_
T1_e O-ZI_| S_L_ ptebLe_ l_s lstely I_C_e _Cute . Sol.titus, beth long t_d
8he_t te_M_ are _i_8 t_t, i_ the meJ_ t_IN f/1&htS 8_e ¢=_t1_ui_|, It _S
recJtlo_ t_t • umt tent solut;oa 114 IncOtl)_Zated _or _18ht_
fel_II STS-2? _ch _s clt%e_tly sched_ed _or 2_ _u_st 1985. _e =e_r
tetlm mo1_tiol uses t_e m _osslble mbl_ thlckn_)s 8_ • ,292 +.00_/-.0C-:
$_h d$_ (_flm 8. _ tem#Xts of tl_se _ cb4_|e| _Te _hM in _a_le i. A
|_est 41t-I of e_feZt _I_ _m teq-'red to Im¢ot1_ta_e t_se _|e|. No.ever,
am s_ Im t_m $6ble t_m 0-zi_ squeeze ls aea%ly d_bled for the ex_m_:e
(ST_-2?A), _ l_mst eff0_t mh_t_¢ )e m_e to _1¢3ude • u_ s_m k=t a_d the
,_2 dl_m 0-,I_ 8_ S_ _s 18 ptscti_ _I, l_¢h o! the 11_t_ml blo_t-_y dur=_&
0-_la_ 8e_i_q_ 18 ¢_lttto_ed by 0-r_8 |q_eete. M|o mote sscrII:clJ/ 0-t_=g
Nterl =I 1| emmll_ble te pret_t the mesle_ Imttlo_ o! the 0-tin|. _he a_¢_
cre|m-|eetlolml ares of t_ ,292 _i_ 0-tit| _ _p the te|l.lle_ce resFc_se
by mdded pzs|mvte fTm t.9_ 8to_ve side _ii,
_t_ I_$ te_m solitlo_ _oo_ |_)_; _ut, meve_l ye&_s are re_Irld t:
li$_1_tStt 8_H _ t_. _ 8(m_e shazt te_m masuzes sh_a_d he t_ke_ ',c
_ml_¢t _Xl_t rls_m
k.t, l_mm_Dm on
kiT/Jr
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_ITI ASSESSMENT OF TEMPERATURE CONCLRN ON 3_?I-_ {51L) LAUNCH
(I CALC_;LAT_ONS SH0_I T)IAT SRM-25 O-RINGS _iLL BE 20" COLDER THAN SRM-IS O-RINGS
!
0 _C_tPERATURE 9AF_ NOT :ONCt.US{VF ON PR[_CT',.NG PRI'MARY O-RING _LQ_-BY
0 EN_],NEERIFIG ASJESSI'IENF IS THAT: , i'"
0 CJLOER J-RINGq aiLL _AVE iNCREASED EFFECTIVE DUROMETER ("HARDET_')
[/ "HARDER" D-RIN_S WILL T+,KE LONGER TO "SEAT" i " ""'_
0 Mi]'iZ _a_ _IAY PA_S PRLF_ARY O R!NG BEffORE THE PRIMARY SEAL SEATS
130 DEMONSTRATSD SEALING T_REgHOtD _S TIMES GREATER THAN 0,038"
EiIG$,JN EXPERIENCET] ON Sf{l_-'_ i '':_'"'_ "!"
_J iF T'!E 9RI_ARY SEAL DOES NO_ SEAT, THE SECONDARY SEAL wiLL:SEAT
i_ PRESS'JOE _CLL GET TO SECONDARY SEAL BEFORE THE _ETAL _ PARTS ROT_IE
0 O-R{NG PRESSURE LEAK CHECK PI_ACES SECraNDARY.fSEAL ,IN OUTgOARO:
POS T ON W CH M N ,wi ZES SEAL NG T ME wf.._ _:) ,,*
0 ,_IT_ RELO_#IEND_ Jlb-5,L LAUNCH PROCEED ON _8 JANUARY 1986 v,,3'-,',;',",,:_; .
O SRN-25 wi(._ NOT BE SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT FRGM SI_li-l_"._i_i'"
,dJE C, _.!L_t_iNSILr_ ViCE _RESID_NT
<SPACE BOOSIER PIOGRAHS
M OtWON ll liOl_C_ fh, C.
IRel'. "_' I1 IT 1.% _1' '_"_
IIII I I I _ , .
IRe[. 3.11-17 16 of 2.2]
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MOIITONTHIoKO( INC "-: ........ - -
i--
Wasatr_hDivision
Inleroq_ce Memo
20 RUgL_ 19_ _-
•.. , _ . -
John Wells. Dlrector,_Soac_'O_e_ati_ns _la_t '.
RDSS _o_ma_. Dlrec_o_Soace-_uallty Assurance
_rant Thompson, _lrecto_, R_,D Labcrat_le_
_. Mo _o., Manage., By.imams ._nQxnee?Ing
_oYO C. _inton. Manage_,:Pro_e=t _ng;nee?_ng
Program Management Managers
Space Booster Pro_ect E_GlneIrlng Mana_e_s
F_: _. F;. Lurid "- _
v_ce President, Engineering
A. _. Mc_nal_
D_rector. Space _ooste_ Program•
5LPJEZ_: No==le O-rzrg lnve_L:gatio_ Tash _orre
_s y_u-ire l_are, wl have e-per'zence_ ©-r;ng _amage _ • _a_eom
bas_s in the Call _ield _olnts end more pre_ll_ly in the call/
nozzle joint On thl Space Shuttle Boost_ _ _tor_. The frequency
h_s Increas_ ;n recent _IIghts. b_hzle _e have not compromised
,he oe_o-_ance _ any mct_r to Pate. therest,It o_ • lea_ at any
o_ th_ JOlnt_ _o_Id be ¢ataStroo. hlC.
A _g_:_l_a_t amount o_ ._rh to Oef_ne I solution hal alrea¢_ bee_
• :c_n_l_she_ and zt Is no_ obvlous that • contlnu}ng ea_r_ is
re_u_ued In order to continue t_s probllm In • o?@a_l:ed manner.
tas_ $orce has bl_'. _o_med Yhat reports _hro_vh the Mini@or o÷
Space _oste_ ProjtCL k*lq_neering tO the E,Ig_nee_ing vice Fres;_ent.
The tall _orce _ co,._r_se_ _4 both _ull tlme a_part t_me par_z_.-
paints. The _ull time G_rtlC_p_'_lk.J_Ee_
_na_d M. l:etner, Cha_-marl
_oger _o_sjoi_, Str._ctural Des_g_
@_lan Russell, SRM Frogram O_+_ce
marl Sal_ta., Moto? Fer_ormance
S_t_ Stein. S_ace _ooItIF _roject Engineering
[Her. 'i 1 I 17 17 of 221
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The Other- Identified partlcipants who wzZ! serve at the _Irectlon
of the _hairman on an as needea basi s are:
Karl £=khardt, Insulation Design
Stan Boraas, Gas Dynamics
Phi I Shadl eskey, Heat T,_ansFer _," T
El°on Bailey, Man_factuFing Engzr, eerlng - . - _ -
- Fred Bras<leld, St., _u,i _ty Englneer_ng _{_: - "
Tom Gregory," 5oace Boost - Pr_ect E-nq_neering" ' .....
_ L):_.=--._-_:%:_LZ<%-:-"t_:!:--: _=.7 :':<_?-C'_;-:_-_- : _='=_"_-'--__-: " - - -
It is the cha_te_=_o_ this--task: ....... =_.=__r.-_-_...%._-.-._ ,_2:. :-= " -
f:rce _to-iAves_gate._t_e .c_m ca_e'
and r;o_:_.Ie - Jo:nts, _,i . -'._ +-. - :_--=---_ - .,
both materla+ls_andco_n__igura_lons" and rec_m-'.:
men° b_th .s,._crt'tc_m and long te_m s_:utio_S._._;_:.:L 2-__ #_-- __.-_.- .
The task i_rce is " speci¢ically charter_'d '-_:to_--or'ganize---...... -and" ' _irect-"
the re_u:red investlgati_ns, itest_,-'- and !.analyseS, " and wli! act
*n the roll n¢ Project Engineers tr) dlrect activities in suD2ort-
lng _rganlzat jons. -2
We _ll ampreciate y_ur c_ntlnuea Suc_or't 131_ this a_tlvity.
JR,4". '2 ] ! IT 19 -1"22)
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--. ,"_i 22 July 1985
__ _-','._'. ..:=___._T_--T.---.-< " - _ '
.,; _,;__:,: -_ .=-T I _OCr_SS EPCRT ; : - : / , _'= " "
..... = ' ,. ..... ' , "--- ?-i:.-- _ :- '
._ , -.-" .. ._, ' A_PLI_ EECI_4ICS DEP._.._-j " -.._
"-.c- , : - . Cost Center 287x . :"
_,..<¢_ -. , . _ . -. . . - . ,
.-____r -._ ,'' ..- " : :'.'- " _. .-'._-t_._-:_:L: j: -_'-",_-_ .r:'::7.- " "
' _a_d _ " p t_tors o_ • r
egar_less a_ :L_ac_. to cos" --_ _ .... P ent ever 7 _,dea ,
-_-_:_- soae<:u.te or !_natever.'-. KLeven hours of
.... _--:_ ha_ See= Spen:.di_cusslm E the R-o_,em and _a-amt'_.
inC.ude the many hours of ln_orma_l mee_imgs _e_Id .....
with s_la!ler 8rcups.... "-...'---_-.-.-_'c L. " .--
"'_. ., r .-_n r.: , -g_ p _ i _eople to :h/s task -
% n no other wo K aullowee th_s heln an abe
'" " " - g " "olute requ_-e_e-t3 to se_u-e
Sc_"- me. 7_Sc-u_?on, then we stan_ in _anser of hav'/m_ o':e:of t_-
--,_ ou. proo___ via an u-sol_c_t.; -- , • _, . -q_.", - ^ ---. co=petltcrs
_ - =u p:oposaLA.21ZLZ s thought is aLLmosr as . "
horrifying as !_v__ng a f2/_gh: facilu:'e before • eolut/en is i_plzaeated _o
preYenr O-r_nE eras!on.
IRof. '2 11-17 2(I of 22]
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- - :... -*::,-- :-: -_ _ L"<L-:.,i:.-7.=
b OKTo,_Tt-tlO_<,_)L.INc-: ' . .- . ........
Wasa:ch DL',Lsicn "L
. ¢- .- :: p
!nlerof:_ce Memo - - . I. - j]
21 July 19_5
2870 : P.'86:073 - _ . . .
i - . _ . _ .- .
- "--L-:-;_-:#_:_ -" v±cePreslde:."_-g'_2e_-±n_" _i':-':;-_"=':--"-_."*.":-:'-.:--- -: -
'. '=. _. ,. _,-.:_"_.:.::Y':'i_>-.-=_':- - --; ,-- :--=.'.:. ," :'- ==.:-.z'-.__._-_: -- "'- _. " "
CC: : : :-: i" B. C. _rln_o=, A. J. HcDoua!d, L. IL Sayer, J. i. Kapp
_c_: ,-._-'-. ;.-T 1. _. 'Bo_-sJo!y
. Applied Merha=.Ics - Ext. 3s7.5 _-,
-- " E.os._nlPa.en_,a_ Failure C:1:Icai!_y
l-his le_:er is written to Ir_ure that maaagemen_ _s fully aware of the
ser_czs=ess of the current 0-.R_i= K erosio_ problem:i_ _he S_M Joi_=s from an
ezglzo_r!ng szan_;_Int, :_ :'' "" "'" -
•"he mistake=l*, accepted posi_i_ on r_he Joint _:obl-_was to fly without fear
of failure ani to _:n a series of desigR% ev_ua:ion-_ which would _Itlmataly
lead to a solution or at least a s!_.Iflcant reduction of _he erosion problem.
This position is now dras_Ica/!y changed as a zesu!t of the SK,M I&A no:zle
Jois_ eroslo_ w_dch ersded a seco=dar 7 0-._izgw_-Lh _he pri_a_'-y _-._Ling never
sealing.
if the saae-soenarlo should occur in a field jointi(azd.lt con!d), =hen it _s
a Jump ba_ as to _he success or failure of the _cin: because =.he se=oniar7
O-Ran K cannot res_ud t_ the c.!e'vls open_inK rate and may no'E be capable of
pressurization. .The :es'_Ir wo_Id'be a catas_r0phe of _he highest order ,-
loss of human l_fe.:_:. _-
An uneffi=ial tea_" (a memo defining t-he team an_ its pu_-p,ose was oe'_er
published) w_th leader aas formed on 19 July 1955 and was tasked with solvlzg
the prDblem for both the short and long te.--m. This unofficial team Is
essentially =onexls_ent a'l: tb!S t..i=e. ._n my opinion, _he _eam must be
officially _i'ze:% =he responsibility and the auzhorit 7 to execute the work
that meeds to be done on a _on-i=terference basis (_ull time asslgr_enu until
comple;_ed).
CCMP._\'f PR:VATE
IHef. '2 11-17 21 of 22]
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1210
TESTIMONY OF ARNOLD THOMPSON. DESIGN ENGINEER. MORTON THIOKOL. INC.
MR. THOMPSON: Arnold Thompson, Design Engineer, in the case design structural engi-
neer.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: The comments I made to Mr. Boisjoly apply, of course, to you. We
know that.
You are not expected to make a presentation, but go ahead.
MR. THOMPSON: I understand.
I need to start out first by "Amending" what Mr. Boisjoly has said. His thoughts parallel
mine very closely.
I would like to add some more features to this.
As many of you know--and I think it answers some questions that were presented during
the course of this morning, and initially this case was thought to not open up. You've seen the
pictures where the gap opens up, and the secondary and primary, and the analysis revealed that
it, in fact, was not supposed to open up. After running some hydroproof, and, in fact, the first
attempt at a burst pressure cf the standard weight case, it leaked. In fact, it leaked at about
1.300- 1,40(t psi
We ran some additional analysis, and
1211
re-boundaried the pins, and it turns out that the pins and how y6u boundary those is very, very
critical to the response of this opening up that we are talking about.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Could you give the dates of when you ran those--.voughly?
MR. THOMPSON: Two or three years ago.
DR. WALKER: What do you mean, "boundaried the pins?"
MR. THOMPSON: The boundary conditions of how you tbllow the load lines through the
pins indicates if you're modeling the axisymmetric case that we smear the pins out in it and
give the stiffness appropriate to make it approximate the case.
Now, if the pin doesn't follow the load line, that affects very much the results.
DR. COVERT: In other words, they cannot make the model, the math model, they cannot
grid it up with these 177 pins? They have to model it some other way? Is that correct?
MR. THOMPSON: We're now modeling with a three-dimensional analysis to try to attempt
to follow the load line better. And so we didn't know it was going to open up. And it, in fact, did.
And we have shown that, and by remodeling in some, we were able to get 10/1,000ths, and then,
by that time, the STA-1 came on the scene. That is where we first got our first
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definitive measured data that opened up on the order of about 42/1,000ths. And I think the
MEOP at that time was 93_L
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MR.BOIS,JOLY:Thatwasthestatic.Not "'STS-I":STA-1.
MR.THOMPSON:STA-I.Thankyo't.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: When you said it leaked, did it leak water':
MR. THOMPSON: It didn't leak. It opened up. And we had one pressure port that was down
at the bottom. We put into it a pressure transducer so that we could follow the motion of it
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: You said you had some tests leak at 1,300 - i,:l()0 psi?
MR. THOMPSON: Yes. We ran a hydroburst because it leaked very badly at that point.
, ICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: And that was water?
MR. THOMPSON: Yes, it was water. It leaked so badly, we just shut the test down.
But that gave us a very, very close to our safety factor, our 1.4 safety factor, with 936, so
that was sufficient at the time
Later on, we ran the STA-1 test.
MR. SUTTER: I didn't understand your last statement.
You said you ran a test and you got a load and it was very close to 1.4.
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Is that good or bad?
MR. THOMPSON: We have been asked to produce a 1.4 factor of safety and have a positive
margin.
MR. SUTTER: But the load you got in this test was how close to that 1.4?
MR, THOMPSON: We were at, I don't remember all the numbers exactly, but it was 1385
psi, and it was 936. So it would be 936 times 1.4, would be the required number, and the 1,300
number came very close to that.
DR. WALKER: Pretty much at the 1.47
MR. THOMPSON: Yes, very close.
DR. COVERT: 1.4 if I did it right, is 1320, and I'm not good at arithmetic.
MR. THOMPSON: But I think we were just slightly below the 1.4. And so, we proceeded in
doing better modeling. And then, of course, the light-weight motor came in, where we took about
41/1,000the off the stiffeners and attachers, and about 20/1,000ths off the cylindrical wall. And
we then ran a test with those light weight cases. And we ran a verification where we attempted,
once again, to measure the joint motion. Because, as you can see, it is very critical in the oper-
ation of this motor. And we, because of some bracketry problems on that, we got the measure-
ments
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that were somewhat high, we tried but the brackets were rotating, too, and we tried to go back
and correct for that. But it was somewhat high.
And then subsequently we have run a bunch of tests where we have confirmed what we feel
good about, on the order of 42/1,000ths between the sealing diameters at 1004 psi. So these are
kind of new things that have come on the scene.
We have tried to adjust for these things.
We put shims--first of all, we adjusted the tolerances. We looked at the tolerances of the
case, the O-ring groove depth, and so forth, and we found that most of the population was within
tighter tolerances. So we changed the drawing.
We found out that we could, by twisting some arms with the O-ring people, we could reduce
the tolerances on the O-rings also, and so we did that.
And then, the next thii_g we did, we put shims in on the outside to force the tang over
against the clevis, and these are some .,3f the things that we have been doing in an attempt to
counteract that, what you are seeing.
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DR. WALKER: That wa, to increase the squeeze on the O-ring?
MR. TfIOMPSO ": Increase the squeeze. It has
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two squeezes. One is when it is just sitting there, static, with the various pre-launch loads on it,
and so forth. That is what we call a gathering squeeze, That, on a worst, is like :{,_ 1,0!!0ths. And
then, once the cases are pressurized, they go around, but not necessarily concentric, and so that
can get as bad as 8,' 1,000ths.
So we are really better ott" pressurizing.
But the issue that we're speaking of today is that of the openin_ and the rate of opening.
All of you I think are familiar with the pressure trace. You recall that it has kind of a toe
on _t, and then it comes up over the inflection point, and then it has a saturated curve on top.
Well, of course, the movement of this gland or the separation of this <land is very close to
that same response.
I would like to speak first to the primary O-ring.
The primary O-ring has lots of energ,_" to activate it and it probably does it very quickly. But
it is kind of dependent, as Roger has said, on the stiffness of the material.
If you look at the relaxation data for rubber at cold temperatures and very high rates of
loading, it
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has a very stiff response, versus a higher response at higher temperatures. And we were loading
on a fairly fast response. So we are in a transition range of this elastic material, and it has to
flow. And if it has to flow, it has to deflect, and the deflection would be dependent upon the
stiffness of the rubber.
If it is colder, it will move slower. Before an O-ring can seal, it has to go into the squeeze,
into the extrusion gap. It has to fill in the little pores in the metal, in fact, even tl',e lay of the
lathe turnings, as it is turned in the machine.
Until it does that, you're going to get some blow-by.
There is just nothing that you can do about it until it is finally extruded into the gap.
So we have two things that are happening. One would have to translate a little bit. That's
only on the order of 20/1,000ths across the O-ring groove, maybe less. And then it has to form
into the O-ring groove. Until such time, you are probably going to get some flow; at least you
can't guarantee that you're not.
Now, on this particular motor, we know that when we launched with the O-ring tempera-
ture predicted to be 53 degrees, we had considerable blow-by. It was blackened for about 180
degrees.
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Now we're proposing--and I'm thinking of the next day now--of launching at 29 degrees,
and it was quite a ways out of our experience realm, as has been said many times goday.
Now, let's talk about the secondary O-ring. I started to talk about it a minute ago.
The departure of those two surfaces is very similar in shape to the pressure trace. In the
beginning, during the pressure buildup, and during the separation of these two things, it is
rather slow. On a comparative rate, it is on the order of, maybe, about 1.2 inches per minute.
And then it increases as you get to the inflection point.
It is as high as 10 inches per minute.
Then, when you go over the top, it backs off to 1 or 1.5 inches per minute.
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Thereasonwe talk aboutinchesperminuteisbecausewearegomgto usean instron:o do
somework,andthat is thewaythosepeopletalk--rather, in inches per second.
What we had done, and the data we had available to us that night, was two inches per
minute. Now. if we take a secant from time zero to the max pressure of 1,000 psi in _;00 millisec-
onds, that secant is about 3.2 inches per minute, That was shown on the chart.
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We tested at 2 inches per minute, because that is how instrons work. geeerally in decades of
two. and at two inches per minute the resiliency of the O-ring is not sutt]cient to fbllow that
velocity at room temperature. It will separate. But it won't separate until in the low velocity
sections. So you've probably got, as has been mentioned here today, somewhere between 100 and
125 milliseconds while you're in the low velocity movement of this gland. And in that time you
do ha_e a secondary O-ring, as Roger indicated in the bracketing of various sequences during the
rise in pressure. But in the early parts, you do have a secondary O-ring, and in the latter parts
you do not.
Now. what has been alluded to earlier. We have devised a machine now where we can con-
trol the instron to give us exactly the shape, and we're doing that work now. In fact, a lot of that
work has been done--which confirms much of the things that we'ce discussing here.
So, I guess, in a final summary, without talking too much, my view was that we were now
launching at a lower temperature; we were going to get more blow-by; at 53 degrees we had
considerable blow-by and now we're going to get more of it; arid after the first hundred millisec-
onds, 125 milliseconds, we do not have a
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secondary O-ring that is functional,
MR. RUMMEL: I have a question for clarification.
As I recall, the wall of the motor, I distinctly recall it was reduced in thickness during the
course of this program. That would tend to increase the spread in the joint, would it not?
MR. THOMPSON: Very little. It is on the order of 1-2 mils and I'm speaking now from
finite element analysis, after we had learned to boundary it, so that we could predict the correct
STA-1 structural test article results. We used that type of boundary conditions and applied it to
both wall thicknesses. It was very small. It was on the order of a few mils of additional opening.
MR. RUMMEL: That was actually tested? Or this is predicted?
MR. THOMPSON: Those were predicted numbers.
MR. SUTTER: These improvements resulted in tighter tolerances in the shims? Were they
in some of the flight vehicles?
MR. THOMPSON: I was trying ta remember if they were, in fact, in all of the flight vehi-
cles. I think shims were. It's about a 30/1,000th shim that take up some of that slop.
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MR. SUTTER: Do you know when they were introduced--which flights?
MR. THOMPSON: I don't know.
Maybe Mr. Boisjoly recalls.
MR. MASON: Those were right from the first flight.
MR. SUTTER: So these were improvements from the beginning, and the joint basically has
been the same?
MR. MASON: Yes.
DR. WALKER: Did you consider using a larger O-ring?
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MR THOMPSON:Youcango to abouta 292O-ring,withoutgetting--andthen.of course,
youhaveto havea toleranceon that of plus 5, minus 3. And anything above a 292 with plus 5
on it, and it' you go to the wall on the land, that is all that will fit in. We hace considered a 295.
In thct. we have assembled shells w_th a 295 in hardware, after firing the DM-[. our first static
firing, and they went together fine
DR. WALKER: Why didn't you go to the larger O-ring, then'?
MR. THOMPSON: One Froblem in going to larger O-rings is in field joints--plant joints,
excuse me. In the plant joints, if you put in the 295 and you take
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the worst on worst, when the joint is raised to a temperature of 325 degrees during the curing of
the insulation, it is an overfill conditmn because of the alpha problems with the case, and the
rubber.
DR. WALKER: There is no reason why a field joint and a plant joint had to have the same
O-ring, is there?
MR. THOMPSON: There were some QC people that were afraid of the confusion that might
be developed between two nearly the same sized O-rings.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: A couple of questions, if I may.
Was any consideration given to the possibility of water? I notice you said earlier on that
there were some experiments with water. Any consideration given at this time to the possibility
of water being dangerous'?
It had been raining a good deal prior to this launch.
MR. THOMPSON: Well, it had been raining, and also we know that at one time we disas-
sembled a motor when we had to make a nozzle change; and when we pulled out the pins, water
came out. And we know that water does get in there, and we know that the temperatures most
likely were below freezing. _go th_r_ w_ _ chance
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of some ice.
I'm not sure that was a consideration tha_ night, though.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Were there other engineers that would take issue with you on this
matter, when it came to the launch question of : hether to go or no go? Did you have others who
opposed your point of view?
MR. THOMPSON: No, sir.
I have 24, 25 people, gals and guys, working for me, and I know none of them that would
have opposed this viewpoint that are involved in the case, the case/nozzle joints.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: All of those people would have said no to the launch?
MR. THOMPSON: My judgment is yes, that is true.
MR. ACHESON: Question, and maybe this question runs against the engineering culture.
But what I'm wondering is when people run test programs that show these significant anoma-
lies, some think related and some think maybe not related to temperature, why wouldn't MTI
say to NASA we have some tests going on that shew some inconclusive, but troubling, results,
and we're not sure we know what to think about it. But until we decide what to think about it,
you ought to be damn sure you
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don't launch below X temperature, and that is an order. I mean. you are to accept that with our
product.
Do contractors ever talk that way to the customers? If not, why not?
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[ dont qmteseewhythis spirit of scienti{_cinquirywith neutral:tad anti-conc[usory culture
surroundin_ it _hould be allowed to continue so lon_ when the worst case is pretty obvious and
it had pretty bad results.
Of course, we don't know vet that this was the ca.ee, but if you believe that it could ha_e
been a catastrophic category in the worst case, when your test results were troubling, but r._ot
scientifically proven, I really don't understand why the customer isn't told to hold everythin_
below some threshold condition.
MR MASON. Sir, I probably should address that.
MR. ACHE'SON: And I don't mean just this launch.
MR. MASON: I understand It's more of a policy issue, so I should probably address it, in-
stead of Arnie. Let me try to do that.
I believe that we have provided fu!l visibility of the testing, the analysis, and there has been
a joint continuing review with NASA on the whole
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questior, of the joint, and on every flight we have assessed that isstle, looking at our most recent
history o: our totq! history, to see if there would be a concern on the subsequent flight.
We were really trying to acquire enough information to be able to identify if there was a
threshold.
I think the fundamental answer to your question is we didn't know what the threshold was,
we knew we needed more test aata, and we are getting that so that the threshold could be iden-
tified.
We were looking at both what the c_p,_bility of the existing joint was as well as at the same
time looking for improvements.
While l've got the floor, we have in the too:or that is about to be static tested, we are testing
larger O-rings. That is one of the candidate improvements. And I will add to that that a lot of
you already know that when you have something that is working and you have to contemplate a
change, you have to be absolutely certain that the change is, in fact, an improvement; because
the history of the business is that if you aren't very, very careful, what you think is an improve-
ment may end up being worse. It has happened a number of times.
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So I know there is concern about the time that we have taken to look at these improve-
ments. But you have to be certain that they are improvements before you make the change.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I would like to go to a little more specific point. I mean, I think
Dave's point is a good one. But the thing that is most troubling to me is if you had Mr. Thomp-
son, who is a supervisor, and he says all of his people had doubts about whether this launch
should take place, and it has been a matter of major concern all of this time, and you have
eGdence from the flight a year ago that _here was blow-by, what was it that causod you to go
ahead and approve it?
MR. MASON: Well, let's see. First off, to say that all of his people didn't even know that
there was an issue, and so, I mean, it is really conjecture to determine what their position would
have been. But, as far as what motivated us, it was logic said that 53 degrees is not a threshold.
If you ask anybody would 50 degrees be okay, I think everyone would sign up at 50 degrees.
So, every flight which the program has had, has had to break some frontiers.
But when you go from STS-1 to STS-2, you went
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into a temperature regime that you weren't in, and as you move down through the program, you
are working to some degree in an extrapolated area.
DR. RIDE: The time you go through frontiers is during testing, not during the t]i_hts. That's
the way it's supposed to work.
MR. M2.SON: Well, "demonstr,,.tion" is a better word, at the demonstration. You thli on
your analysis when you make your first flight, and your second flight you're Falling on your
analysis. You have not demonstrated everything that you're going to see.
I hope that is clear.
I'm trying to say that when we qualify in tt,e first place, we don't test the full range of'
every piece of item, and we therefore take some data and extrapolate it by analysis.
So we don't have actually demonstrated capability on every facet of the motor.
DR. WALKER: We are talking about 25 degrees away from your experience.
MR. MASON: And that is certainly the reason that it had the extensive debate that it did.
DR. WALKER: And just recently, apparently, the previous launch was a situation where
something was 2 degrees out of spec and the decision not to proceed might
1227
have averted a catastrophe. So 25 degrees out of your experience is really rather a large extrapo-
lation.
MR. ACHESON: It seems to me not a case where you are trying to set a threshold, but a
case in which you have established a point which is 53 degrees, and everybody, as you say, would
agree that's all right. And you've got some people who say anything substantially outside of that
is troublesome and anything colder than that is more troublesome. And we think we see a paral-
lelism between increasing coldness and increasing unreliability. That is the state of mind at
MTI.
What I really don't quite see is why everybody took it: so calmly.
MR. MASON: Well, it was not calmly nor was there a lack of concern.
We were trying to, we listened to all of the arguments, and we found ourselves in a posi::.on
of some uncertainty that we were not able to quantify. And we had, as opposed to the 53 degree
joint that had a blow-by, we had five joints that did not in that very same flight. And so, we, on
a statistical basis, we were working with random occurrences. And taking a couple of random
occurrences and trying to say there's a clear correlation didn't hold up.
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Our intuition and, of course, some data, says the colder it is, the more risk there is. The real
issue was how much colder before you run into a regime where you will get three times the
erosion of the worst one we had seen. It wasn't as if what we had seen before was on the verge
of failure. It was not. The blow-by, by itself, was not a failure mode. It has to lead to erosion.
And the worst erosion we had seen was a third of what we were tclerating.
So our first thought was that, even if we had more blow-by, and it led to erosion, it would
have to be three times as much as anything we had seen, and that seemed extremely unlikely.
MR. ACHESON: It seems to a layman that it comes down to a point of view that says the
burden of proof is on the people who want to launch, this cold; and another point of view says
the burden of proof is on the people who want to stop the launch. Then nobody can really decide
how to resolve that. And so, it just got resolved either by persuasion or by some presumption in
favor of launching or--I don't know how.
But I don't see either a mathematical or a logical process by which it got resolved.
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MR.MASON:Well.certainlysincethe incidentwehavebeensearchingour mindsandour
soulson the
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questionof did weaddress_tproperly.Youknoweveryonehassaidif I could have stopped it, I
wish I had.
But here we are, trying to present th_ thought process that we went through that day,
rather than what we could do over.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, I think everybody is sy.._pathetic, and we understand. The
problem that I'm having is when you talk about frontiers, 1 think we all understand that. I
mean, this whole program has had a lot of frontiers, and we understand, But it doesn't seem to
me that you were saying to yourself now we want to test this equipment because we're going to
establish a new frontier.
It seems to me that the question was should we delay this launch or scrub it. And so., you
really weren't thinking about a new frontier.
MR. MASON: That was a poor choice of words on my part.
What I was trying to convey was that we are always working somewhat in the extrapolated
area.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But that is not this case.
I mean, here you have a lot of warning, and you've all been discussing the O-rings and seals,
and you've all had concerns, and it's all over the papers.
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All you have to do is look at it, as we have, and you can see that's been a major conce:'n. And
now you have a situation where there is a lot of concern and a lot of your people expressed a
negative vote, and that our people in NASA don't even know about it.
I mean. that is unbelievable to me. At least, if there were a calculated decision and every-
body said yes, we all know about it and we're willing to take the risk, and there is some risk,
and I suppose you have to do that. Every flight has some risk. But this one seems to be so diffi-
cult to explain. It must be difficult to ask about it, as Bob said.
Well, do we have any other questions'?
MR. REINARTZ: Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to ask Mr. Thompson one question.
Arnie, had you said during the end of your discussion that after 100 to 125 miliiseconds you
do not have a functional secondary O-ring?
MR. TttOMPSON: Yes, sir.
MR. SUTTER: I have one question.
I'm really confused as to whether the secondary seal was considered by anybody to be effec-
tive or not. But the statement that was used states if the primary seal does not seat, the second-
ary seal will seat. I think that is a key issue.
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What the hell is going on there_and was this criteria that was used--did the people know
that stated that criteria--did they know this? And why didn't MTI and NASA have better com-
munications on that ve-y critical item?
I just don't understa:_d it. And I have listened for two hours and i still don't understand ic,
I think 1 hear two diffe, cnt things here.
It's sort of a hell of a way to run a railroad en a critical item like this.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, shall we go to the next item on the agenda? ! guess that's all
for today.
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MR.McDONALD:SinceI causedthis meetingto comeabout,I wouldlike to testify, I guess.
CHAIRMANROGERS:Surely.
VICECHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: I was just going to say that other Thiokol people might
want to testif, and should be given the opportunity.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, we have a little scheduling problem. Everybody will have an
opportunity, but I think you should particularly have an opportunity, A1, and we will assure you
you will all have an opportunity later on.
We do have a schedule we want to try to keep to. We're a little out of sync already. But,
please,
1"232
go ahead.
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TESTIMONY OF AL Mci)ONAI]). MORTON TtlIOKOL. INC.
MR. McDONALD: Since I was very involved in getting the issue brought to a head through
the te!econ and from the concern:_ at the plant, and I was at the meeting for Thioko! at Kenne-
dy, since [ was the senior member at Kennedy from Thiokol for this launch, as the presentation
was being made by the members or" Thiokol, there were some commems that were made, I think,
that influenced some of the d(cisions that were made later,
Besides the comment being made that NASA was appalled by our recommendation, but they
said they wouldn't fly without our concurrence, Mr. Mulloy jumped in and said that you guys
are trying to establish new launch commi criteria, and you can't do that on the spur of the
moment; those are predetermined constraints. I think that ialluenced some of the thinking.
In addition, Mr. Reir_artz turned to me and said your _5;:_degree temperature recommenda_
tion isn't consistent with what I understana is the qualification temperature tbr the rocket
motor, which I believe is 40 to 30 degrees, isn't it'? And I told him yes, I think it is 4(_ to 90
degrees, but that the recommendation m this p_rticular case was being made on our experience
base,
]2;3.1
and that the temperatures r.hat were predicted were well below that.
I was very supportive of the decision that was made by the plant initially at 5'3 degrees, and,
while they were off.line, reevaluating or reassessing this data, because the chart that Mr. Boisjo-
ly had made that I was looking at, and I presented from last AugusL which was my grave con-
cern about the whole situation, I got into a dialogue with the NASA people about sucil things as
qualit_cation and launch commit cmteria.
The comment I made was it is my understanding that the me, for was supposedly qua!ified to
40 to 90 degrees.
i've only been on the program less than three years, _ut I don't believe it was. I don't be-
lieve that all of those systems, elements, and subsystems were qualified to that temperature.
And Mr. Mulloy said well, 40 degrees is propellant mean bulk temperature, and we're well
within that. That is a requirement. We're at .-)5 degrees for that--and that the other elements
can be below that; that, as long as we don't fall out of the propellant n_ean bulk temperature. I
told him I thought that was assinine because you could expose that large solid rocket motor to
extremely low temperatures--I don't
12:_5
care if it's 100 below zero for several hours--vvith that massive amoun_L of propellant, which is a
great insulator, and not ctaange that propellant mean bulk temperature but only a few degrees,
and [ don't think the spec really meant that.
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But that was my interpret_ttion because [ had been working quite a b,t on the filament
wound case solid rocket motc.r. !_ was my impression that the qualification temperature wc,s -It)
to .q0, and I knew everything wasn't qualified to that temperature, in mv opinion that we were
trying to qualify the case its,+'.f at _+1_to 90 degrees |'o," the filament wound case.
I then saict I may be naive about what generates !a_mch commit criteria, but it was my im-
pression that launch commit criteria was based upon _hawver the lowest temperature, or what-
ever loads, or a'hatever environment was imposed o:3 any element or subsystem of the shuttle.
And if you are operating outside of those, no matter which one it was, then you .had vio!ated
some launch commit criteria
That was my impression of what that was. And I still didn't understand how NASA :ould
accept a recommendation to fly below 40 degrees. I could soe why they took issue with the 53.
but I could never see how they would take or accept a recomn;endation bek_w 4(}
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8egrees, even though I dMn't agree that the motor wasn't fully qualified to 40. I made the state-
ment that it' we're wrong and something goes wrong on this flight, I wouldn't want to have to be
the person, to stand up in front of board of inquiry and say that I went ahead and told them to
go ahead and fly this thing outside what the motor was qualified to.
I made that very statement.
I was still very upset because when they came back on the line and said that we, Thiokol,
would go ahead and fly alter the caucus, I was bothered enough, because i believe, and Roger
and I--and I have worked with him, I believe the :__ame as he does--that I wanted to have cne
more reconsideration. I asked the tblks at NASA for one more reconsideration not to Ily. In fact,
I said, can we qy in the afternoon? It was my impression when I came down here that the origi-
nal launch schedule was ;1:45 in the afternoon It seems like _t's an available window. According
to the weather report I heard, _t was going to be 48 to 50 degrees in the late afternoon.
The comment was made that, well, that was consid::red but there was some problem with
one of the transatlantic abort landing site:s, with bad visibility in late afternoon. So then I said
well, if' you don't accept
12>)7
the discussion we had as a good enough reason not to fly, there are three good reasons not to fly,
and those three, together, ought to be a good enough reason not to fly.
And I said we just discussed the O-ring as I left Titusville, from Mr. Carver Kennedy's
house, who happens to be our Vice President of the Space Services tbr LSOC here. I was staying
at his house. He had just gotten a report from the recovery ships. The recovery ships reperted to
him that they were in an absolute survival mode, that they were headcd toward shore, and had
been for some time, there was 30 foot seas, winds of 50 knots sustained, gusting to 70 knots, they
were pitching 30 degrees. They even thought they may have done some damage to some of the
retrieval equipment on the back of the ship. They were doing about three knots toward shore
and they would not be in the recovery area to support the launch in the morning. And they did
not dare even turn around or try to turn because of the tremendous seas.
And I said you know, that is, in my opinion, putting the boosters at risk, and I think we
ought to remember also that this flight is the very first flight that we were going to sever the
exit cone at apogee from the solid rocket motors, and it also was the very first
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flight that we were going to sever the parachutes fro: .he boosters on impact. And in my opin-
ion, we were putting the recovery, the boosters, at risk. But we were certainly just throwing
"7',}3
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away the parachutes, the frustums, You would never t_nd those because the recovery ships wU[[
never get back in the area And [ think that is an important consideration
The third consideration ,*hat we ought to consider is I know damn well in the mornin.g
there's " ,_golna to be ice all aroL, nd that place, and water, because we've got this sound suppression
system and I don't under_;tand how it a!l works But I do know that maybe we ought to, maybe it
will chm':,._,e the acoustics on the vehicles, the structures, or debris. [ don't know. But it seems to
me that that is another unknown that we shouldn't be delving into.
I was told that, you know. these are not your concerns. And I said well. I am concerned
about al! of these, and I think those combined should be absolute criteria not to launch this
thing because if I were the launch director, I wouldn': do it.
That is what I told them.
Well, I was waiting for the fax to come back because wi_en the final recommendation was
made by Thio',.ol to fly, they were told to put that in writing.
12/_,_)
I told Mr. Mulloy I wouldn't sign that, it would have to come from the plant because normally I
am respol sible for telling whether the flight goes or not.
And so, I had deep concerns about that.
So I was told to stay and wait tbr the signed fhx to come in, to deliver it to the attendees at
the meeting here, and that is when we had a lot of this discussion.
So l believe the NASA people that were here decided that there were enough concerns t ....
they would at least pass those on in an advisory capacity, as I was fairly emotional about it. And
I went. They asked me ",,,;here the fax was because it was just like the five minute caucus, i ae
fax took another half hour or more.
And Mr. Houston told me where, it was at. It was at the other end of the building. And they
asked me where it was at, and so I left the end of the building to get the signed fax. And I
waited. I wondered if the machine wasn't working or not. And I waited for it. And it took a
while. And it finally came through.
I came back, and I believe they were m Mr. Houston's office or something. And they were
on a telecon. I believe it was with Arnie Aldrich, but I'm not sure. I thought somebody said
Arnie, and I heard them discussing the concerns and problems with the
1 ") t l'_
recovery ships, and the survival mode at sea. And the discussion went along these lines, that the
conclusion was that the ships were heading toward shore and would be way o__at of the launch
area, and could not support a morning launch, and that if a decision were made to launch, it
would have to be made on the basis that the recovery ships would not be in the area. And the
problem associated with that Mr. Mulloy recognized there was a fairly high probability that be-
cause of that, we would lose the F_rachutes and the frustums, and he was asked, I believe, what
the value of all that was. He gaw some value like $660,000, where the parachutes and frus-
tums-it was someplace, I guess, of around a million dollars of hardware.
He was asked if he could continue to support the flight schedule if we lost that much hard-
ware, and he said yes, that he had sufacient. And then he was asked about whether we were
putting the boosters at risk, and be said that he didn't think there was any significant risk of
putting the boosters at risk, that we did have airplanes in the area and they've got beepers and
things, and we could get them later.
And he was told well, for darn sure, don't have the ships try to turn around in the condition
they're at, to go back there, and risk the ships, to be
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in thearea,.Theymustcontinueon their coursebackin
Andthen the nextdiscussionthat came up chat I heard part of was about the water system
and the freezing and the ice. I neard some comment basically that that was ,'onsidered earlier
and discussed. But I didnt hear anything about the O-ring discussmn, and ! presumed that that
discussion happened while l was down at the i'ax machine, waiting tbr the , ,x to come in. And
the gentlemen did make it clear that thev were acting in an advisor_" capacity only. to make
sure he was aware of this infbrmation.
And, at that time. l had given them, I went to Jack Buchanan's office and had copies of it
made, of the fax that was signed, and gave it to them. And then I went home that night.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you very much.
Any questions'?
MR. ALDRICH: I would like to comment on that phone call.
I do not remember that with relation to this incident. There was a phone call to me that
night of the status of the launch facility with respect to the temper_.tures and tee discussion
about the recovery ships not being able to hold station, and being well off station; and they
headed into the weather, which was
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taking them away from their home position--was discussed.
My first question was if it was safe for them to be out there at all for some other procedure
than with respect to the ships themselves and the people on board. We should be concerned witt:
their safety. And I was told that the ships had dual engines and that they were considere(1 safe,
but they couldn't guarantee to be in the position the tbllowing day.
We discussed a delay in recovering the rockets and the discussion proceeded that we would
lose some of the equipment, but probably not the rockets themselves. And I determined at that
time that that was not cause to call off' the launch or to not proceed with the tanking.
The other discussion l had was abot_ the facility, and tt had to do with the earlier sessions
we had, that is, that the temperatm'es were cold, they were proceeding slowly, more slowly than
normal, and that there was expected to be ice on the facility, perhaps there already _vas ice _n
the facility.
That was the total content of that discussion, and there was no inference of threat to flight
hardware, other than the potential for some difficulty or delay" in recovering the solid rocket
boosters.
The following morning, I went to the Control
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Center, as I have described previously. I spent a large amount of time dealing with the question
of ice on the launch facility and its implications and concerns for it.
At that time, I also checked on the status of the recovery ships. In fact, the seas offshore
had subsided, and it was reported to me that it would not be a problem, that they would be in
the proper position tbr launch.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Are there any questions?
DR. WALKER: I have a question. It is a question that I would like perhaps to have a re-
sponse to later on.
I would like to understand how you go about developing criteria for launch, and if these
always are initiated within NASA or whether the contractor can initiate things, what the proce-
7()5
dur_'is. and. ,n p_',rtlcular, why there was not :l criterLa for the ()-rin_ seals. ,is opp¢._sed to the
bulk tomperaturo ot the propelIant"
.MIR ALI)RICIt: We wili :learlv have re; present tha,. The process is that each pro l_ct devel-
ops for tF.eir equipment :rod hardware w_th ti_at contrach)r It is submitted to a review at _he
!nte_rated pr'<iect _eve! and is approved up tho iine. and what we ha_e Ln place is what has been
entered into that tmoect review and
',21'
approved
_'ttAIRMAN ROGERS: Okay,
1 would like us, if there is no objection. I would like to recess the meeting, now, and [ think
the Commission should consider the testimony that we have heard this mo: l zg very carefullv
and then decide our next step,
We will be in touch with all of you as we make some decisions.
DR. FEYNMAN: Sir, don't you think it is necessary to get all of the testimony from the
ThiokoL people that are here now, who wish to. that is, who wish to make a statement"
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, I think---obviously, as far as the Chairman is concerned, we
are prepared to listen to anybody that wants to testii)" We are going to have to have a lot of"
testimony. We can't take it all today
It ma_ be if' any Commission members or anyone else want to say something, fine. But we
have had a pretty full morning, and there is a lot of" material to digest, and there are a lot of
questions to be asked and a lot of answers to be given. I guess I'm just saying that I'm not sure
that. unless there f.s any particular-
DR. WHEEI_ON: Mr. Chairman, may I propose a
12.15
procedural thing, and that is that we turn individually to each one of the Thiokol people and
establish today wheth_,_r they have additional mt\)rmation that they can provide whenever avail-
able or pass at this point--just to get an explic,t disclaimer from each one of _hem that they
have nothing to give?
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: That's a good idea.
Does anybody from Thiokol want to add anything, either in this session or to the Committee
s t a f't2
Dr. Keel will be here and his assistants will be here. If you have anything you want to pass
on, fine. It' vou want to say anything now, fine. But we do assure you that you will all have a
chance to be heard more fully at a later date. We're not sure what that later date will be, but
we will decide that pretty soon.
MR. ACHESON: Could I ask, fbr the record, what the requirements and constraints are
presently governing the preservation of Thiokol records of this launch, and the system hardware
and testing preceding this mission?
Is there an order outstanding or an impoundment?
MR. MASON: We have been instructed to impound all of the data having to do with the
launch and have
1246
done so. Much of it has been copied and sent to Marshall as part of the process, but it is all
impounded in one area.
MR. ACHESON: It will physically be at Marshall?
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MR MASON; Right now its imp,rended at the plant ;.rod were sending" copies or" whatever
anyone w:ints tor the investigation.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Is there any materml in NASA on this general subject matter that
we haven't seen'.'
MR. HARDY' Not that I'm a'aare of
MR. ACHESON: How broadly does the lmpoundmen_ order run?
MR. MASON: It covers anything to do with this specific laanch, and the complete history el
the motor, the tYbrication and anything .) do with that motor.
MR, ACHESON: Including test procedures and test records'?
MR. MASON: Where they are applicable to that motor.
MR. ACHESON: Do you mean the SRB type or do you mean just the segments involved in
this launch7
MR. MASON: Just the segments involved, the data for this specific launch is what is im-
pounded right now.
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DR. WALKER: [ think our question would extend to all of the data, such as the test data,
which is described on the O-rings: eli data referring to tests concerning the operation of the O-
rings, particularly their response to temperature. All of those data should be made available to
the Commission.
MR. HARRINGTON: , m Jim Harrington, Secretary of Jess Moore's Task Force. We, the
day of the accident, instituted our contingency plans, which are covered under NASA docu-
ments. Our first action was to impound all data.
And so we instructed all of the NASA centers, and they, in turn, instructed all of the con-
tractors to impound all data pertinent to the incident.
Now, specifically, some data that you talked about is test data run years ago, and may not
have been covered by impoundment because it doesn't relate specifically to the incident.
MR. ACItESON: Well, isn't it clear that we want eventually to look at all of the data relat-
ing to the O-ring problem, at least, regardless of what sections it afibcted'?
DR. WALKER: Could we request that NASA ask the comractors to preserve all such data
and make it available'?
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MR. ALDRICH: Yes, sir.
We'll take that action.
DR. RIDE: I guess I would also like to ask the people from Marshall why they decided riot to
advise Mr. Aldrich of Thiokol's concerns'?
MR. REINARTZ: I think, Sally, I would be glad to go through it again, but I think I indicat-
ed earlier through the basis for the decision not to bring that up as being a Level III item that
did not violate waivers or constraints to the launch, and that was the basis for not going ahead
and bringing it up at that time.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: So, you have nothing to add to what you have testified?
MR. REINARTZ: No, sir.
DR. KEEL: Mr. Chairman, could I just ask one question, just not to embarrass anyom or
put anyone on the spot at all, but just for the sake of establishing the record, so it is not left to
inference?
The inference, Mr. McDonald, from your testimony is that you were under pressure, perhaps
unusaal pressure from NASA officials, to go ahead with the launch. Is that an accurate infer-
ence or not?
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MR McDONALD:That is anaccurateinference,yes.
CHAIRMANROGERS:Anddid [ understand,to_.
1249
that youdid notsignofr onthis one?
MR. McDONALD: No, I did not,
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Was that unusual?
MR. McDONALD: [ believe it was.
Yes.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you.
Let's adjourn for lunch.
Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at le,:a5 p.m., the meeting was adjourned.]
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PROCEEDINGS
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: The Commission will come to order, please.
Today the Commission will focus on the events leading to the decision to launch the Ch'_i-
lenger. The Commission has already reviewed a good deal of information about the seals and the
O-rings on the solid rocket boosters. It should be noted, however, that it is not yet clear tha; the
joint area was the originating problem.
Therefore, it is important that all potential causes of the accident, including the external
tank, be actively pursued.
In our sessions today and tomorrow, we want to present in a thoughtful and orderly manner
the facts relating to the decision to launch the Challenger. Because of its importance I will ask
witnesses to identify the time and place of any event that they are addressing and the names
and positions of persons who participated.
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The Commission wanr, s to be {'air in the presentation of' the t'acts because the subject matter
may involve possible human error, as distinguished from equipment faiiure. The Commission
will attempt to give a right of reply as soon as possible to any person who
125:2
believes he has been unfairly criticized or whose actions may have been inaccurately portrayed.
During the last two weeks, the Commission has encouraged NASA to disclose a large
number of facts and dacuments relating to the launch, which has been done. As a result, we
believe the public is better able to understand and assess many aspects of the accident. We hope
that this process will continue until all the facts are fully known and as much as possible fully
understood.
While the Commission has the responsibility under its mandate from the Presldant w invee-
tigate the accident and report its findings, the media plays a key role in the process by keeping
the public infbrmed. We believe it has performed this role well and with a high sense of respon-
sibility.
If the Commission effectively pertbrms its duties and the media pertbrms its role of accu-
rately reporting the facts as they develop, the public will be wel! served.
Witnesses who appear today -will be able to comment on or clarify their testimony, as long
as the substance is not altered. Of course, any additional evidence or additional material that
might assist the Commission in the performance of its duties and
125;:!
responsibilities will be welcome.
The first witness this morning will be Allen McDonald. Following Mr. McDonald and at the
request of Morton Thiokol, the Commission will next hear Je,'ry Mason, who is executive vice
president of Morton Thiokol.
Now I would like to call upon our Executive Director, Dr. Keel, who will make a few com-
ments betbre we hear Mr. McDonald.
DR. KEEL: Mr. Chairman, for the benefit of the Commission we have put together a chro-
nology of events relating to the period when the first temperature concerns were raised wkh
respect to the Challenger, indicating the activities and also the participants as the Commission
understands them, based upon testimony and documentation provided to the Commission.
This chronology has beer provided to all of the witnesses, Mr. Chairman, so they will have
an opportunity to understand our reconstruction of those events and to clarify them, and also, as
appropriate, to identify the nature of the discussions at each of these meetings and activities,
starting approximately from the scrub of the originally planned launch of Challenger for Janu-
ary 27th at 9:38 a.m., ranging up to the launch of the Challenger on January 28th at 11:38 a.m.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And , f there are corrections
1254
that have to be made on this document, we will make them as we go along. It is as accurate as
we can make it at the present time.
Now I would like to call on Mr. McDonald, please. Mr. McDonald, I think probably if you
take the middle chair it might be best. And I think to be consistent, let's swear all the witnesses
in again.
(Witness sworn.
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TESTIM()NY OF AIJ.EN M,t.I)()NAIJ). MANA(iER. SRM i'R(),IE('T.
M( _RT()N-Tll l()K()i.. IN('.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. McDonald. you're now employed by Morton Thiokol, Inc,?
MR. McDONALD: That is correct.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And how long have you been employed by them?
MR. McDONALD: I've been w!th Morton Thiokol a little over 26 years.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And you're an engineer'?
MR. McDONALD: Yes. I have a bachelor's degree in chemical engineering from Montana
State University and a master's degree in engineering administration from the University of'
Utah.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And can you giv_ us some history of your employment with Thiokel?
MR. McDONALD: I am currently the director of the space shuttle solid rocket motor
project. My responsibilities are for technical, cost, and schedule performance of the steel ca_e
motors that are flown out of Kennedy, and also the development and qualification of" _he fila-
ment wound case solid rocket motor to be flown out on Vandenberg Air Force Base.
I have had this position for a little less than two years. I started as director in March of'
1984
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of the shuttle SRM project. Prior to that, I was the manager of' the project engineering division
at Morton Thiokol, at which I had technical responsibility from a project engineering standpoint
for all of the programs in the plant, "with the exception of the space shuttle.
That included the Peacekeeper, the MX stage one. Trident 1 C-4 p_'oduction, Trident 2 devel-
opment, the HAARM Mark 104 standard missile, MD-2, the improved performance space motor
2. I finisbed a contract on qualification of a long life motor for SHRAM. I had all of the inde-
pendent research and development, advanced technology programs with the rocket propulsion
laboratory, and also some work on air bag, air cushion restraint systems.
I had that job I guess for about three, four years prior to. coming into the shuttle program,
and prior to that I was the manager of the propellant development department for a few years.
And prior to that I was the manager of the project engineering group for advanced development
and development projects.
I started with Thiokol in 1959, after graduating from Montana State University, and my
first job was involved in designing the external insulation for the stage one of the Minuteman 1
did that design and I was then chosen as a group leader for flight test
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of the M_nuteman, and p_,. "iclpated in the t'light tests, about the first 20 flights of the Minute-
man. out of the (?ape.
Subsequen: to that, I spent considerable ttme working as the chief engineer on development
,0{' some controllable solid rocket motor concepts for several years, and worked on a lot of ad-
vanced development programs, before 1 became involved in the Trident program in the early
seventies.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: For the last three or tb,_ir years, where have you spent your time?
MR. McDONALD: The last couple of years of courst. I spent my time as director of the solid
rocket motor project, which involves a considerable amount of coordination relative to produc-
tion of the shuttle solid rocket motors, assessment of the flight readiness reviews for the space
shuttle solid rocket motors.
I am the chairman of the senior material review board for the SRM. That senior material
review board has to review all of the discrepancies on any of the hardware that's considered as
criticality one or any that is outside the experience base of our previous experience.
As chairman of that board, _here are members from our qua!i_y group, our engineering
group, NASA
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Marshall representatives, but I have to sign every one of those that they're ready for flight.
And I am also a co-chairman of the problem review board with Marshall Space Flight
Center, relative to any problems that are identified f'rm,q returned hardware that come back to
.he Cape and what actions are taken to understand those problems and provide fixes for those
and prevent them from occurring.
My activities in the past year to a large extent have been involved with design certification
of the filament wound case solid rocket motor. I am also the co-chairman of the design certifica-
tion team, represented by Thiokol apd Marshall at the SRM level for that, and that has taken a
considerable amount of my time this past summer in a series of reviews for certifying the graph-
ite composite case for Vandenberg.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Now, how much time did you spend in the performance of' those
duties at Kennedy Space Center?
MR. McDONALD: Well, I have been alternating with my supervisor, the vice president,
space booster programs, Mr. Joe Kilminster.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mister who'?
MR. McDONALD: Joe Kilminster.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And what is his title?
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MR. McDONALD: He is the vice president of the space booster programs. And he and I have
been alternating going to the Cape, supporting the launches of the SRM's.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Is he your immediate supervisor?
MR. McDONALD: He is my immediate supervisor, yes.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And you alternated going to the Cape?
MR. McDONALD: Yes.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Now, how did that work?
MR. McDONALD: That works out fairly well. We both, o_ course, have a fairly heavy
den,and on our time, with all of the reviews in the shuttle process, primarily with the trips to
Huntsville and the Marshall Space Flight Center.
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I atteuded,of co:lrse._heSTS31-L l-tewasat the ylor tllaht Andotlr cl",_rte,"i_ t_)attend
the [, minus_me_!eetmg
CHAIRMANROGERS:7,!.L i._ the Challenger launch"
MR McDONAI, D: That Is correct
CIIAIRMAN RIR;ERS: And _)ti were there _tt tha_ time Was he. air Ktiminster. there at
the previous
1:26_}
launch'.'
MR. McDONALD: He was at the previous launch, yes.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: What about the one before that'.'
MR MeDONAI, D: The one befme that I was at, and he was at the one, I think, before that.
We have been fairly well alternating.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And what were your responsibilities when you were there at the
Cape at the time of the launch?
MR. McDONALD: Well. at the time of the launch I was in the firing room two launch con-
trol center. There are seats there for the monitors of many of the functions on the solid rocket
boosters, as well as a TV monitor.
The Marshall Space Flight Center has a group at their console that involves the primary
contractors for all of the subsystems. The SRB has one monitor, and they have people from
USBI who provide part of the hardware for the SRB and for the shuttle.
We also have a monitor from our support to the space shuttle processing contractor, that is
right next to that monitor, and Mr. Carver Kennedy, our vice president of our space operations
at the ('ape, was at
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that monitor that's right next to the Marshall monitor, and I was sitting with him at the time or'
the launch.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I wasn't speaking so much about the Challenger launch as I was
gepera!ly ,:peaking Generally speaking, when you or Mr. Kilminster are at Kennedy, you speak
tbr the company, is that it'?
MR. McDONALD: Yes. Generally, the process is, before launch there is an L minus one
meeting the day betbre the launch, at which time all of the problems that w ,,e still open prior
to the L minus one review are reviewed with aess Moore and his board., and are assured that
they are all closed out and we are ready tot the launch.
Subsequent to that meeting, there is a poll that is taken. He takes an oral poll of everyone
that is involved in the launch, including, as weil as the propulsion systems, but the payload and
everyone else. And every contractor that is invo!ved in that has to answer to the poll as to
whether they are ready to go ahead and launch.
I attended that meeting. As you know, the L minus one meeting was conducted, I believe, on
Saturday or something.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Yes. I would like to, if you don't mind, come to that chronologically
in just a
1262
moment.
But, so at those meetings when you were there, you spoke for Thiokol?
MR. McDONALD: Yes, I spoke for Thiokol.
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t'![AIRMAN R(R;ER£ ,-\:_d how lon_ had you bee_ there prior t_, the hunch of the Chub
[en_er, physically, located at Kenp, edy7
MR McDONALD: I was :_t Marsnali Space Fliaht Center earlier in the week on some neg_-
ti,ttions ior :_ -_ubsequer,_ con,'racr.. ,rod }rod _er:r down to Kennedy on, I bet{eve it was. the
Thqr>da.v before the !aunch.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Couid vott aive some explanation of the relationship between your-.
self and Marshall before wm went to Kennedy'.'
MR. McDONALD: l'm not sure ,ahat yon mean by' relationship."
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well. what function _as Marshall pertbrmin_ at that time. and
,,,hat were vou doin_ in representing Thiokol?
MR. McDONALD: Well, Marshal.1 has overall responsibility tbr all of the propulsion subsys-
tems on the shuttle, and we are part of the SRB team. 1 work directly with Larry Weir, who is
the project manager tbr Marshall on the solid rocket motor, and he works for Larry Mulloy, who
is the project manager on the SRB,
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which includes the solid rocket motor and the aft skirt. TVA system, and the parachute recovery'
svseem that makes ug the whole SRB.
And [ always attend or Joe Kilminster attends the launches with Mr. Mulloy, and he has
the representatives also from the other subcontractors tbr USBI, and in case there's any ques-
tions that come up, that we can either resolve there or get resolution to prior to launch.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Just {br the record, where is Marshall located?
MR, McDONALD: Marshall is located in Huntsville, Alabama.
('HAIKMAN ROGERS: And when did you leave Huntsville, Atat_ama. to go to Cape Kern:e-
dv c,n this occasion?
MR. McDONALD: l think it was Wednesday or Thursday afternoon betore the launch.
CItA!RMAN ROGERS: Did you go by yourself or with someone?
MR. McDONALD: I went bv myself.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Now, I want to give you an opportunity to give a full description of
the event,s the day before, the 27th, and the day of the launch. But before I do that, I a_:Jerstand
that you made. some notes after the accident which put on paper some of you, r
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recollections of the events preceding' the accident. Is that correct?
MR. McDONALD: That is correct.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And you have those notes now"
MR. M_DONALD: Yes, I have those notes. IR,'r. e 2.-, I I
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: i would like to explain to you that you are at liberty to refer to
those notes in any way you want to.
Ar_ now, beginning with the first recollection you have of the weather problem and how it
came to _'our attention, give as a full account of the events of that day and the following day.
the :?7tb and the 2Sth. And we will try not to interrupt you, except possibly tLr clariF, cation.
And I want you to feel free to tell everything you recall ooout it, and then after that we
may ask some questions to try to ampiil_v any answers that you may give.
MR. McDONALD: Well. I had first become aware of the concern of the low temperatures
that were projected fbr the Cape, it. was late in the afternoon of ,*he 27th. I was at Carver Kenne-
dy's house. He is a vice president of. as I mentioned, our space operations center at the Cape.
and supports the stocking of the
71,4
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And I had a call from Bob Ebe]ing. He is the manager of our ignition system anti final as-
sembly, and he- works for me as program manager at Thiokol in Utah. And he called me and
'_aid that they had just received some word earlier that the weatherman was projecting tempera-
tures as iow as 1_ de_rees Fahrenheit son t_ time in the early morning hours of' the ")Sth, and
that they had some meetings with some of the engineering people and bad some concerns about
the O-rings getting to those kinds of temperatures.
And he wanted to make me aware of that and also wanted to get some more _pdated and
better information on what the actual temperature history was going to be predicted, so that
they could make some calculations on what they expected the real temperature the O-rings may
see.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: He was calling from Utah'?
MR McDONALD: He was calling from Utah.
I told him that I would get that temperature data for him and call him back. Carver Kenne-
dy then, when I hung up, called the launch operations center to get the predicted temperatures
from pad B, as well as what the temperature histor2_ had been dur;ng the day up until that time.
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And pad B was the area where the launch was going to take p|ace?
MR. McDONALD: Pad B was the pad the Challenger was to J]y off of, and this was the first
time it would fly off of t_lat pad.
He obtained those tempe,'atures from the launch operations ._enter. and they basically said
that they felt it was going to get near freezing or freezing betore midnight. It could get as low as
"2'2 degrees as a minimum in the eariy morning hours, probably around (k(_0 o'clock, and that
they were predicting a temperature of about 26 degrees at the intended launch time. about .9:38
the next morning.
I took that data and called back to the plant and sent it to Bob Ebeling anti relayed that to
him, and told him he ought to use this temperat,,:re data for his predictions, and that I thought
this was very serious and to make sure that he had the vice president of engineering involved in
this and all of his people: that I wanted them to put together some calculations and a presenta-
tion of material.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: WhJs the vice president of engineering'..'
511_ \hl)(,\.\l.[_:Xlj l',,d,lxl _tl',l,lll \l_','lll,",lIl_'lll,_l¢'Iktll,('lillt_;lllb'tl \]I'l!'_l;'!'}ll"l,_)lI:ltilll
iIt
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Utah.
To make sure he was involved in this,and thin this decision should be an engineering deci-
sion. not a program management decision.And | told him that [ would like him to make sure
they prepared some charts and were in a position to recommend a launch temperature, just
don't recommend a launch, but recommend a launch temperature, and to have the rationale for
supporting that launch temperature.
I then hung up and l called Mr. Mulloy. He was stayi.}:g at the Holiday Inn in Merritt
Island and they couldn't reach him. and so I called Cecil }hmston--Cecil Itoaston is the resident
manager for .he Marshall Space Flight Center office at KSC--and told him about our conc:,rns
with the low temperatures and the potential problem with the O-rings.
_15
And hesaidthat he_aouidset upa teieconference.He hada four-wiresystemnext to his
ot'tice.His oft_ceisrigl',tacro,-sfromthe VAB in thecrudercomplexCoverthere.Andhewould
set up a {oar-wire teleconference involving the engineering peop!e at ?,larshall Space Flight
Center at Huntsville. ','ur people back at Thioko[ m Utah: anti that I should come down to his
o{tice and pa,tlcipa',e at Kennedy from there, and that he would get back with me aml let me
_now when that tinge would be.
L'26_
I waited for a short aeriod of time, ! gon't know exactly hox_ long. It wasnt very long, and
he called back and told me that he had contacted the parties and it was all set up for S:l; p.m.
eastern time for that teleconfL, rence.
I relayed that message on back to the plant and told them that we have to have charts at
that time faxed out to Kennedy as well as Marshall that we could discuss for that teleconfer-
once.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Could you expiain what "charts" means?
MR. McDONALD: Well, their charts, any data *+hat we had for showing why we had con-
cerns on the O-rings at low temperatures, what our history has been, what, any calculations we
might be et)le to make relative to their performance, supporting rationale for what is an accept-
able temperature, what might not be an acceptable temperature, and to review that. JR,4. 2 __ :q
And these would all be on charts that we would send by a lax machine so that people could
read those and we could discuss those as the rationale for either recommending a launch or not.
I a_,ived at the Kennedy Space Center at about 8:15, and when I arrived there at the Ken-
_:_edy Spaco Center the others that had already arrived were Larry
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Mulloy, who was there--he is the manager, the project manager for the SRB for Marshall. Stun
Reinartz was there and he is the manager of" the shuttle project _ffice. He's Larry Mulloy's boss.
Cecil Houston was there, the resident manager tbr Marshall. And Jack Buchanan was there.
He happens to be our manager. Morton Thiokol's manager of our launch support services of'rice
at Ken,'..edy.
The tetecon hadn't started yet. It came on the network shortly after I got there. But I was
told to hold on beraus+_ the charts had not been received either at Marshall or at Kennedy at
that time, and we waited I guess tbr probably another half:hour before those charts finally came
through and we could reproduce them.
In fact, they hadn't all even been received yet. There were some conclusion and recommen-
dation charts that didn't come for about a halt" hour or e_e," later than that.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Was it essentially a telephone cont>rence, or was there actually a
network of pictures?
\llg ',1, I_l _N \1.[_: If _a-:_ ,,,!,,t,}_,_l_,., ,,tll,,l,,l_, ,, i_,l l"h't'll'_" /,_1_ , ,_},} }1,';11 1t_' \ ,*i__'s I'l,u)l
Ill,' <,lt,t't I,',,, I>ta_,,'- a_-. ',x_'il at- ,,_t *1\\11. li¢,xx_'\t't, lt_,' \\:t3 lll_,'.,'
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teleconferences work, there are buttons that you can push and that will mute out you speaking
if someone else is speaking, and you can usually hear it better when you don't have your own
mikes open. So there is a lot of conversations. I am sure, at all of the facilities at one time which
you can't hear.
But I will relay on what I heard on the conference as best I can. The teleconference started
I guess close to 9:0_ o'clock and, even though all the charts weren't there, we were told to begin
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andthat MortonThioko!shouldtakethe _eadand._othroughthechartsthat they hadsee.to
bot.hcenters
The chartswere presentedby the engineeringpeoplefrom ThiokoLin !"-actbYthe people
_hathad_,.,_tqethoseparticularcbarts ,__me of ,them _ere tyl_d. _)me of them were har_dwrit-
ten. And they discussed _zr center.s witb ,rbe i_w _emperatures relative to the possible effects
on the O-rings, primarily the tirnin_ function _o seal the O-rings,
They presented a history of some of the data that we had accumulated both in static test
and in flight tests re!ative to temperatures and the performance of ',.he O-rings, and revie_ved the
istory of all of our erosion with any O-rings in the field joints, any blow.bT," of the primary O-
ring with ._oot or
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products of combustion or decomposition that we had noted, an.d the pertbrmance of the second-
ary O--rings,
And there was an exchange amongst the technical people on that data as to what it meant
and discussions. But the reM exchange never really came until the conclusions and recommenda-
tions came in,
At that point in time, our vice president, Mr. Bob Lund, presented those charts and he pre-
sented the charts on the conclusions and recommendations. And the bottom line was that the
engineering people would not recommepd a launch below ;33 degrees Fahrenheit. The basis tbr
that recommendation was primarily our concern with a launch that had occurred about a year
earlier, in Januar:' of 1_,_5, I believe it w:_s 51-C,
It was our motor number SRM-15, and that particular motor had a couple of field joints that
not only had some erosion, but they had _ome fairly severe blow-by of the primary seals, ih, rly
heavy soot over a fairly large arc, very deep and black.
And even though we could see no measureable e_,_ion _r_ ,:he secondary O-ring, it was a
heat effect, and by that, the sheen was gone off of the O-ring seal. That was, you couldn't meas-
ure any, but the sheen was gone, and because of that we were concerned with Iaunching beyond
our experience base, below that
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temperature.
Well, that temperature brought a lot of strong comments and reaction from several of the
NASA officials. I believe it was Mr. Mulloy made some comments about when we will ever fly if
we have to live with that some time in the future: and also commented that, we are trying to
establish new launch commit criteria and we can't do _:hat, you don't do that the night before a
launch, that is a predetermined set of constraints and we can't do that.
And other comments were made about whether we could ever fly out of Vandenberg 24
flights a year, because it wasn't uncomrnon to have 5_ degrees in the early morring hours where
a lot of the launches occur.
One of the comments that came_and this :,s by voice recognition; I believe it was from Mr,
Hardy at Marshall Space Flight Center--was that he was appalled at that recommendation.
However, he also said that he certainly wouldn't fly without Thiokol's concurrence.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: He _lid he would not fly---
Mr. McDONALD: He would not fly without Thiokol's concurrence, even though he was ap-
palled at that recommendation.
I believe it was Stan Reinartz made a comment that he we_ under the impression that the
solid rocket motors were qualified from 4() to 90
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degrees,andthat 53degreerecomme:',dationcertainlyv_'asinconsis_c,nt with that.
So.heplacein the conversationaboutthe impactof 7):_ degrees, [ believe Cecil Houston at
some time commented that it wouldn't be until about Thnrsday that we would have morr:;ng
temperatures probably in the fifties. So he didn't seem to be as alarmed about when we could
get to that temperature.
There were _.,everal challenges relative to, _t was felt how conclusiv'e the effect of tempera-
ture was on this whole 2roblem of O-ring erosion or soot blow-by. And the challenge came from
looking at the total data, because even though we were as concerned about this fhght, which was
the coldest ever at that time, Dora Florida a year earlier there was a flight back in the late fall
of '85, [ think it was probably October. t;l-A, was our SRM-22 set, that had some blow-by of the
O-rings, no erosion of the primary O-rings, in fact a couple of them.
And. this happened to be a iaunch that had the highest temperatore, and so there was some
concern that the data was inconclusive; and also that we had some motors that were static
tested as low as 36 degrees Fahrenheit, DM-4 I believe, and it showed not only no O-ring erosion,
but no blow-by.
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Well, some of the eommen*,s that came back from that., and I believe it was Roger Boisjoly
commented that he felt that there was a significant difference in the observation of the actual
soot that passed the primary O-ring on the SRM-15 set, that was the cold one, versus the one
that was warm; that there was a much larger arc between the two O-rings from the effect of the
soot, it was much blacker. It penetrated all the way up to the secondary O-ring, and of c:mrse we
had some heat effect there.
And he thought there was a significant difference, and that well could be the ditt>rence just
due to temperature.
i commented at that time about the static test history. I told him I did not feel that that
was a valid data, for a couple of reasons. One, on the static test motors, we keep the static test
motors m an environmental building essentially during the buildup, assembly, and checkout of
all the iestrumentation, and that environmental building is kept at 7t} to 72 degrees, and that
building is then rolled back on a track about six hours before the static test. So it wasn't exposed
very long to the cold temperatures.
Secondly, in the static test motors we went in and actually repaired and filled holes m the
putty.
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These holes are formed by the assembly of the rocket motor. As you form the tang and clevis,
there's air trapped in there, and that air has got to go someplace. And sometimes that air will
go up through the putty. We have seen this.
And also, when you run the leak check on the two seals, if you get any blow-by during the
leak check it may tend to propagate those. And in tht static test motors, some of these were
observed and they went in and filled those inside the too:or prior to static test.
So I told him I didn't feel that that data was conclusive and they shouldn't use that for
deciding what the O-ring performance was.
At that time there was other discussion on some of the chart_ that we had that was some-
what inconcluaive. We had a chart that had some sub-scale data, where we had run some tests
on blow-by with some sub-scale O-rings that actuaP.y had the full-scale die, meter, 280 thou-
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sandths, but the_ were smaller That was the cross-section of the O-rm_. they aresmal!erdiame-
_.er hardware
And they were cold _as tests, and we were attemptin_ to trv to tacos,Ire what kind or" blow-
by onemi_ht get with thepressurizatmn rates you see in the motor And we wereusinaarg_mas
the work_n_ fluid and
i 27_;
also some freon, and we had run some tests at around ambient 30 de_rees in thoz_e and did not
see any difference.
And so there was some conflicting data that said that it wouldn't make any difference. But
that, I want to remind everyone, was a cold test.
At that time, I commented at the time that I felt that lower temperatures were in the d_rec-
tion of badness for both O-rings. because it slows down the timing function Ibr both of those, but
the effect is much worse _br the primary O-ring compared to the secondary O-ring, because the
leak check forces the primary O-ring in the wrong side of the O-ring groove, while it forces the
secondary O-ring in the proper direction; and this fact should be weighed and considered m
making an evaluation as to ,*'hat the recommended temperature should be.
I was looking at a chart at that time that we had. In fact, it is a chart that I had made with
some help of our engineering people buck last summer, in a presentation I l-,ad made here in
Washington to the headquarters people on August 19th.
And it was a chart that showed that there is really three phases or three re_.ions of concern
during the ignition transient relative to the penbrmance of
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the O-ring• The first phase of that is a condition where the O-ring, the primary O-ring, is pres-
surized and starts the energizing process and actually has to move from the forward face of the
O-ring groove, because that is where it's at as a result of the leak check, and then it has to move
back and seal on the back face.
And this process we felt took place in the early part of fhe ignition transient, someplace
before it got to 200 psi. And in cold weather what's going tc affect that, of course, is the gree.se
that is in that area also is very viscous and stiff. The O-ripg itself is stiff.
We knew that the cold temperature shrank the O-ring some, and from our resiliency tests,
which are tests that basically show how the O-,'ing responds when you have it under _ome com-
pression and release that load, it shows that it gets cold and stiff, it doesn't want to respond very
well.
And ! looked at it something like a flat tire on the bottom. I remember when we used to
drive nylon tires; when it was cold I would get out and there was a flat spot on them.
And that O-ring having to move, it either has got to slide or it has got to roll somewhat, it is
not a very big dimension it moves in. It is 20 or 110
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thousandths. But certa'nly it can't be as good as when you don't have that.
Also, being hard, it then has to extrude into the gap between the two O-ring seals, and the
harder it is I'm sure it's harder to extrude in the gap, which means it may take a higher pres-
sure to do that, which also takes a longer time.
I felt that, based upon what we had done in the past, we had concluded that this blow-by
phenomenon had really occurred in this first part of the pressurization cycle, and I think there
was good evidence that it had because the soet that appeared between the two O-rings was exact-
ly that, it was soot; and we analyzed it, but it didn't see any heat effect on the metal at all,
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In somecases it discolored the g.'ease, but didn't really burn it ,<,me of" it was the products
o1" the _rease You could not _ee any real effect on the secondary D-ring. So it couldn't have
!lappened very Iota: and it couldn't happen under very severe conditions.
Bur. at the same time. the temperature effects were concerning, that maybe we were _oin_
!nto anather tirvAna regime, flowe_er. _'t"we !'elt that we had a good :nar_in there and w_ felt
that we d,; have a _ood
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secondary _eal 4uring this time--! think there has been some misconception about the redun-
dancy of the secondary seal. The secondary seai is indeed redundant until the metal parts be-
tween the tang and the clevis actually rotate. It is a full redundant seal and during this time
period it is redundant, and that is important.
But once those metal parts rotate and you have a problem of resihency, it may nor. be. And
_ *.hat is why I was concerned about that area. But if"we could convince ourse!ves that the data
said it wouldn't make that much difference in that part of the phase, then it would be a reasona-
ble recommendation r.o say that we wouldn't expect much different perfbrmance.
Shortly thereafter, Thiokol was asked alx, ut their recommendation. I believe Joe K_lminster
was asked himself what his recommendation would be, since it was engineering that recom-
mended not flying at 5:{ And he said that he would not go against our recommendation, he
couldn't go against it.
But based upon the controversy relative to how conclusive the effects of temperature actual-
ly we:-e o,, this phenomenon, we were asked to reassess and re-evaluate that data, and we decid-
ed wJ would do tha' And the people at !.;mh said that, well. they would like
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to have a caucus for about five minut_ and go off the Kne.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Could I m,k you to stop there just fbr a moment and go back. We
will come to the caucus in a minute, but go back and explain what was said to convey the deci-
sion of t_o launch'? I gather at that point the decision Dy Thiokol was to recommend against a
launch?
MR. McDONALD: That ;s correct, that it was .:t that point, the recommendation was not to
la,mch below 53 degrees.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Who did the talking on that subject?
MR. McDONALD: That was Bob Lund, vice president of engineering, who presented that
position.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Were you able to ascertain from that conversation how the engi-
neers as a group stood on that?
MR. MeDONALD: Well, the engineers as a group, I can't speak for the group. I was not
there, but I did hear the engineers that presented the charts, that they actually presented as
part of that, that supported the 53 degree recommendation. And I felt they were very strong in
their eonviction as to why they felt uncomtbrtable to go outside that experience base.
CHAIP,,MAN ROGERS: And who were they?
MR. McDONALD: Roger Boi_joly I think wa__ one of the strongest ones, and Arnie Thomp-
son, that presented tho_ positions and presented t;e charts.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And Mr. Lund himself at the time?
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MR. McDONALD: Yes. Mr. Lund himself at the time didn't present the detailed technical
charts, but he did present the conclusions and recommendatiops, and that was his recommenda-
tion as vice president of engineering
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Was anyone who was on the telecon from Thiokol's side recommend-
{n_.. launch7
MR McDONALI): At that time. no. there was no one that recommended launch. And I don't
recall there was anyone at either Marshall or Thiokol from NASA that didn't agree that cold
temperatures went in the wrong direction, didn't help anything But no one from Thiokol at that
time recommended launch.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And what were the comments by NASA officials about that recom-
mendation, as you recall?
MR McDONALD: Well. as I recall, there were some fairly strong comments about being
appalled by the .recommendation. about trying to institute new launch
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commit criteria at the last minute, about when we will ever get this launch ofT.
I thought those were fairly strong comments.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And those are comments, according to your recollection, that were
made by whom?
MR. McDONALD: Well, the comments relative to the launch commit criteria and when we
will over get this off was made by Mr. Larry Mulloy. The comment about being appalled was
George I-lardy, who was at Marshall. I think I recognized his voice, but that **-as by voice recog-
nitmn.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And so it was decided--and are there any other questions that any
other member of the Commission has up to that point"
GENERAL KUTYNA: Mr. McDonald, I have one question. Before you went off" the net, did
you ask or make a comment about the secondary O-ring seal seating?
MR. McDONALD: Was I asked to make one?
GENERAL KUTYNA: No. did you make a comment?
MR. McDONALD: I did make a comment, yes.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Could you recall that comment, please?
MR. McDONALD: Yes. I think I read it to you, and I would be glad to do that again. I made
the comment that lower temperatures are in the direction of
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badness for both O-rings, because it slows dr,wn the timing function, but the effect m much worse
for the primary O-ring compared to the secondary O-ring h_,,au_ the leak check forces the pri-
mary O-ring into the wrong side of the groove, while the secondary O-ring goes in the right di-
rection; and this condition should be evaluated in making the final decision for recommending
the lowest acceptable temperature for launch.
That was the comment I made.
GENERAL KUTYNA: That confused some people Some of the witnesses I spoke to thought
that that was a comment in support of the iaunch, the fact that the secondary O-ring seal would
seat.
MR. McDONALD: Well, that comment iu a good news-bad news commcnt. There is good
news and there is bad news. The good news is that the secondary seal is in the right position,
but that is not unique to temperature. It is always that way.
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The bad news is that the primary seal i:a the one we are depending on tbr the full i_znition
transient, and it is going to be a lot worse than it was. But even the secondary, as l mentioned,
wouldn't be as good cold as it would be normally.
GENERAL KUTYNA: But by this comment you were not supporting the launch"
t2_4
MR. McDONALD: No. not by that comment I wasn't supporting the launch. I was just
saying it is an important consideration and i felt that it" we could run some calculations to show
that the temperature did not affect the timing, then that would be supportive of the launch.
It" it did--and that was a concern, if we push that timing out long enough, we had a chart in
there that said if that timing goes beyond that 20!) psi regime while you're still eroding the pri-
mary O-ring, that for whatever reson if you ever bypass it at that time you can't depend on the
secondary, and that is what is important.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Thank you.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: So at the time of the caucus, then, you never favored launch'?
MR. McDONALD: No.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And you made it clear that you were opposed to launch'?
MR. McDONALD: Well, I never said I was opposed to the launch. I just made a few com-
ments about why I thought some of the data was not appropriate, like the static tests, for saying
the O-rings were good to ;16 degrees. I made this comment about the lower temperatures affect-
ing both O-rings, but it affects them
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a little bit differently because one of them, it is a dynamic O-ring, it moves. One ot them has a
lot more movement and effects on it than the other one does, because it has to move across the
groove.
I made those comments.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But you accepted the recommendation'?
MR. McDONALD: l accepted the recommendation, yes. I thought it was the appropriate rec-
ommendation.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: In other words, you accepted the recommendation of no launch that
was made by your company?
MR. McDONALD: That is correct.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Armstrong.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Would you be surprised if your comments were interpret-
ed by both your own company personnel and Marshall personnel as being supportive of the Mar-
shall position?
MR. McDONALD: Yes, I would be surprised at that, yes. I wouldn't be surprised that that
would be evaluated as the effect of that, but I would be surprised that it was interpreted as
supporting.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Thank ycu.
MR. RUMMEL: Mr. McDonald, you mentioned a 40 to 90 degree qualification limit. Was
that referring to
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ambient air temperatures?
MR. McDONALD: Wel!, I had a discussion about that later. It was my impression that the
motor itself was qualified from 40 to 90 degrees for operating, and we got into a discussion in
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t%ctduring thecaucus,that wa_supposedto last ti)r five minutesthat iastedfor abouta halt"an
hour,on that very subject.
I told the people that were there from NASA that I. 12rst of' all, didn't agree that the motor
was even qualified for ;_ to 90 relative to all of its e!ements and subsystems. [ wasn't there in
the qualification of the steel case motor but I just recently went through that process in the
[51ament wound case SRM, and I am not aware of the testing or analysis that the O-rings were
a_cod to those temperatures, i_nd that therefore it is part of the elements.
And the way I interpreted the spec is that all of the components and elements that make up
the SRM should be qualified to those temperatures. Larry Mulloy at that time told me: Well, no,
the 4t) degrees refers to a propellant mean bulk temperature, and the propellant mean bulk tem-
perature was being predicted to be 55 degrees {br that launch: and that as long as the propellant
mean bulk temperature wasn't below 40 degrees that you could expose the other parts of the
motor to
lower temperatures, as
the 40 degrees.
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',,ng as you didn't drop the propellant mean bulk temperature outside of
! responded. I told h_m I thought that was absolutely ridiculous, because you could expose
that motor to very severe cold temperatures, subzero temperatures, for a fairly long period of
time, and you wouldn't change the propellant mean bulk temperature at all. It is just such a
massive amount of propellant and insulator there that it takes a long time to do that, and I'm
sure that the spec really didn't mean that.
And so my interpretation was certainly different than his.
MR. RUMMEL: Was there in thct a minimum temperature established by specification or by
rote or in some manner that related to the O-:ings or the joint at that time?
MR. McDONALD: Well, I wasn't aware of one tbr the O-rings. I tbund out later that there
was--our specification refers to a higher level specification, which is level two at Johnson. I
think that's the 07700 spec, that says that the shuttle vehicle has to be capable of launching in
:{1 to 99 degrees, or something like that; and therefore, since it is a higher level spec, that we
should be able to comply with that.
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But I'm not aware that all of the elements and subsystems were ever qualified to that.
MR. RUMMEL: What do you mean by "higher level spec"? Could you explain that?
MR. McDONALD: That specification comes down from the 3ohnson Space Center. who is
responsible for the overall preparation of the vehicle, the shuttle vehicle, and what it is capable
of operating in, the environments, both pre-flight and flight. And that specification ior the over-
all vehicle gets incorporated as part of the lower level specifications that go through level three,
which is Marshall Space Flight Center, to the various elements.
And they refer to that, and when they refer to that the way the system is supposed to work
is, you're supposed to comply with your own specification plus any higher level specifications
that may involve the entire shuttle system.
And I was unaware of that, frankly, that that criteria was in there. I'm still a little puzzled
about it, because it doesn't have any timing limitation on ic. either, whether it's 31 degrees for
five minutes or 40 days.
MR. RUMMEL: Was there a Thiokol design temperature limit at the time this motor was
designed
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with respect to low temperatures'. )
MR. McDONALD: 1 really can't answer that, because I wasn't involved in the origina!
design quaIification.
CHAIRMAN ROGER_: [f I may. 1 would like to continue, and we can come to some of these
other questions. I would like to continue the chronology, because we were going fine and you
stopped about the caucus.
Mr. Armstrong has a question.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: One question, involving your answer that you just gave.
Had Morton Thiokol to your knowledge ever informed NASA that the launch commit criteria
were inadequate or did not in fact cover the kinds of conditions that you were concerned about?
MR. McDONALD: I am not aware that they ever did, not to my knowledge.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: And so we're really talking about an event that was
within the launch commit criteria, but outside what your experience base was?
MR. McDONALD: Well, I guess I don't even--I'm not convinced of that, either. I didn't
learn about the 31 degree thing until some time afterwards.
But we were told to make this evaluation on
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the basis of launching at 0938 in the morning, where the predicted temperature was 26 degrees
Fahrenheit. That was the predicted temperature, and that was the decision that was made,
whether we could launch at that time. So I'm not sure where that came from either.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Dr. Ride.
DR. RIDE: Yes, just one follow-up to Nell's question. Are you aware of NASA ever asking
Thiokol to quality" the SRM or the SRB to 31 degrees?
MR. McDONALD: I'm not aware of it, but again, I wasn't in that part of the program. They
may have. I can't say.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: If we may now, let's go back. You said that a suggestion was made
that you have a recess for five minutes. Who made that suggestion?
MR. McDONALD: That suggestion was made from someone at Thiokol. I can't recall wheth-
er that was Joe. I think it was probably Joe Kilminster, but I'm not sure.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Okay. Now what happened? You said that that lasted almost a half
an hour instead of five minutes?
MR. McDONALD: That is correct.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And during that time what did you do and who were you with'. )
MR. McDONALD: Well, I was in the conference
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room at Kennedy with Mr. Reinartz and Mr. Mulloy and Mr. Houston and ,Jack Buchanan still.
And I gave you my conversation about interpretation of the qualification temperature there.
I also commented at that time that, I suggested that maybe we consider a late afternoon
launch. I didn't feel good about the low temperature launch, because when I h d first come
clown to Kennedy the original schedule was to launch that in the late afternoon, I _hink quarter
to 4:00 or something like that. And based upon the weather report I heard, the temperatures
would be 48 to 50 degrees in the late afternoon.
So I said, why don't we go to a late at'ternoor launch, and I was told that was considered,
but it was rejected because of some problem eithez with visibility or weather at one of the trans-
Atlantic abort sites. I think it was Dakar or Casablanca, one of those.
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l really expected--and the teas ,n it was taking so long t'_c this five minute caucus is that
we were either trying to t_nd some more inlbrmation to support our recommendation or that we
were trying to run some kind of calculations to determine how far away from that we could go.
because clearly 21; degrees is a long way from 5:_
12_2
l personally felt we certainly wouldn't go below -lit, because [ thought mv interpretation of
the qualification _as correct and we wouldn't do that. But the reason it took so long was the
engineers were reassessing all of the data they had and finding any more that thev may have,
and trying to quantify more. A tot of that data was very qualitative.
And finally, the people from Thiokol in Utah did come back on the line, after about a halt"
m hour, and I believe it was Joe Kilminster who came on the line and said that, even though
we had some concerns about the lower temperatures, that we would recommend that they pro-
ceed with the launch, based on the fact that we felt the temperature data that we had was not
totally conclusive.
And he outlined several concerns still that we had relative to the effect of temperature, but
also some rationales why we felt it was safe to proceed.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Can you relate what he said?
MR. McDONALD. Well, it was the informat;on basically that ended up finally on the faxed
statement relative to our concerns about the O-rings being colder and harder, but that we also
had some data that was inconclusive relative to temperature, and I'm sure it
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was the warmer temperature launch when we had some blow-by.
I didn't see anything that I recognized that was new information, but maybe they had some.
Arid I felt all the engineers were certainly there that had generated the original data and evalu-
ated it, and maybe they had reconsidered or re-evaluated the data they had and tried to quantiQ¢
it and felt it was probably okay.
When he completed that he was asked, I believe it was by Mr. Hardy, I'm not sure, to pat
that rationale in writing and to sign it, make sure they get it down to the Cape, l think by
morning, early morning.
And I was sitting acro_s the table from Larry Mulloy at the time and I said I felt that I was
the one who was going to have to sign it, because I was at the Cape: and I said I wouldn't sign it.
I couldn't: it would have to come from the plant.
Joe Kilminster said that he would draft a letter or a statement and send it down, and he
would do it tonight. He wouldn't wmt until the morning. And I was instructed to stay there
until that came down; and that he would also send it out to Marshall, and it would be a few
minutes before that would come down. li_.'l : _-' z
He went off line at that time, and I asked Cecil Houston where the fax was, and he told me
it was
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at the other end of the building. I had a conversation with people at Thiokol just before they
went off the line: Would they send that information in to Jack Buchanan's office, which was
And they said: We will send it on the same one we _'ent all this other material, because they
had the right number, and it happened to be the Marshall one, which was at the other end of
the building. And so I said, fine, I would wait.
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Again,it tooksometime t_r that {hxto get there,andsoall of the partieswhowerein the
meetingwerestill sitting there.Andwestartedto talk aboutsomethings.
[ told th_,mI didn't feel verygoodabout this recommendation, and I recognized it is very
difficult to quantity" at which temperature these seats may be acceptable and where the3" arent
acceptable based upon that data. Some of it certainly ,,as inconclusive, there was no doubt in
mv mind, and that is a difficult thing to quantify.
But even though I didn't agree with the t0 degree qualification of the motor, that all ele-
ments
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were qualified to that, it was my understandiviz that there were a lot of people at both NASA
and Thiokol signed up to that, the design certification process, the critical design reviews, and I
was absolutely surprised that NASA would accept any recommendation below 40 degrees Fahr-
enheit, especially when the predicted temperature was as low as 26 degrees Fahrenheit.
[ told them: I may be naive about what generates launch commit criteria, but I was under
the impression that that was generated based upon the qualification o.f all elements or subsys-
tems of the space shuttle, and that anything that was outside that qualification was a launch
commit criteria, and we never went outside that envelope, and I don't know why NASA would
ever launch below 40 degrees Fahrenheit if that is what the SRM was qualified to.
In fact, I made the direct stateme_,t that if anything happened to this launch, I told them I
sure wouldn't want to be the person that had to stand in front of" a board of inquiry to explain
why we launched this outside of the qualification of the solid rocket motor or any shuttle
system.
When I made that statement, no one commented on that. I was still very upset, and so I
asked that they reconsider this decision, for three reasons not one
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but for three. And I said, if I were the launch direc'lor I would cancel this launch, fbr three
reasons, e,.ot j_tst one:
The first one being the concern of the cold O-rings that we just discussed, but there were
two others. I had just left Carver Kennedy's h<,use in Titusville, Florida, and he's responsible not
only for stacking of the SRM's, he's responsible for the retrieval operations.
And he kad been in communication with someone that was at hangar AF, I believe, that
contacts the booster recovery ships at sea, and they had told him that the booster recovery ships
were in an absolute survival mode, was how they put it; that they were in seas that were as high
as 30 feet. There were winds at 50 knots sustained, gusting to 70 knots, pitching the boat as
much as 30 degrees.
They even felt the rough seas may have damaged some of the retrieval equipment on the
back of the ship. They were steering directly into the wind, heading for shore at about three
knots, and they had been doing that for some time. There was no way that they would be able to
support an early morning launch, because they wouldn't be in the recovery area.
I then reminded everyone in the room that
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there are some firsts on this launch. This was the first time that we were going to use the _ew
electronic controi system for separating the nozzle extension cone on the SRB's at apogee, rath._r
than just before water impact, while it is un(er full main parachute, an,1 we were going to set.a-
rate the parachutes at water impact for the very first rime on this launch; and that, Lased ,m
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theseastatesthat l hadjust heard,it appearedto methat it was_oin_to bene;__r[vimpossible
to recoverthat hard.are,either theparachutesor the thrustums.
TF_t tb "e was also. l felt that th,'v were putting the boosters at some risk as far as recov-
ery was ..:interned. because the ships were steering away
I also said that the third reason for not launchin_ le the lbrmation of ice I knew that the
sound suppression system was a water system, and I felt chore was probabiy a lot of _ce around
there. And l'rn no expert on all these matters, but I do feel that there may be a chance that that
changing acoustics may be a problem with debris. It may have some effect on the st'uctures. I
didn't know, but I didn't think it was prudent to launch under that kind of a condition.
I was told that you know. there really woren't my problems and I really shouldn't concern
myself with
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these. Bu_ I saicl, you know, all three of these together should be more than sufficient to cancel
the launch, if the one we had discussed earlier wasn't
The NASA lx, ople who were there said that. ,_-ell. they weu!d pass these on, and they could
ell I was disturbed and they wo,,_!d pas_ i.b.,se on as concerns, and that they would do it in an
advisory capacity.
I was then asked by Mr. Mulle? where the signed fax was, because some time had tran-
spired since the teleconference b_,d ended and i_. still wasn't there. And so I said. okay, I will go
check on that. and I went do," n to the other end of the building, to this fax machine.
And there was nothing there that had come out yet, and I really wondered if it was work-
ing. And it was gettieg kind of late, and so I stayed down there I guess for about ten minutes.
And it finally can, v m.
I brought the fax back--it was a single sheet of paper--to Jack Buchanan's office, where we
repr_,duce_ copies for everyone. And I walked into, !tnink }t was, Cecil Houston's office there
and tbere was a teleeon being conducted, and I believe it was with Arnie Aldrich.
And they were in the middle of this telecon and they were discussing the conditions of the
booster
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recovery ships and the high sea states and the fact that they were in a survival mode. And i
recall that Arnie Aldrich asked Larry Mulloy if he felt there was any risk to recovering the
boosters because of this. And he said, no, he didn't think there was any significant risk in recov-
ering the boosters, because they hud beacons and monitors, and the> were going to have aircraft
in the area also; but that there was a high probability that they would not recover the para-
chutes or the thrustums.
And the conclusion was that, I guess, they would have to make a decision to launch on the
basis that they would have a high probability of not recovering that hardware.
But they weren't compromising the recovery of the boosters significantly. And I remember
Arnie asking LarTy the value of that hardware, and I think he gave some number close to a
million dollars and asked him if he could afford to lose it and support the schedules of the pro-
gram. And he said that he had sufficient inventory to do that.
But Arnie also told him that in no way have those ships attempt to turn around in those
kinds of conditions, and the safety of the ships was imporiant, to try to support that launch, and
to turn around too soon, so to tell them to continue on towards shore until
1300
it was really safe ta turn around.
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Theythen briefly discussedthe ice iss,le,aboutthe ice,and therewasa concernraised
there AndArnie, [ believeit wasArnie. respondedthat they haddiscussedthat issueearlier in
theday.Soit wasa fhirly briefconversation,
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Arnie is Mr. Aldrich?
MR. McDONALD: Yes, Mr. Aldrich. They also made it clear thai. they were acting in adviso-
ry capacity only they weren't making some recommendations, they were acting in advisory ca-
pacity, but they wanted to be aware of this information. I didn't hear anything discussed about
the O-ring seal problem. I presume that was done while I was down waiting for that fax, because
that was the first concern.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But you're not sure of that?
MR. McDONALD: I'm not sure, I presumed it was because I got in on the middle of the
conversation on the boosters and heard the ice. So I don't know. And finally the conversation
concluded and the recommendation was to proceed on with the launch.
I stayed around a few more minutes and talked to Jack Buchanan tot a few minutes, and
then went back to Carver's house in Titusville, where I stayed, and got in there, I guess, a little
before 1:00 sometime. And I guess that's all I have to say.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: A couple of questions.
One, when you first appeared befbre the Commission I remember your explaining the fact
that the company originally had recommended against the launch. And then you testified that
after the caucus they came back and changed their mind and said go ahead with the launch.
You said it was based upon inconclusive data.
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I remember asking you how could they have changed their mipd based upon inconclusive
data. Can you explain that'?
MR. McDONALD: Well, I can't explain that. T}mt was :he cor_l,'nent _hat was made, that
the data was inconclusive relative to the effects of the temperature, al_d I arefer you ask those
questions of those that made that decision. I don't know. I wasn't there i _asn't there when all
of that da_'a '_'as reassessed and evaluated and what the conclusions were drawn.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: One other question. Dr. Keel asked at the conclusion of your testi-
mony in executive session whether you felt that you were under pressure or had been under
pressure or the company had been under pressure to reverse its decision, and I think your
answer was yes. Do you remember that?
MR. McDONALD: Yes, definitely. There was no doubt in my mind i felt some pressure. I
feel that I have a responsible management position, and I felt pressure.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Would you explain the reasons for feeling pressure?
MR. McDONALD: Well, I have been in many flight readiness reviews, probably as many as
anyone, in the past year and a half at Thiokol, and I have had to
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get up and stand before, I think, a very critical audience at Marshall, and a very good one, justi-
fying why our hardware was ready to fly. I have to get up and explain every major defect and
why we can fly with that defect.
And for the most part they are very minor--very, very minor. And I ha,,e been hassled
about how I'm sure that that is okay to fly with. You know, such things as losing vacuum in a
carbon cloth part in the nozzle while the part is basically cured. It is a critical process.
/..8
There is a lot of' those critical processes, and I have to address every one of those in great
detail as to why I am sure that that part has not been compromised. And it has been that way
through all of the reviews I've ever had, and that is the way it should be. And it is not pleasant,
but that is the way it should be.
And I was surprised here at this particular meeting that the tone of the meeting was just
the opposite of that. I didn't have to prove that I was read) to fly. in fact, I think Bob Crippen
made the most accurate statement I ever heard. His conclusion from that meeting was the phi-
losophy seemed to have changed because he had the same impression I did, that
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the contractor always had to get up and stand up and prove that his hardware was ready to fly.
In this case, we had to prove it wasn't, and that is a big difference. I felt that was pressure.
CH_TRMAN ROGERS: And can you explain a little more what source the pressure came
from in your mind'?
MR. McDONALD: Well, I think the strong statoments that were made by Mr. Mulloy, and
even some of those, the people at Marshall that were on there--Mr. Hardy--were I think fairly
strong statements that I took as pressure about when we will ever fly this thing and the launch-
commit criteria that we can't generate at the last minute, and appalled by our recommendation
to fly at temperatures as high as 58 degrees. And that, to me, that was pressure to me.
It may not have been interpreted by others, but it was pressure to me.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Any other pressure that you want to refer to at this time or at any"
time?
MR. McDONALD: No. I just felt that the way the comments were made, as strong as they
were made, and the fact that the conditions tbr justifying this launch were so much different
than anything I'd been involved with before.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: As far as the Telefax was
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concerned, would you normall) have signed that Telefax, or was the procedure that was followed
the normal procedure?
MR. McDONALD: Well, I'm not sure. I guess, what the normal procedme i:;. ' felt that since
I was there representing the senior official at the Cape th.at I'm the one that us.ually is responsi-
ble fbr that [ know at the L-l, when we have a normal launch, there is a poll that is conducted
by Jess Moore of all the contractors, whether they are ready to fly, and I am the guy there that
has to get up and say yeah, Thiokol's hardware is ready to fly.
i felt that was my responsibility That's why I'm there. ! can't recall whether we were asked
to sign anything like that before. We have a presentation that is given at every flight readiness
review that is signed off by the principal parties. Joe Kilminster usually signs all of tho_e on the
formal review, but if anything comes up afterwards it has been done on an oral basis.
But I don't know. I've never been put in that position, and I don't know if Joe has. I don't
believe he has.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: So, the fact that a written decision was requested, as, far as you were
concerned, was not a normal way to de it?
1:t{16
MR. McDONALD: It was not normal as far as I was concerned.
CItAIRMAN I_:OGERS: And, as I recall your testimony, you testified that you made it clear
that you would not sig_ a written statement approving the launch. Am I correct'?
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MR.McDONALD:Yes,that is correct.And l think that hasbeenmisinterpreted,at leastby
thepress.Theysaidthat [ wasover'r_iled by my supervisor. Tha: is not true at all. [ chose not to
sign that. He didn't overrule me. 1 felt that that decision, when I started was an engineering
decision by the people that understood the problem the best, that had aI1 or' the data and facts.
and they are' _.he ones who, shouM re:ommend it. Arid that is why I made that.
It wasn't that I was overruled.
CHAIR,MAN ROGERS: Thank you very much. i am sure other Commission members will
have questions.
Mr. Armstrong',
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: You were talking about the 41)-degree qualification of
various components of the solid rocket booster, and I was aware of the 40-degree limit on the
mean bulk temperature. But was there anything else that the 40 degrees referred to?
MR. McDONALD: Well, in the spec, going back
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after the fact and looking at it, that is what it had. What it refers to is the propellant mean bulk
temperature.
1 gl_.ess that is. in my opinion, it's an oversight, maybe, in the spec, or the launch tempera-
ture of 31 to 99 should be stronger in there to apply to all components, and by qualification it
either has to be qualified by test or some analysis, and that means every element. And I'm not
aware that all of those elements were qualified to that temperature.
I know we bought O-rings that said they are good to minus-30, but I never saw the analysis,
and the application that we used them in that says that the)' are good to that, and that is a
differepce. It is a mate_ ial problem versus a design problem.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: I understand that, and t understand the 40 degrees wa_
intended to protect against grain cracking and the consequences of that. But what I didP.'t quite
understand is why you said you wouldn't recommend any time lau_c.bAr:g below 40 degrees.
MR. McDONALD: Well, the reason ! said that is I felt that is what everyon_ had signed up
to, as what this thing was really qualified from an operating standpoint. Now the motor does get
exposed to much lower temperatures. We have a criteria it', our
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specification to expose that to much lower temperatures, sub.zero temper:,ures in the 60-mile
winds coming across Wyoming, because we ship these things ti'om Utah dowl_ to the Cape. So in
the transportation mode they are subjected to some very severe temperatures tbr some _riods of
time.
And there has been analysis to show that they will withstand those temperatures as long as
you don't operate them at those temperatures. The 40 degrees, they won't crack. There is no
problem there. That is a, primarily a performance standpoint. You lost total impulse and per-
formance the lower the temperatures go. If you get below 40 you start losing performance out of
the shuttle and that is why that number came about.
As far as the capability of--grain structural capability, it can withstand a lot colder tem-
peratures than that, and we have analysis where the transportation ar, d storage shows that, and
it has good margins of safety, very high margins of safety for exposure to lower temperatures.
It is just that things like the O-rings and some of these other components, I am not aware
that we have really analyzed or tested those well enough to understand how _hey would operate
in that kind of a temperature. There ;s a difference between exposing
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them ant storing ,hem versus operating them,
VI('E (.'!IAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Thap, k w)u.
DR. WALKER: I have eLquestion just ret)rring back to the statLc test that you meptioned at
;); degrees which was used as a justification. Was the"e analysis to indicate what the ()-ring tem-
perature d url ng the *',.ebb'*"_'a:s"
MR McDONALD: Well. it was done after the fact, and I believe in the presentation that
was made on the night before the launch the,, calculated like 17 degrees is what they pr_.'sented
-as what they expected the O-ring temperature to have really been when that was static tested.
DR. WALKER: I have a couple of other questions regarding the conference. Was there a
specific request by NASA to reconsider, or was the reconsideration as a result of the implica-
tions of the remarks made by the NASA lx._ople in the conference?
MR. McDONALD: Do you mean the reconsideration of what?
DR. WALKER: Of the initial decision not to launch. The initial recommendation of Thiokol
was not to launch, and then that was reconsidered. Did anyone from NASA explicitly ask tbr
reconsideration, or did the reconsideration occur because of the negative remarks
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and comments on that decision?
MR. McDONALD: Well. I think it was the latter. I can't fully recait whether they directed
us to do that or not, but they had concluded that the temperature data was inconclusive, and I
don't know whether we volunteered to reassess it or they said we need to. It is not clear to me
on that. i'm not sure.
DR. WALKER: One further question in regard to the signature on the sheet which was
faxed from Mr. Kilminster. Was there a specific request tbr that to be signed, and whe made
that request'?
MR. McDONALD: Yes, there was a specific request tbr tnat to be signed. ! believe it was
George Hardy. It may have been Larry Mulloy. But I think it was George Hardy had requested
that.
MR. ACHESON: Mr. McDonald. did you consider bringing your concerns about the final rec-
ommendation to the personal attention of Mr. Moore or Mr. Aldrich or Dr. I,ucas?
MR. McDONALD: Well I'm very familiar with the process by which these things are re-
viewed, and I was absolutely positive and sure that they were brought to their attention, because
that is the way things go. I talked to the SRB project manager. I talked to his boss, the shuttle
project manager, the shuttle project
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office, and I was assured that those all went through those reviews.
I had no doubt in my mind that they had.
MR. ACHESON: Thank you.
DR, FEYNMAN: You indicated that NASA folk indicated that they would pass your con-
cerns along, and I presume that you thought that--there were three concerns that you were
talking about--the O-rings, the ocean, sea and the ice. But could they have simply meant the
last two concerns, the sea and the ice? "/'hat is one question.
And the other is who were the NASA folk that promised to pass your concerns along'?
MR. McDONALD: I guess you could maybe interpret that I thought it would be all three,
but the people were Mr. Mulloy and Mr. Reinartz that would pass those on, and I presume they
passed them all on. I didn't see any reason why they wouldn't.
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MR HOTZ:Mr McDonald.youmentionedearlier tf',at you thought this decisme, on launch-
imZ should be an emzir, eerm_Z decision and not a proof'am n,.:nagement decision. I-lo_v wo_dd v,_,u
char:Ictertze the t'inai decision to launch from Thiokol' Was it ena,,neering or was i[ mana._e-
t-nel_ t '_
MK McDON_\I.D: [ _uess [ would have to
I:_'2
characterize it as a management decision, the final dec,sion.
MR. HOTZ Thank you.
DR. RIDE: I have got a couple of questions on Criticality Is. Did I understand you ,,, say
that you chair the board on Criticality Is on the SRM from Thiokol'.'
MR. McDONALD: Yes, on all defects that are affected by that. yes.
DR. RIDE: Could you give us your understanding of the meaning of Criticality 1 and just an
estimate of how many parts in the SRM system are classified as Crit 17
MR McDONALD: I don't have the number tbr you, but there is a tremendous amount of
Crit ls on the SRM, primarily because the motor doesn't have very many redundant features.
The solid :'ocket motors don't. And, of course, a lot of it is structure and structure all becomes
Crit t if it fhils.
DR. RIDE: Could you define a Crit l?
MR. McDONALD: Crit I is a single point failure that if that element fails there is no recov-
ery. You lose the hardware and it is catastrophic. There is a lot of elements in the SRM that are
under that category. Relative to the O-ring
seals, the redundancy was built in, because that was a critical element, as the pressure seal. in
order to provide that redundancy.
I think there is some confusion of late as to what 'that Crit 1 and IR was relative to the
seals and how it was removed I wasn't involved at the time, but it was tbund that because this
joint rotated that if you took all of ti_e worst engineering tolerances and dimensions that were
allowed by the prints--and that mear;s the maximum clevis openiqg you could have to start
with, the smallest and thinnest tang that you could put into that clevis opening, the minimum
O-ring that you could put in there with the maximum size of :he grooves you could possibly put
in there--that you put all of those combination:: together, you could show that you would actual-
}y lose squeeze on the secondary O-ring once you pressurized the sy._tem and the joint rotated.
And, therefore, if you ever had to call upon tl_dt O-ring as a redundant system during that
time period, you couldn't depend on it.
Now I wen back and had an assessment made of have we flown any hardwa e in that con-
dition, because _ was a bit shocked about that, as much as anyone, uhen I first ,ound that out,
which was, by the way, last August
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when I made that pre_ntation here at NASA headquarters, i was unaware of it myself, that we
had such condition, that we were flying with a Crit 1 on that part of the hardware.
Based on the informanon that I have received on all of the joints ever flown on the shuttle,
there was only ,one time where we had a tolerance stackap of a joint that would have fallen
from a Criticality 1R to a l, and that was on STS a. We had never had one since. We didn't have
one before that. We always had adequate squeeze from the hardware when it rotates to main-
tain it as a Criticality 1R.
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DR.RIDE:I'm notquitesure[ understandthat. becauseI thoughtthat thep>'ce,)tpaperin
th_critical itemsiist specificall_'_tststhe primary()-rinaasa (_>iticalitv I
MR. McDONALD: Yes. it doe_, and the tea,son it does that _._because the drawing tolerances
allow you to ir_tall hard,are that may come together on a _orst :as_, basts that cann,)r. _uaran-
tee a se_:ondarv seal. And, therefbre, if you u_e all _f the hardware that ts :n the _n_eut,_r_ _r'
you coulct possibly have in the inventory and build to acceptable prints, you could end up with a
very small traction.
It is averv small i'raction that could _o
lal5
together that _a), and therefore that document was written to cover all that. But m reality
other than that one case we never assembled hardware that way. We haven't had the thinnest
tangs w_th the widest open clevises with the minimum O.-rings ever put together. That is a con-
cern, and the seai is a very serious concern, in my opinion, because that decision was made at
the time based upon wha: we knew about joint rotation.
Since that time, we're getting this information on resiliency and the effects of temperature.
which were never put into that at that time. that brings that question back out in front. I told
you we didn't fly from a Criticality IR and 1. Well, that is true, based upon the decisions and the
information that was known that changed it from a 1R to a l just upon the tolerances and di-
mensions.
As far as the resiliency thing, I can't assess that yet well enough to know, but I do know we
never stacked hardware together that had tolerances so bad that we didn't have contact of the
secondary O-ring other than one joint.
DR. RIDE: But, just to be clear, I guess, you don't on a joint-by-joint basis go back to the
NASA board "and kind of reclamma the Crit l and turn it back into a 1R, do you? It is always
classified as a
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Criticality I on the primary seal';
MR. McDONALD: That's absolutely right. You are correct, Now we do, as part of our flight
readiness review, present those joints that we are mating and what those O-ring squeezes are on
every flight.
DR. RIDE: Did any discussion of the primary seal as a Criticality 1 come up during your
meetings on L-l?
MR. McDONALD: No, they didn't.
DR. RIDE: Thank you.
DR. FEYNMAN: You suggested that the secondary seal would not be much affected by the
temperature, but now you are telling us that because of the complete or nearly complete loss of
resilience--that is, the tendency to spring back--the secondary seal would require very little ro-
tation to open. Do I understand that correctly?
MR. McDONALD: I said it wouldn't be as affected as much as the primary seai because it
doesn't have to move from one end of the slot to the other. But as far as the effect of resilience,
you are absolutely correct. It still has the same problem. As far as extruding in the gap, it has
still got the same problem.
DR. FEYNMAN: We were talking about .....
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somewhere there was a discusswn abo,,' ne _econdary seal beiniz redundant until the m_ta!
parts rotate When the pressure starts to build up, it can't move the primary seat until there is
some pressure, and then _here's a very small pressure, perhaps, and a very smail rotatior..
Isn't it true that the rotation ts more or less proportlonai to the pressure, or is th_ re some
delay ,)f some _ort" Why is there a time delay be,'_ween the two'S'
MR. McDONALD: There is some delay because the joint is stiff enough that under '_'ertain
pressures you just don't move it at all until you have to build up some pressure to make any
rotation. So there is a delay in that time period. But at some point in time it becomes a direct
function of the pressure.
DR. FEYNMAN: Isn't the laws of elasticity such that everything is proportionate to the
force and all of the spaces are proportional to the tbrce? Wouldn't it be true that at every pres-
sure there is some rotation and the rotation is more or less proportional to the pressure?
MR. McDONALD: Well, I think when you are down to a few psi or 50 psi. I don't think you
are rotating anything.
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DR. FEYNMAN: You are rotating it one-tenth as much as you rotate it at 500 psi; is that
right?
MR. McDONALD: Well, the structure is so stiff that I can't believe you rotate it at all at 50
psi. You are moving the O-ring seal back into the groove, however,
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: ,Just to go back to :he Criticality 1 so that I can understand it a
little better, in, what, 1985, a change was made?
DR. RIDE: 198:L
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I guess it was 1982 or 198;]. At that point, it was listed as Criticality
[ with an R. Is that right'?
MR. McDONALD: That is correct.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Now, does that mean that it was decided that if there was a failure
in that seam, O-ring, that the mission and the crew would be destroyed, the whole thing would
be a catastrophe? But at that point the R meant that there was a redundancy there, that you
had two rings and each at that point was considered to support the other, or at least one was a
backup for the other?
MR. McDONALD: That _s correct.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: That is what "R" meant?
MR. McDONALD: That is correct. The "R"
1319
means redundant
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Now at that time experience merely demonstrated that the analysis
which you had been using up to that point may not have been correct, so that instead of having
both a primary and a secondary seal which provided redundancy, you came to the conclusion
you didn't have a redundancy. Therefore, it was changed to Criticality 1; the "R" was removed.
Is that correct?
MR. McDONALD: That is correct.
CItAIRMAN ROGERS: And so from that point on, I believe it was in--what is the date--
December 1982, those shuttles have been flown on the basis of Criticality 1, so if there was a
failure of that seal a catastrophe could result because there was no redundancy; is that correct?
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MR McDONALI):Well. I guessthat is the interpretationof that But recognizingthe,wtual
hardwarethat wasput togetherand whatweknewat that trine, l don'tbelievethat that was
true.
But whatwastruewasthat thedrawin<s,asl mentioned,allow,dthecondition_herethat.
youcouldfly _hathardwarein that conditmn.
DR RIDE: But. just to be clear, what the ('IL says is that the primary O-tiny is a Criticality
1 and
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you're not allowed to consider the secondary O-ring as a backup to "_hat?
MR. McDONALD: That is true, Sally That's absolutely correct. That is what is meant.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And that was known by everyone, l assume, who was working on
the program--or most of the top people working on the program. Would that be true?
MR McDONALD: Well, I kind of thought I was one of the top people working on the pro-
gram. and I didn't know that until August of 1985 when l put that presentation together. I pre-
sume it was. I did find out that there was some disagreement between both Thiokol and Mar-
shall in interpreting that relative to the joint rotation.
The joint rotation th_.t was used for concluding that was obtained from two different
sources. One of those sources was from the structural *.est article l, the first structural test arti-
cle-and this was way before my time. But where this test article was taken to Marshall and it
is basically a forward segment--it is unloaded--and an aft segment. And where they input both
the prelaunch loads and they put flight loads and all that business into the test article.
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And this test is run horizontally and they measure through the leak check port, I under-
stand, or some places, the actual rotation of these parts. And they got some |airly high numbers,
up around 60/1,000thz, ! believe, is what they said it rotated. We had run some tests ourselves in
a vertical assembly during the hydro test, and measured some of the rotations and got numbers
like 30 to 40/1,000ths. So there was some disagreement as to which numbers were correct.
Some of our people felt that the horizontal assembly may have made the structural test arti-
cle numbers not representative and the vertical assembly was better. And in fact, because of
that disagreement, we are in the process--and started early last summer at the direction of
Marshall--to come up with what is called a referee test, to do some very careful instrumentation
in a vertical assembly to get a better handle on the exact amount of joint rotation.
Those joint rotations that are used are those that are predicted tot the maximum expected
operating pressure, which, by the way, we have never obtained, tbrtunately--and I hope we
never do. But that is a 3 sigma out there someplace. But that still is a point of controversy as to
what that number really is, because
1322
the CIL, I believe, the critical items list, that changed that from a 1 redundancy to a 1 not only
assumed the MEOP but I believe it assumed the larger rotation, which is about 50 percent more
than some of the data that we got from vertical.
So I still don't fully understand that. What I do understand is that it was made at the time
when temperature effects were not known. And the resiliency problem, as Dr. Feynman brought
up, I think is a more serious one.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Going back, though, beginning in 1985, when you realized that the
Criticality 1 was on the critical items list, you knew from that point on that a single failure
would be a catastrophe as far as the mission was concerned?
735
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MR McDONALD: Well. as [ mentioned earlier, you have to postulate what your t'adure
mechanism is. and [ t'elt very strongly that the blow-by that we had observed indeed was _n the
earn part of the ignition transient I think we all felt that _,;av We modeled _h',tt. bv the way. I
think fairly reasonably on the erosion
And at that point in time. when the hardware really hasn't had a chance to rotate, taking
the temperature effects out now. th2.t we do indeed have a
_)od. redundant seal, because if we lose the primary O-ring at that time that secendary seal is
in a better shape than the primary to really seal. It hasn't come of!' its !and at all, if you ignore
the resiliency problem.
DR. FEYNMAN: That is your opinion. In a different scenario, suppose the pressure is in-
creasing tbr some reason in the primary seal. Just to understand what the situation is. the pri-
mary seal begins to erode, and by the time the pressure gets to some figure like 61)I) or 701) psi,
which is I think just below the maximum operating pressure, it finally erodes all the way
through so that the gas can pass through the primary seal.
Would you think there was a reasonable probability that the whole thing would fail because
the rotation by that time was enough that the secondary seal can't hold it?
MR. McDONALD: Yes, l think there was. and that was our assessment in August--that
there was a :'_asonable probability.
DR. FEYNMAN: Okay. That you first knew or thought of in August 1!185?
MR. McDONALD: That ;s correct.
DR. FEYNMAN: Not before"
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MR. McDONALD: That is correct.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Foliowing up on that. wouldn't you assume that other people who
had been working on the program and working on the seal and the O-rings would understand
that, too?
MR. McDONALD: Yes. I think there is another important piece of information. F _ck in the
end of April I985--[ forget the exact flight, but it was the last one in April--we had t problem
with the O-ring seal in the nozzle.
That flight, after it, came bc_k, the nozzle was still attached to the aft segment and we disas-
sembled _he segmer_t's ,_rhe_ ".l_ey were brought back to the port. And then they are put on rail
cars and sent back _,o,U¢'ah a_d we _ever got the segment back until, I don't know, sometime in
the latter part of J_ _¢ _,me_l_mt_;. This ft,ight was at the very end of April.
We disasserrtbted_ th_ rm_ge and _e found that we had violated the primary seal, in fact in
three locations, and burned completely through. The secondary seal also had eroded like 32/
1,00¢_ths, but it held and it did its job. That was in a nozzle joint.
The primary seM in the nozzle joint is a bore seal quite similar to the field joint. Tolerances
are a little different. Itat the _y seal is a face
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seal. They are b_h s_me_l_;_ dym_mie _ts, Oat it is more of a static than the bore seals. The
face _al is torqued diom_ _ _ _ it ¢_b_i_asly did its jab.
And (,ur concl_ w_s, _w _ parti_ulaT instance, was that even though we passed the
|e:_k check that the _rr_, _y may t_e m_sked that leak check. We were using at that
time a pressure, a stabil'ixir_g pve_.re, _e run :I_at leak check at 100 psi. We had had some data
earlier that showed us that the consistency of that putty is quite variable, and you can actual-
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ly--the putty wil! become a good sealant m many cases a,,d it can hold as much as 100 psi for a
_ood period of time. Sometm',es it will blow through and sometimes tt won't.
And so our concern was that maybe we were not really checkin_ the O-ring seais. We were
checkin_ the putty and we wanted to make sure we were checkmg the ()-ring seals. We jacked
the pressure up to '21)I) psi and that was the last tlight where we were still under the I0!) psi.
which was the previous requirements, to stabilize ,it 10_) :knot ther, once _ou have stabilized it
for a period of time there, you drop the pressure completely agam and you brm_: it up to 50 psi.
and that is what you run the leak check out for about ten minutes And we only allow a one psi
drop.
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In that pa.rt,,c_lar set of hardware, since :hat was the la_,', one we ran at 100 psi because the
change hadn't gotten through with all of the paperwork systeto on what we understood about
how putty behaves under pressure, as we went to 200 psi for the field joints at that time, we just
hadn't gotten the nozzle, we concluded that the putty may well have masked that leak check,
because it was at 100, and therefore we may have had some defect in that seal that we didn't
detect.
And as a result, that seal leaked at ignition from time zero, and when that happens you get
severe erosion in the O-ring, because you get the jet impingement that we have been calculating,
which is directly onto the O-ring seal, like a flat plate. But when you bypass the O-ring in a leak
like that, it actually chokes at tha_ point, so you're forming a throat and it erodes very rapidly
from underneath, as well as jet impingement, and you lose quite a bit of the seal.
We lost most of the seal, in fact. But the nozzle seal is very good, the secondary seal, because
it is around the :orner and it expands and goes down around the corner. And it eroded some of
the secondary seal.
We ran a lot of analysis aRer that, because that was the first time that we had observed
erosion of
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a primary seal. We developed our models to predict erosion, what would happen in blow-by ero-
sion, and it was because of that that we found that hardware.
And it was late in June and it was into July that we got aii that tiara together, and we went
down to Marshall and had very detailed reviews, because that was a serious concern to everyone
that we had violated the primary seal that was in the nozzle joint.
But we were asked to come to Washington. to headquarters, and review that. It was a very
serious concern. It was at that time that I got together with the engineering people and said. we
need to put the whole story together on all the pressure seals, because I and several others still
felt that, even though that problem happened with the nozzle, the field joint was a more serious
concern, because I felt very good about the secondary, seal and the nozzle: I didn't with the field
joint.
And I put together a presentation for August that I think showed where our tea1 concerns
were and why we felt the highest priority was the field joint even though we had just experi-
enced that problem with the nozzle, we /elt we had corrected the problem with the nozzle be-
cause all subsequent flights had the 200 l_si leak check, so that we could not miss a possible
defective seal or a contamination that may have
i;_28
prevented that seal from seating in the first place.
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But that was some ot' the background that l think really turned up the gain on the whole
seal issue, from about April. really, and June on. Prior to that time. we were doing a lot of work
to better understand this ro_ation business, but we have done a tremendo_ls amount of work
In fact. you may have read in the press, and it is true, that we actually went to an SAE
_:onference last fall, a couple of our top engineers went there, to try to get help from the whole
seal tr_dustry and $AE about the field joint: ls there a better way to seal that joint?
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: What does "'$AE'" mean'?
MR McDONALD: The Society of Automotive En_ineers.
And we did a lot of work to try to get help from the outside, as well as do the work that we
had inside And l think that is all relevant to the discussion.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Were you surprised that some of the top people in the decisionmak-
ing process didn't know about this at all?
MR. McDONALD: Didn't know about the CIL or the criticality one or what?
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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, the whole thing, the concern on your part and on the part of
Thiokol's engineers, that the original decision had been not to lau_ch and all of that.
MR. McDONALD: I'm very surprised at that. I hardly believe that. The issue is so contro-
versial I thought that I'm sure that they were aware of it. I have a hard time believing they
didn't.
MR. SUTTER: Could I ask one question? In talking about criticality one and going to 1R, I
think you made the comment that you would have to '_ave all of the tolerances going in the
wrong direction to meet that condition, but you did say that one unit did meet that condition?
MR. McDONALD: Yes, to the best of my knowledge. And I had some record search done. [
was told that there was a condition in the--I think it was ;he forward field joint of the STS-4
someplace, that was in that condition.
MP. SUTTER: What if that launch had been done at a cold temperature? Wouldn't it have
maybe taken it over the edge?
MR. McDONALD: I don't know. It is possible. I certainly don't feel good about that.
MR. sUTrER: The reason I ask the question, it
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seemed to me that if it was a Criticality 1 item then everybody should treat it as Criticality 1
and not rationalize that it may not ever happen.
MR. McDONALD: I agree with that.
MR. SUTTER: You think everybody else agrees with that?
MR. McDONALD: I think our engineering people agree with that, and that is why the rec-
ommendation we had made originally. That was the basis for that recommendation. We felt that
we had observed a condition a year earlier that we did feel was attributed to temperature in
some way or another and it was not a good condition, and we didn't want to go much beyond
that, because, even though that one was successful, it certainly wasn't a good condition.
MR. ACHESON: Mr. McDonald, was it NASA or Thiokol that originally initiated the
change from Criticality 1R to Criticality 1 for the primary O-ring?
MR. McDONALD: I have to tell you, based upon what I was told, because I wasn't involved
in that cha _'_,e, but I was told that that was NASA-initiated.
MR, ACHESON: What experience led to that change, do you know?
MR. McDONALD: I am not sure of what
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experiencetedto the oh:rage[ presumeit wasthe understandingt'romthejoint rotationdata
andthe drawingtolerancesof all of theseparts that that condit;on could exist someplace m the
hardware, and therefore if we were going to fly the hardware as it was designed that, either
through rei'urbishment or new hardware that was within those tolerances, may be matched to-
gether some time to g'ive us a condition like that.
But l think you would have to ask the people tha_ were invoived in that particular decision.
MR. ACHESON: How do you account tbr what appears to be the fact that between De,:_'m-
ber Lgg2 and the middle of !9,q5, when Thiokol became concerned about the erosion and the
blow-by, that flights did not occur seemingly during that time that led to the same concern'.'
MR. McDONALD: I can't explain that. I certainly didn't know about it until August t985. I
don't know. I think that everyone was concerned, at least from the standpoint that we always
had to present data on the joints that we were mating to show that we had adequate squeeze
and all.
That data was presented, and I'm sure the people were concerned about that.
taae
MR. ACHESON: Thank you.
CHAIRMAN ROOERS: If there are no other questions, we wilt have a ten minute recess.
{Recess.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Will the Commission come to order, please.
If I could ask Mr. Mason to take the stand.
{Witness sworn. }
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T_ped verslon, of handwritten notes of A. 3. McDonald, Manager
S utile Rocket Motor Project, Morton Thioko|, Inc.
A.J. McDONALD
DIRECTOR SOLID ROCg_T MOTOR PROJECT
MORTON THIOKOL, INC.
No_es from January 27, i986
Late afternoon On lanusry 2_ti_
whz!e staylng at Carver Kennedy's roe:lance in Titusvi_!e,
F!or_da, [ raoeive_ a c_il from Bob EDei_n G , _anajer. Sol_
Rocket Motor preiect Officer, i_ni:er an_ F_nal Assembly
[T_iok3[, _tah], abo_t conners Of l_ temperature prod:clod at
t._ Cape for t_ launch of [Shuttle !aunci_ STS-51L t_e _e_t
morning. Co_cern w,_s m_soc_*ted wL_ perfo,_mance _f t_e f_e[d
29[e_ 0-_._gs. [ toll him ! would obtain zbe latest weather
Lnfo_'_,at[on a_d predicted temperatures up to llunz_ t:me _-_ call
hi:. back. Carver Kennedy, Vice President Space Services at
Keqee_y Svaze Center for Morton T hio<nl, iron., called t_e Launch
Operations Center and received the latest recor_e_ te_ieratJres
a_d cemperature predictloss up to the planned _munc_ ti_e of $938
ZST _n 29 January 1996. Fr_ezln_ was e_pected to occur before
mi_night wztn a min_m_.c_ temperature of 22 ° F e_pected by 6:00
a.m. with around 26 ° _ at launch time. I transmitted this data
back to t,he plant and said I would set up a meetlcg on this
subject as soon as possLble with Kennedy Space Center and
Marshal[ Space Flight Center. I told Bob to make sure Bob Lund,
V_ce President, Engineering [Thiokol, Utah] was involved in
making this declsio_ because it s.hould be an engineering decision
not program manzjemen_. I felt that I was not in a position to
make the assessment or recom_andation. I told Bob Ebeling that
engineerin_ meeds to prepare some c_rts on this matter and FAX
[telefaxI them to Kennedy Space Center and Marshall Space Flia ht
Canter. I told Bob to make sure engineering is prepared _o
recommend an acceptable launch temperature with t.he da_a and
rationale supporting _he
[end of page 1 of notes]
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recommendation. I then called Larry Mulloy, Solid Rocket
Booster, Project Manager [Mars_!l Space Flight Center_ at the
Holiday Inn at Merritt Island [Florida] and they could not reach
him. I then called Cecil Houston, Marshall Space Flight
Center Resident Manager Office at Kennedy Space Center and told
him our concern about the low tempertaures on the O-rlng seals.
Be s_id he would set up a 4-wlre teieconference on this subject
with Marshall Space Flight Center and Morton Thiokol, Inn.
through his conference room in Complex C at Kennedy Space Center.
The tsleconference was set up for 8:15 #.m. EST and I told Cecil
Eouston I would support the conference at that time. I relayed
this message to the plant.
8:15 P.M. EST.
I then left Carver Kennedy's house and went to Cecil
_ouston's conference room arriving about 8:15 p.m. T.hose present
were Cecil Houston, Larry Mulloy, Stan Reinartz, Shuttle Project
Manager IMarshalll Jack Buchanan, Manager Kennedy Space Center
Operations for Morton Thiokol Inn, and myself. The charts from
Morton Thiokol Ino. had not been received and the 4-wire call
came in shortly thereafter and we suggested all parties held
because t he FAX transmittal had not yet been received at Kennedy
Space Center. The F_X started coming through around 8:40 p.m.
(_ST_ and we waited several minutes until most of the charts were
transmitted and co_ies made for distribution to attendees. The
meeting started just before 9:00 p,_. (EST) before all the
c hart_, were received. The conclusions and
[End of page 2 of notes] IRef. 2 23 ! 2 (,f'21J
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recommendations were not received until approximately _:30 _.m.
(_ST).
T.he presentation wa3 made _y Mr. Bob Lund, Vice Preaident,
Engineering at Mo_ton Thiok_l Inc. (I think). T_ c_rts that D_
used pce_nted _ history of O-rlng erosion and blow-by of the
primary seal in tha f_eld _oints, reasons for concern at lo_er
te'.sper_tures, results Of subscale tests, previous flight and
static tea_s Of Solid Rocket MOtOrS and conclusions aad
ce_o_e-dations. The data presented by Morton Thiokol Inc.
showed t_at the timing f_nction to seal t n_l O-rings _oulJ _e
_I_wsC due _o _ower temperatures (Chart 2-2) and t_at _he worst
_[Dw-Dy pac_ a _rimarf _-ting occurred on _h_-15 (BTB-51C_ _o!id
Rocke_ Motor-15 o_ Shuttle Z[_ght STS-5_C on January 24, 19_5
1:50 _.m. _$TI whiah was _iown about a year a_o and had t_
¢olde_ O-rLngs of any of the flight me,ors (Chart a-l). Morton
t_iokcl Inc. reeontmanded not to fly STS-51L (S_M-25) 51t w_th
_olid Rnckat Motor-25 sz_hed'J!ad _or launch next mor_Ing on
January 2@] u_ti_ the temperature of t_ O-rlngs reached 53 a ? or
hiJ_[. This temQerat_re must be calculated eased u_on local
_Dient temperature a_d wind conditions. This recomJ_en_ati_n was
Oas_cai!y made On our su:_es_ul _xperience base.
NASA [George _acdy (: think), Deputy Director Science and
Zngineering a_ Mana ball Space Fl_g ht Center) said he was
"apes!led" by Morton Thiokol Inc.'s re,_ommandation. Larry Mulloy
then commented t hac we _ere trying to establish a new iaunch
Commit Criteria which we co31dn't do: Launch Commit Crlteria's
are 2re-established sets el constraints.
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Stan Rein_tz, also commented that he was under the impression
that the Solid Rocket Motor was qualified from 40 • F to 90 " F m!_d
the 53 e F recommendation was not consistent with that. Larry
Mullo_ also commented that if we live to a 53 • F requirement
then we will never make 24 launches per year because many of t.he
launches Occur early _a the morl _ng where 53 _ R !i not uncommon.
Furthe-_more, we may never get a _aunch off at Vandenburg Air
Force Bas_ under the 53 _ F constraint levied by Morton Thiokol
Inc. an_ we don't know when we will ever get STS-51L launched
[planned January 28 launch]. Cecil _ouston commented that it
would Qrobably be _hursday, January 30th before morning
tom;statures _i.e., 9:_6) would reach that condition.
NASA challenged Morton Thiokol Inc.'s 53" F recommendation
based _n the data presented on Charts l-I and 6-1. These charts
s hc_ed that the next worst blow-by of a primary O-ring occurred
en SRM-_2 _STS-61A) [Solid Rocket Motor-22 on Shuttle Flight 61A
launched on October 31, 1985 at if:00 a.m. EST] which had the
highest temperature (75 ° F) and that we had static tested motors
(DM-4) at even lower t_mperatures (36 a F) with no observed
blow-by or O-ring =roslon. Based on these data, NASA felt £Ae
temperature effects on the O-rings were inconclusive. "I
comment_ that I didn't believe that t he static
[end c _ page 4 of notes]
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test history was a valid test for the O-rings because the blow-by
holes observed in the zinc c.hromate putty altar assembly and lea_
c_eck w_re manually filled i'_ior to static test." Someone from
Morto_ Thiokol _nc. commented that even t_ugh SRM-22 [75 e F] was
the second w_rst blow-by observed, t_ severity of the _iow-by
was not nearly as pronounced a_ S_-15 [53 _ F_. Soot o_served
behied t.he primary O-rlngs on SRM-15 was mooch blacker, covered a
larger area, and there was some hea_ affect _effect] without any
me_suraDle erosion observed on the secondary O-rinQ of SRB-15.
Fur:her discussion centered around the i_consistency of the
dat_ presented %n O he c h_rts relative tO temperature effects.
The data presented in the charts, _gely Chart I-I, 4-3 and 6-1
were considered inconclusive and NASA suggested that Morton
Thiokol Inc. reassess their recommendation of 53 " F for a launch
temperature based upon a re-examinatlon of all the data. George
H_Edy ([ thln,_) said he would not consider flying without Morton
Thiokol Inc.'s COncurrence. "I commented that lower temperatures
are iD the direction of badness for both O-rings because it
slowed down the t_minq f!_nc:ion but t_at the affect [effect] is
muc_ worse for t ha primary O-rlng compared to t_ secondery
O-ring because the leak cnec_ forces the primary O-ring into the
wron 9 side cf the groove
[end of page 5 of notes]
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while the secondary O-ring goes in the right direction and that
this condition should be evaluated in making the final decision
for recommending the lowest accepteble launch temperature."
Based. on thm data prescribed in Chart 2-I I considered this very
important because depending on how much delay one has in getting
a good reliable primary seal affects the capability of the
secondary O-ring to seal.
Morton Thiokol Inc. decided at that time to hold a caucus
off-line to re-evaluate all the data they had at their disposal
and come back with a re-assessment of the temperature conditions
ac=eptable for launch. Morton Thiokol Inc. planned to be
off-line for approximately five minutes but _ere actually in a
caucus in the MIC No. I at Wasatch for nearly a half hour.
W._ile we were waiting at Kennedy Space Center for Morton
Thiokol, Inc. to Caucus, Mr. Mulloy, Mr. Relnartz and myself
or, Gaged in a discussion concernin_ the qualification temperature
of 40 • F to 90 " F for the Solid Rocket Motor." I told them that
I wasn't Involved in the qualification of the steel case Solid
Rocket Motor's but based upon my experierce with the Filament
Wound Case-Solid Rocket MOtor,
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I don't believe that every component and elemen_ of the Solid
Rocket Motor is qualified to 40 • F. My interpretation of the
Spec _s that 40 e F to 90 e F is the operating temperature range
and _ncludes all components of the Solid Rocket Motor." Larry
Mulloy commented that t h_ 40 • F requirement applies to Propellant
Mean Bulk Temperature only and that we will be at $5 e F for
Propellant Mean Bulk Temperature at time of launch. He said that
means other components could be below 40 e F as long as ti_
Propellant Mean Bulk Temperature never dropped below this value.
I told him that is ridiculous because the propellant is euci% a
massive insulator that it never changes Propellant Mean Bulk
Temperature even with tremendous external temperature extremes
and i'm sure the Spec didn't mean that.
While we were waiting for Morton Thiokol Inc.'s response, I
suggested that NASA recommend delaying the launch until late
afternoon when temperatures are expected to _each 48-50 • F. I
told them that I understand t.nat this would be an acceptable
launch window since t.he original launch time for 5TS-51L was set
at 3:45 P.M. (EST.). I was told that this was considered and
rejected Oeca_Jse of problems with weather and/or [shuttle fAi_ht}
visibility at on_ of the TAL [Trans Atlantic Landing] abort
sights, I believe Dakar ]Senegal]•
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Since the temperature data appeared to be inconclusive based
on the charts presented, I expected Morton Thiokol Inc. to either
find some more supporting information for the 53 ° F temperature
requfrement or evaluate lower temperatures end make •
recommendation and that's why it was taking so long. I really
suspected that the new recommendation would be 40 Q F because of
the discussion concerning the qualification requirements for the
motor unless some new calculations could be made to obtain a
better number.
Morton Thiokol Inc. finally came back on and said that they
had re-assessed the data and concluded that even though the iowe_
temperature_ were cotioerning that the temperature affects were
inconclusive and therefore Morton Thiokol Igc. recommends
launchlng. I believe Mr. Joe Kilm_nster, Vice President, Space
Booster-Programs, at Morton Thioko.. Inc. was the speaker. Mr.
George Hardy (I think) suggested that Morton Thiokol Inc., put
that in writing and send it by FAX to both Kennedy Space Center
and Marhssll Space Flight Center to be available by morning. I
told Mr. Mulloy that I would not sign the letter that it woold
_ve to come from the plant.
lend o_ page 8 of notes]
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JOe Kilminster (I think) saiu that they would draft a latter and
send it out right away on t_ FAX to both Kennedy Space Center
end Marshall Space Flight Center. I was i_structed to stay and
receive t_ letter and deliver it to Mulloy, Reinartz, and
Houston. I asked Cecil _ouston where the FAX was and he told me
it was at t hm other end of the building.
While we were waiting for t_ signed FAX, I made several
comments to Mr. Mulloy, Mr. Reinartzt and Mr. _ouston with Jack
Buchanan present. I told them I didn't feel geod about the
recom_.enda'ion and that based upon the data presented no one
could really define an exact temperature at which this seal
problem may be unacceptable. However, even though I did not
agree with the position that all components of the Solid Rocket
Motor were really qualified to 40" F, I understand that ma_y
people at both Morton Thiokol Inc. and NASA signed up to t_at
based upon the CDR [Critical Design Review] and DCR [Design
Certification Review] for the steel case motor. I was surprised
that NASA accepted a recommendation to fly at a temperature well
below the qualification temperature; predicted temperatures at
launch time (9:38 a.m. EST.! *ere expected to be around 26 ° F.
[end of page 9 of notes]
[ ] brackets denote comments added to author's notes for clarity.
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I further stated that I may be naive about what generates a
Launch Commit Criteria bu_ 2 was under the impression that it was
generated based upon launchin_ within the qualified enviroruaents
of all elements and subsystems of the _pace S_ttle. Because of
that, I don't understand why NASA would allow a Shuttle launch
below 40o F. I told them that if anything happened, X sure
woulda't want to be the person who had to explain to a Uoard of
Inquiry w_ it was all right %o launch at a termperaturs below
that at which the system was qualified to. Me one in the room
co_manted on that statement. I was still so upset at the
decision that I asked for reconsideration for postponement of the
launch because there were other considerations which were bad in
addition to the O-ring seal problem. I stated that if I were the
Launch Director, I would cancel the launch for tomorrow morning
for three reasons:
(I) The possible effects of the O-ring sealing problem at
low temperatures that we just discussed.
(2) I had just left Carver Kennedy's house to come to this
meeting and had just received a report from the booster
recovery ships.
[end of page 10 of notes]
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The ships were in a absolute =survival = mode in 30 fat
eelS, sustained winds of 50 knots gusting to 70 knots-
pitching 30 degrees and they thought the rough seas may
have damaged some of the recovery equipment on the back
of the ships. The ships were heading straight into the
wind toward shore for survival and could not support
tomorrows planned launch at 0938 A.M. (EST). The ahips
had been moving away from the booster impac _- area at
a_proximately three knots for sometime and didn't know
when conditions would be safe enough to attempt to turn
around, i then reminded everyone that this was the
first launch with apc_ea separation of the nozzle exit
cone and sa_ration of the parachutes frown the boosters
a,_ water impact. Launching early t_e next mor,_in_ would
put the boostar recovery aL soma rzak and would most
likely eliminat:_ _ny real possibility of recovering the
fruatr,mms and parachutes.
The thlr_ reason for not launching was the axpected
formation of ice in the Launch Comp!_x area, I told
them t_t _ 4_d not know what affac=s that this may have
on accoustics, debris, or structures but it didn't seem
prudent to launch under these unknown c-_nditions.
[end of page Ii of notes]
[ ] brackets denote comments added to author's notes for clarity.
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I was told that these were not my p:oblems and that I
shouldn't concern myself with these. I responeed that maybe one
of these problems was not being considered sufficient to cancel
the l_unch but thaL all three of them combined should be more
than sufficient to delay the launch. ":he NASA folks indicated
that they would pass this information on in advisory capacity.
MullOy then ss_ad me where the signed FAX was and I told him I
would gO check on it.
The FAX had not come in yet so I waited at the FAX machine
for a while and wondered if it was working because it had been
sometime since the teleconference had been completed. The FAX
finally come in st II:27 p.m. (EST) while I was waiting at the
machine. I took the FAX to Jack Buchanan'a office where he
reproduced several copies for distribution to the attendees, of
the meeting.
returned to Cecil Houston's office where Mulloy, Houston
and Relnartz were on a telecon. I believe with Mr. Arnie
Aldrich. They were discussing the condition of the booster
recovery ships at sea
[end of page 12 of notes]
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[Ref, 225-1 12 of 24 I
745
-, : W%*_
a_*d concluded that a launch decision would have to be made based
upon the reasonably hlg_ probability that the parachutes and
fruat_ums (approximately $1 million of hardware) would not be
recovered but there wee was no significant increase in risk of
retrieving the boosters. Mulloy was asked if the could tolerate
the loss of the parachutes end frustrums s.nd still support- the
launch schedules and he said yes. A decision was made to proceed
with the launch without t._e recovery ships in the area and to
make sure we didn't Jeopardize the safety of the ships by t_yln9
to return to the recovery area in such bad see conditions.
They also briefly discussed the ice issue _n the iaunch
complex a_ea and were told that the ice iss_/e had been addt'essed
earlier in the daM, Mr. Mulloy end Mr. Relna_tz n_ade it clear
that they were acting in an advisory capacity only and w_nted to
make sure that all this [nformatlon was made available. The
decision was to _rocsed with the earl_' morning launch and the
te_econ was concluded. I did not hear any conversation o_ the
O-ring co_:er_ D_t i pres._n,e that discussion occurred wh_le I
was at rh8 FAX.
[end of po,;e 13 of note_]
[ ] brackets denote comments added "_ author's notes for clarity.
_Ret'. 2 25-1 I:1 of'2; I
I I
I gave copies of the FAX signed by Joe Kilmineter with the
recorm_endation by Morton Thiokol Inc. to proceed with the launch
of [shuttle flight] STS-51L on 28 January 1986. I was surprised
that the FAX did not address any temperature conditions at all.
It contained a breif summary o[ soma of the Pro'a and Con's
associated with colder temperature and recommended proceeding
with the launch on 28 January 1986 without reference to any
particular temperature or time. The meeting broke up end T spent
a few more minutes with Jack Buchanan and returned back to Carver
Kennedy's house in Titusville arriving there between 12:30 and
_:00 a.m. (EST.) on 28 January 1986.
A.J. McDonald
(S_gned)
2/_3/86
Since recording the events the night before the launch I came
across a piece of paper in my suit pocket that was written by me
when Morton Thiokol Inc. made their final reco_mnendation. I have
included as page 14A in these notes.
A.J. McDonald
(Signed)
[end of page 14 of notes]
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_ORTON TH!OKOL _NC. R_COMMENDATION
Tem_e_l_re data _1 inc_nclusive
P-14A
ORIGINAL PAGE, I_
OF POOR QUALITy
',2;
,)
,4
WR;TE
Cold O-rin_ m_vLng into lest_ pos_t_o_ n_d opporcuo_:?
_r gas _o_g _et_ee_ two calit_es.
Secondary O-ring problem after prime_y O-ring _elte_.
;ncreaseC =i$_ d_e to ha:_ness not much d_fe:en= t_al
o_ _RM-15 -- I_ t_o+_ tw:=e as long would ;et _w:_e
ecos_o_ - 0.070 - 0._90" csn sccolmoda_s.
Primary will seal - longer tim@ - some gas posslble. If
_rimary doesnt secondary w_!i_ Proceed w_=n iaun=h
under cold =ondi_%Dns.
THIS DONW, S[ON IT _D FKA OUT.
[signed A. J. McDonald in bottom right corner]
[Ref. 2 2.3-1 13.f21]
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I_T[ ASSZSSHENT OF TEMPERATURE CONCERN ON SR_I-25 (51L) LAUNCH
• ' • "'u _ , .L ,J ,r --
0 CALCULATIONS SHOW THAT SRM-25 O-RINGS dILL BE 20" COLDER THAN SR_-I5 D-RINGS
0 TEMPERATURE D&TA NOT CONCLUSIVE ON PREDICTING PRIMARY O-RING BLOH-B_
0 ENGINEERING _$ESSMENT IS THAT:
0 COLDER O-RINGS WILL HAVE INCREASED EFFECTIVE DUROME3ER ("HARDER")
0 "HARDER x O-RINGS WILL TAKE LONGER TO "SEAT"
0 MORE GAS MAY PASS PRIMARY O-RING BEFORE THE PRIMARY SEAL SEATS
{RELATIVE TO SPJ_t-15)
0 DEMONSTRATED SEALING THRESHOLD IS 3 TIMES GREATER THAN 0,038"
EROSION EXPERIENCED ON SRM-15
0 IF THE PRIMARY SEAL DOES NOT SEAT, THE SECONDARY SEAL WILL SEAT
0 PRESSURE WILL GET TO SECONDARY SEAL BEFORE THE METAL PARTS ROTATE
0 O-RING PRESSURE LEAK CHECK PLACES SECONDARY SEAL Ill OUTBOARD
POSITION WHICH MINIMIZES SEALING TIME
0 MI'] RECOMMENDS STS-51L LAUNCH PROCEED ON 28 JANUARY 1986
0 SRJ_I-25 HILL NOT BE SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT FROM SRM-15
x_ri_ C, KILHINSTER, VICE PRESIDENT
/xJ_PACE BOOSTER PROGRAMS
k_ THtOK,OL [HC
le4FORA4,_IION O_13"HIS P_E W/_, PREPARED TO SUPPORT AN ORAk PRISEWrA'nON
AIND CAilNOr III C_rr.REO COI41'UETI WI_HO4JT THE O_AL, IDtSCM$$1OI4
[Ref. "2'25 '2}
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TES'I'IMG, NY (IF .JERR'_ MASON. _ENI()R %i('E PRESIDENT. _kANAT('ll
DIVISION. 31()Rr()N-Tlll()K()I.. IN('.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Mason, you requested that you appear after Mr. McDonald, and
we are glad to welcome you, and go ahead and pccceed any way you would like.
MR. MASON: Thank you, Mr, Chairman. We have given you a handout there, and I wanted
to start on page 18. We had originally thought to provide some technical background, but that
could be covered late
(Viewgraph.) !_,.r _'-, :_
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Could I say tha_ we have of course recei:.,,ed quite a lot of this infor-
mation in executive session, and we will certainly be pleased to look at the information on this
first 18 pages. But proceed in any way you would like.
MR, MASON: Thank you. My intent here is to explain the organizational structure and
those people that participated in the discussions, and then go through the chroaology of the oc-
currences that night on the 27th of January.
First off, I am the Senior Vice President of Wasatch Operations. We have on the chart you
have there selected only those people that participated in
1334
the discussions.
I might point out that there are three divisions reporting to me: the space division, under
Mr. Wiggins, who is listed there; and there are also a tactical and strategic division reporting to
me. Mr, Lund, who shows there as vice president, engineering, provides engineering services for
all thre_ divisions.
We have covered just the space div_:_ion in detail. You will see that Mr. Kilminster reports
to Mr. Wiggins, and he is the head, he is the vice president of the space booster programs. And
of course, you've just heard from Mr. McDonald, and reporting to him are Messrs. Ebeling and
Russell. And then, from the KSC offices, Jack Buchanan, also reporting to Mr. Kilminster.
Within the engineering organization, there is a space shuttle project engineering group
under Mr. Brinton, and Mr. Macbeth reports to him. Then the other part of engineering, engi-
neering design organization, you will see the people listed there, I don't need to read them, but
they were all participants in the discussion.
We added a couple of notes here we thought were pertinent. One is that we do have a flight
readiness review at Morton-Thiokol before Marshall has
754
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their flight readiness reviews, and Mr. Wiggins chairs that P,ight readiness review gr_,up. And
the results of that flight readiness review are signed off both by Mr. Kilminster and Mr. Brinton
to indicate that we are ready to fly.
Then Mr, Kitminster then attends the flight readiness reviews cf NASA.
One other point we made here. which was also discussed by Mr. McDonald, and that is that
he and Mr. Kilminster have been alternating as the attendees at the launches,
Now, as 1 go through the chronolo_," you will see the names of various people here, and you
will find them all in this chart. But I wilt try to point out where they fit as I go through the
chronology.
(Viewgraph.l [m.r. 2 2_-l]
We have the times here listed both in the Eastern Standard and Mountain Standard time,
and the significant occurrences as we move through it. At 1:00 o'clock Eastern Time, Mr. Mac-
beth and Mr. Arnie Thompson and Charlie Saderholm all received calls from Bo3 d Brinton, who
was at Marshall.
And that is something I ought to point out, that throughout this discussion Mr. Brinton,
who is the manager of space shuttle project engineering, was at
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Marshall Space Flight Center, as was Mr. Speas. And as you know, Mr. McDonald was at Kenne-
dy, as was Mr. Buchanan. The rest of the people we have listed here then were all at Wasatch in
Utah.
As a result of the call at 1:00 o'clock, Mr. Ebeling and Ketner were notified, and Mr. Sader-
holm started the bulk temperature analysis of the propeilant and 13riar. Russell arranged a
meeting in Mr. Ebeling's office.
They convened that meeting in Mr. Ebeling's office, and the attendees are as listed there.
During that meeting they discussed the O-ring resiliency data at 50, 75, and 100 degrees. They
talked about the amount of blow-by and erosion that had been seen on the 5l-C, which was the
previous coldest launch.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Were you at those meetings?
MR. MASON: I wa,_ not at that meeting, no, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: So this is hearsay as far as you're concerned'?
MR. MASON: That is right. I do get to where ! entered the picture here in a moment. This
was an effort to get an overview of what happened and where, to try make the rest of the testi-
mony flow a little better.
la3 
They did look at the other launch and static test temperatures and concluded that they did
have a concern. They broke that meeting up and started to do some work. Mr. Maw was to run
the e'_lculation of what the O-ring temperature would be if the ambient were 18 degrees, and
Mr. ,e,aeling notified Mr. Kilminster of the concern that they had.
And Mr. Kilminster asked Mr. Ebeling to get the engineering management, including Mr.
Lund, involved, and to notify both Mr. McDonald and Mr. Brinton of the Marshall concern.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I assume that there was no recording made of these meetings and
this is reconstructed from conversations you have had with other people?
MR. MASON: That is correct. We did talk to all of the people involved, so we felt we had a
consensus of the sequence.
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Then Mr. Buchanan called to give us some temperature predictions at that tirae. They were
predicting :14 degrees at launch time at 9:38.
Then Mr. Thompson briefed Jack Kapp on his concerns. Then Mr. McDovald called from
Kennedy, hoping to have a telecon between Morton Thiokol and NASA on those concerns. There
were people called to the
i338
conference room to support the telecon, and that required interrupting the meeting that was at
that point under way in Mr. Lund's office.
(Viewgraph.l IR,.,-' 2n _!
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, just tbr semantics, you say people called to support the tele-
con. Do you mean to take part in the telecon?
MR. MASON: Correct. The conference room we have there has microphones so that you can
be in the conference room and anyone can talk and be picked up.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: My question really has to do with the word "support." Where you
say "conference to support telecon" and "interrupted to support telecon," do you mean take part
in the telecon?
MR. MASON: To take part, that is correct.
That telecon then proceeded with the people that are listed there, some 13, including the
people at Marshall and at Kennedy. At the time that started, they notified Mr. Kilminster that
it was starting.
!Viewgraph.) !J_,'J -' -'_ "l
At the same time, essentially, i_e received a call from--that LSS--that means launch sut>.
port services. That is the people who work for Mr. Buchanan down at Kennedy. They called and
gave him an updated overnight temperature prediction on a two hour basis,
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every two hours they gave him what the temperature was going to be.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Were any notes or records kept of this conference, or is this all re-
constructed from memory?
MR. MASON: Well, I don't know of any specific notes, although there may be. I guess I
would have to answer it that way.
I know the calculations that were run. Those calculations exist, because they took those on
an every two hour barns, and had started using 18 degrees and then proceeded to use the more
updated temperatures, because ultimately we were told it was forecast to be a 29 degree O-ring
temperature.
In any event, those concerns that existed were discussed, and they amounted to the fact that
the previous coldest !aunch had given us the greatest blow-by and that, coupled with concern
about the stiffer O-ring that would exist at a lower temperature, was the focus of :he discussion.
It was just that, a discussion. And so it was decided, and NASA requested that we put to-
gether an organized analysis or organize the data and write down what our concerns were, so
that it could be reviewed in a more careful fashion.
1340
So there was a telecon then scheduled for 6:15 to do that, and at that point Mr. Kilminster
called Mr. Wiggins and me--we were in another meeting in our Brigham City plant--and toId
us that there were concerns and that the telecon was going to start at 6:15.
And so we---
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MR.SUTTER:Excuse me. A quick question. You had data where you had reached a conclu-
sion. What was the purpose of NASA asking you to better organize that data? Was that tbr them
to review it and reach some of their own decisions, or just to see if your thinking was proper?
MR. MASON: At this point we had not reached a conclusion. During the part that I'm cov-
ering here, we had had the discussion.
MR. SUTTER: I still don't understand why they needed the data better organized at this
point.
MR. MASON: Well, we were providing it verbally over the telecon. They didn't have it in
front of them. And so we were talking about things like curves and that sort of thing, that they
didn't have the direct visibility of.
And we had not yet reached any conclusion. We were just saying that we were concerned
because it was
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cold. So the request was to get that data and fax them down, so that they could look at it at the
same time that we were looking at it..
And when Mr. Wiggins and I were notified, they were in the process of putting together
what data was needed for the discussion. And at the same time, Mr. Lund was trying to prepare
some conclusions and recommendations. So the chart preparation and the conclusions and rec-
ommendations were going on simultaneously.
And Mr. Wiggins and I then arrived as that was going on and, as it turned ou'_ we were not
able to get all of the charts together in time to start the telecon. We got. the first charts faxed
down there by 6:30 and the last charts didn't get down there until 7:20,
And so we were working this in a real time basis. We did start the discussion again at 7:00.
iViewgraph, l Ira': -' 2; 71
The engineers that had prepared some of the charts discussed their charts, and ultimately
Mr. Lund discussed the conclusion and recommendations chart. The fundamental issue, howev-
er, was the concern about what effect the cold would have on getting the primary O-r;ng to
move into its sealing position and seal.
And if it needs clarification late,', Mr. Lund
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has some charts to explain that. But when we run the leak test, the _'rimary O-ring is moved
into the furthest point away from its sealing position, and that is maybe 20 thousandths of an
inch or so, whereas the secondary is moved towards its sealing position.
And the concern was whether the cold and the stiffness of the O-ring and the grease would
delay the movement of the primary O-ring so that it would not seat properly and there would be
blow-by and perhaps damage to the secondary O-ring.
We looked at the erosion history we had to see what correlation there was with tempera-
ture, and there really wasn't any correlation. There was also a review of the blow-by history,
which Mr. McDonald has covered very well, and the correlation that appeared there was that we
had blow-by in both 75 and 53 degrees, but it was much more severe at 53 degrees, and so it was
thought that that was evidence that the cold did in fact affect the performance of the O-ring.
Now, we looked at data on the hardness of the O-ring as an indication of how stiff and diffi-
cult it might be for the O-ring to move.
(Viewgraph._lm.f zz_
And we determined that from 50 degrees to 30 degrees, a 20 degree drop, it would increase
the
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hardness by about ten percent. In tact, that put it in the range ot'--when we discussed this that
night, early in the prc,_ram we were deciding what hardness we wanted and we had used some
90 duromet_'r O-rings in some of the hydrostatic tests. We ultimately ended up with the _0 du-
rometer O-ring.
But it was pointed out that we had some experience with that O-ring which was harder.
DR. FEYNMAN: What you mean by hardness is it's difficult to squash it into the tiny crack
that it is supposed to go into? What is the feature of hardness? It is not resiliency; it is the
difficulty of pushing it into a corner?
MR. MASON: Well, i.t was thought that that stiffness might make it move more slowly,
moving across the gap, and then it would be harder to extrude it in. However, once it sealed,
being slower to extrude per se wouldn't be a problem, once it sealed.
The points we're talking about, of course, were the points that were discussed back and
tbrth that night.
We did look at the temperature history on our previous tests and flights, and we discussed
the fact that we had run a sub-scale blow-by test at 30 degrees which had shown no blow-by.
That was only an indicator,
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because that was a cold test and it was with a fixed joint gap, and so it was just another point of
data that we had to put in our heads.
MR. HOTZ: Mr. Mason, was that a vertical or a horizontal test rig that you ran the sub-
scale test on?
MR.. MASON: T don't know.
MR, HOTZ: Could you find out. for us, please'?
MR. MASON: Yes, sir. There are several fellews here that know, I'm sure.
VOICE: It was a vertical test rig.
MR. MASON: Out cf that discu_ion, we got to the point where we just--we cou!dn't make a
clear conclusion of the effect of temperature on the O-ring performance. And a number of the
engineers felt that on that basis we ought to just stay where we were in our flight history and,
with the information we had at that point and as far as we had proceeded in our thought proc-
ess, that appeared to be the right thing to do.
And so we proceeded to present that information.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Isn't it fair to say, though, that all of the engineers felt that way?
MR. MASON: No, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Which ones favored--
MR. MASON: At that point it was not a pro-con
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sort of discussion. It was, where are we in our thought process, and wi,ere we were in our
thought process was that what we've discussed to date says let's stay with our experience.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But what I mean is, didn't all the engineers agree with that?
MR. MASON: I w_uld say that at that point we all agreed with that, that it wasn't engi-
neering or anyone else. We had just looked at what we had and went through our thought proc-
ess, and at that point we felt that that was the recommendation '-hat we got.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: The position, though, that you tuok unanimously was the engineer-
ing position, was to base the recommendation on previous flight hiutory, and you cite 51-C, which
"7,58
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was the coldest lauach that had been made and where you had had the most trouble, isn't tilat
right'.'
MR. MASON: That's right•
IViewgraph._ fl_,'l -' "-, "i
The next comments then were essentially, as Mr. McDonald said, that Mr. Mulloy said he
disagreed because he didn't feel that we had shown any correlation between blow-by and erosion
with temnerature, and that there_bre the rationale that had been used when we decided to fly ia
the f_rst place was still a valid
1_4_
rationale.
And Mr. Hardy expressed surprise at t.he recommendation because it was obove the qualifi-
cation temperature. However, he said he wouldn't recommend flying against our re,_ommenda -
tion.
And then Mr. McDonald came on and said that he too had a concern about the cold, and he
pointed out that the secondaw O-ring was in the position to seal, where it didn't have to mo _e
as the primary did, and that this point ought to be considered.
With that discussion, we were--let's say we felt that we needed ;o have further discussions
to see if these comments would in fact cause us to have any change in our position. And so we
decided to do that off the net, and we asked for a caucus.
(Viewgraph.i Ira., :: z; Io I
Now, in the caucus we revisited all of our previous discussions, and the important things
that came out of that was that, as we had recognized, we did have the possibility that the pri-
mary O-ring might be slower to move into the seating position and *hat was our concern, and
that is what we r.ad focused on originally.
The fact that we couldn't show direct correlation with the O-ring temperature was dis-
cussed, but we still felt that. there was some concern about it
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being colder.
We then recognized that, if the primary did move more slowly, that we could get some blow-
by and erosion on the primary. But we had pointed out to us in that caucus a point that had not
come across clearly in our earlier discussions, and that is that we had run tests where we delib-
erately cut large pieces out of the O-rings to see what the threshold of sealing was, and we found
we could go to 125 thousandths of a cut out of the O-ring and it would still seal.
DR. FEYNMAN: Mr. Mason, was that a static test or a dynamic test'?
MR. MASON: It is done by blowing the pressure against the O-ring, and it was done both
cold and hot.
DR. FEYNMAN: But not in a moving joint'?
MR. MASON: That is correct. And I might follow that. Through the whole discussion we
were concerned about or we recognized that the O-ring, either primary or secondary, would have
to seal before the joint had time to expand.
Now, the gas pressure gets to the O-ring before the joint has a chance to expand. But the
question was, with the slower movement of the O-ring, would it still be there and seat before the
joint expanded.
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MR. HOTZ: Mr. Mason, what kind of time frame were you talking about there, in the time
it takes to get there?
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MR MASON:Well, the chartsthat wehadsaidthat if' youseatin 160millisecondsthat--
well, let'ssee.Thisgoesbackto that IR versus1discussionwehad,that what that boileddown
to wasthat during the first 160millisecondsthejoint is still closedeneughthat the secondary
O-ringactuallyprovidesredundancy.
Up to 300milliseconds,there is lesscertainty, and above that there is a serious question
ab_mt that.
Now, again, that chart was based on the worst conditions as far as joint conditions were
concerned, that is tolerances. And what we had here we knew was a fairly nominal compression
condition.
DR. RIDE: Excuse me. Did you just say that is the first 160 .milliseconds that joint is official-
ly classified as a Criticality 1R?
MR. MASON: It is not officially, no, ma'am,
DR. RIDE: That's right. It Js just a Criticality 1, so even during the first 160 milliseconds
you are not allowed to consider the secondary seal a backup to the primary seal by the critical
items list.
MR. MASON: Well, I don't certainly want to
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debate that point. What we did, what we considered, we considered that ,,hen it was establishcd
that it went from 1R to 1 it was identified that we were losing redundancy after the ignition
transient.
And we did consider, and that is where I'm headed, that there was some protection during
the ignition transient from the secondary O-ring.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I'm not sure I understand your answer to Dr. Ride's question.
MR. MASON: Well, let me try again.
DR. RIDE: Well, it sounds to me like you're trying to exercise some kind of engineering
judgment on whether you can consider this a 1R or a 1, and I just don't think that the system
allows that. I think that once something is classified as a Criticality 1, that sets a red flag in
everyone's mind that that is an extremely dangerous situation.
And I'm just not sure that you're allowed to go back and rationalize it as, well, during this
100 milliseconds we may have a secondary seal, we may be allowed to consider it a redundant
seal, we may have protection to a Criticality 1 system.
MR. MASON: Well, I really can't address the propriety of it as far as the system is con-
cerned. I would have to state what we did, and we had recognized
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_hen the criticality was changed from 1R to 1 that it was done because we didn't have a full-
time redundant seal.
And at the time of this discussion we were not addressing the thing from a 1R/1 viewpoint.
We were addressing it from what we knew of how the joint performed, and what we knew was
that early in the ignition transient that the secondar) in fact did function until the joint rotat-
ed.
CHA!RMAN ROGERS: But isn't that in effect changing the critical items list? I mean, as
Dr. Ride says--and her list shows there was no redundancy, and if I understand your answer
you're saying that, we as a management team decided there was redundancy.
MR. MASON: We did consider that as a factor in our decision process. And let me say first,,
I didn't get to the thing in the right sequence. Our primary concern, and the thing we addressea
in our earlier conversation was getting--making sure the primary O-ring would seal.
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And when we had this further discussion it was pointed out that we had run the test which
showed that we could tolerate about three times as much erosion in the primary ()-ring as we
had previously experienced, in
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fact experienced in that _) -(, [ should say, in that cold test.
So we felt we had a substantial margin because we had the ability to tolerate much more
erosion than we had, and that the erosion was driven by the volume of gas that could be passed
past that O-ring, and that that we felt was limited, so that it was very unlikely that it could get
beyond the three times the erosion, or beyond the three times the erosion we had seen betbre.
DR. FEYNMAN: Could I ask some questions. Doesn't the erosion partly depend upon the
speed of the gas, the size of the hole through which it comes, and other matters? And do you
have some kind of calculation that shows that you couldn't get more erosion than the amount
that you got in 51-C?
MR. MASON: I don't know whether we have that calculation that tells us what that limit is
or not.
DR. FEYNMAN: What made you think that 51-C was the maximum erosion that you could
reasonably expect?
MR. MASON: We didn't fee! that that was the maximum we could exneet. W. _aid that if
there was a temperature effect that made it move slower, we might get some more erosion. And
we felt that the factor of three times was not likely to be exceeded.
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DR. FEYNMAN: Well, let me explain. I'r _ not interested at the moment in the temperature.
I'm going to criticize the original decision that you can operate at 53 degrees, which is a differ-
ent point of view than what we're talking about, based upon the idea that you've already seen
that you have one-third the amount of' erosion necessary to split the primary ring at a time
when the secondary has a high probability of' not being seat.able, as Mr. McDonald said.
And I would like to know how you judge, by having seen one-third of an O-ring disintegrat-
ed in one fligkt, that it is very unlikely that: you would get three times that erosion on another
flight under the same circumstances?
MR. MASON: Well, that is the jadgment issue that we finally got down to.
DR. FEYNMAN: I am trying to understand your judgment.
MR. MASON: When we had the previous erosion, to get that we had to fill all of the cavity
that was there, all of the annular cavity. So there wasn't any way to get any more, substantially
any more gas flow.
DR. FEYNMAN: Doesn't it depend upon the speed of the gas and the temperature'? Doesn't
it depend maybe upon the complexity of the hole that goes through the
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putty, so that it would be a matter of accident how much you get?
Could it, for example, have been that you got one-third the amount of erosion, for instance,
because the putty hole was smaller and longer with a reasonable probability'. )
MR. MASON: Well, the engineers, which are here, have--I don't have off the top of my
head the numbers, but we did run tests with focused jets, which focused the most amount, to see
how much erosion we would get. And I believe they can do a better job of correlating that than I
can.
I can comment that my underst_mding of it was that it would appear that, because there is
a limited volume and we had looked at what a highly focused jet would erode, that the combina-
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tion of that knowledgereade us feel that the probability of getting three times the erosion was
very unlikely
DR. FEYNMAN: Thank you,
MR. WALKER: Sir, isn't it true that the amount of erosion you can tol,_rate actually de-
pends upon the particular rocket motor you're dealing with, because the amount of compression
can vary on the particular O-ring depending upon where you are within the tolerances of the
two pieces which make up that rocket
I;254
motor'?
And had you analyzed the particular amount of compression on 51-L, these particular joints,
to see whether or not that was the average amount of compression and how m'._ch erosion of the
O-ring you could actually tolerate?
MR. MASON: Yes, we did look at the compression on that testimony joint, and we compared
it, as a matter of fact, with the compression that we had had on the previous cold launch. And
the compression was essentially nominal. As I recall, it was around 40 thousandths. And so we
did consider that.
DR. RIDE: Let me go back to this for just a second. We have got a Criticality 1 system and
there is some question in your minds whether it will perform at the temperatures that are pre-
dicted at launch. Around :_9 or 39 degrees is what you are basing your judgI_ents on.
What test data did you have to show, or any test data at all on joint rotation or the timing
function, or even seal erosion, down at 30 degrees, that would allow you to make a reasonable
engineering judgment that this Criticality 1 item was safe to fly?
MR. MASON: Well, it was the various items that I mentioned. We had the durometer of the
O-ring
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down to below 20 degrees. I don't remember exactly, but it was down well below the tempera-
tures. And we could see what the change in durometer was with temperature.
We did hay, _ the two tests we had run with the fixed joint at 30 degrees to indicate that the
O-ring would seal if it moved in in the right timing.
DR. RIDE: But you said that at the time you weren't putting much emphasis on those tests.
For one, they were fixed plates, and for another thing, you were using the argon gas and not the
freon by that time.
MR. MASON: We were trying to avoid overemphasizing that test. We wanted to make sure
we recognize it wasn't a totally representative test because it didn't have the joint rotation. On
the other hand, we felt, because it was at the temperature and did indicate that the O-ring
would seal if the timing was proper, so that the O-ring was in position before the joint rotated,
we expected the seal--we expected it to seal.
DR. RIDE: Did you have data that indicated how the joint rotated at those temperatures?
MR. MASON: We know how the joint rotates. I don't believe there is any real effect of tem-
perature on the joint rotation. If anything, it would slow it down.
DR. RIDE: Had that analysis been done?
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MR. MASON: The joint rotation, the analysis to see what the tempe _ture effect on the
joint rotation is?
DR. RIDE: Yes.
MR MASON: I do not believe that has been done.
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DR.RIDE:Howaboutany testsor analysis to determine what the timing {'unction would be
at those temperatures? Had those been done at the time?
MR. MASON: Well, they had not been done at the time. We were in the process of devising
the tests to try to establish that
DR. RIDE: So those tests hadn't been done when you made this decision'?
MR. MASON: They had not been done. Well, I had better not go beyond my knowledge of
the subject. I don't know personally how far we had progressed.
I can say this. We didn't have enough intbrmation that we could quantify the effect of the
cold,
ltl_' l_ll)l']: "i ,>ti '-,;li_l Ih<il I;i',<'\ i_,l_-I) >,,_i I!;i_t ;I !<l,.'i,.i <,! ltii','_'-.,li_'l\ li/ '.,,.';ll tq'll.-.,illll "l'll_li <-.l_illi,t'-.
I:_ lilt' lil,;_' ',,_ll '.,',,_'it' v,. iiiili_ I<_, ;i_, _.1_1_t;illl:i_'.' 1_ ;I /'rili_ :tlil3 1 '-,], ",ll'llt lli_t ),q_ll t!_1\ <' ;111\ l_i_'ltl_ Tl_lll
t_l \',.ll;il It1_" ",i'{l! ¢'l'l)_,ltlli \%_llilli I)r., i_! _1!1%. tiT_llll, ll"-.l ill
1357
analysis on what seal erosion would be under these conditions, or were you extrapolating from
the 53 degree temperature, and did you have a model to do that extrapolation?
MR. MASON: Well, that is a lot of questions. We had done some modeling of the flow in
the--the flow effect on the O-ring, and I'm not qualified to really talk about that in detail, but
the engineers when they get here can provide more detail on that
I have lost track. I would try to answer all of your questions. I have lost track. Could you
ask me again?
DR. RIDE: Okay. The first one I guess I was asking about was the seal erosion. Do you know
whether you had any test data on the seal erosion'?
MR. MASON: Well, I know we had a lot of intbrmation, as I said, where we had focused,
deliberately focused hot gases to see how fast it would erode and what kind of gas flow rates
were necessary. And that is on erosion.
DR. RIDE: Let me ask a different sort of question. Were you willing to accept damage to a
Criticality 1 system? It sounds as though you were willing to allow erosion on the primary O-
ring.
MR. MASON: The answer has to be yes, and let
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me explain that. The position we were in is, the first thir:g that has to happen is you have to
have the blow hole through the putty, and our experience is that that happens like five percent
of the time. I don't have that number exactly, but if you look at o'ar history in the flight motors
that is like five percent of the time.
When that happens, you can either get no effect, just simply hot gas pressur;.zes the O-ring,
or you can get blow-by and then the O-ring seats, or you can get erosion.
And we had erosion, if memory serves me, four times in the some 144 joints that we had
had. And so we recognized that we might get some erosion. We also recognized that it was a low
frequency event, but the possibility existed, and that if it did happen, we had erosion, that it
would in our opinion seal because of the extra margin that we had identified by running the
tests on the amount of flow it would take to get enough erosion to actuaiiy keep the primary
from seating.
DR. RIDE: I guess wt _t I'm really trying to understand is whether you really had the engi-
neering data or an engineering analysis to back up the decision that this Criticality 1 system
was safe to fly at those temperatures.
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You know, _hat we've seen tn the charts so far is that the data was inconclusive and so you
said go ahead.
MR. MASON: I'm sorry, I hope I didn't convey that. But the reasons for the discussion was
the {'act that we didn't have enough data to quantify the effect of the cold, and that was the
heart of our discussion, is how much efiect is the cold going to have on the perlbrmance.
MR SUTTER: Could I ask a question? Your engineers with the data they had and with the
concern with the temperatures did reach a tentative conclusion at least that, why not wait for at
least a temperature that had already been flown. I guess you were responsible, your engineers
were responsible, tbr the design and the testing and qualification of that design, and 1 would
assume the interpretation of the data.
And theretbre I am extremely puzzled why a NASA person could disagree and ask you to
review the decision your engineers had reached, since it seems to me theirs was the responsibil-
ity for the design.
MR. MASON: Well, let's say the request to reassess was not a major factor in my view. The
fact that we were picking a temperature based purely on the one test or the one flight, and we
had had static tests
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at other temperatures, and Mr. McDonald explained why we didn't consider those conclusive--
but it was difficult to say that 53 degrees was ez_actly the temperature that you ought to fly at.
And when Mr. McDonald made the point about the secondary O-ring being in a favorable
position, we felt that it was appropriate to consider that point, and that is the reason that we
said, well, let's make sure that we have considered everything.
And the two things that came out of that assessment were: One, that we did have--we be-
lieved that we had a margin, a substantial margin, of allowable erosion and still have that pri-
mary ring seal and seal properly.
We didn't know for sure what the effect of that cold was on the time to move, but we said if
ii_ fact it does delay moving and it cause blow-by, then the secondary ring is already in position
and the blow-by has to occur--if it occurs, it occurs immediately. The blow-by occurs on pressur-
ization.
And so under those conditions, if you were to have blow-by you would be seating the second-
ary.
Now, I understand the point about the 1R versus 1. I simply have to be honest and say that
that is the way we were looking at it then, that during the
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ignRion transient that the secondary really could function, and we had never said that it
couldn't function on the ignition transient. Even when we wrote the CIL, we had indicated that.
In any event, we did expect the primary to seat. We expected it to seat because we had some
tolerance of its ability to erode and still seat and seal. And so that was our thought process.
Now, the discussion was a free and open discussion with all of the people there, and I be-
lieve that it was not--well, at that point it was clear to me we were not going to get a unani-
mous decision. And so the question was, did we have a reasonable position to go to 53 degrees or
did we have confidence that we could fly with a 29 degree O-ring.
And the people who were there had heard all of the discussion, and so I concluded it was
appropriate to talk. to get a poll of the chief engineer and the chief program manager, and Mr.
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Wiggins,who has the divisionresponsibility,to seehow they telt, _'he'ch_,rthey fe_.that we
couldsafelyfly with all of the i_:ibrmationthat hadbeenpresenr.ed.
Andwedid conduct that po:l. and we did conclude timt _t was safe to launcil.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Could vot, teII 'as what the
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poll showed'? You say that you and Mr. Kilminster and Mr. Wiggins and Mr. Lund were unani-
mous. How about the others'?
MR. MASON: We only polled the management people, because we had already established
that we were not going to be unanimous, and we had already heard--
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: That wasn't the question. The question was what about the others.
You testified before that you thought probably all of the engineers were against the launch, and
now you say you took a poll and you only polled the managers. You didn't ask the engineers
how they felt after their review of the data?
MR. MASON: In that discussion I felt that everyone had represented their opinion, and
there were a number that I felt indicated, as we did, that with the consideration of the erosion
margin and, well, _he very factors that I just talked about, that they also considered that to be a
reasonable--
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Did they express a change of mind? Did they say, well, I've changed
my mind?
MR. MASON: Not per se, no. Excuse me, I just feel teat it is the kind of discussion that we
frequently have, in which all of the people express their opinions and they make them clear.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Did you ever have an experience
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where all the engineers voted one way and management voted the other?
MR. MASON: That wasn't the case here.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: What was the case here'? It looks that way. It looks as if you said the
managers you polled were unanimous and the engineers who were opposed to the launch were
still apparently opposed to it.
MR. MASON: There were some engineers.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Which ones?
MR. MASON: Mr. Boisjoly and Mr. Thompson were the outspoken ones.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I'm asking which ones changed their' minds. Before you testified that
all the engineers were opposed to the launch, and now you went through this process you've just
described to the Commission.
My question is, did any of the engineers change their minds, and if so which ones?
MR. MASON: Well, I would say then that I would have to lcok at the list here. Based upon
the conw,rsations that we had there, I felt that Mr. Macbeth and Kapp were supportive. And
Mr. Brinton, who was at Marshall, it is harder to judge, because he didn't have a lot to say.
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What we were faced with was that there were the outspoken individuals, and the rest par-
ticipated to a lesser degree. But I believe that we are familiar enough with the people and their
manner to be able to judge their feelings, and we heard what they had to say.
MR. WALKER: Mr. Mason. earlier in testimony in private session, you indicated that Mr.
Boisjoly and Mr. Thompson were the most knowledgeable on the seals, is that correct?
MR. MASON: Yes.
-(-,5
MR.WALKER:Thenthetwo mostknowledgeableengineerswerestill opposed,andmy un-
derstandingis they werestill stronglyopposed.Why did youproceedin the light of your two
expertsbeingverystronglyopposed?
MR.MASON:It's aindof a horserace as to who is the most expert on the subject, because
there are di.qbrent areas of expertise, some on the gas flow and some on the metal parts. We
identified that Mr. Boisjoly and Thompson were both generally knowledgeable people on those
joints, and they were peop[e whose opinion we regarded.
However, Mr. Kapp has a long hi:-tory on the joint and he is as knowledgeable in my opin-
ion as they are, and Mr. Sayre to a lesser degree. So I would say
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that we felt that, although they were outspoken, we listened to their reasons more than the in-
tensity, and the reasons boiled down to the things that i said. The reason was the uncertainty
about the rapidity with which that primary would move.
MR. ACHESON: Did Mr. Russell participate in the conversation, either on the telecon with
NASA or in the caucus off-line that followed?
MR. MASON: Yes, he participated in both discussions, it is my recollection.
MR. ACttESON: What were his views as far as you can reconstruct them?
MR. MASON: I felt that he had similar thoughts that we did. He had ,:oncern about the
uncertainty, but beyond that I would say that he was, if anything, neutral; that he was provid-
ing all of the information and was having some difficulty, as were the rest of us, trying to get a
decision in which we had confidence.
MR. ACHESON: Now, during the telecon with NASA and during the private caucus off-line
did anybody, either at NASA or at Thiokol, mention the change in the critical items list to Criti-
cality 1?
MR. MASON: No, sir, that was not discussed. That was not an issue at that point.
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MR. WALKER: I have a question about the temperatures. You said that you decided that 29
degrees was safe to launch. Did the discussion result in some lower temperature limit below
which you would not have recommended a launch?
MR. MASON; I'm sorry'? Are you saying would we--
MR. WALKER: Your ultimate recommendation to NASA was that it was safe to launch,
and I believe the predicted temperature of the O-rings was 29 degrees.
MR. MASON: That is correct
MR. WALKER: Did your discussion result in the establishment of a tempe_'a_are below
which it would not have been safe to launch?
MR. MASON: No, we didn't pursue it below that. I think the initial concern when we heard
18 degrees and we were thinking that the O-ring might be that cold, that is how all of the dis-
cussion got started, and there was a lot of apprehension at 18 degrees.
And then it was later found that it was going to be somewhat warmer than that, bu_ we
didn't pursue the idea of getting any colder than 29 degrees.
MR. WALKER: Well, how critical was this? If the temperature turned out to be 28 degrees,
would this
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have made a big difference? The recommendation was based upon a prediction. Of course that
was only a predicL:._n at the time and you didn't know exactly what the weather was going to do
and exactly what the temperature was going to be.
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And I wouldhavethoughtthat the recommendationwouldhavebeenmorespecific,sothat,
dependingon the exactconditionswhichprevailedwhenthe latmchoccurred,the recommenda-
tionwouldhavebeenonewhichcouldhavebeenusedto makea decision.
MR.MASON:Well, I can'targuewith that reasonipg.Wewereaddressingthespecificcon-
dition,not lookingtbr a threshold.
MR.WALKER:But usuallyengineeringdecisionsandcalculationsarepretty exactcalcula-
tions,andyouusuallyhavea veryspecificnumber,andthat is why thereare launchcriteria.
And thosenumbersarespecificnumbers,theyarenet ranges.
And hereevidentlyyou had a range,but you didn't even specify what that range was.
Wasn't that rather unusual?
MR. MASON: Yes, I would say it was, the tact that we were focused on that one point, and
that is what we were addressing. Normally, if you were -nrlier, preparing for another launch or
something, if the
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question came up, you would in Igor tend to bracket it.
We _-ere faced with, we felt, a specific condition here, and that is the reason we addresspd it
that way.
MR. WALKER: So you didn't feel uncomfortable with this position?
MR. MASON: I didn't. I fel: tI!E_t, after we had hashed it out and understood it, that the
inability to precisely quantify tb ,' movement of that primary O-ring was the concern that we
had. And that is the additional knowledge that I would like to have had.
But I felt that, with what the things that I've already pointed out, that we had a reasonable
basis for feeling that it _as--
GENERAL KUTYNA: Mr. Mason, you have used the word "uncertainty" now four or five
times in the last five minutes, and now you've just had the inability to quantify this thing. That
is the best thing y(,u had going tbr you. I mean, every launch has a risk, but you take that risk
becaase something must be achieved.
What was driving here? What was to be achieved that caused you to go?
MR. MASON: Well--
GENERAL KUTYNA: Why couldn't you wait a day?
MR. MASON: Well, as far as waiting a day is
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concerned, we wouldn't have gained any more information.
GENERAL KUTYNA: You would have gained temperature.
MR. MASON: That's true. And we had to decide whether we felt that it was safe to fly at 29
in order to respond to the question, should we fly. That was the question we were trying to
answer.
MR. HOTZ: Mr. Mason, in responding to the General's question about the use of the word
"inconclusive" and "uncertainty," in your whole presentation here today you were basing your
decisions on inconclusive and uncertain information. And yet, my understanding of NASA's
flight philosophy is that decisions to go or no-go are based on certainties and conclusions.
When did this change in philosophy affect your operations?
MR. MASON: Well, I would have to respond, I think it is a case of degree of uncertainty.
MR. HOTZ: Well, do you allow any degree of uncertainty before you launch?
MR. MASON: I believe that in any case in the design and testing and so forth of the whole
system, there have to be some uncertainties. It is a question of
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degree.
MR.HOTZ:But it seemsto metherewasa high degreeof uncertaintyin yourcalculations
here.
MR.MASON:Well,therewas.
MR.HOTZ:Accor_lingto yourowntestimony.
MR.MASON:Well.that of courseis the pointthat wewerestrugglingwith that night,was
whatdegreeof uncertaintyis there.And theareaof uncertaintywasthemovingof the primary
O-ring.
MR.HOTZ:Well,hov wouldyoucharacterizeit? A high degree,a lowdegree,or a medium
degreeof uncertainty?
MR. MASON:As far asthe probabilityof seatingis concerned,I thoughttherewasa low
degreeof uncertaivty.
CHAIRMANROGERS:Followinguponthat,Mr. Mason,Mr. Kilminsterwhenhewrotethe
telefaxsaid"temperaturedatanotconclusiveonpredictingprimaryO-ringblow-by."
Isn't that a veryseriousstatement,sayingthat it wasnotconclusive?Isn't that anotherway
of sayingthat theremightbea conclusionthat therewasgoingto beprimary O-ringblow-by?
MR. MASON:Well, what we did wassay,sinceit wasn'tconclusive,we weregoingto
assumethat it
lo_1
wouldhavea negativeeffect.Thatis thewayweapproachedit
CHAIRMANROGERS:In otherwords,this is a statementsayingweexpectprimaryO-ring
blow-by.
MR.MASON:Wesaidwecan': tell howmuchelfect temperatureis goi_,,gto have.andso
wehadbetterlookat whatcanhappenif in fact it does.
(Viewgraph.) Ira4. 2 I ,-,ol
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Now. if that is the case, Dr. Ride's question is most relevant, because
the critical items list said that you cannot rely on this redundancy. If you're predicting there's a
possibility of primary O-ring blow-by, you are violating the critical items list.
MR, MASON: Well, we weren't predicting it, but we were saying because we weren't able to
be certain--that the situation we were faced with is we have had blow-by on earlier flights. We
had not had any reason to believe that we couldn't experience it again at any temperature.
That is where we were right then. And so we had to say that we can experience bit',v-by,
because we had experienced it, and we had not yet been able to figure out what to do to prevent
it. And so we knew that it could happen, and so we had to say, what's the
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probability.
But even given the low probabiiit: see still had to think, what's it going to mean if it does.
And that is what we endeavored to do, s'as to think, what does it mean if it does, even if it is a
low probability.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, I don't want to continue arguing, but it seems to me, though,
ti_at the critical items list says if tnat is the case it's going to result in a catastrophe, because
there is no redundancy. That was the finding as I understand it. Am 1 correct. Dr. Ride?
DR. RIDE: Well, I guess that, just reading the critical item_ list. what it says is that it is the
primary O-ring which is Criticality !, not a Criticality 1-R.
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MR,MASON:If youjust readit in that sense,yes. But if you know how it was generated,
which was that it was not redundant full-time, that it was only redundant during the ignition
transient and then it was non-redundant once the joint opened up--we knew that. We under-
stood that, and that did enter our thinking.
CIIAIRMAN ROGERS: Dr. Feynman.
DR, FEYNMAN: In discussing this idea that the secondary sea[ will _eat, the principle is
that is
_3t ,)
located in the correct place because of the pressure put on during making a check, which is t_o
days or so before launch. After the check has been made in the VAB building, this machine is
put on a carrier aqd carried, c.md jiggled and so forth all the way out to the site, and it stands
there tbr two days and is rained upon. and we have found in other cases that water gets into the
seals.
Did you consider, ,,v} ?n you were discussing these, the probability or the possibility that in
all of this jiggling and the water inside there freezirg, making ice, that it cou!d have displaced
the secondary seal and that your idea that the seconder 3' o_,_ is in exactly the right place and
will seat immediately during the short transient might have even more uncertainty? Were you
considering that possibility?
MR. MASON: We were not considering' the possibility of ice in the joint. We did not discuss
the potential for how much the O-ring migh'_ move as a point of rolling it out, although i think
the foeling is that that is a pretty stiff joint and doesn't see any real movement.
But we did not consider the possibility of ice in the joint.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Armstrong.
1:/74
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Typical approaches to performance expansions, envelope
expansions in the case of airplanes or component performance envelope expansions, normally
take the position, well, I've flown in these places ,_,',d, based upon that and my analysis of the
results of those flights, I would be willing to go this much farther for the next case.
But yet, your engineering group said they wouldn't be willing to go outside their existing
experience base. or recommended that they not originally, and then you said. well, we will go
this much more,
Was there before the tact any attempt, let's say, to provide a level of expansim_ which ti_e
company could stand behind?
MR. MASON: Well, there was work under way to get a better understanding of overall per-
formance of that joint and the effect of rotation and the effect of temperature, the program that
was kicked off after the August meeting at hea(iquarters, where all of the joint designs and per-
formance was reviewed.
Then ;.here was a program plan put together to look at ways to improve the pertbrmanc_,
and get a more full understanding. That was under way. We didn't have the data.
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VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRC,_C: "fhe reasons that didn't exis; after you had flown, as y(_u
say, 144 joints or whatever, could you attribute that to some reason? Was it tha* y,;u werm:t
interested or didn't think it was important, or that you didn't have the re,_ources?
ttow would you characterize the fact that you were only as far alcng as you were?
' 69
MR.MASON:Well,this spansalonga fairly longperiodof time,but therehadbeena fairly
longperiodwherewehadmadesomeimprovementsin the layupof'the putty.Wehadput some
controlsonthe timeit couldbeexposedandthat sortof thing.
Weweretrying to makesomechanges that were not at risk of going in the wrong direction,
but we had high confidence we were going in the right direction, and we were having a long
period not having any erosion or blow-by.
In spite of that al:d in the middle of" that period, in the August time period we all concluded
that we needed to proceed with an aggressive effort, and so there was, say, a little pull and tug
there, in that at that time the performance was running pretty well. but at the same time the
analysis said we needed to get on with some improvements.
And we were searching for improvements that we
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could prove out without running any risks on the flight.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Mr. McDonald stated that he did feel some pressure in
this meeting, and would you characterize your own feelings about pressure that may have influ-
enced the decision process in any way?
MR. MASON: I've thought a lot about that, and there was some pressure, but 1 believe it is
in the range of what we normaliy encounter. Whenever we're taking a position, NASA tests us
on that position to explain it, justify it, that sort of thing'. And that is the way I perceive we
were being tested, ia how supportive or how well can we justify our position.
And so we responded in that fashion. Now, I can ,ay, I guess, that I get pressures in a lot of
cases, for a lot of decisions, not just from NASA but from mank people I deal with. my boss and
so forth. And I think that I am able to treat that properly and :nake a sound decision i,',depend-
ent of that.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Well. let me be more specific 1o follow up. Do you think
schedule pressure or cost pressure had significant influences in this instance'?
MR. MASON: Cost pressure definitely had no bearing on it. From a schedule standpoint, we
take a
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lot of pride in the fact that we have supported al_ of' the launches to date, and it" there was any
pressure, we wanted to continue to do the job we had been doing.
And that kind of' situation exists every time. We have to say, are we ready to fly or are we
not, and we want to be ready to fly, but we want to make sure it's safe.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Did anybody get in touch with you, at_y calls of any kind, urging you
to go ahead with this launch'?
MR. MASON: No, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: As far as you know, were any calls made to anybody in Thiokol?
MR. MASON: To my knowledge there were none. The only conversations we had were the
ones on the net that have already been reported.
CtlAIRMAN ROGERS: Just one other question. Did you realize, and particularly in view of
Mr. ttardy's point that they wouldn t launch unless you agreed, did you fhlly realize that in
effect you were making the decision to launch, you and your colleagues?
MR. MASON: Yes, sir.
MR. WALKER: Mr. Chairman, I had two other brief questions.
I would just like to return to your analysis
77()
137_
of the data during your half an i,'ur caucus in regard to the imprecisior, or uncertainty of the
data. Is it not the case that the largest amount of blow-by was associa:ad with the coldest
launch, and that point was made by some of the engineers in the discussio_f. _
Why did you not consider that conclusive '_
MR. MASON: Well, we did consider it, but we didn't consider it conclusive, simply because
we had had blow.by at the warmer temperatures and we had had erosion at varying tempera-
tures.
MR. WALKER: But the largest amount of blow-by was at the lowest temperature.
MR. MASON: Actually, the erosion is more of a concern than the bi:)w-by.
MR. WALKER: In fact, let's turn to the erosion. Mr. McDonald just stated that there was a
case em lier in which the primary O-ring on the motor seal was, on the iowest seal, was eroded
and only the secondary O-ring prevented a burn-through. And since you _-ould not really rely on
the secondary O-ring for the other seals, was that not also a very significant parameter'?
I notice that is not mentioned at all in your analysis of your half an hour caucus.
MR. MASON: Of course, we were considering the
1879
joint seal and, as Mr. McDona]d pointed out, we had concluded that the most likely cause o,* the
nozzle problem, the nozzle and joint problem, was the tact that we had tested at a low pressure
and probably had not had a seal of the primary, we had not confirmed that seal.
And we had subsequently gone to a higher pressure, the 200 psi. to be sure that the seals
were proper, rather than be masked by the putty. What we tbund was that at the lower pres-
sures, d_wn at 100 psi, the putty could actually hold the pressure and so you weren't certain
that the primary was seating. So we had to go to the higher pressure, which we knew the putty
would not hold, and with that we could be sure the O-ring was seating.
And so our [eeling on the nozzle joint was that that problem had been a product of not
having proper sealing of the primary O-ring, and it hadn't been tested adequately because it was
masked by the putt).
MR. WAI.KER: But was that incident discussed during this half-hour caucus?
MR. MASON: It was not discussed, no. sir. We were talking about the joint. It was of course
known by everyone that that had occurred.
MR ACHESON: Mr. Masor_, can you recall any previous occasion when your at least pre-
liminary advice
1_/80
to NASA had been not to launch and they wished to go ahead with the launch?
MR. MASON: No, sir, I do not.
MR. ACHESON: Was there ,an_ comment made during these conversations that you have
described with NASA that this was a very unusual situation? Did anyone, for example, say that,
it is odd that the shoe is on this foot?
MR. MASON: No, not in that fashion, no. The situation I felt sure, or feel sure, was clear,
because of the conversations that had gone on and the discussions by all of the people about how
they felt and the data they had was all on the net. And so it was understood where we were
chining from.
MR. SUTTER: Could I ask one question': in the analysis to get ready tbr launch, there was
this one statement that temperature concerns we:'e maybe fuzzy because there was a blow-by or
erosion at a 5:1 degree launch, but there was also one at 7.5 degrees. And I am just wondering
7:71
MICROCOPY PESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BtJqEAII OF STAND_RD,S
STANDARD REFERENCE MATERIAl. I0!0a
(ANSI and ISO TEST CHART No 2)
•_,,_r'_[:_ qL_tr... _,,'iI. _,,,.ii_.lrl ! I_L,I! r',tlt,¢', ,.'ttcer;l_ t!l,l( Iy|,i_ht, fhl.i ,i,,,itq.m _,,t,l rtlrlrltf'l_ q_.ll)t, fvl,tr
4 _ _ _ r I ' ' 4' t ; I i I ';"''!! :t)'t')'' ' ',':li_,,*f't!t|r_." WiYU_( d, :'q_iill% [)tl:. If ,,'1 I '(ll_') fTl,lri{if|,l] ,',)rl_|tfi))fl' l'h.t{ to
C)I*'C_, ,'t' ?r_' :'H,)t,L_._ r;_,)r.' )'r,)_()_1 ._)Id l)!()_ |)_. _,;i_ ,.L-currini_ m()r,, r,._').fltl_ th,in irl ,.arlll.r
.'.m_0.-'_..u_d the. d),,_n charuge.(, llkt, the re(luct;on m the ,tr_a,'tural _tr),r,,gth _f the motor__ ,t the
,',|.,IL),I.the incr,.a.,uJ,of the' thrllst--w_t.q .)her;. ,i ¢on(.err_ at Thlok_)l that l_rh;ll:_ it.qtln_l_• _._ _{olnK
()rl ;.ind tilt. 4)_ti.f11 'Ait_ il.1_lnk_ it It) p.rh)rm b_tter, thi|t p'rh,ll_ ii _)-i(l _tL.i i_l,.tt_rtK i[! morl. tr()_l-
hie'
An,| I'm just tr._'lnt,_ I() understand %_)':1:_there that con(.-ern, or _,ere you be_.'omt_ K rm)rl, ri,-
la_ed"
MR M,L"_)N 1 would _ay when we put tt all toCt'ther in Atl_u.qt we tndtc_lt(._ that we ha,| a
concern itn(| that we ne_,ded h) work ,m ;in improven_ent We aLqo in that _ummary ,iclld that we
felt that :t wz|_ _at'e to continue to l]y a..i long a.,i we had the pr(_per c(mdlti|m,, that t.,i. the, 21_l)
p_l h'ak test, pr()p@r a.,(.._embly, and that _t()rt of :h=ng
And .._) we endeavored to ._ummar=/.e wher,, we were in that ;t,t,gu_t melting, b(et'au.,_ we
h)oked at all three joint& we h),)ked at the field jolnt...l.w.., l(x)ked at the nozzle joint, and we
looked at the iEniter joint
W_, hx)ke(l at all ,)f our hi._tor_, and mcludmi_
the hi._tory that y_)u have here. and made our ,i._eswment and )dentlfi_d that we ought to pro-
cee(t in ,in ,)rderIy t'-l._hion, but aRgre._ively, to make ;.in improvement m the joint
MR. S_.'TTER. Well. then ,n the August nteetmg then. were there .tome ground rules [a)d
down. like _o(x| inspections and other condition.-) to keep flying"
MR ._IAS()N: Yes. and those were identified _).,_(Itho._e were in place.
.'ell{ Sl !TTNR l_,> we helve a record of what those condition, were'.'
MASON: It is in th(" August I!) briefing that we have provided copm._ to the (.'r)mmi..)-MR
_l()rl on.
MR
MR
SUTTER: Did you ('over anything on t,.mperature"
MASON: Ne. [n fact. in the copies that we provided we al._o put in a February 10tb, _,t
of pages re|]ecting the things that had happened _ince. and in there we .,_aid that that is the
condition that we ._hould have.
MR, ACHESON: Tbose at,. the blue pages, are they not'?
MR MASON: Correct.
CITAIRMAN ROGERS: Dr. Keel .)
DR KEEL: Mr. Mason. in testimony that the
l:_S;_
Commission has received in executive session and al,m in personal notes made available, you
were characterized as telling M_. Lund in this caucus to take off his engineering hat and put on
his management hat as part of that final management caucus.
And in fact. in your notes here from your presentation from your charts, you indicate that
you have asked them to exercise best judgment and make management recommendation. Since
Mr. Lund was your vice president of engineering and since he presented the charts and the rec-
ommendations not to launch outside of your experienc,: ba.._.... that is. below a temperature of 5:_;
_"7 ") /,<- _ C.2
f11*'lii l_ t| '
[_h,_,'rlh'i'll ,_t lh.lt, rh,. t:r'h* f,,' !_1,,'.vNh'I_! ,,f !h,' llr',ll1.lr'_, %, ,]l_Irl ! !I.|_,. fh,. ,l.l_.l ',, ,l,, 'h.l_
_|I'l I_I':KI. Vih.tt _rt_;,:,,r_._|'h,, :.tucu_ th.lt l'hh,k,,l.t,k,,d!,_r t,,,,rdln_ t,,_h,' ",,-,t!m,,:_.
l:l'_ I
,_f n,t ]aUlWh,,n=l ,'_.[-_ ,_ ;;l degree. [";thr_,nh_,_t t,,m|w*r=ltLlr,, l',_r the (trtng. _111_|p_|r'_l_.'td,trlt the
I)urm_l the ;I_ minute ¢atlcu._,w_u there _m._ l_lrt -f y-ur (IL,W'U,_mU _,t_ _,ddn,,_._e_ithat
imp_tct ()n ,wheduIP _tnd wh.lt th;t! nlt, anr to l'h:.k,_l, ,t=lt m_tn;tgen_ent c()f;cern (_n th;tt"
_IR M,t._),N Well. _h,.n ',,_u _1,v whl! - wh_tt tri_lg,.red the C'lltlCtl'l '_il_i n,t NA._ _'_ ,.,_pr,-s.
,_mn of cont'ern In filet, the.re i_ ,, hlt ,)f Ir()n). hut fr.m my _e_p_)Int li1_, |:,,inlar', trtK_l,.r _a_,
Mr _lcl_n;_Id'_ _',_r:._n_en! ;|h_ut the fact that thP ,_.c_:ndary _11,4 Ir_., prN'err,,i l_1,=,,n..rod that
i_ ;i Ix_in[ that we had n(}t ilCtlVeIv con_l(|er,_ In ()Llr pre_.'l(_u_ dL_'t].,e_l()n
DR KKI':L _A'ell. whllt',t th,. ;|n_wer tnth*' _III*"_tI_1'I. thoullh" | _ald w_, hilS,'_' pn.s,Imlil t_ll.
rn-n_ theft lh_it i.i wh_tt trl_Ig*.r,'d It R,.l_;ir(l!P-¢, -f _h_tt trIEE,,r,._l It. _:-n-_Id*._ n_ lh_,. _,,:_c,.r:_,
were, e_Ipr_,_l, w_t_ !her_' (|l'N.'U_t4lltfl Ir_ th,, rhl,kul _.'lltll.'tl_4 Wlth rt,"_lll_'t hl ,_ch*',,_l.l!l- llh I fhP
llllpilCt C_I' 4tlckl_'Ig !(};.t .'_:_(|e_re*, l",lhr,.nh,.tt t,,ml_,r_11_=r,, ,1.,_._ l,lun,:h _',,_tltr=,,_ md ._ h,_t rh.lt
rneilnt '_
MR M.L_O.N .N,,. there _;t_ n,t
I)R KF:KI. No dl_'U_t.n ,,t-_ch,'duh, inlpilc!
('IIAIR._IA.%" R()_;ER._ _Ir _t:_on. *h,.n v.u _l,_k,' !, Mr l.u:=d ;:,nd r(,hl hm_ _n ,,If_,t-t _,_
take (.}IT hi..* enRin,_,rmg h,t[ ,tnd put _n h_ m_m_1_.m,.r_! h_=t. w:J.,n't th;it prt.*_,_ur,. ,m _'JI" p,_rl
to =_._uh_rdinat,. th_It h*' _h,uld chanl_,. I_=,, mind"
MR _|A.q)N Well. I h(_l_' not. but ,! ¢(>ul(| b,, mt,.rpr,,ted theft w,_
('IIAIR$1AN R(X;KRS l._.t', adJourn _md re_'.nv_.t_- Y. '-' *_4_p m And we pllm to h_v,, ._Ir
P_i._joiy imd Mr Th(_mp_m ,=nd Mr l.und ;filer lum'h
=Wher,'upm. at IIN) p rn. the he,_ring m the ,ltx>ve-entithM matl_,r _it._ r_,_'es_,d, t_ rec, m.
vene :It 2()_ p rn i he ,_am,. day .
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Meeting Participants
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"Janu_hronology
rto-h-'T-h in k o I(-_-tah)
A_.p.proximate Times
EST MST
'00pm 11:00am
\
W Macbeth (MTI)_A, Th_son {t'41Tl_: and C. Saderhotm
(MTI) receive calls from-_, ar;_-_n_-M_T[-at-]_lS--CT_a>sking if
18°F overnight ",emperature-'-_3_XSC-_uses-c-56c-_n for SRMs
1:10 pm 11:10 am • R. Ebeling {MTI) and D. Ketner IMTI) notified of request
• C. Saderholm init;a_p,,, mean bulk temper3ture analysis of
propellant
• B. Russell (MTI) arranges meeting in R. Ebe=ing's office
2:30 pm 12:30 pm • Meeting convened in R. Ebeling's office to discuss effect on
seals
• Attendees: R. Ebeling D. Ketner G. Gorman
W. Macbeth A. Thompson B. Russell
R. Boisjoly J. Burn
{K,'="J .",.ti ,r Jl
(27J anuary-i-986-chron--ology_at >
Morton-Thlokoi-(gtah)-(C-ont)
EST MST
• Discussion topics:
• Static O-ring resiliency (recovery) test data at 50 °,
75 °, 100°F
• Soot blowby and erosion of O-ring on 51C (SRM-15)
• Previous launch and static test temperatures
• Conclusion was that concern was valid
• Meeting adjourns about 2:00 pm (MST). Separate activities
initiated
• A. Thompson instructs J. Maw (MTI) to calculate
O-ring temperature if ambient is 18°F
• R. Ebelingj]_ifies J. Kiiminstor (MTI) of concern.
Kilminste._rdirects Ebelin togtg___volv e engineering
m#n._ag_ement including R. _MIJL,lad_toJl_J_
A. McDonald-(Ml'l et--t'K_ )_d B. Brinton (MTI st
-_fn
5:00 pm 3:00 pm il • J" Buchanan (MT' at KSC) pr°vides temperature predicti°ns atllaunch time (34°F at 9:38 am EST)
Mo_ro_ I_.,,oK(:x..I_,w;
wl_¢_ :)IN. e,m,e
[Kef..'_:Z:3-.I• r _I
._-i-
27 January 1986 Chronology at
Morton Thiokol (Utah) (Cont)
EST MST
5:30 pm 3:30 pm
5:45 pm 3:45 pm
6:05 pm 4:05 pm
• A. Thompson briefs J. Kapp (MTI) on concerns
• A. McDonald calls from KSC hop_ing to ad_d.r.ess,concerns in
telecon between MT_a_I__
• People concerned called to conference room to support
telecon
• Meeting in progress in R. Lund's office interrupted to support
telecon
• Telecon discussion between MTI and NASA begins
• Atten_clees:\
(.: Lu_sV J. Maw
_L-T S-ayer W._ Macbeth
J.Kap_ : R. Boisjol¥
D_Ketner
-J:Burn---_" R. Ebeling
B. Russell
R. Tydeck
C. Saderhoim
B, Brinton (MTI at MSFC) J. Lovingood (NASA at MSFC}
K. Speas (MTI at MSF___ L. Wear (NASA at MSFC)
(._---ATMCDo_alo'-(IMTI at KSC)_ J. Miller (NASA _t MSFC}
r K. Coates (NASA at MSF-'
,mcmMaf_om _ f_$ P,C! wA_ N_R(O ,_ SiJ*w,,Iv 4e* On_ _wt _m,4f,r_
27 January 1986 Chronology at
Morton Thiokol (Utah) (Cont)
• J. Kilminster notified of beginning of discussions (receives call
=_Tom-L-S_wvit h-u pd al_ed-av ern l_jl_t-t-e-r_-e ra_u-_-pr e dict ion s)
• Concerns discussed
• 51C (SRM-15)launch was previous coldest and
-expMl_nc(_d greates't soot _-owby past primary 0-ring
• O-ring resiliency (recovery) data--lower response at
low temperature
• NA-q.A ron,,==at_ hAttmr o_rganize_d, written statement of
concerns
• Follow-on telecon scheduled fol_15 pn_) _
• J. Kilminster calls J.M MTI) andC. Wi insJM__Tl_at
-'l_Qham__.ty__o._ffice about 4:30 pm (MST) to advise of
COnCe_._11i_ending telecnn c.nntinuatinn_
• R. Lund directs presentation chart preparation of data,
Discussions continue between R. Lund, A. Thompson,
L. Sayer, J. Kapp, D. Ketner, W. Macbeth, J. Kilminster. and
R. Ebeling regardin 9 conclusions and recommendations
Mk_RroN _OL II,,_C
WmmcR og_r 446o_s
27 January 1986 Chronology at
Morton Thiokol (Utah) (Cont)
ii i
EST M_T
8:15pm 6:15pm •
9:00 pm 7:00 pm •
J. Mason arid C. Wiggins arrive in conference room
(approximately 5:30 pm MST)
NASA (MSFC) initiates resumption of telecon
• First charts faxed 6:30 pm (MST)
• Conclusion recommendation charts faxed 7:20 pm
(MST)
Presentation begins by MTI
• _rin_g_ " s effect of cold
._temperature on time for primary O-ring to move into
sealing position ANOSEAL
• Data review included:
• Erosion history
• Primary O-ring blowby history
• 51C (SRM-15)-F53°F
• 61A (SRM-22)+75°F
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27 January 1986 Chronology at
Morton Thiokol (Utah) (Cont)
i l
•_...TItEnperature effects on O-ring hardness
__.J.]_0._ercent increase m _rdness with 20 degree
_in t_mra_r_tt lrp))
• Temperature history of previous tests/flights
*
• Subscale blowby tests at 30°F showing no
blowby
Effect of temperature on O-ring performance was
unclear. Eng;_e_r m'_g"_O!JitiOff-_'_ _'to_ se
recommendation _og_prev=ousfiight-hJs-_-_-y- _ 1
__, 5-5-_1_ O-ring temperature _
J
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27 January 1986 Chronology at
Morton Thiokol (Utah) (Cont)
i ii i
EST MST
9:45 pm 7:45 pm • Presentation ends and following comments made:
• L. Mulloy (NASA/MFSC at KSC!_disagrees with
that did notjecommend_l__a_6s- - data reflect
correlation between blowby and erosion with
temperature.
• G. Hardy (NASA at M SFCLexI______s _su_rDd_e at
r_ec_l_ill]lg__dation. Believes qualification temperature to
be lower than-5-3_°F. Would not recommend flying
against MTI recommendation
• A. McDonald (MTI Fy. _K_n0w/le_dggs t_ha1_.qgJd
- tempefaIucP,.s_M_ c¢_9.__D_cern__.P oint,__ry
____-J_g_JllLpOSit;on tn .,,._I if j:_l_jjl]aEy_.(_[_n_L_S_slow i_____nn
sealip_g, and that this should be considered
lV_AT_'.¢ _IOKOL If,sE
we_¢ch Ope_ _lO_S
4_ ¢_,_f tql _OP_thOtlliO COUP_.ITt WlV_OV;' T_ Ogt,u. {)¢SC_ISS_O_
779
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27 January 1986 Chronology at
Morton Th-:okol (Utah) (Cont)
EST MST
10:15 pm 8:15 pm • J. Kilminster asks for off-line caucus to consider comments
......... j
• Caucus focuses on effect of cold temperature on joint
seal function
• _lZecogzdzedthaLpdmaw_may_bC,_qw_wer in
moving to sealing position
• A__c_cknowledgedthat blowby may not be a direct
function of temperature since blowbx_.has
-'-o_:cur_e_d-j_-e_yi-O_ssl__at-O_in-g temperatures of
both 53 ° n_dT_5_°F
• R eEon_d _(hat if primary O-ring did not seal
immediately, some blowby ,_md erosi_on_to
__rjma_y_O-_ziug_..auld_=_cuu:. Reestablished that
three times amount of erosion previously
experT_ 51C _ without
violating primary O-ring
MOItTON "n"_lO_OL I_K:
WaWKh _ mtm_
[R,,r. J 25-10]
d / _
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AFTERNOON SESSION
(2:05 p.m.)
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: The Commission will come to order, please.
tWitnesses sworn.)
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Boisjoly, you are now presently employed by Morton Tt _kol?
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TESTIMONY OF ROGER BO|SJOLY, SEAL TASK FORCE, THIOKOL, AND ARNIE
THOMPSON. SUPERVISOR. STRUCTURES. THIOKOL
MR. BOISJOLY: Yes. I am.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And how long have you been employed by them?
MR. BOISJOLY: Approximately five and a half years.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: How many?
MR. BOISJOLY: Five and a half years.
CH3.IRMAN ROGERS: And what is your present position?
MR. BOISJOLY. [ am a S_enior Scientist is my title, and I am basically a staff member to
the Manager ef Applied Mechanics.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And what kind of work have you been doing for the last five years?
MR. BOISJOLY: I have been involved in the joints, I have gone down to the Cape and taken
a significant amount of inspections of the solid rocket boosters as they have come back from
flights. I have reported on that information, and that information has been used in the flight
readiness reviews for the next flights. And I have also participated in some of the
1388
structural analysis, and also was one of the primary drafters of the refurbishment speciiication
on the cases themselves, particularly in the area of the joints.
I have given, made a videotape and have given a presentation at our plant, also at Vanden-
berg and KSC concerning the inspection characteristics of the joint surfaces themselves. I have
been appointed as a member of the Special Seal Task Force that was initiated last August, and I
am in that position currently.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: You 5ave been described in previous testimony _ either the leading
or a leading expert on the subjec: of seals and joints in the booster rocket, and I gather Mr.
Thompson works with you in this cormection?
MR. BOISJOLY: Arnie used to h_e my supe_'isor. [ used to work for him until approximately
two years ago. and I went out of that capacity, like I said. about two years ago.
CHAIRMANROGERS:Mr, Thompson,doyouwant to givea little backgroundof yourown
experience?
Howlonghaveyoubeenwith Thiokol?
MR.THOMPSON:[ havebeenwithThiokol21years
CHAIRMANROGERS:Howmany,317
MR.THOMPSON:Twenty-oueyears.
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CHAIRMANROGERS:Andduringthat time--well,what isyourpresentjob?
\11_ )'ilq_.ll'_)X: I;t._ll,,'_",L_(,_ ,d _tz_.t_l,,.l)_,_mn_l,,t _,,,t.,,I t_.,1,,__;_..., '_-,.l_'l,_ll_ _,,,k,'_
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: How many men work for you now'. )
MR, THOMPSON: About 25 people.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Are they mostly engineers?
MR. THOMPSON: Yes, sir,
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And have you had extensive experience in connection with the solid
fuel booster rocket and the O-rings and the seals that we have been talking about?
MR. THOMPSON: Yes, I would say so. I have been involved tbr about seven or eight years
in the case program, [ first came in,_o it right after the first hydroproof of the cylindrical sec-
tions.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Boisjoly, do you have engineers working for you or with you?
MR. BOISJOLY: No, [ am strictly in a staff positicn at this present time.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Do yoa want to go back a little bit? You have been doing some extra
work in connection with the seals and the O-rings.
Do you want to describe that to the
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Commissio:., please?
MR. BOISJOLY: Yes. As a result of my involvement in hardware inspections after the vehi-
cles had flown at Kennedy, I got involved quite heavily in some of the flight readiness reviews
that presented problem areas with the seals, namely, the erosion that was going on.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Do you want to move the microphone just a litti.e bit closer, please?
MR. F3OISJOLY: I was involved in going down to the Cape and inspecting the hardwme
after it flew, and any of the hardware that experienced problems with the seals, ,tamely erosion,
I was also involved in the preparation and sometimes the presentations and flight readiness re-
views along with A1 McDonald.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: ,So you have made some of the actual inspections we have been talk-
ing about this morning in connection with erosion and blow-by and so forth?
MR. BOISJOLY: I was the person who was there when SRM-15 was disassembled. I was the
person that inspected those joints and reported on those joints, took the samples of the black-
ened grease, characterized the degrees of arc that the blackened grease existed, directed the pho-
tographs taken of the joint, took the
1391
samples for a chemical analysis back to Morton Thiokol for analysis of what the blackened con-
dition actually was, and then prepared the presentations to give to Marshall on the condition of
those joints
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: So you had as much firsthand experience as probably anybody else
in the field?
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MR.BOISJOLY:Thatiscorrect.
VICE CHAIRMANARMSTRONG:Perhapsyoucouldcharacterizefor usthe concern and
,activities that went on with respect to the joints, starting back in the time before the August of
!9_5 time period, or wherever before that where you should start.
MR. BOISJOL_t: Yes.
Just along about SRM-8 or thereabouts--and I could be off a vehicle or two either way--we
had previously to that experienced putty going around the end of the clevis and up to the pri-
mary O-ring and actually sometimes into the groove, and there was some concern expressed
about that situation because the putty has an asbestos filler in it which is a fibrous filler, and
the concern was that the fibers might interfere with the sealing capability of the O-rings.
Theretbre, a change was made to lay up the putty in a little bit different character on the
end of the clevis leg such that when you mate it, you would not
1392
see that characteristic amount of putty down there next to the O-ring. And by observation, that
intent was successful because from that time on I never saw putty past the chamfer on the end
of the clevis leg, and never around the corner on the radial surface and down toward the seal.
Then we would rep6rt on the erosion characteristics on the seals as we observed them. Like
I said, we photographad them. We documented the degree of arc of any of the damage, both heat
affected and erosion, and the erosion generally is very localized removal of the material in the
O-rings, and it goes some distance longitudinally, and as the charts explain that you have, and
we would report on that, and that became a focal point for discussion as a problem area for the
next flight readiness review.
So basically that was my task at that time.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Was tbere an increase in concern in mid-1985 as a result
of the observations that you and others had made?
MR. BOISJOLY: Yes. SRM-15 actually increased that concern because that was the first
time we had actually penetrated a primary O-ring on a field joint with hot gas, and we had a
witness of that event because the grease between the O-rings was blackened just like
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coal for those arc lengths that were described in the charts, apd that was so much more signifi-
cant than had ever been seen before on any blow-by on any joint.
MR. FEYNMAN: When was that flight?
MR. BOISJOLY: That was a year ago last January, and the reason it was so vivid in my
mind is because I was at the Cape prior to the launch, giving the presentation to approximately
130 people at the launch facility on the inspection techniques on the joint to be used to ensure
that any defects which had been removed from the joint were removed in a manner such that
the transition on the defect was very smooth, so that the elastomeric condition of the O-ring
could actually get into those imperfections because it had been smoothed out. And being elasto-
mer, it would do just that.
And I remember watching the launch, and the launch--I went out of the VAB, and it was
an afternoon launch, my recollection is sometime between 1:00 and 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon,
I'm not sure, but it was reasonably cool, but yet 1 went out without a suit coat. During the pres-
entation of that vehicle, after it was inspectecl, it was calculated by the folks back at the plant,
the heat transfer folks, that the seal temperature would have been approximately 53
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degrees for that launch, and that was part of the characterization of the presentation in the
flight readiness review for the next vebicle.
Now, that presentation was a very pointed discussion, a very detailed discussion, rand quite
frankly, I commented to A1 McDonald once or twice that had I not been personally there and
been personally witnessing what I had seen and presenting what I h,_d physically seen, I don't
think we could have been able to convince NASA to continue to fly.
i felt very strong about that fact because [ spoke from conviction, and I was challenged by
just about everybody in the room about what I had reported, and I was very grateful that I was
there and was able to stick by my convictions because I had seen the condition of the joint.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Mr. Boisjoly, on 51-C, you saw a very blackened joint.
MR. BOISJOLY: Two of them.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Well, however, on 61-A, the temperature was 75 degrees, and that
has been u_ed to minimize the effects on 51-C. saying that it occurs at warm temperature also.
Wouid you explain the difference that you saw or heard of between the two joints?
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MR. BOISJOLY: Yes. the difference, the SRM-22 that was used as a comparison basis was
not one that I saw personally but a junior engineer, or a younger--I shouldn't say junior, but a
younger engineer who works for Arnie had actually been at the Cape and seen those joints. I
questioned him, and asked him to tell me in his words what he saw. What he told me was that
he saw light grayish to dark grayish splotches that occurred over an arc length of appraximately
40 degrees.
Then we discussed the photos. He had a phcto of that joint., and I had a photo package of
the SRM-15, and we put the photos side by side, and you could see that the SRM-15 j,_mt had
coal black color where we had photographed it, and the joint was as he described; it was not coal
black, it was significantly lighter and a littie bk splotchy. The splotchiness wasn't so definitive,
but that is how he defined it to me.
Now, on that basis. I concluded, and so presen;ed the night before the launch, that that was
extremely significant. It was very significant because it was telling us that temperat,_e was
indeed a discriminator, and that although I couldn't quantify what that discriminator was from
an actual threshold standpoint, in other words, I couldn't say you can fly
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above this temperature, you can't fly below this temperature, I couldn't do that. I don't know of
anybody that could do that with the data we had at the time. but I was extremely concerned,
and my concern ran deeper than SRM-15. It ran as a result of the SRM-16 nozzle which the
primary nozzle was compromised, and we presented that as having never sealed, and as having
happened in the ignition transient, in launching that vehicle.
Now, that was characterized as a seal that never sealed because it either was not properly
leak checked, because of what was explained betbre_I shouldn't say not properly leak checked,
but it was leak checked at 100 psi, which we knew, we had data that said that putty could m_sk
a leak check at that level. We also postulated that maybe there was no'_hing wrong with the
leak check and maybe in the trans._er of the O-ring in the groo'_e, it had simply ridden up on a
piece of contamination and, never did seal.
But the thct was that now you introduced another phenomenon. You have impingement ero-
sion and bypass erosion, and the O-ring material gets removed from the cross section of the 0-
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We :a.-u-tllv use the charact,,ristlc blow-b, _o define ffas past it...'u_d we use the other term to
indicate that we are et'_xlin_ at th,,sam,, tin:, .\e,,i -,, v_q._al_ }i;t'..._,: .w-[_x Z_lth,.*u.'_ eio.qon, vo,.:
can haave blow-b)' _'ith erosi:m.
No_. I dtm't remember the temperature _' teat par::,.u;_, ,.e_',:c].. 'lit ,}:_,: • _rned the ga:n
up very. very high (:n the seal problem, extremely hl:Ih m m.c n,m,.i % , ",_,'re j'.asr, playing with a
dan_;erous :_ituation
&, you have seen the packages that I have tu,'e_d in, and you have probabl_ _*ead the memo
that ] wrote and expressed the ::oncern r.h,_t [ had to m,,,,, absolutely sure in everybody's mind
that management was _'are o_" my :oncer_qs, seeing that I was on ,_ of the fellows that was most
involved with that particular sit._ation.
VIt.'E CHAIRMAN AR.'vlSTR()N(}. Let me ask. since you are on the task force-
MR. BOI,'E.IOLY. 'Ye-,.
_, ICE CI-|AIRMAN ARMSTRON(; Tell us the history o_" the establishment of the task force
_tr'td ,vha_ they were charged to do.
MR. P,OIS, JO[,Y: We were charged to look at alternate designs in the joint upstream of :?:e
()-rings themselves, and to also look :_'. the seal design as it
_. f" ,
relates to the secondary seal. And that was to t r), to come tap with something _hat would replace
the p_tty, would be of a vented design and assure that we got gas pressurization to the seal, the
prima_y seal, also look at an alternative -_,_condary seal design which would indeed follow the
gap opening of the metal parts such th.u should a primary O-ring be compromised in any
manner, that the secondary seal would be m _ position because it _,:-:s in contact, with both sides
of the metal parts, to be pressurized, pressure actuated, and cause the seal to be ef!Octed. And
that was the primary task of this team.
VI(?E UHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: To what extent were temperature considerations in-
volved in the work of the task force ')
MR. BOIS,JOI_Y: To the extent that we had run tests, or ._.rnie actually had them run at the
lab, but I was aware of them, we had run tests on O-ring resiliency, and from the team stand-
point we ceased to talk about an O.-ring and started to talk about seal because some of the seaD
under investigation are not O-rings: they are cross sections that have metal!ic leaf springs i>.
them such that you will get a mechanical assist to force the elastomer to remain in contact such
that if you did violate a primary seal, you would be
l ,,9,_)
capable of pressurization.
So with that info,mation, we were looking .: the whoJt, regime. _,Vv were tt'ying to get res_!-
iency data run at the plant since last October, which I merit.toned in my statement, and also that
night mentioned over the phone, and we had trouble because _e kept having machine I_reak-
downs, we kept having priority problems, and here we were. three months later. :_nd we stii_
didn't have the data necessary for us to pursue it even further.
So that night we presented the information on .'.he basis o.' what we i-new, a_:d what we
knew--and I feel very strongly about it--is that we had a problem with temperature, and it was
away from the direction of goodness, and thai. is my phrase because I can't quantify it, but l
always use that, It is away from the direction of goodness. And we had run tests to show that
"S5
thesealneverhftedoff m a resdlencvtest at ll_ de_rees Fahrenheit We had a dat,_ pmnt thnt
m_ht that _howed that the seal lifted off m the tgn,,tton cycle for 2 1 2 _econd._. or 2 I ,_ecmld_ at
room temperature. T5 de_rees. We _howed that ,t llfted off .'.nd remainecl lttte,'l ,fit t'_r tn ,,,_ce-_
,'_( I_ mmu'_es, because ,,,'e stopped the test at ILl minutes ;.It .'_I_de_rees
}-low. with that _estm_ that v,a.._ run nitially, l through my concern _tnd the j_nnt_ that I
had
I. l_iO
witnessed, had asked them to please run cne more. and that was to back off the instrom ma-
chine platens that had compressed the seal I0/I000 inch. and see what happens. And the)' did
that, and it remained seated. That was my comfort zone. [ am the one that made the chart that
AI McDonald presented at Washington in August which said that if you go from zero to 170
milliseconds, you have a high probability of r ,rood secondary seal. If you go from 170 to :{;{0
milliseconds, you have a reduced pro_,ability o,' a secondary seal. And if you go beyonti that point
to full pressurizatior,, you most assuredly might not have a secondary seal.
Now, that was based on the information that I had at the time, and I just went in and esti-
mated those from a pressure trace, pressure time trace, and made that judgment. And that was
the basis of my concern, and that was also the basis of continuing to fly because it happens--
either it happens or it doesn't happen right at the very first threshold of the ignition transient.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Mr. Thompson, in your group, were you or any of your
people working this problem as well, or aware of this'?
MR. THOMPSON: Yes, sir, we were. Right after the January witness of SRM-15. and the
disastrous
!40!
effects, in my judgment, on the O-ring situation, and seeing lots of soot iv. toth the primary O-
rings of the field joints _nd between the primary and secondary field joints and the nozzle, it
appeared to me that some additional tests needed to be run. And as Roger mentioned, the resil-
ience test was one o_ the first because then, if we were getling soot blow-by by the primary O-
ring, we had better be checking and making sure that our secondary is in good shape.
So we devised a t_st to squeeze an O-ring down a nominal amount and then come off it
about two inches per minute in an instrom machine, a_td I would like to quantify that just a
little bit because if one looks at the rate at which the s'arfaces separate, it is a nonlinear func-
tion. It has kind of a toe. on it at first, and then it has a fairly high rate over an inflection point,
and then kind of comes over the top. And if one take_ a secant from time zero to the top point,
which is about, oh, 42/1000 at .6 second, that secant v, as on the order of 3.2 inches per minute.
And the tes'cs that we had run up to this point, ir:cluding the night that we were discussing
this, was 2 inches per minute. And additionally, the concern is if one looks at the steeper slope
after you come off the toe through the inflection point, that that slope is
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on the order of 10 inches per minute.
So what it means to me, and I hope to others, is that i_ is a very, very high rate shortly
after it comes off, on the order of 100 to 200 milliseconds..So the message I believe, and I tried to
convey, was for 100 milliseconds to 200 milliseconds, r_oger has indicated !70, you really prob-
ably do have a pretty good chance for a seal. Thereafter you do not.
And so, to further answer the question--and I hope I'm not too long--is that blow-by, of
course, was an issue. And I set up a series of tests to try and determine the factors that affect
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th,t r. !_ the pwq_),,r !t..,'['ll'
_'¢iL'_ Ill:'. t_I1 3rl :lt'TIl.ll _i'l _l'. h.Ird'.*,.trt'. ,iv ',_.1. 1[ .I ._"_! _.t'hlc'lt'..tI_d htl;_, vv_jtllll '_,ler.INc,',
lni'lt.lt.llC,., I{h<ll" ('o_lld _,ou (,.r. quirt, .! _,dri_'d _lll-iwt i" d,.l_.,ndini_ til)_tl_ _t'l,.lh,.r b,ltl t'l,i,l , l!)4i'l!
J,_inl .it" _ht'lt'li'r _,_ttI b:ld <l .;_.tptn ,h,li _.l_ <1_._,. <'_, th,, il!ht.i ,,rot ,it rht, ll)lPr.lla'.'t' '
MR "rtlI)Mf._N. Ye._, lie what we did, recol_ni_lng this 14 fir,lt (it' all, it was a bench tell,
it was a three inch piece of O-rirlg, _n fact, two ii,ch plt_:e uf ().rlni_ that wa..i sql.let.zi_d tl) ai'_iut ;|
nornilictl ."_tut._#.e. which i_ like lit llilili Many oI' our joints have ai'_ut tl'uit _tlUt-_#.e eke pllrt_cu-
lar one in question in the incident was 3D. ltiOi). :t7 ltil)il And so we just merely would give it the
#queeze. and then b_ck off (it the _lmulated rate that we could do on the instrom machine
MR. SUTTER: Well, do you think you might get a variation in results on actual flight hard-
ware then, delxmdmg upon the varmu_ production runs on the ca._.s?
MR THOMPSON Yes, _lr, we do In fact, if you have additional -.tueeze, you not only have
the" two surfaces, the ont_ surface pushinl4 off, bu_ If it is ;I lot of _lqueeze and a _ma!l ()-ring
ifroove, the side surface of the O-ring probably can al._) help, and that gives you additional
ener._' to help it respond
MR. SUTTER Well what about th,, other directions where the tolerances are on the other
side"
MR. TtIOMPSON We investigated tolerances and gaps, and we have set up a matrix to do
that very' thing This was kind c:£ a preliminary test we had run. and as Roger men'_ioned. _e
have refined the tests and
1 lii.l
have some results now. but after the, fact, al:d the tests included squeeze and included tempera-
ture. and it also. the v:iriable rate that we think we really have in the motor, we have simulated
that by input, using a function generator as an input to the instrom m_chine so that we could
generate the actual motion as we saw it.
MR. SUTTER: But wi,h the fac, that the testing is somewhat late and that there's a lot of
variables and there's been a lot of commentary on temperature, could you come up with ,a situa-
tion where temperature and tolerances could develop a submarginal joint and that of the 114
cases that have been fired, you could run the gamut from having very goc, d ones to very bad
ones'. )
MR. THOMPSON: Yes. sir, we could. We ran. as l say. a preliminary run that showed that
it was a problem.
MR. SUTTER: But would all of the parties be aware that you could have wild variations.
then, that--and couldn't this deve!op quite a concern on everybody's part that the system was
pretty tender?
MR. THOMPSON: In my £eeling, the system was tender, and this is the reason I objected
that night.
MR. BOISJOLY: That was the _int we tried to make that night, is because we didn't have
sufficient
1405
data.
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_h,,t tb,, _Itua!l,_," v_:i.,_ _,.r_ t,.mh, r..lml _h; _,_lldt_'t ,-v,.rvba_¢l_, ,l,.v,.h,p ,t !t-t-ltr't_ _d _rt. it C_,t_
_'rt_. tl_,_ tfl,-I! !,_ 'i', |! :l_,',|ll.,l dt".'t'i_t, ,| '.. '.;. . ',', C,)ll_.*.r_,lll_,_. _tttl[udt. r,_,trd ll_)I,_.rtKD,'}'llr1,._ ,I
],lll lh,_,_ .
MR ll()l._J()l._ ['h,_; _.. what we. l.h,,u_;,_ i_.Ippened wh,'e the ,,r_inal c,mclu._i_m._ .rod r,.v
r,_ lh- n-'*_tlng and prior to mak]r;g the ehart._
('IIAIRMAN R(X;ER."; ('an l interrupt just a _.co,_d" I _,_uhl l_k,. t. c,,m,, h, th,, night _I
the launch and the launch it.,u_If, nr the. d_'_.'I,_ion.L in a little _._lle, but I w-uld like t_) go back
just a mlnt_te to .,a)nle of the bzlckground before w,, get t(, that ix)int, to _how w_ur cono.rn a.._
e_pres_ to management
[ have here a letter which appears to be one _Lgned by you date,d July ;I_,, l!)_.', And l wLll
ask Dr Keel to give it to you
And I gather from the files that we have re_e_ved from you, you wrote it .o,er_es of letters or
memr_, l gue_ memos i_ a bette, way to de_'ribe it
MR BOLq,JOLY Th:,s,. were activity rep, t'.rts
11_
('HAIRMAN RO(;FRS: Expressing your concern about thas probh, m ,._f the _als and the O-
rmg._ and _ forth
And I would a._k you. it' you don't mind, to read that memorandum dated .July :l.t. which y_u
wxote to l'{. K Lund. _'ho is Vicu Presulent of Engine_.ring Ir,.t : "', nll
W.uld you mind"
MR BOISdOLY. Yes,
'This letter t_ written to en_ure that management ts fully aware of the ,_'riou_,_ess of the
current ()-rln_ erosion problem in th.' .SRM joi,,t,q from an engineering _tandl_mt The mi._tak-
enly accepted l_)sition on the joint problem wa._ to fly without fear of failure and to run a .qerles
of design evaluations which wou!d ultimately lead to a solution or at k'a_t a ,_ignificant reduc-
lion of the erosion problem.
"This p(_'Ition is _ow drastically changed as a result of the SRM-I_;A nozzle joint erosion
which eroded a _econdary O-ring w,th the primary O-rinK never sealing If the _ame scenario
should occur in a field joint _and it could) then it is a jump ball as to the success or failure of the
joint because the secondary ()-ring cannot respond to the clevi._ Ol_ming rate and may not be
capable of pressurization. The result would be a catastrophe of the hi_hest 9rder-loss of human
life.
14O7
"'An unofficial team (a memo defining the team and its purpose was never pttblished_ with
leader was formed on [9 .July 19_5 and w_ tasked with solv|ng the problem for both the short
and the long term This unofficial team is essentially nonexistent at this time. In my opinion.
the team must be officially given the responsibility and the authority to execute the work that
needs to be done on a non-interference basis Ifull time assignment until completed)
"It is my honest and very real fear that if we do not take in,mediate action to dedicate a
team to solve the problem with the field joint having the number one p:'iority, then we stand in
jeopardy of losing a flight along with all of the launch pad facilities."
Then I signed it. and a manager that I worked for countersigned it as concurred.
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CHAIRMAN ROGFRS: Thank you.
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l L_._t|m* °, Mr 1"hotl'lp_ol"L, _1.1 :t_rt,_ , _lrh the ,'_wtt,,P'_ ,d that rn,,m_rirt(_tH_l'
SIR I'tt(LMtL_q_N Ab_u,lut,.lv. _,,.',. _lr
('|IAIRM \N b[(X;l']R."; l:nl,,_ the (',m_mi.L._um ha._ am, furtht.r qut.:_tu_n-_. 1 w_Juht Ilk,. ',_
n,_, _ t,) th,o .J.tnutrv '2. and .J,tnu,lr_ _._',,t,) ;i.-_k win..Mr |hu.9,dv. t_ d,,,_crlb., tn _mr ,_*,n
_rt4,_ _Ir lir,_! lll_¢)[_t'[_,ll'll[ In th,_._,. C[I-t,ClI'4,41()n4 ;|l'l(i _1,II 'v_,l.4 -tahl, vvhl! !,H)l,t i.,ir_'. ,ti'Ul _,)ur
|_),-lltl(_n, iirld[ later on, >our p_,tttl_ll
MI'I PA)I._JI)I.Y ()kay M.v l'_r,_t
CIIAIRMAN R(XiERS And can I ,ay t_, you al_, just l_.iore y,)u _ttrt . I'm _orr,, to inter.
rupl, but y_)u Chd m._ke note_t on the 27th about the event_ at that tlme'
MR BOIS.JOI,Y Yes, I did I made them after the meetlnlil Itl,.t -' I I I,I
('tIAIRMAN R(XiFR.S: But on the ..tame day
MR BOI&JOI.Y Yes, and then l made a few more notes on the day of the laul3ch, prior to
the launch, and then l made a ._hort entry after the launch.
('tIAIRMAN R(X;ERS: But the notes on th*. L'Tth and the 2;_th _ere made on th_, days?
MR. IK)ISJOLY: Yes. they were
('tIAIRMAN I_(X;EILg And the last one was made
I I09
alter the accid_,nt"
MR BOIS.JOLY That L, correct
('tIAIRMAN R(X;ERS: In your di._cu._sion you may refer to th_e not_. and if you have no
objectum, we may make them public
MR B()IS.JO[,Y l kind ofjuat paraphr_L-a,d them and m_.te them ,m three by five card._, hut
i think they e._:entially haw, the content of what i._ tn tho_, notes--my first knowledge about
any temperature concern on the launch was approximately 104) p m on the L_Tth of .January
There wa._ a prel_rmnary meeting held to discuss the conc_.rn -it t}1_ low temlr_rature l'_r resilien-
cy, ._oot blow-by, prevlo,_ launch and static test temperatures, and there were several, well,
r,here were quite a few people in that meeting, most of whom were enl,_ineer8..qome of whom
were program management. [ don't remember the names, honestly
Anyway, that meeting concluded with the tempo that there was a valid concern for temper-
ature, low teml_.rature [ al_) heard ._omettme afterwards that it had been cold for several days.
and what really tmpres.sed me about this pwce _)f information was that it was opposite what
SRM-15 had experienced, and that concerned me bec_.u.._e when l got off the plane a year ago
last .January for the SRM-I.3 launch, it was very cold.
l It0
like 17 or Ig degrees when I got off the airplane at Orlando. The next few days, although it
remained cold. it got warmer, and by launch time. like I said. it was probably in the 60s. but it
did get warmer.
Now. what was concernufg me about thi._ pieo. of information wa_q it was the rever._e, it had
been cold for several days and was getting colder. And :hat is why I noted that because that just
turned the gain up or, my concern becau.se that was awa_ t'rwm g_dnes_ again. SRM-15 tha_ I
am referring to was the coldest launch up to that point in tim_'.
Okay, I felt we were very successful in convincing engineerin_ and management of th_ prob-
lem. By now we heard that the overnight low was predicte_ '_, be '_ degree_ Fahrenhei;, and
again my concern deepened because of what I just spoke, it w3s zoir,_ the wron_ diroction from
the past experience base.
A telecon was set up with Marshall Space Flight Center and Kennedy Space Center to
present data over our concern about the low temperature. Now, there had been some meetings
llll
:{ t_)_1 in_'h. :ind thnt w,1_ dut, t_ h_th the, ,_hrink_1_e _m the dinr_,,t_.r :ind the _,l'l'__'t of tem|_.r_-
ture ._tretchin_ It ,iround _ts circumf_.renc_, and thu_ c;itl.,qnl,_ the, diameter to shrink down ;_Ir,
There wa._ n_u_hl._ a fift_-fifty _p[it in th_" number,_, but the hott_m_ !Ine wa_ _t w'a_ aL_ut :_
lOl_ inch
(pkay, that +how,q me that +qtleeze wasn't really an eff_.'t ._u_,eze wa.,_ not an issue [t never
ha._ bc, en an m.,_ue with me be_au_e if you look at all the eroded O-rings, they don't correlate
with .-_ueeze The O-rin_ that you would expect to be eroded are those that have the low¢_.t
.,_lueeze, and that IS not the ca.,_e. _ .._ueeze was r_ever an issue, but [ ran the numbers anyway
to a._ure myself that it was okay, which it wa.._
Okay, the telecon data--and [ murat emphasize thi,. We had very little time to prepare data
i',>r that telecon When it was decided in a group in our conference nx>m that we would take a
._y+tematic approach and a.,_igned c'ertnin individual+ certain ta_ks to prepare, we all +curried to
our individual hx'ations and prepared that informathm in a timely manner That is why the
charts for the moat part are hand printed t)r hand wriPten, because we didn't have time to get
them even typed.
Each per,qon durlni_ the telecon pre.,_ented their
lll_
own charts .lust for the rect_rd, l presented Charts 2-L. 2-2. 2-;L and l _ilso pre_nted :l-l, which l
did not prepare but which was ,_equenced right alter one that [ did. and [ was asked just to
present it, which [ did [ pre,_ented l-I and .-_-I [ expressed deep concern al_ut launching at low
temverature I presented ('hart 2-I with emphasis--now, 2-l. if you want to see it, [ h._ve it, but
basically that was the chart that summarized the primary concert_s, and that wu_ the chart that
[ pulled right out of the Washington presentation without changing one word o| it because it
w_s still applicable, and it addresses the highest concern of _he field joint in both ,he ignition
transient condition and the steady state condition, and it really sets down the rationale for why
we were continuing to fly Basically. if erosion penetrates the primary ()-ring seal, there is a
higher probability of no secondary seal capability in the steady state condition. And [ had two
sub-bullets under that which stated bench testing showed ()-ring not capable of maintaining con-
tact with metal parts, gaD, opening rate to maximum operating pressure. [ had another bullet
which stated ber_ch testing showed capability to maintain O-ring contact during initial phase ¢0
to 170 milliseconds of transientL That was my comfort basis of continuing to fly under normal
L_L3
circumstances, normal being within the data base we had.
I emphasized when [ presented that chart about the changing of the timing function ef the
O-ring as it attempted to seal. I was concerned that we may go from that first beginning region
int, o that intermediate region, from 0 to 170 being the first re, on, and 170 to 330 be_.ng the in-
termediate region where we didn't he_ve a high probability of sealing or seating.
[ then presented Chart 2-2 with added concerns related to the timing function. And basically
on that chart I started off talking about a lower temperature than current data base results in
changing the primary O-ring sealing timing function, and I discussed the SRM-L5 observations.
namely, the 15A motor had 80 degrees arc of black grease between the O-rings. and make no
mistake about it, when [ say black, [ mean black just like coal, It was jet black. And SRM-LSB
ha,{ a i l,_ degrt,t, trc of black _r_-a.,,. l_,t_,en the, ()-rLn<_ %'e _L,uld hay,' l_)_v()-r)ng ._qut'eze _lu •
to low temp_,r;ittlre ,,vhlvl'_ [ ha_i cal_tll',tted earl:er ,n th*" day %'e %,)u{<l h,lv¢, hldh_'r l)-rlr't_
_hore har(In_,_.,_, and that _._the, characteristic _in_ilar to the hardne,_._ t¢'_t that t_ done _)n r_',+.tal
e_cept that It h,l_ a different :tnvd _iz(,. :it_,{ when _',)u pr,'_ llgi.llr1_'lt thl" +'];l.-Itllf'111"{"IC tt_:It*'l"Iil].
that I_
illl
the mea._ure of how far a standard _ze anvil will go into the part|cular ela_tomer, and _t g_ve,_
you a mea.._ur," of relative hardne._._ ot" the _ub_tanc_'
Now, that wouh/ be harder And what that r(,ally rne¢:n_ ba_cally is that the harder the
material is. it would be likened to trying to ._hove a brick into a crack ver._us a ._ponge That i._ a
gtx)d analogy for purposes of this d,scussion I also mentioned that thicker grease, as a result of
lower temperatures, would have a higher vi_(_ity. It wouldn't be a,,_ slick and slippery as it
would be at room temperature And so it would be a little bit more difficult to move across it.
We would have higher O-ring pres,_ure actuation time, in my opinion, and that is what !
presented. [f action time--and these are the two. The_e are the sum and substance of what [ just
presented. If action time increases, then the threshold of secondary seal pressurization capability
is approached. That wa.q my fear. [f the threshold is reached, then secondar¢ seal may not be
capable of being pres.qtwized, and that was the bottom line of t,verything that had been present-
ed up to that point.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Did anybody take i,_,_ue with you':
MR. BO[_JO[.Y: Well. I am coming to that [
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also showed a chart of the joint with an exaggerated cross section to show the seal lifted off,
which has been shown to everybody. I was asked, yes. at that point in time l was asked to quan-
tify my co:acerns, and [ said l t ouldn't. [ couldn't quantify it. I had no data to quantify it. but [
did say l knew that it wa._ away from goodness in the current data base. _,meone on the net
commente,:l that we had soot blow-by on SRM-22. which was launched at 75 degrees [ don't re-
member who _nade the comment, but that is where the t_rst comment came in about the dispari-
ty between my conclusion and the observed data because SRM-22 had blow-by at essentially a
room temperature launch.
I then said that SRM-13 had much more blow-by indication and that it was indeed telling us
that lower temperature was a factor. This was su,_.1_orted by inspection or" flown hardware by
myself. I was asked again for data to support my claim, and I said [ have none other than what
is being presented, and I had been trying to get resilience data. Arnie and I both. since last Octo-
ber, and that statement was mentioned on the net.
Others in the room presented their charts, and the main telecon _z_sion concluded with Bob
Lund, who is our Vice President of Engineering. presenting his
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conclusions and recommendations charts which were based on our data input up to that point.
Listeners on the telecon were not pleased with the conclusions and the recommendations.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: What was ).he conclusion?
MR. BOISJOLY: The conclusions were that we should not fly outside of our data base, which
was 53 degrees. Those were the conclusions And we were quite pleased because we knew in ad-
vance, ha_ing participated in the preparation, what the conclusions were, and we felt very com-
fortable with that.
MR. ACHESON: Who presented that conclusion?
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MR Bt)I,'q,J(}I,Y Mr B,,b l,und lh, had prepared th,_,_+,charts lie h,_d input t'rt+m ,+ther
people i!,' had .tcttAall,, phy._t;'.dl_ prepared the ,:hart.-+ It _,:i-_ .l[m_tlt that ttt'n+, rh,lt _[r ll,trdv
t'r++nl ),lar,_h:111 _,:_.._a_ked what he thotlght :lh<,l|t ,he MTI recommend:it1<+n, and h+, ._atd h_, w,:t.,_
,q+p+illed at the MTI h-:t+ic,n Sir llardv w+1._also, ,tsk,,,l ,_b<.,ut l:tunchln_. :in+i h+, -<,!d n.,. n_t it
the .-t_ntr tc't,>r rec_}tt_rnemh,d not l,turtchtr_.;, he m_uld not _:,, ,tdait_,.,t the o)r'_tr+t_.'t++r ,_r_'l launci+
there _r_I_ __ "_h_}rt (h>+,:u+_It_r_ theft t'tl"ll.l+'<.l Afar)uP !,'+t_p+'r:i'ur+, ,_Jt !_'_ng ;I dl+crtmtn_tt_r h,.-
t,.veen ,qRM-l.-_ and 22. ,,nd -+h<+rtlv _ll't+,r. [ b+-It,+++, _t v+_, Mr l_tltt+xrt,_t_,r +t,,+k+,d tf excu-+e r+ztt+
l'm _+,tt_n_ ¢m;fu,..+ed here Mr
t|t:
Kilminster was ask,-,,d by NASA if he would launch. ,rod he _a=d n,) b_,cau.,_-, the englne_'rtng rec-
on,.mendation was not to launch
Then MTI management then asked for a five minute caucu_ I'm not sure exactly who ;tsked
for t, at, but it was asked in _uch a manner that l remember tt W_L_asked for. a five minute
caucus, which we put on--the line on mute and went ()l'flme wxth the rest of the net.
('HAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr Boisjoly. at the time try:it v,,,a made th_.... that Thiokol made the
recommendation not to l,tunch, was theft a un-l,'_in'lou_ rrc_r'_,_,nd.tt;,_n _s far a_ _,_u k3ew+.'
MR. BOI_JOLY: Yes. I have to make ._omethlng clear [ have b_.e_ di_tres,--_-,d by the things
that hav_ been appearin_ in the paper at...: things th'tt harp bee,', -_a_J :r_ _t.neral. and there +,,,'as
never one l_r_itive, prtwlaunch _tatement ever made by anyb,_ly ['here have been some t'eeiings
since then that folks have expressed that they would _upport the decision, but there was not one
[.x>sitive statement for laun.::h ever made in that ro_,m
Picking up where the caucus started--
CHAIRMAN R(X;ERS: Excuse me. Is that your recollection, too. Mr Thompson .+
MR. THOMPSON: Yes. particularly in the
Ill+
caucus. I think Ro_er and l were the only people that expressed our views.
CEIAIRMAN ROGERS: But nobody expressed a view that you should proceed with the
launch at that time':
MR. THOMPSON: Nct amongst the people that I was able to hear
GENERAL KUTYNA: Mr. Boisjoly, you said there was some confusion in your mind as to
Mr. McDonald's position at the time he came out with the comment about the secondary ring
_ating, that you should consider that'.'
MR+ BOISJOLY: That is correct. When Al first came on the line and explained the situation
about the primary and secondary O-ring and how the secondary O-ring was in position. [ had a
flash of confusion in my mind as to what he was s:,.ying, but I, having worked on the SRM-15
presentation and the SRM-I(; presentation, realized exactly what he was trying to say. But I did
have that tinge at the beginning, and so there was defiaite misunderstanding about Al's state-
ment, there's no questior_ in my mind. because I had it, and [ was probably closer to that joint
than most anybody else, and I had that tinge, and [ so stated that to you.
Okay, the caucus was started by Mr. Mason stating that a management decision was neces-
sary. Those of us who
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were opposed the launch continued to speak out, and l am specifically speaking of Mr. Thomp-
son and myself because in my recollection he and I were the only ones that vigorously continued
to oppose the launch, And we were attempting to go back and rereview and try to make clear
what we were trying to get across, and we couldn't understand why it was going to be reversed.
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+ally_,t up t'r,_m hi.+ l+m+..+itt_t_ v+hlch _as down the t,tblt,, and ;,,,,tke<| up tht' t,tblt, +inti put ,i gt.£,+d
p_l(l d,_wtl it'+ lrt_t_t ,+|" t',_t, tabl+., lit fr++nt ,,t tht, ;l_:tt_,t_entettt f+>Jk-+. +ln(+ tr-i_.d t,_ -+k+-tch ,Jt.t t_t_+:_.
,i_;iin +,h_tt ht,_ ,'_ncprn ,,_,+t-+ _++tth the j_+lnt. ,tnd wh+,n h_. rt,_lJl/t+<J hi" _,_.:t.,.it1't _++,ttln+._ thr'_,t|_i', l'I+,
jtlst .,t <_pp_,d
] tried <_nt, m<+re tttt'_ + +it +" Phi- pl'tt:to..; l _rabbed the" pht_t_, and [ w,nt up and ,|t:_ct,l-ist,<l th+.
photos once '.tl,_aln and treed t,+ make the [m,lnt that it _,_,a+,,+nt_, oplnlol'l trt>m .tctuaJ ubser'.att_,t+_+
that temf...rature w+ts ind+.e<l a di...+crintin:_t,+r and _,e ++ht_uhl n<_t t_nore the physical e,;idenc++,
that we had o_.rv_,d
And a_ain, l hr,_u_lht up the poi:_t that SR.M-I-_ had a ll'_ de_,ree arc of black _rease while
SRM-2:2 had a relatively dift_rent amount, which wa._ les._ and wasn't quite as tflack I als,_
stopped when tt was apparent
that I couldn't get anybody to listen.
DR WALKER: At this point did anyone else speak up in favor of the launch"
MR+ BOISdOLY: No. sir. No one said anything, in my recollection, nol_xty said a word It
was then being di_'ussed amongst the management t'olk._ After Arnie and I had our last say.
Mr Maim said we have to make a management decision. He turned to Bob Lund and asked him
to tak,_ off hi._ engineering hat and put on his management hat. From this point on, manage-
ment formulated the points t_, base their decision on There was never one comment in favor, as
l have _aid. of hn_nching bv any engineer t_r other nonmanagement person in the room before or
after the caucus I was not even asked to participate in _iv_ng any Input to the final decision
charts.
I went back on the net with the final charts t_r final chart, which was the rationale for
launching, and that w_s presented by Mr. Kilminster It was hand wri'.ten on a notepad, anJ he
read from that notepad I did not agree with some of the statements that were being made to
support the decision. I was never asked nor polled, and it was clearly a management decision
from that point.
I must emphasize, I had my say. and I never
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take any management right to take the input of an engineer and then make a decision based
upon that input, and I truly believe that. I have worked at a lot of companies, and that ha_ been
done from time to time, and I truly believe that, and so there was no point in me doing anything
any further than I had already attempted to do.
I did not see the final version of the chart until the next day. I just heard it read. I left the
room feeling badly defeated, but I felt I really did all I could to stop the launch.
I felt personally that management was under a lot of pressure to launch and that they made
a very tough decision, but I didn't agree with it.
One of my colleagues that was in the meeting summed it up best. This was a meeting where
the determination was to launch, and it was up to us to prove beyond a shadow of a doubt that
it was not safe to do so. This is in total reverse to what the position usually is in a preflight
comversation or a flight readiness review. It is usually exactly opposite that.
DR. WALKER: Do you know the source of the pressure on management that you alluded to?
MR. BOISJOLY: Well. the comments made over the net is what I felt. I can't speak for
them. but I
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mtmqllr._7,__ .--,,,,_-_ _,
i &22
had,.m,u<h data t- I:unch And I fi.lthat ver_ r_.al
[)R _,VAI,KER |'hesewere tiff,c_m_mt,nts from the NA.";A peoph, .itM u',hal and at K._("'
MR I_()[S.J()I.Y+,_
.MR ["[']YN_[AN: I tak,.,_tyi_u _ere trying,you were a._ked to prove that the _eal would
t'a|l"
MR B()I,'_JOI, Y: Yes.
MR. FEYNMAN: And of course, you couldr(t, Ix, cause as a matter of fact it didn't. That is,
five of them didn't, and only one of them did. and it' you had proved that they would have all
failed, you would have found your._elf incorrect and under criticism because five of them didn't
fail.
MR. BOI_I()LY: That is right. I was very concerned that the cold temperatures _ould
change that timing and put us in another regime, and that was the wEole basis of my fighting
that night.
MR FEYNMAN: It is just that the probabdity had been increased to a point where it was
intolerable?
MR. BOISJ()I,Y: That's right
MR. ACHESON: Mr. Boisjoly. your correspondence in the summer of l.*l*.q indicates that the
112:_
heightened sensitivity to the ()-ring problem at Thiokol was really initmted by heightened sensi-
tivity about it at NASA, and for example, reference is made to the problem that has escalated so
badly in the o_/e_ (_ ov?ryn.n.e, especi'.:)ly our customer, NASA
Now, was any mention made during the telecon net with NASA the evening of' .January 2"7
of how the NASA view had moved from this heightened sensitivity to the O-ring problem to the
position that they were now putting forward at the ,January :27 telecon?
MR. BOISdOLY: No, that wasn't mentioned, but in fact, they were just as concerned as we,
our counterparts that we worked with, that they were right on top of' the seal task torce team
with us, and we had status reviews going on all the time. In fact, when any time we would hit a
situation where they felt we weren't going quick enough, we ended up having a visit, and they
would just be there and watch over our shoulder_ and make darned sure that we were proceed-
ing in a timely manner. And so that to me told me that they were just as concerned about it as
we were.
DR. WALKER: Mr Boisjoly, could you tell me something more about the task team that
was set uo? You alluded to it in your letter of 31 duly, and you asked that that team I:e reconsti-
tuted and made more urgent.
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Did that happen?
MR. BOISJOLY: In a way.
DR. WALKER: Who was on that team 9
MR. BOISJOLY: Don Ketner headed the team up. I was a member. Brian Russell was a
member.
DR. WALKER: Were there any NASA members?
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._IR BOISdOLY They had a counterpart team. yes They had members of the,r team ()ur
r/laln inY.erf_ll¢'e -,'_l..i wit__ it _'t_lIt]emil_'l nllrned .Jerry Pi,oples ,l_id R,)n Mclnt_sh. but they h_id
their _'_dks revolved :,dso
DR WALKER You h_,d meetings with representatives trc, n,, both NA.qA _md "rh,,k,,r'
MR BOIS,JOLY- Yes. we d,_d. when we outlined the plan on how we were _c,ing to proce_.d t_
fix this problem, they _'ere part and parcel to that plan
DR WALKER: Now. this is the team that evolved a number of solutions to this problem.
_ome ol whicl, nave already been publiclzed
MR. BOISJOLY: That is correct,
DR. WALKER. And some of those solutions were short term solutior.s, and others _ere long
term solutions?
MR. BOISJOLY: We categorized them. at least l did in all my notes, as short term __lutions,
medium term solutions and long term solutions. And to give you
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a tlavor for _ hat put what in what category was I considered a short term solution, for instance,
a 292 diamete: O-ring which would have afforded us 12/lifO0 more squeeze and atili not have an
overfill conditit;'_ in ',he groove with the elastomeric material. Also couple that with _lective
_himming that would make the tang and clevis more concentric to one another, and take as
much of the free volume gap on the outside away to make sure that we were putting more and
more squeeze on the O-ring and less and less chance for the gap to open up to the rate that it is
opening.
DR. WALKER: Do you have some estimate of how long the short term solutions would have
taken 9
MR. BOISJOLY; Yes. We had assembly tested a :Z92 O-ring in some static motor joints--
excuse me, some inert, mo*,or joints, and put them together _nd tbund that we had good success
with that. They are currently installed in the aft two field joints of the QM-3 test motor that was
ready to fly or fire about two weeks ago at our plant. And so we had made that progress, and we
were well on our way to showing that those seals would work in a joint.
And I must emphasize that the QM-3 motor is a filament wound case motor, and it is a joint
with a capture feature on it that doesn't have the gap
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opening. But the major issue on the 292 O-ring was the assembly characteristics of it, and we
were getting like 12/1000 inch squeeze for free. Basically that was the short term issue that we
could implement as quick as possible.
DR. WALKER: Did the team report on a regular basis to both NASA and Thiokol manage-
meat?
MR. BOISJOLY: We had status reports with the Marshall folks at regular intervals, and we
had a Friday teleconference at mid-day and statused the proceedings of that previous week with
them.
DR. WALKER: So everyone in the telecon on January 27 was aware of the work o" this
team, the solutions that it had proposed?
MR. BOISJOLY: I don't know that everyone was, but there were a number of people that
were, yes. i don't know. I cannot make the statement that everybody that was on the te_econ
knew about that. For instance, I had never heard Cecil Houston's name before. ! didn't know
that he was a Marsl:all type until I heard on the telecon afterwards that he was.down at KSC. I
had not met that gentleman, so [ don't know if he knew it or not. And I don't know if some of
,-/, -
,9__
the _)th_'r folk._ knew. but there were enough folks _n that telecon that knew wi',at the sta:us
WiIS
It27
DR. WALKER: What about Mr. Malloy and Mr" Hardy? Do you know it' they knew"
MR BOISdOLY: [ dor,'t have sure knowledge of that. no. I don't know
MR. FEYNMAN: [ want to get away for a moment from the temperature question which
come_ up later and go back :o the earlier time when you were worrying about these things, and
I would like to know whether already you felt that there was a serious problem in flying even at
5;i degrees, where the following logic is p<_sible, perhaps. And you can correct me.
If their primary ring would start to erode and would take enough time to erode that it
takes, the pressure builds up to 600 [_si or so, then if there is joint rotation from the result of
that, the secondary seal may fail, if the erosion would get all the way through the primary seal.
The erosion got through a third of the way of the primary seal in fact in 15C.
Do you feel that you understand the proce_ of eros_an well enough to know that it was
unlikely to go three times as far?
MR. BOISJOLY: l think we need to clarify one thing. One third of the seal was not eroded.
One third of the allowable erosion numbe, _ccurred, and you really have to clarify that because
we are talkiv.g about a seal
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diameter that is "',-,(,_in diameter, okay, and we really eroded about 32/1!)00 inch on SRM-15, and
the fhctor of three is being used against subscale data which showed that we were able to seal
an eroded seal on a subscale rig that had I0 inch diameter seals, that up to an eighth of an inch.
Then we had _. window where we f.Med to seal, and then we had another one up to I believe it
was [45,' 1000 or 147/1000 of an inch that also sealed.
And now, _he analysis from the gas dynamics standpoint, which is out of my area, had been
conducted, and they found an excellent mate model of that erosion process, and it correlated
extremely well with the subscale test data which had been run about a year before, and _here
were 27 tests that characterized that erosion The), ran most of them at 3 seconds, and then my
recollection is there was one or two 5 second tests and one or two 20 some odd second tests to
show that it was indeed at ignition transient, and what that test was all about was they had a
metal orifice with a rectangular orifice that was 40/1000 wide and had different characteristic
heights, and they ran a parametric study using those tests, that test rig, and determined what
the erosion rate, or not the rate, but the erosion depth was as a function of the orifice
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size.
Then the math model was made and characterized that, and my recollection is they were
within 12 percent of all of the test data, and they w ere very pleased a,_ the characterization ana-
lytically of what was going on.
So from an erosion standpoint!. I think it is fair to say that there was indeed sufficient
margin, but that wa_ no_ the issue. Erosio._ wa:- net the issue. What was the issue is can you
stand a longer period ot t-me i_ a," attempt _e _,,al before the -,ros'_on e,_t_ you _li_e and you
dont have a seal, period? Becaase once you get flow you have two types of erosions. You have
blow-by erosion and xmp_ngement e_osion. The 27 tests characterizea impingement erosion only.
There were no blow-bys in that.
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And I might say. too, we ran tests on that same rig without an orifice and pressurized it
exactly the sz_me way on an unprotected O-ring, and there was not even the sheen missing on
the O-ring. So the analysis characterized that very weil and they understood it very well.
What it is, it is a volume filling problem as a function of time. The higher the volume, the
more ,'he time the hot gas flows, if you have a blow-by through the putty, that will enable you to
get erosion, and I felt
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very confident they had a good analytical handle on that.
MR. FEYNMAN: Thank you. I have another question now on the other side, which is that
blow-by early on, that is, in the first whatever you call it, 170 milliseconds, during which it was
sup o(_.-_d that the secondary ring would be close enough to the right place to be sealed, but now
I am going to talk about the lower temperature.
Under those circumstances where the thing is standing around and it has no resilience, and
in fact, when the engine goes off it swings or twangs back and forth and there are various
stresses that have been there since the time the ring has been pushed into place by the test,
which I now discover was 28 days earlier, not just three days earlier; isn't it possible that the
secondary ring has gotten squoze or squeezed to a smaller size than it should be, and then when
it bends back it leaves a hole, that there is no 170 milliseconds at al!, that it is already too small
because it has so low a resilience time and it takes so long to respond after it has been squeezed.
MR. BOISJOLY: That is possible. I had done a series of tests relating cievis opening prob-
lems back about three years ago where we had experienced a
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phenomenon where the clevis was opening up, oh, maybe 3/1000 to 5/1000 inch over its original
manufactured dimensions, and we tried to run that down and pin that down as to where that
came from, and in the attempt to do that I ran a series of tests which took an empty cylinder
segment, and I actually characterized when it was round what hapoened to the clevis, when I
ovalized the case what happened to the clevis, when I took the case and put shims underneath
the longitudina! direction, what happened to the clevis, and characteristically with very large
numbers, like when I ovalized it to a value of approximately an inch, I could only affect the
clevis gap opening say several thousandths of an inch.
And so, even though you get motion, it was not characterized as a major motion relative to
the squeeze that we had. But in reference to temperature, which is what you are talking about,
yes, you could have very well had that situation.
MR. HOTZ: Mr. Boisjoly, we have had some data, you probably know, on experience with
water accumulating in the field joint while it is standing out there on the stack. As Dr. Feyn-
man pointed out, 51-L stood out there for 28 days during which there were some heavy rain-
storms, wind driven rain.
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What would be the effect--and then we also had cold temperatures the night before and a
couple of nights earlie _. What would be the effect if water accumulated in the field joint and
then froze during these _.ard freezes?
MR.. BOISJOLY: Well, :_rst of all, I had no prior, prelaunch knowledge of that occurring. I
have since found out that there was a vehicle that they changed out one of the segments, and
when they pulled the pin, water poured out of the joint. I did not know that prior to the launch.
We have been looking at that since the incident and actually have run a test, and the effect
ou the actual opening of the clevis, the actual spreading of the clevis itself was almost nonmea-
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surable,andweattribute that ! guessto the fact tk_atyoucannotfill thejoint, by configuration,
all the wayup to thesecondaryG-ring.
Now,if youpostulatethat therewasenoughgreasein thereand you actually moved the
grease with the ice, then you could move the O-ring. But that is speculation at this point. It
looks from the d('sign configuration of the joint that if you filled the joint with water, you would
still have an air column that would probably be on the order of 5/8 to 7/10 inch high,
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and you would simply compress the air column. And it appeared like you wouldn't be able to
generate enough pressure to transfer the ring.
But in all fairness, we are running tests to find that out. We haven't completed them yet, or
I should say Marshall is doing that.
MR. ACHESON: Mr. Boisjoly, were you at Thiokol when the design of the joint ibr these
SRMs was developed?
MR. BOISJOLY: No, I was not.
MR. ACHESON: But you were there when SRM-8 was fired, were you not?
MR. BOISJOLY: Yes, I was there when SRM-1 was fired.
MR. ACHESON: Cma you account for what appears to be a concentration of erosion and
blow-by cases in these O-rings following SRM-8 as opposed to prior to SRM-8?
MR. BOISJOLY: That has been a topic of much discussion over the years, and there was a
putty change. The original putty was a Randolph putty, and then they imply s_pped making
it--no, excuse me, not Randolph, Fuller-O'Brien, excuse me--and they simply stopped making it,
and then we switched to a Randolph putty, and that is a simultaneous general area of time
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sequence ,Nith the changes in the layup of the putty to bring it back around from the edge of the
clevis so tt;at we were sure there wasn't any putty down by the O-ring. But that hasn't fully tied
together either because the first erosion that was ever indicated, to my knowledge, was on SRM-
2, or STS-2, the second flight. In fact, the second flight had the most erosion of any of the O-
rings in the field joint.
So we have been struggling with that because the data appears just totally random. If you
look at the degree locations, if you look at the temperatures, if you look at--it is random in
regards to erosion per se.
MR. ACHES_)N: Were you at Thiokol when the Critical Items List was amended in Decem-
ber 1982 to make it a Crit 1 instead of a Crit 1R?
MR. BOISJOLY: I was at Thiokol at that time, but you know, I don't even know what a CIL
is. I am hearing a,l of this for the first time. I just don't know.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: I would like to ask Mr. Thompson, from your point of
view in the engineering group, did you feel that perhaps particular constraints needed to be es-
tablished on the operation of the motor and the caze and its joints that hadn't been, and for
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example, temperature related or other function related? And was that passed up the line at all?
MR. THOMPSON: Yes, I did feel impressed to, back in the times of STA-1, which was struc-
tural test article, STA-I structural test article, we discGvered that the joint was opening up
rather than closing as our original analysis had indicated, and in fact, it was quite a bit. I think
it was up to 52/1000 at that time, for the primary O-ring. And at that point, at that same meet-
ing, we went to Marshall and discussed the problem, and we also indicated, in fact, I think it
was me that indicated that the secondary O-ring in certain worst on worst conditions pressurir_d
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even without resilience considered, col!!d be opened, could be noncontact with the adjoining sur-
face
And so we have been ,,'orking with th:,se problems tbr the last ._everal years. And ot cou-se,
you can immediately see our respo_se, both Roger and myself, we know that we need an .klsto-
merit seal very badly, more _o than in many hydraulic applications, because if you look at the
usu_d, probably a dynamic seal. but nonetheless, the requirements were ['or a 70 durometer O-
ring at I.(X)O psi People want te talk about 6.' 1000 or 7/1000, and now we are talking about that
type ,,)f clearance to start with, but coupled with another 50/1000 of motion. And so it
isan elaszomeric problem of the firstorder, in my judgment.
And what isrequired isa visco-e}astictype of pher.omenon. As we allknow, any viscoelastic
material isvery temperature sensitive.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Well, did you in fact,or do you know of specificrecom-
mendations being made with respect toestablishing limitationsof any type on launch?
MR. THOMPSON" Yes, sir.Several changes were made. We looked at the O-ring tolerances.
We looked at the O-ring groove tolerances.We looked and we decreased on the side of goodness,
as Roger would say, all of those,things,and in addition to that, the shim--we called ita center-
ing strip at that time--was 20/I000. We replaced that with an M type clip that goes over the
pins in that area, and increased that to 32/I000
And these are some of the _hings we have made in an attempt to make the joint better from
where itwas originally
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: And all of the recommendations that you made, to your
knowledge, were accepted and implemented?
MR. THOMPSON: No, sir,not ailof them were
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made. Recently, and a_ lateas August of 1982,I wrote a memo to my management projectengi-
neering, indicated that we should _top flyinguntil such point as we could double the squeeze on
the O-rings. Im.t : -'_I_'I
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: What was the date of that?
MR. THOMPSON: About the 22nd of August 1985.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: You said 1982, I think.
MR. THOMPSON: That was 1985. And my recommendation there was to double--I went
through an example in the memo--I think itwas Sl_M-20--where ifwe went to the shim that
Mr Boisjoly has indicated,a fullshim, which isabout a 55/1000 shim versus a 32/1000 shim,
zoupled with a 292 O-ring,which isabout the largestO-ring w, can get in there with confidence
that we are not going to nick itwhen we assemble, that this would about du,,ble_he .squeezeon
the O-ring,which we feltwas an important thing to do.
And I realizedat that point that the O-ring committee that had been dispatched to discover
these things had in fact discussed that. But it was my view that we needed to get it into the
flightright away.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Were any recommendations made with respect to tem-
perature ofthe ,sealarea at launch, to your knowledge?
MR. THOMPSON: Not at that time. But that is
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one of the reasons, is that if you get additional squeeze on it, particularly the secondary and the
primary, the primary will have a better chance of seating with the additional squeeze, and the
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secondary will get more help from the side walls of the O-ring groove and help its resiliency
problem. And we know that additional squeeze also helps in extending the time that the O-ring
is in _ontact with the seal.
MR. RUMMEL: Mr. Boisjoly mentioned the capture ring a few moments ago as having been
included in one of the tests. At what point, if ever, was the capture ring seriously considered for
adoption'? And as I understand it--and I appreciate your comment on this--the capture ring is a
flange which is intended to arrest the opening up of the two-seal--the area of the two seals.
When was that first seriously considered, or has it been seriously considered for production?
MR. TtIOMPSON: When it was first brought to my attention was in the design of the fila-
ment wound case. I believe someone from Marshall suggested it in the adaptors for the filament
wound case, and it was I think roughly two and a haft or three years ago. And it seemed like a
good idea because what it does, it holds that inside flange in against the tang, and our
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finite element ar_alysis indicates that instead of opening on the order of 50/1000, it cuts it down
to 5/1000 or 6/1000, which is in the direction that we need to be going.
MR. RUMMEL: Has that been considered for adoption, or has it been adopted?
MR. THOMPSON: Yes, sir. It particularly has come to recent attention because of the heads
up program where we have discussed higher pressure going up to 1110 psi.
MR. HOTZ: Mr Thompson. could you tell us what happened to those recommendations you
made in August of 1982, or 1985mI beg your pardon? Were they ever implemented?
MR. THOMPSON: No, sir, they were not.
MR. HOTZ: Do you have any idea of why not? Or did you ever receive a reply back from
management explaining that'?
MR. THOMPSON: No, sir, I did not. The person that I wrote it to, directly involved in man-
agement, has since transferred down into my group again, and so that may have been part of
the problem. But management was aware of it because of questions and feedback that I received
from it.
MR. HOTZ: But you got no formal response from
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management on it.
MR. THOMPSON: That is correct.
MR. RUMMEL: On _he capture flange, I have a couple of more questions.
Appare_,.tly it ilas been considered for some time, and I take it the installation of the flange
is an integral part of the case, is that correct?
MR. THOMPSON: Yes, it is part of the tang, and as it comes iI, first, it engages first on a
tapered basis, and then it comes into a cylindrical basis. At first it was attempted to have two
tapers fit, but the _olerances became very unreasonable, and so we would engage first on two
_apered surfaces and then come into a cylindrical engagement where we could muir.rain the
same type of tolerances that we have on the sealing joint.
MR. RUMMEL: Would that involve a change in the forging process or the manufacturing
process, or the ibrging billet?
MR. THOMPSON: Yes, sir. The inside bark on the forging was not quite sufficient to every
time assure that we would be able to find the part.
MR. RUMMEL: Would a change or' that magnitude h,," • _'een practical for your company to
undertake without the concm'rence and authorization from ,, :_,SA':
MR. THOMFSON: No. I think that would take a
8t)O
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high cooperation between ourselves and NASA because it is quite a large undertaking, of course.
MR. RUMMEL: Well, could you clarify for me if that in fact has been undertaken and what
the t_rst implementation dates were or might be'? Obviously it wasn't on 51-L.
MR THOMPSON: I think that it is indicated to me that on a general effort, that it was on
the order of 18 months, but on the basis of an extremely large effort, a 'aartime effor.'. I think
was the word that was used. it could be made available in !2 to I3 montEs.
MR. RUMMEL: Are any under process of being manufactured at the prv_e:!_. _izt'e w_:._- ,Ee
capture flange'?
MR. THOMPSON: Yes, I think several forgings have been ordered, and 1 don'_ kr, w,_ i:" it is
a full flight set or not. Some other people would have to answer that.
MR. BOISJOLY: I would like to address that on the seal team that was part of the long
term fix--and there had been some forgings ordered, and the expected delivery was in February
of 1987, and that was in the works, and that was part of the peripheral action, if you will, on the
long term basis of the seal task team.
MR. RUMMEL: Have they been tested yet?
MR. BOISJOLY: No, sir, there hasn't been one
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delivered.
MR. RUMMEL: When is a test scheduled?
MR. BOISJOLY: The first delivery was scheduled for February of 1987, and so we wouldn't
be able to test until after the hardware was received.
DR. WALKER: I would like to ask a question about the putty.
Do you or does anyone know what the impact of temperature is on the putty and the forma-
tion of blow holes?
MR. THOMPSON: We have the formation of' blow-holes on assembly. Since then, during the
investigation which we of course didn't know at the time we were making this decision, we have
tested putty in a putty test fixture somewhat similar to what the motor has, only instead of
pressurizing from the outside, as we usually do in running our seal pressure test, we pressurize
from the inside, and in some cases, in the worst on worst small ciearance basis, it held pressure
for about '3209 seconds.
MR. BOISJOLY: I should amplify, the night of the launch, the only data we had in our pos-
session on the putty was that we had run temperature tests down to 40 degrees, and that was
the characterization that
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determined the leak check pressure, to ensure that the leak check pressure was not masked by
the putty, and we have held up to 100 psi with the putty, pressurized through the leak check
port. And so we had temperature data at 40 de_,_rees on the putty at that particular time, and we
determined that 200 psi would be a ccnservat ve number that would bracket all of the testing
that had been done, and we would have a le_ k check at 200 psi for 15 minutes with an open
nitrogen gas source to ensure that the putty was no_: masking a leak in the O-ring, and we would
drop to zero, repressurize to 50 psi, and run the actual low pressure leak check on the sea_l. Fifty
psi is a very severe check on an O-ring seal a: low pressure, hotdmg that for ten minutes and
allowing a one pound drop is a very, very small leak, on the order of an atomic ener;,w type
reactor 1,,ak.
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DR WALKER There is one thing that disturbs me somewhat about the qudldlcation te,_ts
m regard to the putty. As I understa:ld it, during qualification test.,,, the putty was actuall)
smoothed out or there were attempts made to eliminate any imperfections in the putty, but in
fact, durinK an actual launch, that ns not done. So in that sense, qualil]catlon tests did not trul._
simulate launch conditions
Did that disturb anyone?
1-1-1l
MR. TIIOMPSON: Yes, sir, that is true. To assemble these motors under a horizontal condi-
tion, which we would do for the development motors and the qualification motors, the motors go
out of round probably more so than they do during the normal stacking, vertical operation, and
so the putty is probably moved more than it would be during normal stacking. And so probably
more blow holes were generated, and you can see, we sometimes called them volcanoes in the
putty.
DR. WALKER: _ ou say probably? You don't really have any data?
Does anyone or has anyone actually photographed the condition of the putty or examined
the putty when the vertical stacking is done, even early in the program?
I had herod that someone was lowered in a bosun's chair during the early phases of the
program to examine the putty on a field joint
D_ you know whether that has ever occurred?
MR. THOMPSON: l don't have any detailed knowledge on that. We do know that as the
tang is inserted into the clevis and the first and once the O-ring covers up on the tang, the seal-
ing surface, that the residual air is compressed, and we know for a fact that
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sometimes that air :hat is compressed will cause a blow-by just on tang insertion.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Mr. Boisjoly, I wonder if we could go back to a broader question. You
talked about data that you couldn't get, resources that you didn't have. Mr. Thompson has men-
tioned a letter that he put in in August that he got no response to. You wrote an activity report
on the 4th of October that characterized some of this.
Could you summarize some of the things you said in that activity report, the key points,
please?
MR. BOISJOLY: I have just got to check to make sure I know which one you are speaking
of.
GENERAL KUTYNA: It is tLqed SRM Seal Problem Task Team Status, and it starts out
with "The team generally has been experiencing trouble."
MR. BOISJOLY: Okay. i have tha_. That was written October 4.
Do you want me to read it?
GENERAL KUTYNA: Well, the pertinent points; I would like you to make those points, if
you would.
MR. BOISJOLY: I felt, as I stated m my original memo before the team was formed, that
the only way that we could pull off a timely resolution to this problem was to have people dedi-
cated to this problem
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full time with full cooperation, and I felt that wasn't coming to pass. I felt very strongly thac we
were working towards a solution in a timely manner, but we were getting--
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Could I interrupt just a second?
You might as well read it. It is a short memorandum. Dr. Keel will give it to you.
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MR BOIS, JOI,Y: Thts _,_s an act,'_ltv rt.D_rt that I turnt,d tn that _atd SRM Seal t'r_hh,m
Ta:_k Tean, Statu:_ The team generally has been experiencing trouble from the bustne-_s-as-u_tl_d
attitude from _upporttng organlzatton._ l'art of thts i.-_due to lack ,ff understamttn_ _t" how m_-
portant this t;_sk team activity is. and the rt,st 1._due to pure operattng procedure inertia w'hit'h
prevents timely result,4 to a .q._cific request
"'The team met with .Joe Kilminster on I0 :t '_'- to discuss this problem lie wanted specific
examples, which he was given, and he simply concluded that tt was every team member's re-
sponsibility to flag problems that occurred to organi ational supervision, and to work to remove
the roadblock by getting the required support to .,a,,¢e the problem. The problem was further
explained to require alm,x_t lull time nursi,l_ of each task to ensure
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that it is taken to completion by a support group. Joe s_mply agreed and said we should then
nurse every task we have.
"He plain doesn't understand that there are not enough people to do that kind of nursing of
each task. but he doesn't seem to mind directing that the task nevertheless _ets done. For exam-
ple. the team just found out that when we submit a request to purchase an item, that it goes
through approximately six to eight people before a purchase order is written and the item acttt-
ally ordered. The vendors we a_ working with on seals and spacer rings have responded to our
requests in a timely manner, yet we, MTI, cannot get a purchase order to them ia a timely
manner
"Our lab has been waiting lot a function generator since 9/25/_5. The paperwork authoriz-
ing the purchase was finished by Engineering on 9,'24/_5 and placed into the system. We have
yet to receive the requested item."
The reason I made an issue of that is because we had heard it was on the shell" down in San
Diego. it was simply a matter of picking it up and using it.
"This type of example is typical and results in lost resources that have been planned to do
the test work for m: in a timely manner. I, tbr one, resent working at full capacity all week long
and then being
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required to support activity on the weekend that could have been accomplished during the week.
I might add that even NASA perceives that the team is being blocked in its engineering efforts
to accomplish its tasks. NASA is sending an engineering representative to stay with us starting
October 14. We feel that this is the direct result of their feeling that we, MTI, are not respond-
ing quickly enough on the seal problem.
"I should add that several of the team members requested that we be given a specific manu-
facturing engineer, a quality engineer, a safety engineer, and four to six technicians to allow us
to do our task on a noIfinterference basis with the rest of the system. This request was deemed
not necessary when Joe decided teat the 1_ursing _f the task approach was directed.
"Finally, the basic problem boils dowp. to the fact that all MTI problems have number one
priority, and that upper management apparently feels that the SRM program is ours for sure,
and the customer be damned."
And I signed it October 4, 1985. Ir,,_. z z._ _:_1
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: May I turn the subject a little bit around now to another aspect of
it? One of our responsibilities is to attempt to determine the cause or causes of the accident, and
I guess both of you gentlemen have suggested in these memos that if certain
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_bin_'_ w_,r,, n,,, el,me, a cat:l_tr,_phe might result
l.t_king at the pictures that we no_ have a_'ailable to us, which show a puff of black ._moke
durtn_ the [_r._t, le._._ than the fir._t _e_:ond of the launch, which was about g5 feet hi_;h, what is
your opinion? Is that ¢onsi._tent with the concern that you had that a catastrophe might ,_cur in
that joint'.'
.'MR. BO|SJOLY: We should back up lad give you a little bit of background information
first It was everybody'_ considered opinion, ,ncluding mine--and I am not a solid rocket motor
man. l don't know anything about the propellants or anything like that, but it was everybody's
considered opinion that if we developed a problem, that we would blow it up on the pad. and
that we would never even lift off the pad.
There has been a lot of speculation about the puff of smoke. [t hasn't really been deter-
mined what it is. where it came from. It for sure--I mean. there is a lot of speculation, but if
that was a joint, then that supports the seal--excuse me, the leak seal leak theory, which is to
say that you had a puff of smoke or a puff of products of combustion pass both seals at a very
early stage in the ignition transient; then you sealed with whatever remaining material you had
left in the seals, and you can postulate this. be it either the
t4Y_0
primary or the secondary, it w "d work both ways, and then at some time later, due to either
going through a Max Q environment or vectoring of the nozzle, that you could--and vibration or
aerodynamic forces, whatever you want to characterize, that there wasn't that much left, and it
spit it out at that point in time and started to leak again
That has not been really determined at this point that that---
CHAIRMAN ROGERS l understand. 1 was just really asking whether the first puff of black
smoke which has been described as about 25 feet high. is not inconsistent with the theory that
you have been concerned about.
MR. BOISdOLY: That's right.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Thompson, do you agree with the comments that Mr. Boisjoly
made earlier about the discussions in the telecon and other discussions that you were engaged
in?
MR. THOMPSON: Yes, sir. I think I am prepared to talk about these things, but I think it
has been mentioned, and most of the points that I have have been brought out.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, why don't you, if you would like to, just look over your notes
and _,e if there's anything you want to add because we would be
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perfectly glad to have you go through the whole thing.
Maybe you can glance at them to see if you want to add anything.
MR. THOMPSON: Maybe I could just quickly summarize.
About 10:00 o'clock the morning of January 27 I received a phone call from Mr. Boyd Brin-
ton. He is manager of project engineering, and he called me from Marshall and told me about
the 18 degree temperature that was indicated that night, and this particular phone call was
prompted by Mr. Larry Wear of MSFC, program manager, and indicating that they were both
concerned about this. And they asked me how I felt and what my--if I felt concerned. And of
co_rse I told them that I did. And it went through a series of meetings up through engineering
throughout the day, ending up finally in Mr. Lund's office, and we had concluded there that we
would not launch if the temperature were anything lower than 53 degrees.
S04
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So at thi._ point l felt fairly content, and we met back over in the engineering conference
room. we call the M[C room, and prepared to make charts, and you have heard much of this
conversation And [ gues.s the only thing I would like to add to it is [ al_ heard that Marshall',_
reaction was that they were appalled at
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our recommendation, and I wa,_ very much surprised by this, having had the experiences over
the years of how careful and conservative these people are, and [ really admire them. And _o [
was extremely surprised and really not ready for this type of a recommendation
And so I guess we had put together some things, probably we may have put together some
more if we had any anticipation that our recommendations would not be accepted. But [ think
we pretty well got everytaing out on the table that we had in mind, and they indicated that the
seal was not a function of temperature, and being a viscoelastic seal. it had to be a function of
temperature, in my thinking, although I was unable to expla|n the SRM-22, where we got some
soot there also. in a supposedly warm motor.
And during the caucus I, as Mr. Boisjoly has mentioned, and something that I am not usual-
ly accustomed to doing, sitting down between two managers and trying one more time to explain
and make sure that I got my thoughts across to them. And after not completing that conversa-
tion but concluding that I probably wasn't being--I wasn't communicating, and that may be my
fault, I am happy, not happy, but I readily admit that it may have been my type of explanation,
I wasn't getting through.
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[ think that--just one last point, l think that we had seen erosion on SRM-15. erosion, but
more important, we had seen blow-through, and it was fairly severe. We had blow-through on
two field joints, and in fact, two nozzle joints also, we saw soot between the O-rings in four
places that [ recall, and that was 53 degrees, and it was my judgment that we had no reason to
take the risk of shooting at a_ O-ring temperature that was lower than 53 degrees, and my rec-
ommendation in some of the former meetings was to just at least wait until the afternoon, and
then, depending upon temperatures, perhaps wait another day. Ands I think that concludes my
remarks.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Can you remember any time in your experience at Thiokol when the
Engineering Group has been overruled in effect by management?
MR. THOMPSON: Nothing that comes immediately to my mind, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you.
MR. ACHESON: Mr. Boisjoly, the activity report of October 4, 1985, to whom was that di-
rected?
MR. BOISJOLY: I turned that in to my immediate supe, rvision for incorporation to go up
through the ladder as it reports on a weekly basis.
MR. ACHESON: Who did you give it to, what
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individual?
MR. BOISJOLY: My supervisor is Jack Kapp. I turned it in to his secretary.
MR. ACHESON: Were you given an opportunity to discuss it at any subsequent time with
anybody in mar_%ement?
MR. BOISJOLY: No, sir.
MR. ACHESON: Thank you.
8O5
DR. RIDE: Just to be perfectly clear ab,_ut thts. is tt fair to say that ,ks engineers you don't
believe that you had data or analysts to characterize the performance of the joint at a :m det_ree
temperature"
MR. BOISJOLY: That is correct
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Is that true of you. blr. Thomps, m'.'
MR. THOMPSON: Yes. sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Okay.
Thank you very much.
Now we would ask Mr. Lund and Mr. Kilminster and Brian Russell to come up.
tWitnesses sworn._
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Lund, do you want to proceed and make any remarks or give
any testimony you would care to, particularly in light of the testimony we
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have had this morning and this afternoon?
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TESTIMONY OF ROBERT LUND, VICE PRESIDENT, ENGINEERING.
THIOKOL; JOE KILMINSTER, VICE PRESIDENT, SHUTTLE PROJECT,
HUNTSVILLE; AND BRIAN RUSSELL
MR. LUND: I'rl not sure there's anything. We've been over so many things; if there are
additional questions, I would certainly be happy to talk about that.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: How do you explain the fact that you seemed to change your mind
when you changed your hat?
MR. LUND: I guess we have got to go back a little further in the conversations than that.
We have dealt with Marshall for a long time and have always been in the position of defending
our position to make sure that we were ready to fly, and I guess I didn't realize until after that
meeting and after several days that we had absolutely changed our position from what we had
been t)efore. But that evening I guess I had never had those kinds of things come from the
people at Marshall that we had to prove to them that we weren't ready.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Do you want to move your mike a little bit closer, please?
MR. LUND: And so we got ourselve_ in the
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thought process that we were trying to find some way to prove to them it wouldn't work, and we
were unable to do that. We couldn't prove absolutely that that motor wouldn't work.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: In other words, you honestly believed that you Lad a duty to prove
that it would not work?
MRr LUND: Well, that is kind of the mode we got ourselves into that evening. It seems like
we have always been in the opposite mode. I should have detected that, but I did not, but the
reles kind of switched, and so after making, or listening to the verbal presentation in the after-
noon, they asked what Thiokol's position was, and I looked around the room, and I was the
senior person, and I said I don't want to fly. It looks to me like the story says 53 degrees is about
it.
And of course, we were requested then to go back and do something more and prepare de-
tailed charts to show that in more detail. And so we got busy then, and I gave assignments to a
dozen or so people to go out and generate data that would in a workmanlike manner show the
rationale and show the data that we had so that everyone would understand all the data and
where it came from.
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And we spent the next couple of hours beating the bushes trying to put together that data.
And so we did that and began transmitting charts even late then, and then went through that
rationale. And all oi" this time we were preparing the data, the data was coming in, and I was
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trying to put together what I was concluding out of ail this because there was some additional
data that was being generated, and _:rying to understand and to absorb all of' the data that was
there, to again see what my thought processes were.
And so we stood at the white board there in the Management Infbrmation Center and as the
data would come in we would try and say, now, what does this tell us, what does this tell us, and
put together a rationale for what we war*ed to do.
So it was in a real time mode, and we were trying to absorb the data and put tog, ether the
story.
Well, as a result of that telecon, I gave the charts that made the recommendation that we
wait until the motor got to 53 degrees, I didn't see anything different that I hadn't seen before.
And of' course, you have heard the story oi what happened after that.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Let me ask a question about that 53 degrees.
You stated that you--it has been often
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stated that the recommendation was at this point "n :ime to stay within, your experience base,
but I find that to be a peculiar recommendation in the cperation of any kind of system because
normall.,' you say from our experience base, our data points, and our analysis, and our extrapola-
tion, we would be willing at any time to go beyon_d out experience point out this far as a next
step, aPd the only reason you would say "I would stay within my experience base" is that you
had a problem at that point that said you dare not go any farther.
So could you clarity why you said that?
MR. LUND: It wasn't a question of that. It was a very definite question of conservatism.
You know this program has people on it, and so I am very concerned about that, and I want to
make sure that if there is any hint of a pr,_blem, that we are not extending that And we didn't
have any data at that point that would indicate that we should go beyond that.
Is that an answer to the question or do you want me to try again'?
DR. RIDE: Maybe a slightly different way of askin_ that _s normaliy, when you are trying to
extrapolate beyond, maybe beyond your flight experience, you rely on your qualification testing
program, and a
] 4(;O
system or a subsystem is qualified to fly within a certain regime or a certain envelope. That
would include environmental effects like temperature.
Did you have any sort of qualification range on the temperature of the SRM?
MR. LUND: Yes, we had development qual motors that _ere down in the 40s, as has been
pointed out. The data, because of the horizontal assembly problems, what we were trying to do is
to put them back to a condition that would resemble that that we would have in a vertical in-
stallation. And so we had gone in and repaired the putty, because when you put those together
horizontally you can't do it the same way. You can't do it the same way.
And so although the intent was to put _hem back to the vertical, there is some doubt that
you can really do that adequately. And so there is always the quest,on, well, was it perfect? And
the answer was, i, was not,
And so my belief is that those l(I degree motors are probably \aiid and adequate, but _',here
is the doubt,
DR. RIDE. So going down below. -:ay, 4; degrees or .10 deg,'ees, you could consider it, perhaps
taking it below what the motor had been qualified to'?
!4_I
MR IA'ND Correct 1 think one thing that we need to make very clear is, as _:e have
talked abot,c .¢RM-15 and SRM-22 being the ones that were the blow-by w3tors, and that we
,:,)uhtn't tell becau._' of tt:ose, but we have got to keep in mind there were ten motors between
th_Jse. ;_1_joint:_ bet_veen th':se two teml:,Watures that had no blow-by at all
And ._o ! think that as Marshall p.:.int?d out, I think Mr Mulloy pointed out, he said, ycu
kn,)w, the data is just not conclusive a: all. and it wasn't because we had a low temperature
motor and a high temperature motor, and we had ten motors in between that showed nothing.
MR SUTTEK Could I ,_k a question on that? In looking at the earlier data it appears there
is erosion attd blow-by occurring more frequently later than sooner, and Mr. Boisjoly pointed out
that during the year 1955. t,ecause of what he learned in looking at, inspecting that one motor
that he looked a_. he developed greater concern, and in line with NeWs question, did you want
to _tay with 53 rather than. say, exploring _)mething slightly beyond that, because there was a
/greater com:ern developing, and was this concern--did you share Mr. Boisjoly's concern? Just
why did you stay with 53 and not say explore a little
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further?
MR. LUND: Well. again, the conservative ,aspect of looking at wbat our experience has been,
and that was the rationale that we presented to Marshall, is stay within the experience band,
don't extend it.
MR SUTTER: Well. how did you _iew--you mentioned ten motors without blow-by. In look-
it, g at the data tl,at was handed out this morning, there are several cases of problems with vari-
ous parts of the motors, and it seems to be more of it later rather than earlier.
MR I,UND: We haven't been able to identify those parameters that are causing that more
pronounced effect.
MR. SU1"I'ER: But if you look at that, since you had a preblem that was developing to a
greater extent, and it was an unknown reason as to why this problem would happen, I can't
understand why there wasn't a greater area of concern developing.
MR LUND: Well, there was, and that is why we had initiated all of this. What are we going
to do with this joint, how are we going to investigate it, set up a special task team. I took one of
my best supervisors and gave him the task of doing that. We assigned Mr. Boisjoly to the task
team, and we put one of our best project engineers on it. and a program manager was assigned.
We
D,
lit-"
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implemented a full time activity to evaluate and do that.
MR. SUTTER: Well, 3ne more question.
Since your people were responsible for the design and were responsible for the testing and
were responsible for the qualification, when it came up to the point where there was a question
of whether a launch should be made, shouldn't you alone or your organization alone be the one
that says yes, or not? And why would there be a question coming from NASA because of not
having data as well presented as they wanted? Why would they raise questions on your data,
and why would you re, trend to that question? Why didn't you just tell them it's our decision, and
this is it. and not respond to the pressure?
MR. LUND: :ks a quarterback on Monday morning, that is probably what I shored have
done, but you know. you work with people and you develop some confidence, and I have some
813
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great confidence in those people at NASA we worked with. We have worked with them for a
long, long time.
MR. SUTTER: But in what I think i have heard is that your experts were developing a
greater and greater concern, including writing rather powerfully stated memos, and it is hard to
understand why they
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didn't get more attention.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: I would like to continue that line of thought in response
to your earlier answer about the ten motors between the 53 degrees and the 75 degrees. One
conclusion might be from that data base is that you shouldn't operate at 75 degrees or 53 de-
grees, but you ought to stay within the temperature range of those motors which exhibited no
erosion or blow-by.
S_ again, I am going to ask you the same question I asked before: what was conservative
about saying 53 instead of a number other than that which might be higher or might be lower,
depending upon how you approach the problem?
I am trying to understand your thought process.
MR. LUND: I guess all the engineering rationale said that cold was probably worse and
warm was probably better, and all the physics of the situation, as we best understood it. And so
we felt that, you know, the conservative thing to do would be to stay warmer.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: But did you like 53 degrees? Did you like the results on
the 53 degree flight?
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MR. LUND: I would rather have a motor that has no erosion and no blow-by and looks per-
fect at the end of the motor firing.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Then might not you have taken the position that 57
would have been a number, or 62 or some other number?
MR. LUND: We have had motors down in the low 60s, and I guess there are some, just look-
ing at my chart, in the low 60s at least that were perfect, and we have had some in the lower
50s that were not anywhere near as bad a_ SRM-15. So there is no clear dividing line, at least.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: There's a lot of other factors other than temperature
that might be involx, ed, is that correct?
MR. LUND: That is corr¢._L. So we don't know what the effect of temperature was.
MR. SUTTEE: Can I ask just one more question?
I heard these comments that some tests looked pretty good at 75 and others looked okay at
53, but was the qualification testing thorough enough for any proper data base to be in band to
really know what the critical variables are like the thrust of the motor, the tolerances of the
metal joints, the tolerances of the
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O-rings, or the application of the putty or the application of the seal?
Isn't one of your problems the fact that the qualification testing was inadequate?
MR. LUND: It seems like the size of the qualification program is inversely proportional to
the siz_e of the motor, which is called dollars, and there's no doubt about that. With small tacti-
cal motors it is not unusual to fire many, many, many, and the larger the motor, the smaller the
qualification program, and to get a full statistical range of every parameter of that motor, I
don't think there's enough money in the national treasury to do that.
So there is a practical limit to what you can do.
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MR. SUTTER: Well, can't you go from the partially qualified motors and make changes and
go into another area of further unknown exploration like reducing the strength of the motor or
increasing the thrust or changing the putty?
MR. LUND: There were qualification motors, of course, to do the strength or the thickness
of the case and the thrust change.
MR. SUTTER: Well, were they adequate?
MR. LUND: In engineering opinion, yes.
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DR. WALKER: I have a question on temperature.
Mr. McDonald testified that he had a discassion, I believe it was with Mr. Mulloy, about the
meaning of the temperature range of 40 to 90 ciegrees, whether it would apply just to the bulk
temperature of the motor or whether it would apply to every part of the Shuttle.
What is your understanding?
MR. LUND: If you would have asked me a month ago, I ,':ould have told you the motor is 40
to 90.
DR. WALKER: And so there is no qualification in your mind on the O-ring temperature?
For example, the O-ring temperature could have been quite cold because the O-ring is certainly
going to move in temperature with the metal case. The metal case could be quite a bit colder
than the bulk temperature of the propellant if the weather had been cold.
MR. LUND: There were no full scale motors fired below 40.
DR. WALKER: But what I am asking is did you as the supplier of the system to the govern-
ment have a specification on the O-ring temperature, _r could the O-ring temperature have been
anything?
MR. LUND: I don't believe there is a
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specification on the O-ring temperature other than the material itself.
DR. WALKER: And what is that specification?
MR. LUND: Well. it is a specification that says the material can withstand these kinds of
environments.
DR. WALKER: But it doesn't specify the operational aspect, does it?
MR. LUND: To my knowledge, no.
DR. WALKER: In fact, the Milspec says specifically that the O-rings should be qualified for
whatever uses they are put to.
So did you take any steps to do that, that is, qualify the range of temperatures over which
these O-rings were to be used?
MR. LUND: Yes. The development motors were fired from 40 to 84, and the qualification
motors from 45 to 83.
DR. WALKER: So then 40 degrees was the temperature limit for the O-ring?
MR. LUND: In the full scale qual program, that is correct.
DR. WALKER: So when it was predicted that the temperature of the O-ring at launch of 51-
L was going to be 29 degrees, the O-ring was outside of the
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qualification temperatures by some 10 degrees.
MR. LUND: That is correct.
DR, WALKER: Then how could you make a recommendation to launch if you were 10 de-
grees outside of your qualification?
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MR.LUND:Our original recommendation,of course,wasnot to launch.
DR.WALKER:Well. I understand_hat,butyour final recommendationwasto launch.
MR.LUND:Okay.Whatweneedto do,then,isgothroughthat rationale.
DR.WALKER:Soyou r_regoingto answermy questionthen at the endof this discussion,
hopefully?
MR.LUND:If youwantmeto gothroughit now,I wouldbegladto dothat.
CHAIRMANROGERS: Well, I think we have heard what explanation you have given. I
think the problem we are having, it is not convincing. I mean, let me, if you don't mind, I
assume you have great confidence in your engineers Boisjoly and Thompsor: and the others, and
they are probably as well qualified as anybody in the country in dealing with these problems of
O-rings ar.d seals and so forth, is that right?
MR. LUND: Yes.
CItAIRMAN ROGERS: And you had a long
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discussion in the telecon, and you decided, all of you, I understand, all of you decided that for
sat_ty reasons you would oppose the launch. And thereafter, NASA, in one way or another,
made it clear that they were displeased with that recommendation, and I assume that you knew
when you made the recommendation that your recommendation in fact was going to determine
whether that Shuttle would be launched or not because NASA had indicated to you that they
would not fly unless they had a written report from Thiokol saying you approved the launch.
MR. LUND: I didn't know NASA would accept that.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: You didn't know that?
MR. LUND: No.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, you must have known your recommendation was very impor-
tant. You knew that if you voted against the launch it would not have been launched, didn't
you?
MR. LUND: Well, we had voted prior to it, and they didn't accept it, so I couldn't forecast
what NASA would do.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But you knew that that was the reason they asked you to reconsid-
er. That is why you had the five minute recess, didn't you?
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MR. LUND: That's a fair statement, yes.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Now, knowing that, and knowing that the safety of the crew was
involved, and knowing your own people, the engineers that you respected, were still against the
launch, what was it that occurred in your mind that satisfied you to say okay, let's take a
chance?
MR. LUND: Well, I didn't say take a chance because I felt that there was some rationale
that allowed us to go ahead.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: T'ell, maybe that isn't fair. Then what was it that occurred in your
mind that caused you to be willing to change your mind?
MR. LUND: I guess one of the big things was that we really didn't know whether tempera-
ture was the driver or not. We couldn't tell. We had hot motors that blew by and cold motors
that blew by, and some very near either end that did not. The data was inconclusive, and so I
had trouble justif_cing in my own mind and saying, by golly, temperature is a factor.
Second
DR. WALKER: May I interrupt for just a moment?
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Mr. Boisjoly has said that the thing which was compelling to him was that the blow-by on
the coldest
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motor was much more severe. He has emphasized how black was the blow-by and how large an
angle over which it occurr._.d.
MR. LUND: But three or four degrees above that was zero.
DR. WALKER: So his discussion was not convincing to you'?
MR. LUND: Well, it wasn't ._,tally convincing because in two ,)r three degrees it went from
very, very bad to no problem, no blow-by.
MR. FEYNMAN: There were many seals that didn't have any problem, and so it is obvious-
ly a random effect. It depends upon whether or not you get a blow hole or you don't get a blow
hole. So if within a particular flight it happens that all six seals don't get a blow hole, that's no
information. The fact that--as far as I can understand this, it doesn't mean you are suddenly
good because it worked and the next time when one goes off it's suddenly bad. It seems to me
that it has to be understood as a probabilistic and confusing, complicated situation.
So you could never decide they are all going to break or they are all not going to break it's
not the wonderful one-horse shay, and when you look at it that way, it is a question of increas-
ing and decreasing probabilities that we have to consider rather than did it work or didn't it
work.
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And I would like you to explain it to me from that point of view.
MR. LUND: Well, the question still is, is temperature the thing that caused the SRM-15
effect?
MR. FEYNMAN: You have heard your engineers argue that there was an effect of tempera-
ture which looked like it made things worse. Is it not inconceivable that there is something else
that sometimes produces blow-by, that there is more than one effect, and that temperature could
still be an important effect and increase the probability in spite of the fact that at a high tem-
perature it gets worse?
Is there any evidence that temperature is not an important matter just because at some
high temperature you have an accident?
MR. LUND: Well, there is, as you point out, there are many variables in the thing, and it
wasn't clear that temperature was the effect.
MR. FEYNMAN: But logically, from the point of view of the engineers, they were explain-
ing why the temperature would have an effect, and when you don't have any data, you have to
use reason, and they were giving re_0sons.
MR. LUND: That's right, and that is what we did as we included in our rationale the fact
that sure
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enough, the temperature could be an effect.
Okay, it wasn't clear, but we said we will consider that to be so.
MR. RUMMEL: I have great difficulty with this. In the usual practice, when there is any
real doubt about flight safety, whether it is aircraft or whatever, you simply don't fly, and it
seems to me this is the reverse, and I just have great difficulty understanding the question that
has been asked before, that is, understanding any answer. I just haven't heard it as to why, if
there is doubt in your mind, why you went ahead, why you changed your mind. I just don't
understand it, and I would appreciate very much if y_l could explain that.
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CHAIRMANROGERS: Ma)be we ought to go to Mr. Kilminster. if you don't mind. He
signed the Telefax, and we have asked Mr. Lund a lot of questions, and I think maybe in fair-
ness to Mr. Lund, Mr. Kilminster, could you attempt to explain to the Commission why--I guess
you ch;mged )'our mind, too, didn't you':
MR. KILMINSTER: Yes, sir, based upon the discussion that we had and the rationale that
was developed.
CFIAIRMAN ROGERS: How can you say you changed
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your mind when you say temperature and data not conclusive oa predicting primary O-ring
blow-by?
Did yoa have a feeling that you had to prove that it was--that the burden of proof was on
you to show that it wasn't safe?
MR. KILMINSTER: No. I think we were asked to relook at the data, which we did.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Could you tell me what d_ta it was that you looked at that was dif-
ferent from the data you had looked at first?
MR. KILMINSTER: There was one piece of data that we looked at which has been discussed
before, and that was the erosion parameter, and the factor of three, but my evaluation was--
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Is that the only new piece of data?
MR. KILMINSTER: That is really the only new piece of data that we had not previously
discussed on the telephone, but I think that the data that we did show, the fact that we had
subscale tests at 30 degrees showing no blow-by was an indicator. We, as Mr. Lund pointed out,
had other flight motors at temperatures between the two in question, that is, 75 degrees and 53
degrees O-ring temperatures that had shown no blow-by, and we had static test motors at tem-
peratures lower than
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53 degrees that had no blow-by.
Now, I would like to discuss that just a moment.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Could you particularly, though, point out the new data be.cause the
purpose, as we understand it, for the recess was to find out if there was any new data, or were
you just asked to change your mind based upon the data you had?
MR. KILMINSTER: I had one piece of data that was new in our discussion was that if we
did have blow-by past the primary O-ring, as it was being positioned to seal, and recognizing the
fact that the cold temperatures could cause that timing function to extend, then we had an op-
portunity perhaps ot having some erosion occur. We looked at the erosion that had occurred on
51-C, and compared that to the data that we had developed, both from cold hydraulic oil testing
and from hot subscale testing, that indicated that _hat very flight had a safety factor of three
over what would have to have happened in order to get to an area of questionable sealing capa-
bility.
With that information in mind, then, and also the fact that we had had some analytical
work done earlier to develop the limiting erosion parameters on O-rings, led me to believe that
we were in the condition
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of having a safe position for recommendin_ a flight.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Excuse me. How come that data wasn't available the first time?
How did it happen to show up at the recess?
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MR. KILMINSTER: Well, it was just a matter of a discussion that we had while we had the
recess. When we said that well, if indeed the temperature is going to cause a longer time tbr the
primary O-ring to function, and there is the possibility of additional erosion, then where do we
stand relative to 51-C, and how much more margin did that exhibit?
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: So you really had the data there before?
MR. KILMINSTER: Yes.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: You hadn't analyzed it. In other words, it was not new data. It was
data that you hadn't properly analyzed, is that right?
MR. KILMINSTER: It was data that we hadn't prepared or discussed on the earlier telecon
or the earlier portion of the telecon.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And that was th rough an oversight?
MR. KILM!NSTER: Well, I don't know if it was oversight or just another piece of data that
we were searching for in order to establish our position.
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DR. RIDE: You are saying that you had a safety factor of three over the 51-C erosion prob-
lem. How were you attempting to analyze how the timing function would change and how much
erosion that could possibly give you on 51-L?
MR. KILMINSTER: Only on a subjective basis that if, as has been stated, the timing func-
tion under cold condition was to extend, and if what was observed under 51-C, not only the blow-
by but the erosion, were combined, then we developed the rationale about that safety factor of
three.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Kilminster, did you have any feeling of pressure being put on
you by NASA, or were you just calmly reassessing?
MR. KILMINSTER: I felt that the pressure that was put on us was to go back and look at
the data, look at the detailed information that had been presented to see if there was something
that we were seeing that we were not representing on the phone.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: You didn't feel they were trying to get you to change your mind?
MR. KILMINSTER: I did not feel a significant amount of pressure in that regard.
MR. ACHESON: Mr. Kihninster, have you had an opportunity to look at the correspondence
of Mr.
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Boisjoly written in the summer and autumn of 1985?
MR. KILMINSTER: No, I have not.
DR. WALKER: Mr. Boisjoly's memo to you of 31 July, you received that and read it, I pre-
sume.
MR. LUND: Yes, and we took immediate action on that and _tablished the O-ring task
team within a week or so of that memo.
DR. WALKER: Did you pass along Mr. Boisjoly's concerns to anyone at NASA?
MR. LUND: The normal process of that sort of information is through the project office ai_d
Mr. McDonald and so on were on that. That would be their task.
DR. WALKER: Well, then, you are saying that it would have been Mr. McDonald's responsi-
bility to alert NASA that a key engineer thought a catastrophe was possible?
MR. LUND: I think NASA understood that clearly, and we have been working with them
since that time on this whole problem.
DR. WALKER: I am not asking that. I am asking whether as a result of Mr. Boisjoly's
memo to you, you or Mr. McDonald or anyone else at Thiokol alerted NASA to the concerns of
this key engineer.
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MR. LUND: ! did not call anyone at NASA
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specifically but I saw that they were alerted because of their immediate response in working
with us.
DR. WALKER: But are you aware of their having heard that a potential catastrophe was
possible?
MR. LUND: I am not aware.
DR. COVERT: Mr. Kilminster, I would like to ask a couple of questions about the tempera-
ture, if [ may, a sequence of questions.
You say that on this 40 to 90 degree launch or certification criteria, is this a cold soak, or is
this some other kind of a temperature?
MR. KILMINSTER: The 40 to 90 degrees is a mean bulk temperature of the propellant,
which means to me that we could have a motor where the propellant grain was soaked out to 40
degrees, or conversely, propellant grain was soaked out to 90 degrees.
DR. COVERT: What is the time constant on this case plus insulator and so forth to get to an
equilibrium bulk temperature?
MR. KILMINSTER: _¢_- ran some calculations based upon equilibrium at the Cape, and I
believe it is about 30 days.
DR. COVERT: So that it is possible to be exposed to a cold temperature and have sharp
temperature gradients within the propellant or the insulator and so
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part of it would be at a temperature far outside of what you think would be appropriate and the
rest of it would still be warmer, shall we say?
MR. KILMINSTER: Yes, but I think that is limited by the other requirement which was
spelled out in the Level II document that said 31 degrees to 99 degrees,
DR. COVERT: Is it possible that some of it could be at 26 degrees and other at 55 degrees,
considering again a 21 to 30 day transient to get to the bulk temperature?
MR. KILMINSTER: That is not the way that I would read the combined two specifications
or two requirements.
DR. COVERT: Is it possible that there is a difference between the behavior of the subscale
motors at some temperature and the behavior of the large motors at the same temperature if
one was in thermal equilibrium and the other was in some sort of a nonuniform temperature
distribution?
MR. KILMINSTER: Yes, I would expect there could be some differences.
DR. COVERT: So there may be some doubt in your mind as to how exactly to apply the
subscale motor data within the framework of the large scale motor if
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you allow for the temperature transient?
MR. KILMINSTER: Yes, sir.
DR. COVERT: Thank you..
MR. ACHESON: I have a question for Mr. Lund or Mr. Russell.
When I was talking with you a few days ago at your plant, I think I am correct in recalling
that one of you told me that if the temperature at the Cape on the day of launch had been in
the 9 to 10 degrees above zero Fahrenheit range, there would be no question but that you would
have stuck to a no-launch position.
Am i right in that recollection'?
820
MR. LUND: That s right. There's many. many things in the motor then that we would be
concerned about.
MR. ACHESON: So )ou did recognize that temperature was a discriminator in an absolute
sense. The only question was what the margin was.
MR. LUND: That's right.
MR. ACHESON: Below 53 degrees, is that correct?
MR. LUND: Yes.
MR. ACHESON: Were you acquainted at all with this correspondence which I assume you
have had a chance to read, of Mr. Boisjoly, written in the summer and autumn of '85? It seems
to say that management does not
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have an adequately heightened sense of the urgency of the work to be. done on the O-ring orob-
lem, the seal problem.
My question is were you aware of that feeling on his part at the time? Did it cause you
concern? And what if anything did you do about it?
MR. LUND: I didn't meet with Mr. Boisjoly, I met with Don Ketner, who is the task team
leader. He made recomr.,endations to us, and I think we followed those recommendations, and
did everything we could to help him with them.
Now, undoubtedly there are things that were bugging them that they didn't bring to my
attention, that I didn't do anything about because I didn't know about them, but when they
came, and Don Ketner, particularly, we worked very hard with him to try and establish and
take corrective action as needed.
MR. ACHESON: Thank you.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: I am sure that all of you and everybody associated with
the Shuttle knew that it was NASA's intention to fly on a very rapid time schedule throughout
the year, or build up to the point of that, and that they would have to launch on winter morn-
ings and at other times.
In the process of evaluating the information
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brought to you, did you at any time suggest to NASA that the launch commit criteria, the LCCs
or other rules, may be insufficiently constraining, and that you ought to establish rules with
respect to the SRM that kept you, one, either within your experience base, your qual test, or
your extrapolations?
MR. LUND: We did not. Mr. McDonald evidently had some discussions with them along that
line.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Thank you.
MR. ACHESON: Mr. Russell, I have a question for Mr. Russell.
Perhaps you would give us your recollection of the thought process followed in your mind in
the change of position between the view presented in the telecon that Thiokol was opposed to a
launch, and _he subsequent conclusion of the caucus within the company.
MR. RUSSELL: I was part of the overall day's efforts that started off pretty early as has
been mentioned, and as the day developed, pretty much agreed with the recommendations, and
as our presentation was made on the charts, the subsequent e',swers that came back, you have
asked others if they felt pressure and undue pre_ure, and I felt some pressure with some of the
comments. I thought our rationale was reasonable. I aaw seen many instances in the past
where we have
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used previous limit_ ['or data on putty that I am famihar with and other raw materials, tbr ex-
ample, that we do not exceed our experience base in the usage of these materials. And so I felt
that this was the proper thing to do, albeit our 53 degree experience, as has been mentioned,
wasn't desirable, bu: we had deemed it acceptable at that time.
And the _tatements that seemed to me to put pressure or at least to make me feel the pres-
sure were the responses of being appalled at our recommendations, the responses of when we
_hould launch, how long do we have to wait, April? And also there was argument about what
sort of rationale we could have for 53 degrees, and Mr. Armstrong made the point that what
temperature could we make a strong statement on? And the data couldn't tell us which temper-
ature other than 53 degrees, which had been our previously most successful low temperature.
And so I felt some pressure based upon those comments.
I would like to add that my feeling as I believe it was Mr. Mulloy--and this is, again, by
voice recognition, but after we had made our recommendation initially, he talked for about five
minutes and explained in his mind why the data really didn't add up to the conclusions that we
had made. And
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I will have to admit at that time that it was a very logical presentation that he had made, and
then there was talk back and forth as _o what the data really meant, and ,as has been mentioned
here, in the caucus there weren't any new data brought up that I recognized. We pretty much
talked over the same t:_pes of things, and my feeling of it was that what some of us were under-
standing and what others were understanding and feeling important didn't really agree.
I didn't make--I think I can only recall making one comment in the caucus. I can't even
remember what that was, and it was very bri.ef, and I don't think it made a big impact at all.
And the reason that I didn't make so many comments, despite what I felt, was that Roger and
Arnie were making the points to the best they could, and I couldn't see a way of making them
any better.
So we got to a point in the caucus where Mr. Mason said, and rightfully so, we are covering
the same information, we are not talking about anything new here, and it's time for a decision.
And I maybe tend in my position to feel more pressure. I know these other gentlemen have
many pressures from all sides, and I can't really speak for them, but I felt pressure that we
were--and I don't
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know if Roger was referring to me in his testimony, but he could have been because I had the
feeling that we were---that it was a distinct feeling that we were in the position of having to
prove that it was unsafe instead of the other way around, which was a totally new experience.
And I believe I made that statement afterward. I know I did when I went home and talked about
it with my wife.
But here again, I think it's impossible for me to say what might have swung the decision.
But I felt in my mind that once we had done our very best to explain why we were concerned,
and we meaning those in the camp who really felt strongly about the recommendation of 53
degrees, the decision was to be made, and a poll was then taken. And I remember distinctly at
the time whether I would have the courage, if asked, and I thought I might be, what I would do
and whether I would be alone. 1 didn't think I would be alone, but I was wondering if I would
have the courage, I remember thet distinctly, to stand up and say no.
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However, we were not asked as the engineering people. It was a management decisio:_ at the
vice president's level, and they had heard all that they could hear, and [ felt there was nothing
more to say, that we could change anything, and also felt in my mind
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that [ didn't see--and [ believe I mentioned this to you las_ week--that I didn't see a dangerous
concern. I knew we were entering into increased risk. and [ didn't feel comfortable doing that.
I was nervous. You asked how I slept that night, and I said I thought I slept okay, and my
wife differed with that as I talked with her after that. But there was a nervousness there that
we were increasing the risk, and I believe all of us knew that if it v-ere increased to the level of
an O-ring burnthrough, what the consequences would be. And I don't think there's any question
in anyone's mind about that.
I don't know if I've answered the question. I guess your original question was what I
thought was in the thought process, but that was what was in my thoughts.
MR. ACHESON: Thank vou very much.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you very much.
Just one other question and I think we would like to adjourn for the day.
Did either of you gentlemen, Mr. Kilminster or Mr. Lund, have any pressures, outside pres-
sures? Did anybody call you or anybody suggest that you should vote to launch? Is there any-
thing of that kind that the Commission should know about?
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MR. KILMINSTER: No, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you very much.
We will adjourn for the day.
(Whereupon, at 4:25 p.m., the Commission recessed, to reconvene Wednesday, February 26,
1986.)
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